State News : Alabama

NWCDN is a network of law firms dedicated to protecting employers in workers’ compensation claims.


NWCDN Members regularly post articles and summary judgements in workers’ compensations law in your state.  


Select a state from the dropdown menu below to scroll through the state specific archives for updates and opinions on various workers’ compensation laws in your state.


Contact information for NWCDN members is also located on the state specific links in the event you have additional questions or your company is seeking a workers’ compensation lawyer in your state.


Alabama

FISH NELSON & HOLDEN, LLC

  205-822-6611

In Alabama, for an accident to be compensable, it must both arise out of and occur in the course of the employment. Unlike many states that employ a one part “but for” causation test (but for being at work, the accident would not have happened), Alabama’s test is two parts and both parts must be satisfied.

 

In the Course of

 

The “in the course of” part of causation test is typically easy to prove because it has to do with time and place.  If the accident occurred at work, then it will most likely be considered in the course of the employment. 

 

Arising Out of

 

The “arising out of” part of the test can be trickier to prove.  For this part of the test to be satisfied, the employee must be able to demonstrate a causal nexus between the job and the injury.  Another way to put it is that the employee would need to be able to prove that the accident occurred because he/she was placed at increased risk of it occurring because of the job.  This is why unexplained falls are not compensable in Alabama.  If the employee cannot prove what caused or contributed to the fall, then he/she cannot satisfy his/her burden of proving that it arose out of the employment.

 

Horseplay

 

When it comes to an accident and resulting injury being caused by employee misconduct such as horseplay, Alabama courts have generally held that indemnity benefits are not owed to the injured employee. 

 

In Walden v. Glaze & Son, the Court found that an employee who instigated or participated in horseplay from which an injury occurs is not entitled to compensation for the injury.  616 So. 2d 357 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992).  In Walden, the Court found that the worker was engaged in horseplay at the time of the injury because he was wrestling in a playful manner.

 

There may be situations where horseplay is determined to be compensable.  Examples of such situations include:

 

1.       If the injured employee was innocently injured through the horseplay of another employee(s).         

2.       If management was a willing participant or encouraged the horseplay.

3.       If management knew about the horseplay and allowed or otherwise implicitly consented to such conduct continuing.

Prevention

 

While it may sound like common sense, it is wise to have safety rules in place against horseplay.  Those rules should state that they are in place for the safety of all employees.  Safety training for employees and management should include instruction on horseplay prevention and it should be included in signage on the employer’s premises in large letters to demonstrate the importance of the rule.  Finally, any such behavior should never be ignored or overlooked.  Enforcement of the rule is every bit as important as having the rule in the first place.

 

Dual Benefit

 

While horseplay is a complete defense to workers’ compensation benefits, having a safety rule against such conduct that is communicated and uniformly enforced has the dual benefit of giving the employer a statutory safety rule violation defense.  Although it is only a defense to the payment of indemnity benefits, it does not hurt to have that to fall back on if the trial judge does not agree that the employee’s conduct rose to the level horseplay.

 

About the Author:    


This article was prepared by Mike Fish, an attorney with Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers and funds, and third-party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Fish by e-mailing him at mfish@fishnelson.com or by calling him directly at 205-332-1448.

On June 3, 2025, Goodyear will celebrate 100 years of soaring over America’s favorite sporting events. Approximately 3.5 years after Goodyear blimps first began flying across the country, the company announced that it would build a tire manufacturing plant in the moderately sized city of Gadsden, Alabama. It would be the first such plant in the South. Gadsden had nudged out a bevy of other suitors such as Atlanta due to its central location, abundant natural resources, and a readily available workforce. The Gadsden plant opened in July of 1929, with a ceremony and dedication. Although the community was happy to cut the ribbon and start making tires, the real excitement came with the news that one of the Goodyear blimps would soon be paying a visit. In December of the following year, the Goodyear airship “Defender” traveled from Nashville to Gadsden. During the trip, the blimp became lighter due to expended fuel and sandbags that were dropped to help navigate in the face of a strong headwind. When several Gadsden plant employees attempted to secure the blimp by grabbing the ropes hanging from the blimp, a gust of wind caused Defender to unexpectedly lunge upwards. All but two employees dropped their rope. One of the two remaining rope holders let go at approximately 25 feet and sustained a back injury from the ensuing fall. Unfortunately, the other man did not drop his rope when he had the chance. As the airship climbed higher, the pilot tried to maneuver the ship over the Coosa River to offer the man a softer landing. Unfortunately, the man ran out of grip strength before the blimp was over the river. After holding on for close to 10 minutes, Iken Douglas Phillips plummeted 150 feet to his death. In one disastrous incident, the Gadsden plant had incurred two of its first Alabama workers’ compensation claims.

My Two Cents:

In the last two years, there has been a concerted effort by a few Alabama plaintiffs’ attorneys to have the entire Alabama WC Act declared unconstitutional. One of the challenges recently made it to the Alabama Supreme Court. Fortunately, the Act survived that round. Had Alabama’s high court agreed with the plaintiff’s position, it would have eradicated more than 100 years of the Grand Bargain which offers indemnity and medical benefits through no fault insurance in exchange for said benefits being the exclusive remedy against the employer.

So, what would have happened to the injured Goodyear employee and what recourse would the deceased employee’s dependents have had without the Alabama WC Act to provide no fault benefits? The answer is that they would have had to prove that Goodyear or perhaps the blimp pilot breached a duty of care and, said breach, caused the accident. Even if they were able to prove negligence or even wantonness against one or more of the defendants, the defendants would have asserted that the employees were contributorily negligent and/or assumed the risk by not letting go of the rope like their co-employees. Let’s not also forget that the stock market crash leading to the Great Depression had occurred a few months after the plant opened and Goodyear had become THE EMPLOYER of Etowah County. The reality was that no juror was going to bite the proverbial hand that was feeding the community. That means the employee and the dependents would have been on their own without any recourse, benefits, or financial assistance to help them.

A Few More Cents:

In the last 105 years, the Alabama WC Act has grown from a meager 33 pages to more than 450 pages. Despite the many statutory additions, changes, and court interpretations, the Grand Bargain remains in effect. The recent constitutional challenges have been unsuccessful to date, but they are occurring more often and with new and inventive arguments. Unless updates are made to some of the more obviously outdated provisions, we can expect the challenges to keep coming. As they say, even a blind squirrel sometimes finds a nut. This nut will send Alabama into the pre-Grand Bargain work accident dark ages.

More Info:

If you are looking for more information about the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act or the recent constitutional challenges, check out the Alabama Workers’ Comp Blawg at https://www.alabamaworkerscompblawg.com.

About the Author:

This article was prepared by Mike Fish, an attorney with Fish Nelson amp; Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers, and third-party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Fish by e-mailing him at mfish@fishnelson.com or by calling him directly at 205-332-1448.

On December 6, 2024, the Alabama Supreme Court released its opinion in the case of Crenshaw v. Sonic Drive in of Greenville wherein it refused to find the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act unconstitutional. At the trial court level, a plaintiff, as the father of a minor employee, sued the minor’s employer for negligence as the result of an injury he sustained on the job. The employer quickly asserted the Alabama Exclusivity Doctrine which serves to protect employers from such lawsuits in exchange for providing no fault workers’ compensation benefits. The trial judge dismissed the lawsuit despite the plaintiff’s claim that the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act was unconstitutional for a number of reasons. The focus of the plaintiff’s constitutional challenge was that the WC Act does not contain a mutual elective option. The plaintiff argued that, while employers can opt out of WC coverage, employees do not have that option. Both employers and employees had the right to opt out until the 1973 amendments at which time rights to both were extinguished. Then, the employers’ right to opt out was restored in the 1992 amendments. It was undisputed that the employees’ right to opt out was never restored. However, the Court of Appeals held that the legislature properly acted within its police power when it passed legislation that resulted in the unequal opt out right.

                                        

My Two Cents: You may be asking yourself, “self, what is this police power that the court relied on to allow for a WC Act that is undisputedly not mutually elective”? Good question! The answer is that a legislature exercises its police power if it enacts legislation that is designed to eradicate or ameliorate a perceived social evil.

                          

You may now be asking yourself, “self, what the heck does that have to do with the above constitutional challenge?” Another good question! To answer that, you must go back in time over 100 years to observe the conditions presented by the industrial revolution in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Safety could not keep pace with growth and a sharp increase in workplace injuries was the unfortunate result. Injured employees who could not work had no means of support for themselves or their families. They had no means of paying for medical treatment. Their only recourse was to sue the employer and attempt to prove liability and damages. The social insurance we now know as workers’ compensation was designed to provide no fault indemnity and medical benefits. In exchange for providing these benefits, employees gave up the right to sue employers in tort. This is commonly referred to as the Grand Bargain. While there have been numerous amendments to the Alabama WC Act over the years, the Grand Bargain remains fundamentally intact.

                           

The reality is that no Alabama high court is going to find the Alabama WC Act unconstitutional as currently drafted because it would adversely affect current and future injured employees, it would terminate all benefits for previously injured employees, and it would effectively terminate the employment of countless people working in the Alabama WC industry. When you consider all of that, is there any question that Alabama’s WC Act was designed to eradicate or ameliorate a perceived social evil? You will have to answer that one for yourself.

                      

This blog submission was prepared by Mike Fish, an attorney with Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers, and third-party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this submission or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Fish by e-mailing him at mfish@fishnelson.com or by calling him directly at 205-332-1448.

On September 20, 2024, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals released its opinion in the case Zackery v. Huntley wherein it reversed both the District Court and the Circuit Court’s judgment in favor of plaintiff that awarded workers’ compensation benefits. The appellate Court’s decision to reverse the WC judgments was due to the plaintiff initially and improperly filing the WC lawsuit in District Court. The Circuit Court was only involved because the employer appealed the final judgment to the Circuit Court for a de novo review. In Alabama, Circuit Courts have original jurisdiction in workers’ compensation cases. Since plaintiff originally filed the WC matter in District Court, the Circuit Court did not properly obtain jurisdiction since it was only involved in its capacity as an appellate court.

                  

My Two Cents: In may types of civil matters, a lawsuit can be filed in the District Court if the amount in controversy is $20k or less. Reasons for filing in District Court include a cheaper filing fee, less formality, and a quicker path to a bench trial. Any District Court judgment can be appealed to the next level which is the Circuit Court. The Circuit Court judge handles the appeal de novo which is Latin for anew or from the beginning. Basically, that means the judge is not supposed to consider the prior judgment and basically wipe the slate clean.

                  

This blog submission was prepared by Mike Fish, an attorney with Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers, and third-party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this submission or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Fish by e-mailing him at mfish@fishnelson.com or by calling him directly at 205-332-1448.

On September 20, 2024, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals released its opinion in the case of Alabama Home Builders Self Insurance Fund, Inc. v. Tumlin wherein it reversed the trial court’s order that denied a self-insurance fund’s motion to reopen a case so that its lien for benefits paid could be addressed after the wrongful death case between a decedent’s spouse and her late husband’s employer settled. The trial court did not rule on the fund’s motion to intervene during the pendency of the lawsuit and then denied the motion to reopen based on the 2-year statute of limitations (SOL). Specifically, it was the trial court’s opinion that the SOL began to run on the date the plaintiff’s late spouse died. In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals noted that since the employer was only seeking reimbursement for indemnity benefits, the SOL did not begin to run until the settlement proceeds were paid to the plaintiff. Since the settlement funds were paid to resolve a wrongful death lawsuit, they were classified as punitive damages which is the only type of damage recoverable for wrongful death in Alabama. As such, the entirety of the settlement funds was subject to the subrogation lien.

                  

My Two Cents:   Alabama Code § 25-5-11(b) is the right to reimbursement/subrogation statute referenced above. Although it amounts to a super lien for indemnity benefits (much like child support), it is only a common law subrogation statute when it comes to medical benefits. This means the employer’s right to subrogation of medical expenses only attaches to that portion of the settlement funds or judgment that is allocated to the reimbursement/payment of medical expenses. As you can imagine, the amount that is or should be allocated for that purpose is often a matter for debate and sometimes litigation. If the parties cannot work it out amongst themselves, the Court of Appeals adopted a formula to assist the parties and judge in 2005 in Miller and Miller Const. Co. v. Madewell.

                    

This blog submission was prepared by Mike Fish, an attorney with Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers, and third-party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this submission or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Fish by e-mailing him at mfish@fishnelson.com or by calling him directly at 205-332-1448.

On August 30, 2024, the Alabama Supreme Court released its opinion in the case of Leader v. Pablo wherein it reversed a bench trial judgment awarding punitive damages in the amount of $3M to a surviving spouse in a § 25-5-11(b) willful conduct/safety removal lawsuit against two co-employees. In support of the reversal, the Court noted that the plaintiff did not prove that the either co-employee willfully and intentionally removed a safety device by (1) failing to electronically interlock a security gate to a limit switch or (2) instructing employer to disregard available safety devices.

                

My Two Cents: Although the spouse sued the defendants for willful conduct pursuant to Alabama Code § 25-5-11(b), the only recoverable damages were punitive Alabama’s Wrongful Death Statute (§ 6-5-410). Unlike compensatory damages where the idea is to compensate or reimburse in an effort to make whole, punitive damages are designed to punish the wrongdoer and deter others from engaging in similar conduct.

              

This blog submission was prepared by Mike Fish, an attorney with Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers, and third-party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this submission or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Fish by e-mailing him at mfish@fishnelson.com or by calling him directly at 205-332-1448.

On August 16, 2024, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals released its opinion in Victoryland v. Patricia Dianne Arnold wherein it addressed the Successive Compensable Injury Test.  Specifically, it affirmed the trial Court’s judgment that a subsequent motor vehicle accident that exacerbated the Employee’s compensable low back injury did not qualify as the type of intervening event that would relieve the Employer from its responsibility to provide medical benefits. 


The trial Court considered the Employer’s motion for relief from future responsibility based on an MVA that occurred approximately 9 years after the Court approved a workers’ compensation settlement concerning the low back which left medical benefits open. It also considered evidence that the Employee was deciding whether to proceed with a third low back surgery at the time she was involved in the MVA. The Employee testified that the accident resulted in exacerbated low back pain that radiated down into both legs.


The Employee took a position in the MVA lawsuit that her low back condition was exacerbated as a result of that accident. In the Workers’ Compensation matter, the Employee took the position that, despite the exacerbation, her Employer should remain on the hook for medical benefits. The trial Court denied the Employer’s motion for relief and so it appealed the decision.


On appeal, the Court of Appeals did not agree with the Employer’s position that the Employee was judicially estopped from taking inconsistent positions in the workers’ compensation case and the MVA case. Specifically, it was the Employer’s position that since the Employee alleged a permanent exacerbation of her low back as a result of the MVA in one proceeding that she could not also assert that an intervening event that severed the chain of causation had not taken place in another proceeding. The Court disagreed with the Employer’s position by stating that the positions, while inconsistent, were not so inconsistent as to warrant applying the Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel.


The Court also considered the Employer’s position that an MVA is not the type of routine event or “customary activity” that would allow the Employee to connect her current need for medical benefits to the original workers’ compensation claim under the Successive Compensable Injury Test (a test which states generally that employer is not relieved of responsibility when it is established that the later injury is the direct and natural result of the compensable work injury).   


The Court noted that an MVA is an unusual traumatic event and pointed out that case law cited in the briefs did not address whether such events should be treated as intervening causes. The Court expanded its research beyond the cases cited by the parties to consider a case specifically involving an MVA wherein the Plaintiff filed a petition seeking an order compelling medical treatment after the Defendant denied treatment following the accident. In that case, the trial Court denied the Plaintiff’s motion and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed that decision. 


Although it did not state as much, the Court applied what amounted to a reverse eggshell doctrine theory.  The “eggshell doctrine” states that you take the plaintiff as you find him or her, for purposes of determining damages.  It provides that plaintiffs who are far more susceptible to a particular harm than the average person may nonetheless recover their full damages without reduction. So applying the eggshell doctrine in the MVA case allowed the employee to maximize her recovery against the third party driver.  In the Victoryland opinion, however, the Court relied on a reverse application because it found the Employee was more susceptible to a particular harm (aggravation to the compensable low back) than the average person.  So, in the liability case, her eggshell condition put responsibility for the increased damage on the liable 3rd party and, in the workers’ compensation case, that same condition put the responsibility on the Employer. 


My Two Cents: While the Court did not say as much, this type of situation really comes down to the specific facts of a case. The seriousness of the pre-existing condition versus the seriousness of the “unusual traumatic event.” Other factors to consider would be whether or not the injured Employee was actually acting in a routine and customary manner at the time of the accident. In the Victoryland case, it was noted that the Employee was driving her two grandchildren and so she was not likely to have been driving in a unsafe or erratic manner. However, in situations where the driver was driving in an unsafe manner, that could certainly be used in support of a motion for relief from future liability of medical benefits. 


A Few More Cents: Of note, the Employer formerly asserted its subrogation rights in the MVA case. The Employer continued to pay for the low back injury medical treatment and, when the Employee recovered from the other driver in the motor vehicle accident case, the Employer received $46,950.81 in satisfaction of its subrogation lien. The lesson to be learned here is that the right to a subrogation recovery and the statutory right to reimbursement can extend to any event involving third-party liability that increases the amount or duration of medical benefits in your workers’ compensation case. 


About the Author


This blog submission was prepared by Mike Fish, an attorney with Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers, and third-party administrators in all matters related to workers' compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers' Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this submission or Alabama workers' compensation in general, please contact Fish by e-mailing him at mfish@fishnelson.com or by calling him directly at 205-332-1448.


As of July 1, 2024, the maximum workers’ compensation payable is increased to $1,130.00 per week and the minimum is increased to $311.00 per week. The memorandum regarding the new minimum and maximum rates issued by the Director of the Alabama Department of Labor Workers’ Compensation Division, Steve Garrett, can be accessed at https://labor.alabama.gov/docs/guides/wc_weeklywage.pdf.

About the Author

 

This blog submission was prepared by Mike Fish, an attorney with Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers, and third-party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this submission or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Fish by e-mailing him at mfish@fishnelson.com or by calling him directly at 205-332-1448.

In Alabama, all disputed workers’ compensation claims are handled through the regular court system. Alabama is the only remaining state to handle disputed claims in this manner. The statute of limitations (“SOL”) for filing a workers’ compensation lawsuit is 2 years from the date of injury or date of last indemnity payment. For cumulative trauma or exposure claims, it is 2 years from the date of last exposure. One exception to the 2-year SOL is if the claimed injury was latent and could not reasonably have been discovered until a later date.

In the recently released opinion of Dillard v. Calvary Assembly of God, the Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed and clarified that a latent injury exception to the SOL is not applicable to situations where a reasonably minded employee knows they have a compensable injury even when there has been no lost time from work. Further, an injury will not be considered latent based on the employee not knowing the full extent of the injury. In Dillard, the employee testified that he had frequent low back pain. Despite being off work following each of his two back surgeries, he never claimed and did not receive temporary-total-disability benefits. As a result, the trial court concluded that a reasonable person would have known the nature, seriousness, and probable compensable nature of the work-related injury as of the date the first surgery was recommended as a possible treatment option.

About the Author:

This blog submission was prepared by Karen Cleveland, an attorney with Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers, and third-party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this submission or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Cleveland by e-mailing her at kcleveland@fishnelson.com or by calling her directly at 205-332-1599.

On May 19, 2023, the Alabama Supreme Court release its opinion in Ex parte Midsouth Paving, Inc. wherein it reversed the trial court’s denial of summary judgment on the issue of whether the roadside paving company where the temporary employee was assigned was afforded the protections of the exclusivity doctrine as a special employer. The trial court declined to grant summary judgment because the employee was never made aware that he was a special employee. In reversing the court’s decision, the Alabama Supreme Court rationalized that the mindset of an employee is of little consequence when determining whether a special employer/employee relationship exists.


About the Author

This blog submission was prepared by Mike Fish, an attorney with Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers, and third-party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this submission or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Fish by e-mailing him at mfish@fishnelson.com or by calling him directly at 205-332-1448.