In Bandy v. Murray American Energy, Inc., No. 16-1165 (W. Va. October 18, 2017), the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals addressed Mr. Bandy's constitutional challenge to the mandatory statutory attorney fee in W. Va. Code § 23-5-16(c). In a Memorandum Decision, the Court ruled the statutory maximum attorney fee is not an unconstitutional interference with claimant's access to the judicial system and the deprivation of due process of law. In light of the Florida Supreme Court decision inCastellanos v. Next Door Company, the West Virginia Supreme Court sidestepped the issue, stating that although the claimant couched his appeal as a constitutional issue, they found it to be a policy argument, and noted that policy arguments are more appropriately directed to the Legislature. The Court found that the attorney fee statute does not deprive claimants of due process or the ability to retain counsel.  

Carpal Tunnel Syndrome

In Stover v. Charleston Area Medical Center, No. 16-1195 (W. Va. September 15, 2017), Ms. Stover alleged she developed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome in the course of and resulting from her employment as a data entry clerk and linen department worker. An EMG performed on January 28, 2014, showed severe bilateral CTS. Her doctor noted that Ms. Stover used to be a data entry professional but lost her job two years prior because she could not perform her duties due to numbness and tingling in both hands. Her chronic problems included diabetes, fibromyalgia, hypertension, and obesity. She was assessed with carpal tunnel syndrome and cubital tunnel syndrome. Her doctor advised Ms. Stover that part of her symptoms could be due to diabetic neuropathy. Ms. Stover underwent right carpal tunnel release surgery on April 29, 2014. Her workers' compensation claim was rejected. An IME doctor opined the diagnosis of bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome is solely the result of Ms. Stover’s personal risk factors and is unrelated to her former occupation. Dr. Bailey stated that she has suffered many other consequences of her long standing morbid obesity including type II diabetes, diabetic peripheral neuropathies of her hands and feet, hypertension, high cholesterol, gastroesophageal reflux disease, and early onset arthritis. In its 5-0 Memorandum Decision, the Court concluded Claimant's job duties do not involve awkward wrist positioning, vibratory tools, significant grip force and high force of repetitive movements that have been shown to contribute to carpal tunnel syndrome. In addition, she has pre-existing medical conditions known to cause carpal tunnel syndrome.

Going to and Coming from Work Rule

In Ferrell v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., No. 16-0581, (W. Va. June 8, 2017), the Supreme Court affirmed a prior decision to reject plaintiff's claim for workers' compensation benefits after plaintiff was struck by a delivery truck in a public street as she walked to work. The Court here relied on the rule from Williby v. W. Virginia Office Ins. Com'r, 686 S.E.2d 9 (W.Va. 2009), which states that an injury incurred while traveling to work, and not on the premises of the employer, does not give rise to a compensable injury unless the place of injury was brought into the scope of employment by an express or implied requirement in the contract of employment. Applying this rule to the facts in this case, the Court relied on surveillance footage of the accident, a traffic report, and testimony from two witnesses to the accident that clearly established the claimant was in the middle of the road when she was struck, and not on the employer's property, nor was she performing any express or implied duties for the employer when the accident occurred. Therefore, the claimant was not entitled to compensation from her employer for the injury sustained. 

Preexisting Degenerative Conditions 

In Powley v. W. Virginia University, No. 16-0753, (W. Va. June 8, 2017), the Court affirmed prior decisions denying a psychiatric consultation and prior decisions denying a request to add depressive disorder, spinal stenosis, and lumbosacral strain as compensable conditions in the claim. The Court noted the claimant's long history of lumbar spine problems prior to the compensable sprain/strain injury and the fact that he had a lumbar MRI the day before the injury due to complaints of back pain. The pre- and post-injury MRI findings did not change, so the Court adopted the medical opinions of two doctors who opined the claimant's continued complaints were related to the preexisting lumbar spine condition, and that there was no evidence supporting the assertion that a psychiatric component should be added because the claimant's depression was in no way related to the injury at issue in this claim.  

In Davis v. Pinnacle Mining Co., LLC, No. 16-0736, (W. Va. June 8, 2017), the Court affirmed a prior decision denying plaintiff's request for authorization of three transforaminal epidural steroid injection claims because the requested injections were aimed at treating pre-existing degenerative conditions rather than the injury which resulted from the accident at issue. The Court adopted the findings of an independent medical evaluation and held that the requested injections do not constitute medically necessary and reasonably required treatment in relation to the compensable lumbar sprain/strain. Furthermore, the Court noted that the medical evidence of record demonstrates that the majority of the claimant's lumbar spine pathology is degenerative in nature and predates the injury at issue, and the Court agreed with the independent medical evaluation in determining the claimant had reached maximum medical improvement with respect to the injury, and any further treatment, including pain management, would be aimed at treating underlying pre-existing degenerative disease. 

In Conley v. Parkways Economic Development & Tourism Authority, No. 16-0896, (W. Va. August 2, 2017), the Court decided cervical radiculopathy should not be added as a compensable condition of the claim. The Court agreed with the findings of the Office of Judges as affirmed by the Board of Review that the only cervical MRI of record has been interpreted to show the claimant's cervical issues were degenerative in nature as opposed to being caused by an acute injury.  Further, the claimant had extensive treatment related to his cervical spine prior to the compensable injury.  

Article by Dill Battle and Karin Weingart

If you have questions or need more information, please call or e-mail Dill Battle at 304.340.3823 orhdbattle@spilmanlaw.com

H. Dill Battle III, Esq.

Spilman Thomas & Battle, PLLC
300 Kanawha Boulevard, East
Charleston, WV 25301
304.340.3823 - office
304.340.3801 - fax
hdbattle@spilmanlaw.com

Simon Law Group, P.C.

720 Olive Street, Suite 1720, St. Louis, MO 63101

314-621-2828

MISSOURI WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CASE LAW UPDATE

July 2017 – September 2017

Intentionally Lighting Can of Flammable Adhesives on Fire Not Accident Because NotUnexpected Traumatic Event

Hedrick vs. Big O Tires, Case No. SD34556 (Mo. App. 2017)

FACTS:  The claimant worked as a general mechanic at Big O Tires.  Employees sometimes used open flames as part of their job duties, but only when safety methods were utilized to make sure that no flammable materials were nearby.  On his date of injury, the claimant intentionally lit a can of glue on fire while a coworker was holding it, which caused an explosion and serious injuries to both the coworker and himself.  He pointed to several previous instances of horseplay at work, including greasing a doorknob or snapping a rag.  He argued that lighting the can on fire was also horseplay, and since horseplay was prevalent at his workplace, the risk of injury arose out of and in the course and scope of employment.

At a Hearing, the ALJ denied his Claim, finding that the risk did not arise out of and in the course and scope of his employment, because lighting the can on fire was an intentional dangerous act, unlike the prior instances of horseplay, which were not life threatening.  On appeal, the Commission affirmed, holding that the mere presence of dangerous materials on the job site combined with the fact that coworkers occasionally engaged in mild horseplay was insufficient to show that these injuries arose out of and in the course and scope of employment. 

HELD:  On appeal, the Court affirmed the Commission’s decision.  It held that the claimant failed to prove that he sustained an accident under Workers’ Compensation Law.  However, it used a different rationale and noted that the dictionary defines an accident as an unexpected traumatic event.  The claimant could have expected or foreseen that igniting a can of flammable adhesives held by another person could produce injury, and therefore, although it was a traumatic event, it was notunexpected.  Therefore, it was not a compensable accident.

Court Affirms Commission Finding Injury Is Compensable Despite Multiple Contradicting Statements Because Unguarded Ramp Was Risk Source 

ConAgra Foods, Inc. vs. John Phillips, Case No. WD80535 (Mo. App. 2017) 

FACTS:  The claimant sustained an injury to his left hip on October 14, 2013 when he was walking up a ramp in the break room and turned to step off the ramp, at which time he fell to the floor.  According to medical reports from the claimant’s date of injury, he told both an EMT and a doctor that he fell because his leg gave out.  However, the Claim for Compensation alleged that he slipped and fell from the ramp.  He later testified at a Hearing that he did not remember how he fell but believed he may have caught his heel on the ramp.

At a Hearing, the employer pointed out the inconsistencies in the claimant’s reports about how he was injured.  The ALJ concluded that even if the claimant’s knee did give out, falling from a height of 3-5 inches put him at an increased risk for greater injury, and his injury therefore arose out of and in the course and scope of his employment and was compensable either way.  On appeal, the Commission agreed that the claimant’s reports as to how he fell varied, but it held that any inconsistencies were “understandable, considering the sudden and unexpected occurrence of the injury and the extreme pain caused by his left hip fracture, along with the effects of the medication administered.”

FINDINGS:  On appeal, the Court affirmed the Commission’s decision and Award.  It deferred to the Commission’s credibility determinations and also noted that it was unclear from the medical records whether the inconsistent statements regarding how the injury occurred were actually provided by the claimant or by other sources, such as EMS or witnesses to the accident.  Also, the Court agreed that the injury was compensable because it was caused by the ramp, which was a risk source to which the claimant was not equally exposed in his normal non-employment life.

Injury While Playing Basketball on Paid Break Compensable Because Risk Source Was Wearing Non-Slip Shoes on Blacktop and Employer Required Non-Slip Shoes

Gruender vs. Curators of the University of Missouri, Injury No. 14-043810

The claimant was a member of the custodial staff and was required to wear non-slip shoes while working.  She had paid breaks during which she was free to do whatever she wanted as long as she did not leave campus.  On June 23, 2014, the claimant played basketball on a black-top court on the employer’s property along with her team leader and another employee.  While playing basketball, her foot got stuck and she sustained an injury to her left foot.  Playing basketball had never been discouraged and was not against any expressed rules, and the claimant was being paid during the break when she was injured. 

At a Hearing, the employer argued that the claimant’s injury was not compensable because she was participating in a recreational activity which was not related to her job duties at the time she was injured.  The ALJ applied the Mutual Benefit Doctrine, which states that an injury is compensable if it occurs while an employee is engaging in an activity that benefits both the employer and employee, and playing basketball on a paid break is mutually beneficial.  Alternatively, the claimant was not exposed to the hazard of shooting hoops on a black-top basketball court while wearing slip resistant work shoes in her normal non-employment life.  Therefore, the injury was compensable anyway.  The ALJ also reasoned that the claimant did not forfeit her workers’ compensation benefits by engaging in a recreational activity or program, because under statute, benefits will not be forfeited if the employee was paid wages or travel expenses while participating in the activity. In this case, she was on a paid break while she was playing basketball. 

On appeal, the Commission affirmed the ALJ’s decision and Award with a supplemental opinion.  The Commission held that a finding regarding the Mutual Benefit Doctrine was not necessary to find the claimant’s injury compensable because the risk of injury came from a hazard or risk to which she would not have been equally exposed outside of work in her normal non-employment life, specifically playing basketball on a black-top surface while wearing slip resistant shoes that the employer required her to wear.  The employer was ordered to pay PPD, TTD, and past medical expenses. 

[Editor’s Note: We are not sure why the Judge and Commission focused on the Mutual Benefit Doctrine and risk source analysis as, pursuant to Statute, if a claimant sustains an injury while participating in a paid recreational activity, the injury is compensable.] 

No Penalty Because Employer Failed to Show Violation Occurred In Conjunction With or Was Proximate Cause of Claimant’s Injuries

Franklin vs. AB Electrical, Inc., Injury No. 15-094035

On December 7, 2015, the claimant fell off of scaffolding and sustained injuries. A co-worker testified that on the morning of the accident, approximately 5-6 hours before the fall, he saw the claimant smoking marijuana.  The claimant’s post-accident drug test was positive for marijuana. The employer argued that the claimant forfeited his right to any benefits because he violated the employer’s rule or policy regarding the use of controlled drugs in the workplace, and that violation was the proximate cause of his injury. 

The claimant’s expert testified that the presence of THC in the claimant’s system would not necessarily indicate that he was impaired, or to what extent he was impaired, at the time of the accident.  The employer’s expert testified that the claimant was likely still impaired at the time of his accident because the effects of marijuana can last up to eight hours, and the accident occurred within that time frame. He opined that because the claimant was impaired at the time of his accident, his drug use was the proximate cause of his injuries. 

At a Hearing, the ALJ found that the claimant used drugs in violation of the employer’s policy.  He also noted that the claimant was the only person to have fallen off the scaffold and his fall occurred on the same day that his co-worker saw him take two hits off a marijuana pipe, and he ultimately found it was more likely true than not that his drug use was the proximate cause of his injuries and any workers’ compensation benefits were forfeited. 

On appeal, the Commission reversed the ALJ’s decision and Award.  The Commission noted that pursuant to statute, there are two burdens for proving a drug violation penalty.  First, compensation shall be reduced by fifty percent if the injury was sustainedin conjunction with an employee’s drug use.  However, the employee forfeits his right to any compensation if his drug use was theproximate cause of the injury.  In this case, the Commission found that the employer did not meet its burden to prove that the claimant’s drug use occurred in conjunction with the accident or was the proximate cause of his injuries.  With respect to whether he ingested marijuana in conjunction with his injury, the Commission noted that the coworker made inconsistent statements regarding whether or when he saw the claimant smoke marijuana, and the urinalysis test did not show when he ingested marijuana or how much he ingested.  With respect to whether drug use was the proximate cause of his injuries, the Commission noted that the coworker testified that he saw no evidence that the claimant was intoxicated or impaired prior to his accident and he was not unsteady on his feet.  The Commission also noted that the employer’s expert’s opinion depended on a finding that the coworker did in fact see the claimant smoking that morningand he had a positive urinalysis test.  Therefore, it declined to apply a drug violation penalty and ordered the employer to pay PPD, past medical expenses, and TTD and provide additional treatment. 

[Editor’s Note: 287.120 was amended in 2017. The statute now states that if a claimant’s drug screen is administered within twenty-four hours of the accident/injury and is positive for a nonprescribed controlled substance, there is a rebuttable presumption that the accident/injury occurred in conjunction with the use of the controlled drug. This removes the burden from employers to prove that use of the controlled substance occurred in conjunction with the accident/injury.]

Appeal Dismissed Because Court Lacked Authority to Review Commission’s Temporary/Partial Award

Williams vs. Tyson Foods Inc. and Tyson Poultry, Inc., Case No. WD80267 (Mo. App. 2017)

FACTS:  The claimant sustained injuries to his feet as a result of his job duties. He filed a Claim, and an ALJ awarded a temporary/partial Award of TTD and medical treatment. The Commission affirmed the ALJ’s decision and Award and again acknowledged that it was a temporary/partial Award. The employer appealed the Commission’s decision.

HELD:  On appeal, the Court held that it lacked statutory authority to review the Award because it was temporary/partial. It identified two exceptions: Awards not made pursuant to 287.510, and when an employer alleges it is not liable for paying any compensation at all. However, the Court held that neither exception applied in this case because the temporary/partial award was made pursuant to 287.510 and the employer only contested the Commission’s finding of TTD and did not argue that it was not liable for paying any compensation at all.

Court Vacates Commission Decision. Claimant Must Show Actual Events Would Cause a Reasonable Highway Worker Extraordinary and Unusual Stress

Mantia vs. Missouri Department of Transportation and Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, Case No. SC95885 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 2017)

FACTS:  The claimant was employed as a highway worker, and her duties involved assisting at scenes of motor vehicle accidents. She would respond to the worst of accidents, which often included fatalities, and she alleged psychiatric disability as a result of an occupational disease. Dr. Jovick, the claimant’s psychiatric expert, and Dr. Stillings, the employer/insurer’s psychiatric expert both agreed that her job duties were the prevailing factor in her psychiatric condition. Despite this, at a hearing, the ALJ denied compensability largely on the basis that the claimant’s co-workers were routinely exposed to the same experiences and therefore, she did not show that her work exposure was extraordinary and unusual as compared to other highway workers or similarly situated employees.

On appeal, the Commission reversed the ALJ’s decision and Award and essentially held that claimants need not compare themselves to similarly situated employees in order to satisfy the burden that their stress was extraordinary and unusual as measured by objective standards. The Commission stated that all cases requiring claimants to compare their stress to similarly situated employees pre-dated the 2005 amendments and the plain language of the Statute does not require such a comparison.

HELD:  On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed the Commission’s decision and held that the objective standard for determining whether the claimant’s stress was compensable was whether the same or similar actual work events would cause a reasonable highway worker extraordinary and unusual stress.  The Court found the claimant failed to present evidence that showed that actual work events that were the same or similar to that which she experienced would have caused extraordinary and unusual stress to a reasonable highway worker.  Therefore, this matter was vacated and remanded.

Employer Responsible for PTD Benefits, Despite Video Showing Claimant Performing Household Chores Such As Mowing and Pushing Broom

Earnest vs. Jackson County Missouri, Injury No. 14-016690

On March 11, 2014, the claimant was using a chainsaw to cut down a tree when the tree fell on him.  He was diagnosed with an acute compression fracture at T7 and underwent an authorized ORIF and fusion of the thoracic spine on April 1, 2014.  In relation to that procedure, he also underwent a resection of rib for bone graft and additional procedures.  The claimant continued to undergo authorized treatment with Dr. Pang, who diagnosed neuropathic pain due to the removal of the ribs and placed the claimant at MMI on June 5, 2015 with 15% PPD of the body referable to the thoracic spine.

Dr. Stuckmeyer evaluated the claimant at the claimant’s attorney’s request and recommended several permanent restrictions, including no prolonged standing or walking and the ability to change positions throughout the day for pain control.  He assessed 60% PPD of the body and recommended evaluation by a vocational expert, who opined the claimant was unemployable in the open labor market as a result of his work accident alone.

At a Hearing, the employer argued that the claimant was able to work and presented surveillance videos showing him performing various household chores, including mowing, pushing a broom, and using a hose.  The ALJ noted that a claimant may be PTD despite being able to perform some type of work on an ongoing basis and held that the claimant was PTD as a result of his work accident alone.  The employer was also ordered to provide future medical care and pay past medical expenses. On appeal, the Commission deferred to the ALJ’s credibility determinations and affirmed the decision and Award.

Employer Liable for PTD After Hernia Repair Resulted in Nerve Entrapment and Need to Recline Throughout Day, Despite History of Prior Hernias

Adams vs. City of Kansas City, Missouri, Injury No. 10-067514

The claimant worked for the City of Kansas City, and on July 28, 2010, he was attempting to turn off a rusted valve and sustained a left inguinal hernia.  Dr. Petelin surgically repaired the same on September 20, 2010 with a mesh implant.  The claimant continued to experience severe abdominal and groinal pain despite injections and physical therapy, and he was ultimately diagnosed with impingement of the ilioinguinal nerve.  He treated with Dr. Wheeler, who placed him at MMI without restrictions after he repeatedly missed appointments and physical therapy and assessed 3% PPD of the body.  He was noted to have a history of extensive hernia repairs as a small child as well as one in high school.

The claimant’s attorney had him evaluated by Dr. Parmet, who concluded that he was PTD as a result of the last injury alone and would likely need to recline throughout the day due to his pain. The claimant’s vocational expert, Ms. Titterington, noted the claimant had no transferrable work skills and limited academic skills and opined that, based on Dr. Parmet’s opinion, she would agree that he was not employable.  The employer’s vocational expert, Ms. Sprecker, opined the claimant was not PTD based on Dr. Wheeler’s report.

At a Hearing, an ALJ found that the claimant was PTD as a result of his primary injury alone.  He did not find Dr. Wheeler’s opinion credible and noted that he released the claimant from care without restrictions due to his poor attendance, which the ALJ opined could be explained by his uncontrolled diabetes, severe pain and depression, and lack of a driver’s license.  The ALJ found the claimant’s experts’ opinions more persuasive and ordered the employer to pay PTD benefits and provide future medical treatment.  On appeal, the Commission affirmed the ALJ’s decision and Award.

Claimant PTD and Unemployable Despite Working Part-Time at a Carwash For Five Years After Injury

Weber vs. Kraft Foods, Inc. and Second Injury Fund, Injury No. 08-124473

The claimant, a 65-year-old employee with a 12th grade education and an IQ of 68 was injured on October 26, 2008 when his back gave out.  Dr. Trecha performed a discectomy and fusion with instrumentation at L4-5.  He subsequently reported neck pain, and Dr. Trecha performed an anterior cervical discectomy and fusion from C3 to T1.  The claimant was terminated from his employment following his back surgery due to the restrictions placed by Dr. Trecha.  He subsequently obtained a part-time job working 4 hours per day, Monday through Friday, at a local carwash, where he greets and assists customers, supervises other workers, collects money, and deposits money in the bank.  The claimant previously resolved his claim against the employer.  At a Hearing against the Fund, the owner of the carwash where the claimant worked testified that he hired the claimant because he felt bad for him and he allowed the claimant to take breaks and leave the premises whenever he wanted.

The claimant had a significant prior history of back problems.  He sustained an injury in 1991 and ultimately underwent a surgical fusion and laminectomy and settled that claim for 22% PPD of the body.  In 1995, he suffered a right upper extremity injury and underwent surgery for a ruptured biceps, which was resolved for 10% PPD of the right elbow. 

Dr. Russell evaluated the claimant at his attorney’s request and found the claimant PTD as a result of the combination of his primary and pre-existing injuries.  The claimant’s vocational expert, Mr. Weinholt, agreed and noted he did not consider his work at the carwash to be full employment in the open labor market.  The Fund’s vocational expert testified that the claimant was not PTD because he worked part-time at the carwash for the past five years.

At a Hearing, the ALJ found that the claimant was not PTD in light of the fact that he maintained part-time employment at the carwash for the last five years and noted that employment in the open labor market can include part-time work. 

On appeal, the Commission held that although part-time employment can constitute employment in the open labor market, that was not the case here.  The Commission found that the claimant’s current employer hired him out of compassion and accommodates him by allowing him to come and go freely during his shift.  Therefore, the Fund was responsible for PTD benefits.

Employer Liable for PTD Benefits Because Claimant Must Frequently Sit and Elevate Leg Throughout Day   

Badock vs. R.P. Lumber, Injury No. 10-004961

On January 4, 2010, the claimant, a 54-year-old delivery driver/yard man was attempting to enter a truck when his left foot slipped, and he sustained a fracture to his fourth metatarsal.  He treated for the fracture, but he ultimately developed multiple pulmonary emboli and partial DVT in the left leg, which doctors opined was secondary to his foot injury, and he started blood thinners.  With respect to his DVT, he treated with Dr. Goldberg, who recommended sedentary work only.  His care was then transferred to Dr. Rao, who released him to return to work full duty in March 2011 and assessed 10-15% PPD of the body referable to his DVT.  However, the claimant continued to experience left foot complaints and also developed complaints in his right foot.  He treated on his own with Dr. Finnie, who diagnosed gout in his right foot and opined that he was no longer employable. 

The claimant was evaluated by Dr. Volarich in March 2012, who opined that the claimant was PTD as a result of his primary injury alone.  The claimant advised Mr. England that he had to sit with his leg elevated most of the day, and Mr. England opined that if this were true, he would be PTD.

At a Hearing, the ALJ noted the claimant’s lack of computer skills and the fact that he had never worked a sedentary job.  However, the ALJ found that the claimant was not PTD and noted the claimant’s testimony that he is able to sit in one place for over 90 minutes and would probably not prop his leg up the whole time.  Also, the claimant testified that he had a fairly active lifestyle and was able to drive and do chores around the house.  Although Dr. Finnie believed the claimant could not work as a result of a combination of his left and right foot problems, the ALJ noted that Dr. Wieman, the claimant’s personal doctor, diagnosed right foot problems in 2004, six years before his primary injury.  Therefore, the claimant failed to prove that he was permanently and totally disabled as a result of his primary injury.  The ALJ awarded 15% PPD of the left foot, 30% PPD of the thigh, and 10% PPD of the body along with TTD and future medical, to be paid by the employer. 

On appeal, the Commission modified the ALJ’s decision and Award and found that the claimant PTD as a result of his last injury alone.  The Commission noted his extensive history of labor intensive jobs, lack of computer skills, and the fact that he had never worked a sedentary job and is 54 years old.  Also, the claimant testified that if he is on his feet for an extended period, he has to sit down the entire next day due to swelling/pain.  Also, the Commission opined that even if the claimant does not have to elevate his leg all day every day, if he does so even a few days per week, he would be unemployable. 

Employer Responsible for PTD Because Claimant Must Now Recline and Alternate Between Sitting and Standing

Jones vs. Harley Davidson Motor Company and Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of Second Injury Fund, Injury No. 11-062102

The claimant was a 50-year-old high school graduate who previously worked in technical communication installation in the Army.  He sustained an injury to his low back on July 13, 2011 while working for his current employer.  Dr. Drisko performed surgery on the claimant’s low back, including a fusion with instrumentation and released him from care in October 2012.  He returned to Dr. Drisko on December 27, 2012, at which time the doctor opined he had developed sacroiliac dysfunction and recommended additional injections and physical therapy, which the claimant declined, and he was released from care again.

The claimant did have pre-existing disabilities.  He previously settled workers’ compensation claims for 22.8% of the right shoulder in 2003, 18% of the body referable to a left shoulder injury he sustained in 2007, and 29.5% of the right elbow in 2010.  He also previously underwent chiropractic treatment for his low back beginning in May 2011. 

The claimant’s experts, Dr. Koprovica, Dr. Stuckmeyer, and Mr. Cordray opined that the claimant would be unemployable and PTD due to his need to recline unpredictably throughout the day.  Dr. Koprivica and Mr. Cordray opined he was PTD as a result of his last injury alone.  Dr. Stuckmeyer opined he was PTD as a result of his primary injury and pre-existing disabilities. The employer’s expert, Dr. Drisko, also opined that the claimant may be PTD, and if so, it was as a result of the last injury alone.

The ALJ found the claimant PTD as a result of the last accident alone and ordered the employer to pay PTD benefits and leave future medical open.  On appeal, the Commission affirmed the ALJ’s decision and Award.

Employer Responsible for PTD Benefits Due to Need to Alternate Positions and Inability to Work Full Day Despite Only Conservative Treatment for Back

Barahona vs. Hilton Hotels/Hilton Worldwide, Inc. and Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of Second Injury Fund, Injury No. 11-031709

The claimant is a 55-year-old immigrant from Honduras with an 8th grade education who never obtained a GED or received vocational training.  Her employment history included waitressing and housekeeping.  On April 24, 2011, the claimant was cleaning a table when she slipped and fell on a wet floor and injured her back and struck her head on the floor and lost consciousness.  Dr. Olive diagnosed a lumbar strain and placed the claimant at MMI with respect to her back. Dr. Miller performed surgery to repair a lateral meniscal tear, placed the claimant at MMI, and assessed 2% of the knee.  The claimant began receiving Social Security Disability benefits in 2012 or 2013.

The claimant also had prior injuries. She sustained two injuries to her right ankle as well as an injury to her low back in 2010, for which she treated conservatively. She also had a history of DDD in her lumbar spine.

Dr. Volarich examined the claimant at the request of her attorney, and opined that she could not be expected to work on a full-time basis in her prior jobs and was PTD as a result of her last injury alone.  Mr. Eldrid performed a vocational evaluation and noted her limited education, math and English skills, and lack of a driver’s license, but he opined she was PTD as a result of her last injury alone. Dr. Kitchens testified on behalf of the employer and opined that she did not sustain an injury to her back as a result of her April 24, 2011 work injury, despite the diagnoses made by other doctors that she sustained a low back sprain/strain.  Mr. England testified on behalf of the employer and opined that assuming Dr. Volarich’s restrictions and that she is unable to sustain a regular workday, then she would be unemployable.

At a Hearing before an ALJ, the claimant testified that she continues to take pain medication and has to alternate positions and has difficulty walking, sitting, or standing for more than five minutes. The ALJ found her testimony and Dr. Volarich’s opinion credible and held that she was PTD as a result of her primary injury alone.  Therefore, the employer was responsible for PTD benefits, future medical, past medical expenses, and TTD.  On appeal, the Commission affirmed the ALJ’s decision and Award.

Claim Against Fund for Enhanced Benefits Denied Because Primary Injury Occurred After January 1, 2014

Cosby vs. Drake Carpentry, Inc. and Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of Second Injury Fund, Injury No. 14-003644

The claimant sustained an injury to his left knee on January 22, 2014 when he was climbing down a ladder at work and the ladder slid out from underneath him, at which time he fell on his left knee and leg.  Dr. Kostman performed surgery.  The claimant subsequently settled his claim against the employer for an unspecified percentage of disability. 

The claimant filed against the Second Injury Fund for enhanced PPD benefits based on the combination of the disability resulting from his current work accident and pre-existing disabilities resulting from prior injuries to the claimant’s left knee, bilateral shoulders, and a hernia.  At a hearing, the ALJ held that the 2013 amendments to workers’ compensation statute prohibit the filing of claims against the Second Injury Fund for enhanced PPD benefits for injuries occurring after January 1, 2014.  Since the claimant’s injury occurred on January 22, 2014, his claim against the Second Injury Fund was denied. The claimant appealed to the Commission.

Interestingly, in a supplemental opinion, despite having no authority to determine constitutionality issues, the Commission opined that the 2013 Amendments to Workers’ Compensation statute are not unconstitutional.  Further, the Commission opined that in light of the changes in the 2013 Amendments, the employer/insurer are now responsible for any enhanced PPD benefits resulting from injuries when the primary injury occurs after January 1, 2014.

Obviously, this is mere dicta, and the employer/insurer are only responsible for PPD benefits resulting from the primary injury. Pursuant to 287.220.3(2), “[When] an employee is entitled to compensation as provided in this subsection, the employer at the time of the last work-related injury shall only be liable for the disability resulting from the subsequent work-related injury considered alone and of itself.”

Employer Not Require to Pay Claimant’s Attorney’s Fees Because It Was Reasonable for Employer to Rely On Medical Expert’s Opinion That Claimant Did Not Require Additional Treatment

Simpson vs. Columbia College, Injury No. 13-069045

On September 19, 2013, the claimant tripped and sustained an injury to her left knee.  She underwent authorized treatment with Dr. Leslie, who performed an ORIF and two additional surgeries after her wire broke and she developed chondromalacia. She subsequently underwent an MRI of the left knee, which showed severe chondromalacia of the patella and a torn medial meniscus, and she underwent a fourth left knee surgery.  After the fourth surgery, Dr. Leslie recommended injections.  However, the employer sent the claimant to Dr. Mall for an evaluation, who opined that the arthritis was pre-existing and the progression of her arthritis was not due to her injury.  He placed her at MMI.

At a Hearing before an ALJ, both Dr. Leslie and Dr. Volarich testified that the claimant required additional medical treatment and would require a future left total knee joint replacement. The claimant requested attorney’s fees and argued that the employer defended its claim on unreasonable grounds when it denied her medical treatment for a year and a half prior to the Hearing.  The ALJ found the testimony of Dr. Leslie and Dr. Volarich more persuasive than Dr. Mall, assessed 22.5% PPD of the left knee, and ordered the employer to provide future medical treatment.  However, the ALJ declined to award attorney’s fees and noted that the employer relied on the expert medical opinion of Dr. Mall, which was reasonable, despite the fact that the ALJ found Dr. Mall’s opinion unpersuasive. On appeal, the Commission affirmed the ALJ’s decision and Award, although it modified the Award to include 40% PPD of the left knee.

The Supreme Court recently released its opinion in Louis Hall v. Bobby Saarinen and Chris Williams, in which it reversed the trial court’s denial of the co-employee defendants’ motion for summary judgment regarding the plaintiff’s personal injury claim.  The plaintiff was injured by a saw while at work, and he sued his employer and two supervisory co-workers in tort.  The employer was dismissed from the action pursuant to the Exclusivity Doctrine.  In his amended complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the co-employees defendants “caused or allowed the removal of a guard from the saw” and “failed to install a safety guard provided for the saw”  and “failed to replace the unguarded saw with a new guarded saw.” 

The saw (Kalamazoo brand) that was used by the employer had a manufacturer-installed guard.  At some point prior to the incident, the plaintiff expressed concern to his employer that the guard was not adequate, and so at the plaintiff’s request, the employer installed an additional guard to better shield the saw when it was lifted up.  Thereafter, the employer purchased a new saw (DeWalt brand), but because they were in their busy season, the employer had not yet installed the new saw for use.  The question at issue before the Supreme Court was whether the presence of another saw on the premises, that had not yet been installed and was not from the same manufacturer, constituted the removal of a safety device under Ala. Code 25-5-11(c)(2).

The Court found that there was no evidence indicating that the co-employees failed to install a guard provided by the manufacturer or that they failed to maintain or repair the guard provided.  Although an additional safety guard was installed on the original saw, that guard was not an “alternative safety device” because the original guard was not by-passed.  The Court concluded that the failure to install another, presumably safer, saw from a different manufacturer that was present on the premises but that had not been put into operation is not the equivalent of the removal of a safety device, and thus does not constitute willful misconduct under Ala. Code 25-5-11(c)(2).

The Court expressly declined to give an opinion as to whether the presence of a new (presumably safer) machine on the premises made by the same manufacturer as the machine that injured an employee would constitute willful misconduct by a co-employee.

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About the Author

This blog submission was prepared by Mary Stewart Nelson Thompson, an attorney with Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers, and third party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this submission or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Mary Stewart Nelson Thompson by e-mailing her at msnelson@fishnelson.com or by calling her directly at 205-332-3430.

Written by: Elizabeth Ligon

In Ball v. Bayada Home Health Care, Plaintiff worked for Bayada as a certified nurse’s assistant for nine months before she was transferred to a new location and began working with a single client. As a result of this change, Plaintiff’s hourly wage and number of hours increased. Plaintiff sustained a work-related injury on February 10, 2011, her first day of work with the new client. She continued working until she was injured again on May 18, 2011. This second injury was found not compensable by the Industrial Commission.

The deputy commissioner used method five of N.C.G.S. § 97-2(5) and calculated an average weekly wage of $510.33 with a compensation rate of $340.24. Method five states that, if methods one through four are unfair to either the employee or the employer, another method may be resorted to that will most nearly approximate the wages the employee would have earned if not for the injury. Defendants appealed to the Full Commission, who applied method three and divided the earnings earned by the number of weeks worked pre-injury. Using method three, the Full Commission determined Plaintiff’s average weekly wage was $284.79 with a compensation rate of $189.87.

Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which held that method three was unfair to Plaintiff because it ignored the months of increased hours and pay she worked after her February 10, 2011 injury. The Court further stated that Plaintiff’s post-injury work should be taken into account to most nearly approximate what Plaintiff would be earning had she not been injured. The case was remanded to the Commission for a determination of Plaintiff’s average weekly wage using method five.  

RISK HANDLING HINT: Plaintiffs’ attorneys might attempt use this case to argue that this constitutes a change in the law, and post-injury wages may be included when calculating claimants’ average weekly wage and compensation rates. However, the facts in this case are rather unique. Normally, a plaintiff will have a reduction in wages following a work-related injury. In this case, the plaintiff’s wages increased for a period of three months following her first injury by accident. The Court of Appeals instructed the Commission to use method five, but did not dictate a specific award. It is possible that the plaintiff’s average weekly wage could actually be lower, depending on how the Commission applies method five based on the facts of this case. Please contact the attorneys of Teague Campbell if you are faced with a similar unique fact pattern. 

The EEOC has provided guidance that in its view a fairly long leave of absence should be considered a reasonable accommodation even after FMLA leave has been exhausted.  The Court in Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc., 33 AD Cases 1113, September 20, 2017 disagreed rather strongly with that view and did not follow EEOC advice.

Mr. Severson worked for Heartland since 2006 performing a variety of manual labor duties in the production area of the plant, operating production machinery, making minor repairs, maintaining the building, and frequently lifting items and product weighing 50 pounds or more.

On June 5, 2013, petitioner wrenched his back at home, which aggravated a back problem dating back to 2005.  He received FMLA leave over the summer months for care of multiple herniated discs.  On August 13, 2013, Severson called HR and advised that he needed to undergo back surgery on August 27, 2013, seeking an extension of his medical leave of several months.  The company advised that his FMLA leave would expire on August 27, 2013. The company stated that Severson’s employment would terminate when his FMLA leave expired.  He was told that he could reapply when he recovered from his surgery.

Severson’s doctor performed surgery, then in October put restrictions on him and eventually removed his 20 pound lifting restriction on December 5, 2013.  He was given clearance to return to work without limitation.  Instead of reapplying for the position, Severson sued and argued that the company failed to provide him with reasonable accommodation.

The trial court granted Heartland’s motion for summary judgment, and Severson appealed to the 7^th Circuit.  Severson relied on EEOC Guidance to the effect that a long-term medical leave of absence should qualify as a reasonable accommodation when the leave is of a definite, time-limited duration and is likely to allow the worker to return to the job and perform essential job functions.  The Court said as follows:

Perhaps the more salient point is that on the EEOC’s interpretation, the length of the leave does not matter.  If, as the EEOC argues, employees are entitled to extended time off as a reasonable accommodation, the ADA is transformed into a medical leave statute – in effect, an open-ended extension of the FMLA.  That’s an untenable interpretation of the term ‘reasonable accommodation.’

The Court affirmed the dismissal of this case, stating that a reasonable accommodation is something that allows the employee to perform the essential job functions, but a request for several months of leave is focused on not working.  It said not an extended leave of absences accomplishes the exact opposite of what the ADA is about, namely enabling the worker to do his or her job.  The logic is compelling but readers should recognize that not all United States Courts of Appeal agree on this issue.  At least in the Seventh Circuit, (Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin), the logic of this case will prevail.

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John H. Geaney, Esq., is an Executive Committee Member and a Shareholder in Capehart Scatchard's Workers’ Compensation Group.  Mr. Geaney concentrates his practice in the representation of employers, self-insured companies, third-party administrators, and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation, the Americans with Disabilities Act and Family and Medical Leave Act. Should you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Mr. Geaney at 856.914.2063 or by e‑mail at jgeaney@capehart.com. 

“RIPE FOR CORRUPTION”

By Kevin L. Connors, Esquire

Not our words!

It is a direct quote from the front page banner headline of the Philadelphia Inquirer on September 24, 2017, with the headline being (Inquirer Investigation/Workers’ Comp, Pharmacies’ alliance:  “Ripe for Corruption.”)

For those who did not pick up a copy of the Sunday Philadelphia Inquirer, the hyperlink can be found by googling “Ripe for Corruption.”

For anyone involved in the administration or defense of Pennsylvania workers’ compensation claims, this article is a “must read,” as it investigates the ethical boundaries surrounding Attorney ownership and investment in pharmacies prescribing medications for workers’ compensation Claimants, as the Inquire investigated pharmacies owned by Pond Lehocky, a Philadelphia law firm almost exclusively representing Claimants either receiving or seeking workers’ compensation benefits, with the firm having written referral “arrangements” with physicians prescribing medications for persons receiving or seeking workers’ compensation benefits, to utilize Pond Lehocky-owned pharmacies to fill doctor-prescribed prescriptions.

Yes, the article accurately sets forth that Pond Lehocky secured approval from the Pennsylvania State Licensing Administration, to establish the pharmacy, also having sought legal Counsel as to the ethics of pharmacy ownership, with the question left unanswered as to whether ethical boundaries limit Attorneys profiting from the medical outcomes of Clients through this type of arrangement without full disclosure to either Patient/Client, and/or Party responsible for paying.

However certain that Pond Lehocky and his Partners might be that their “arrangement” was ethically and legally sound, the “arrangement” was apparently outlined by Sam Pond, a legend unto himself, which Sam had emailed referral doctors:  “For all Patients that you may see with a workers’ compensation claim, referred to you from our office or elsewhere, we ask that you have our pharmacy, Workers First Pharmacy Services, fill these scripts.”

Apparently, Workers First Pharmacy received State approval to open its pharmacy in October of 2016, with the application submitted by Pond Lehocky indicating that no medical practitioners had a proprietary interest in the pharmacy, although, in fact, several doctors are part-owners, as evidenced by the Inquirer’s investigation into the pharmacy.

The “arrangement” has been questioned by legal and medical ethicists, on grounds that it may potentially lead to conflicts of interest, and to create a financial incentive to prescribe the costliest drugs, whether or not medically appropriate, in order to prolong workers’ compensation legal disputes, to boost legal fees and legal recoveries.

Citing to Pond Lehocky’s website, it makes a vague reference to its relationship with Workers First, noting that the firm is “partnering” with the pharmacy to help Clients get the best pharmaceutical care.

However, Clients can click right through Pond Lehocky’s website, to the pharmacies’ website, without being apprised of the law firm’s financial interest in the pharmacy and any medication scripts that it might fill.

The Inquirer article cites to numerous references of Workers First charging what some are calling “inflated” prices for medications, particularly for high-cost compounded pain cream.

Of course, Pond Lehocky takes the position that Workers First Pharmacy is an attempt to “stand up” to “diabolical people” and insurance companies, who frequently deny medications to Pond Lehocky’s Clients, in order to boost insurance company profits.

Pond’s quote is:  “You ever have an insurance claim?  You ever go up against these bastards?”

Pond Lehocky apparently denies that the email/letter that it sent to doctors, asking doctors to use Workers First for their workers’ compensation Patients, does not constitute aquid pro quo, nor does the firm believe that doctors might feel pressured to use the firm’s pharmacy, in order to continue receiving Patient referrals from Pond Lehocky, noted in theInquirer as a major pipeline for new Patients.

Conveniently, Pond says “I would be outraged--if I heard that.”

According to Workers First Board of Pharmacy application, 65% of the firm is owned by Sam Pond, and his two law Partners, Jerry Lehocky and David Stern, as well as law firm CFO, Bryan Riley.

The remaining 35% of the pharmacy is owned by six other doctors.

No less interesting is the fact that Pond Lehocky has been a strong advocate in opposition to House Bill 18, which was introduced in February of 2017 in an attempt to address the over-prescription of opioids and other painkillers, attempting to create a list of approved drugs, a set duration for treatment, and established dosage amounts for workers injured on the job.

In essence, House Bill 18 would create a pre-approved list, or “formulary” of opioids and other drugs for injured Employees requiring medical care and financial assistance for lost wages under the Workers’ Compensation Act.

With Pennsylvania ranking third in a recent 25 State study of the amount of opioids prescribed to injured workers, Bill supporters advocate that House Bill 18 is necessary to protect workers from the effects of being over-prescribed opioids, potentially resulting in other health conditions and extending recovery phases.

In response, Pond Lehocky, in advertisements that it had raised in response to House Bill 18 criticized the proposed legislation as catering to the insurance company, potentially leaving injured workers without proper treatment, as well as being a wedge between Patients and their doctors.  Pond claims that Workers First is a “mail delivery pharmacy” serving as a “counter to insurance companies warranting capricious denial of medical care to people who are recovering from injuries sustained while on the job.”

The opposition to House Bill 18 has been intensive, and no less expensive with close to $4,000,000.00 being spent by “legal professional” lobbyists, opposing the legislation.

True, more dollars were spent by “liability reform” lobbyists, although it is unclear how much of the “liability reform” dollars were spent on workers’ compensation issues.

The September 24, 2017 article by The Philadelphia Inquirer raises very serious issues with respect to conflicts of issue, as well as the potential for abuse and overreach, while, no doubt, advocates, like Pond Lehocky, will claim that their efforts are geared towards reducing worker suffering, as opposed to prolonging the shelf life of workers’ compensation claims, and eventual recoveries predicated on the length and duration of claims remaining open.

However you might look at this issue and whatever your orientation might be, there would still seem to be an unholy alliance in “investing” in the medical outcomes of Clients.

In the final analysis, the Inquirer’s banner headline poses the essential question, being whether this “arrangement” is, in fact, “ripe for corruption?”

ConnorsO’Dell LLP

Trust us, we just get it!  It is trust well spent!

We defend Employers, Self-Insureds, Insurance Carriers, and Third Party Administrators in Workers’ Compensation matters throughout  Pennsylvania.  We have over 100 years of cumulative experience defending our clients against compensation-related liabilities, with no attorney in our firm having less than ten (10) years of specialized experience, empowering our Workers’ Compensation practice group attorneys to be more than mere claim denials, enabling us to create the factual and legal leverage to expeditiously resolve claims, in the course of limiting/reducing/extinguishing our clients’ liabilities under the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act.

Every member of our Workers’ Compensation practice group is AV rated.  Our partnership with the NWCDN magnifies the lens for which our professional expertise imperiously demands that we always be dynamic and exacting advocates for our clients, navigating the frustrating and form-intensive minefield pervasive throughout Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation practice and procedure.

Written by: Matt Flammia and Bruce Hamilton

The North Carolina Industrial Commission recently announced a stricter policy, which includes increased sanctions for failing to timely file a Form 60, 61 or 63. Pursuant to an October 2, 2017 Memorandum issued by the North Carolina Industrial Commission, effective December 1, 2017, there will be changes to the sanction amounts and processes for sanctions pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-18(j).

The amount sanctioned for failing to file a Form 60, 61 or 63 within thirty (30) days following notice from the Commission of the filing of the claim will increase from $200.00 to $400.00. Also, following an initial sanction of $400.00 for failing to timely file a Form 60, 61 or 63, Carriers/Employers have thirty (30) days to pay the sanction and file a Form 60, 61 or 63. Failure to do either action will result in an additional $200.00 sanction and the claim will be referred to an Enforcement Docket for potential additional sanctions.

Finally, all current cases that have already been assigned a $200.00 sanction need to be paid in full by November 30, 2017. Effective December 1, 2017, any case that has been assigned a $200.00 sanction that has been outstanding for more than thirty (30) days will be assigned an additional $200.00 sanction and be referred to the Enforcement Docket for additional sanctions.

The North Carolina Industrial Commission was tasked by the North Carolina General Assembly to ensure stricter compliance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-18(j) with the hope that the new changes may lead to quicker dispositions of cases.

Handling Tip: We recommend all claims are reviewed to ensure they are in compliance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-18(j), and there are no outstanding sanctions that have not been paid so an additional sanction is not assigned on December 1, 2017. Going forward, be sure that a Form 60, 61 or 63 is timely filed within thirty days after receiving notice from the Commission, and, if you are assessed with a penalty, that it is promptly paid and the requisite form is filed to avoid additional penalties.  Any disputes or questions regarding sanctions should be addressed by e-mail to sanctions@ic.nc.gov.

Please contact one of our workers’ compensation attorneys if you have any questions about this recent announcement and subsequent change in policy.

This summary was prepared by Associate Attorney, Scott G. Ferriss.

Some defenses, like the going-and-coming rule, get all the attention but there are other less well known defenses, like lack of timely notice, which can be very powerful as a defense in workers’ compensation.  One of the reasons that the notice defense is often ignored in New Jersey is its peculiar wording.  It has three stages to it.  N.J.S.A. 34:15-17 states initially that if notice of a work injury is not given to the employer within 14 days, then no compensation shall be due until such notice is given.  The employer cannot win in this stage, only delay payment until notice is provided.

The second stage says that if notice to the employer is given within 30 days, then the employee’s claim cannot be defeated unless the employer can show it was prejudiced by the delay. Finally, the statute provides that if notice is given within 90 days, AND, if the employee can show that the failure to provide notice was due to mistake, inadvertence, ignorance of fact or law, or fraud, then compensation shall be allowed,  unless the employer can prove that it was prejudiced by the failure to provide prompt notice. An employee automatically loses if the first notice occurs after 90 days.

Many practitioners tell clients that an employee only has to give notice within 90 days, but that is not entirely correct.  The employee must give notice within 30 days, and if the employer can show that lack of notice prejudiced the employer, the employer wins the case!  This practitioner calls it a 30-day rule.

Notice issues come into play more often than one would imagine even though most large employers have training sessions on the importance of providing notice of injury with 24 or 48 hours.  The statute does make clear that if the employer has actual knowledge of the injury, then the requirement of prompt notice is not applicable.  But a surprisingly high percentage of workers’ compensation claims involve situations where an employee has not reported a work injury for over 30 days.

Why is the notice defense important? For one thing, there are many unwitnessed accidents and it makes very little sense that an employee who is injured seriously enough to require treatment or file a claim would wait 30 days to report the injury.  If the injury were serious enough, there would usually be medical treatment shortly after the incident, and if medical treatment did occur, there should be statements to the physician about a work-related injury. When an employee waits weeks to report an alleged work injury, red flags should be flying.

Three defenses come to mind when an employee claims to have suffered a serious injury but does not report the injury promptly. First is the notice defense as outlined above, and the employer should argue that the delay in reporting prejudiced the employer.  Second is the defense that no accident ever took place, and efforts should be made to investigate the allegations to see if the accident can be disproved. Third is more of a medical defense, namely that if something did happen 30 days ago but was never reported within 30 days, then that event was almost certainly insignificant. Respondent should engage a medical expert to make this argument.  Bear in mind that most of us have had those days where we slip or fall without suffering any real injury beyond embarrassment.

Think about this:  if you were ever seriously hurt at work, why would you wait a month or even a week to report the injury?  What would be the advantage in NOT reporting it right away? It may make sense to wait a couple of days to see if the body recoveres, but 30 days?  That hardly seems plausible.  If the employee admits to treating outside workers’ compensation close in time to the alleged injury, the employer must obtain those records (often they are family doctor records) to see what history the employee provided to the unauthorized physician. Frequently there is no mention of any work injury at all. On the other hand, if the employee has not treated within 30 days, how significant could the event have been?

Winning notice defenses at 30 days comes down to proving that the employer was prejudiced by the delay.  Consider this:  if you rode a bike to the town library and then found an hour later that the bike was stolen, what are the chances that the police could help you if you waited 30 days to notify them? The fact of the matter is that people do report those kinds of incidents right away.  It’s common sense, but common sense often does not prevail in workers’ compensation.  If a claim is reported 30 days late, supervisors and witnesses may not remember the details of events 30 days ago, store security tapes may have been erased or played over, and physical conditions that may have caused the alleged accident will have changed.   Employers are almost always prejudiced by reporting delays of 30 or more days.  These reporting delays make no sense when one considers that most employers train employees about prompt reporting and include this in their employee manuals.

The only conclusion for employers is that these kinds of cases should be denied, and lack of timely notice should be aggressively pursued with the argument that the failure to timely report the injury has indeed prejudiced the employer.

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John H. Geaney, Esq., is an Executive Committee Member and a Shareholder in Capehart Scatchard's Workers’ Compensation Group.  Mr. Geaney concentrates his practice in the representation of employers, self-insured companies, third-party administrators, and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation, the Americans with Disabilities Act and Family and Medical Leave Act. Should you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Mr. Geaney at 856.914.2063 or by e‑mail at jgeaney@capehart.com.