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NWCDN is a network of law firms dedicated to protecting employers in workers’ compensation claims.


NWCDN Members regularly post articles and summary judgements in workers’ compensations law in your state.  


Select a state from the dropdown menu below to scroll through the state specific archives for updates and opinions on various workers’ compensation laws in your state.


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The Supreme Court recently released its decision in Ex Parte Lincare, Inc., which involved an employee who was allegedly assaulted by her supervisor on the employer’s premises immediately after she was terminated. The employee sued her employer for workers’ compensation benefits, and sued both her employer and her supervisor for assault, battery, and the tort of outrage. The employer and supervisor filed motions to dismiss and motions to sever, arguing that the workers’ compensation claim should be severed from the employee’s tort claims, and that the tort claims were due to be dismissed based on the exclusivity provisions of §§ 25-5-52 and 25-5-53 of The Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act. , The supervisor also filed a motion to strike the plaintiff’s jury demand, based on an agreement in the employee’s job application that stated such a waiver was a condition of hire. The trial court issued an order granting the severance, but denying the motions to dismiss and the motion to strike. Both defendants then filed a petition for writ of mandamus with the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that the employee’s alleged assault occurred in and arose out of her employment because it was precipitated by her resignation while she was on her employer’s premises and concerned her possession of certain documents owned by her employer. The Court also noted that the employee’s alleged injuries were not expected or intended by her employer, so they fell within the definition of a "accident" within the meaning of the Act. The Court noted that "even following an employee’s termination, the employee must be given a reasonable time to leave the premises before the employer-employee relationship is considered severed and the workers’ compensation act is rendered inapplicable". As such, the Supreme Court granted the employer’s petition for writ of mandamus, holding that the assault and battery claims were barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Act. However, the Supreme Court denied the supervisor’s petition for writ mandamus, because Alabama law provides for mandamus review of the denial of a motion to dismiss only in cases where the motion is based in immunity (as was the case for the employer, but not the supervisor). Finally, the Supreme Court denied the supervisor’s motion to strike the plaintiff’s jury demand, because the supervisor was not a party to the employment agreement.

About the Author

This article was written by Charley M. Drummond, Esq. of Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC. Fish Nelson & Holden is a law firm located in Birmingham, Alabama dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers, and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation cases and related liability matters. Drummond and his firm are members of The National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network (NWCDN). The NWCDN is a national and Canadian network of reputable law firms organized to provide employers and insurers access to the highest quality representation in workers’ compensation and related employer liability fields. If you have questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the author at cdrummond@fishnelson.com or (205) 332-3414.

Also, new DWC policy (coming, we’re told, from the Chief Docketing Clerk) is for Benefit Review Officers to set disputes for CCH within 60 days of the BRC regardless of whether the participants can be available on the selected date.  So, if there is only one slot available within two months of the BRC and one or both parties cannot attend, it will be set anyway. The conflicted party is advised to request a continuance. How this outcome differs substantively from just setting the thing outside of 60 days to begin with is anyone’s guess.  We chalk it up to DWC-logic. 

Larry Beckham, one of the Ft. Worth Benefit Review Officers, will be retiring effective November 30, 2016. 

John Bell, one of the Dallas Hearing Officers, has accepted employment with a carrier firm. He, too, will leave the Division on November 30. 

The DWC is apparently having trouble finding qualified applicants to take Mr. Bell’s place and to fill the vacancy left by David Northup in San Antonio last August. 

Chiropractor Garry Craighead, recipient of the aforementioned kickbacks, treated Texas injured workers until the Division got wise to him and denied him admission to the Division’s former approved doctors list on August 26, 2007. Thereafter, he was prohibited from providing healthcare services in the Texas Workers’ Compensation System. However, he continued to treat federal injured workers until being charged with federal crimes.

Craighead pleaded guilty in December 2015 to counts including solicitation and receipt of illegal remunerations in federal health programs. He was sentenced June 10, 2016 to 14 years in prison and ordered to repay more than $17 million to the U.S. Department of Labor.

Craighead treated mainly U.S. Postal Service workers at his Union Treatment Centers. In 2008, Craighead issued a notice to all AFL-CIO union members and postal employees stating:

Important Notice to all Branch 181 Letter Carriers in the Austin Area, our Union brothers and sisters were recently informed of the numerous advantages being offered by Garry Craighead, a physician and Director of Union Treatment Centers located at 8900 Shoal Creek Blvd. Building 200, in Austin, TX. 78757. . . . .

Dr. Craighead is providing assistance and treatment for all Federal and State Workers Compensation claims to benefit your "on the job injury needs" . . . .

The notice did not identify the specific "advantages" Craighead offered the Union brothers and sisters for treating with him over other providers.

Nermin Awad-El-Hadik, owner of the Hope Pharmacy in Houston, appeared before a U.S. Magistrate Judge in Austin on November 9, 2016 and pleaded guilty to one count of willful offer and payment of illegal remuneration in relation to a federal health care program.

El-Hadik admitted to paying more than $5 million in kickbacks to Austin chiropractor Garry Craighead, D.C. during a short period between March 2015 and December 2015. Craighead operated the Union Treatment Centers with eight clinics in Texas. El-Hadik paid kickbacks to Craighead to refer federally insured employees to her pharmacy to have their prescriptions filled and for influencing physicians to prescribe compounded drugs that would be filled at her pharmacy. She faces up to five years in prison when she appears before Judge Sam Sparks for sentencing.

The wife and children of a deceased claimant brought wrongful death and survival claims against the third-party administrator that adjusted his workers’ compensation claim. The claimant was a ventilator dependent quadriplegic. Attorneys for the wife and children alleged that repeated requests were made to the administrator for a specialized bed for the claimant; that these requests were either ignored or refused; and that the failure to provide the specialized bed resulted in the claimant’s death. The Texarkana Court of Appeals noted that it’s not clear from their allegations whether they received a denial or no response at all. The Court stated that either way though, the matter could and should have been submitted to the Division. Yet, there is no allegation that they even attempted to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to filing suit. The Court dismissed their suit on the grounds that their claims were barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Texas Labor Code and the wife and children were required to exhaust their administrative remedies. Having failed to do so, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

Freeman v. JI Specialty Services, Inc., No. 06-15-00106-CV, 2016 WL 6503847 (Tex. App.–Texarkana, Nov. 3, 2016).

Chiropractic is a form of alternative medicine founded by Daniel David ("D.D.") Palmer at the end of the 19th century. Palmer worked as a magnetic healer prior to founding chiropractic. In 1895, he met a man with severely impaired hearing. Palmer discovered a lump in his back and claimed that he restored the man’s hearing by adjusting his spine. This led Palmer to develop the theory of chiropractic which is that the underlying cause of all diseases of the body is misalignment of the bones, primarily of the spinal vertebrae. Palmer explained, "A subluxated vertebra ... is the cause of 95 percent of all diseases ... The other five percent is caused by displaced joints other than those of the vertebral column." These subluxations of the vertebrae are treated by manipulating the spinal joints to correct "nerve flow." Palmer opened the Palmer School of Chiropractic in 1897 to teach his techniques. The theory of chiropractic does not have a scientific basis yet it has managed to survive to the present. Today, Palmer’s adherents are heavily involved in the examination and treatment of Texas injured workers, with 365 chiropractors certified to perform designated doctor examinations as of September 2016.

On October 19, 2016, Travis County District Court Judge Rhonda Hurley signed a final judgment in favor of the Texas Medical Association (TMA) in its latest lawsuit against the Texas Board of Chiropractic Examiners (TBCE). Judge Hurley declared void TBCE rules that permit chiropractors to make medical diagnoses and to perform vestibular-ocular-nystagmus (VON) testing.

Judge Hurley determined that the TBCE rule authorizing certain chiropractors to perform VON testing exceeds the scope of chiropractic as defined by the Texas Legislature. She also determined that the TBCE’s definition of "musculoskeletal system" to include "nerves," its definition of "subluxation complex" as a "neuromusculoskeletal condition," and its use of the term "diagnosis" in its scope of practice rule, all exceed the scope of chiropractic, and are therefore void.

The TBCE’s website states that the Board voted to appeal Judge Hurley’s decision. If her decision is affirmed on appeal, it could have implications in workers’ compensation cases where a chiropractor diagnoses a condition outside their scope of practice to do so.

TMA previously brought another successful lawsuit against the TBCE challenging its rules that permitted chiropractors to perform needle EMG and manipulation under anesthesia. Travis County District Court Judge Stephen Yelenosky declared the rules void because they exceeded the statutory scope of chiropractic practice and, therefore, constituted the unlawful practice of medicine. The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed, in an opinion issued July 6, 2012.

The Texas Association of Acupuncture and Oriental Medicine has also brought suit against the TBCE. They seek a declaration that the TBCE rule authorizing chiropractors to perform acupuncture is invalid. That case is presently pending in Travis County District Court.

On December 2, 2016, Travis County District Court Judge Stephen Yelenosky will hear the appeal of the decision from the State Office of Administrative Hearings (SOAH) in the lead group of air ambulance fee disputes between various workers’ compensation carriers and PHI Air Medical. SOAH Judge Craig Bennett ruled in favor of the carriers in 2015 when he held that the federal Airline Deregulation Act does not preempt Texas workers’ compensation laws that govern the amount of reimbursement paid to air ambulance providers for transporting injured workers. Judge Yelenosky will decide whether that decision is correct. The Division has intervened in support of the carriers’ position on preemption. Judge Yelenosky is retiring at the end of the year so his decision is expected before then.

On December 7, 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in New Orleans will hear oral argument inAir Evac EMS, Inc. v. State of Texas, Department of Insurance, Division of Workers’ Compensation. Air Evac, another large for-profit air ambulance provider, filed a declaratory judgment lawsuit against the Division based on the SOAH decision in the lead group of fee disputes with PHI Air Medical. The suit was filed in federal district court in Austin, Texas. Air Evac sought a declaration that the ADA preempts Texas workers’ compensation laws that govern the amount of reimbursement paid to air ambulance providers for services provided to injured workers and therefore, the Division must order carriers to pay its unregulated billed charges.

The carriers in the PHI Air Medical case intervened in Air Evac’s lawsuit. The carriers and Division moved to dismiss on the grounds that Air Evac has no right to bring suit in federal court but that even if it did, Air Evac’s lawsuit should still be dismissed to allow the preemption issue to be decided in the state proceedings where that issue was litigated for the last three years. Federal District Court Judge Sam Sparks granted the motions and dismissed Air Evac’s lawsuit. Air Evac appealed the dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to determine whether Judge Sparks was correct to dismiss the case. If it rules he was not, the case will go back to Judge Sparks for further proceedings consistent with the court’s ruling. Oral argument is set in the case on December 7, 2016.

There were 643 air ambulance disputes pending at the Division as of October 21, 2016, by far the single largest category of medical fee disputes. Additionally, there are around 130 more cases pending at SOAH. In April, Commissioner Brannan announced that he directed Division staff to abate all air ambulance disputes until the final outcome of the litigation regarding federal preemption. The number of disputes pending at the Division will continue to grow as more disputes are filed at a rate of about 30 per month.

 

H&W Workers' Compensation Defense Newsletter
Vol. 1, Issue 4

Hamberger & Weiss Elects Nicole Graci to Partnership 

We are pleased to announce that Nicole Graci has been elected as a partner in the firm, effective January 1, 2017. Nicole has been practicing workers' compensation defense since 2000. She plays a lead role with the firm's Section 32 settlement team and is a frequent presenter on various aspects of New York Workers' Compensation Law and Medicare Secondary Payer Compliance, including Mandatory Insurer Reporting under the Medicaid and S.C.H.I.P. Extension Act of 2007. 

Since 2011, she has authored the New York section of The Complete Guide to Medicare Secondary Payer Compliance(Jennifer C. Jordan, Editor-in-Chief). In 2015 she also contributed the settlement chapter of theNew York Workers' Compensation Handbook, published by LexisNexis and authored byRonald E. Weiss and Ronald Balter. 

She is a member of the Erie County and New York State Bar Associations, member of the Erie County Bar Association Workers' Compensation Committee, Secretary and Board Member of the Erie County Bar Foundation, Vice President of the Self-Insurers' Association of the Niagara Frontier, and is on the National Workers' Compensation Defense Network's Medicare Compliance Committee.

Nicole is resident in our Buffalo office.

Recent Developments in Loss of Wage Earning Capacity

On 11/3/16, the Appellate Division, Third Department ruled in three decisions that the Board can consider vocational factors in determining the weekly rate of compensation for permanently partially disabled claimants. Prior to this, the Appellate Division consistently held that vocational factors were relevant only with respect to the duration of benefits for a permanently partially disabled claimant and had no bearing on the rate of compensation. The 11/3/16 decisions are a departure from prior decisions regarding the determination of a claimant's weekly compensation rate and clarify that the Board need not base the compensation rate for permanently partially disabled claimants solely on medical impairment. 

Allowing the consideration of vocational factors in setting the rate of compensation for permanently partially disabled claimants is surprising, given that Section 15(5-a), the statutory basis for setting the rate of compensation for both temporary and permanent disability, contains no reference to vocational factors—a point often made by the Appellate Division in its decisions prior to 11/3/16 on this issue.
 
The lead decision on this issue was Rosales v. Eugene J. Felice Landscaping,in which the Court explicitly declined to extend its ruling in Canales v. Pinnacle Foods, LLC, to permanent partial disability claims.Canales concerned a dispute over whether vocational factors could be considered in determining the rate of compensation during a period of temporary disability. Although language inCanales and the subsequently decided Franklin v. New England Motor Freight stated that vocational factors are only relevant in determining the duration of a claimant's permanent partial disability benefits, the Court inRosales decided that vocational factors could be considered in determining the rate of compensation for a permanently partially disabled claimant. In distinguishingCanales, the Court relied on what it called a “key distinction” between temporary and permanent disability: that permanently partially disabled claimants have “no expectation” of returning to their former or similar employment and thus it is “necessary” to consider vocational factors in such cases even though it is not appropriate to do so for temporarily disabled claimants.
 
Any hopes that the Court’s decision in Rosales was an anomaly were dashed by Sarbo v. Tri-Valley Plumbing & Heating in which the Court applied its holding in Rosales to a different fact pattern, making it clear that theRosales rule applies to all permanent partial disability claims.
 
Finally, in Till v. Apex Rehabilitationthe Court held that, for a non-working claimant, "loss of wage earning capacity" is not automatically the inverse of the claimant’s "wage earning capacity." Rather, the claimant’s wage earning capacity is a separate and distinct factual determination from loss of wage earning capacity.

In light of these recent decisions, it is important to remember that vocational factors can affect the rate of compensation as well as the duration of PPD benefits. Thus, employers and carriers should obtain and use vocational evidence such as vocational expert reports in appropriate cases to develop the best defenses on their cases. 

Board Announces New Opioid Weaning Process

The Board has announced a new hearing process for opioid weaning issues. The RFA-2 form has been modified to include a new hearing purpose under the “Medical Issues” section of the form labeled “Opioid Weaning under Non-Acute Pain Guidelines.” To use this section of the form, the Board isrequiring an Independent Medical Examination or records review which states weaning is appropriate and provides a weaning program or resource. There isno requirement for an IME or record review within the regulations or the Medical Treatment Guidelines. The burden is on the attending physician to comply in the first place. In fact, there are some Board Decisions that direct weaning without an IME or record review, or when such a report was already precluded. Nevertheless, we always recommend an IME or record review as they tend to provide appropriate alternatives and weaning plans.
 
Once the employer, carrier, or administrator files the RFA-2 for opioid weaning, the claimant is to obtain a report from his or her prescribing physician, which must be filed by the date of the hearing.  The hearing should be held approximately 45 days after the Board notifies the claimant of your request for a hearing. If the claimant wishes to depose the IME, such transcript must be submitted to the Board before the hearing. If the claimant submits contrary medical, the employer/carrier may request cross-examination of the provider at the hearing.
 
The WCLJ will issue a ruling that either directs weaning, weaningand enrollment in an addiction treatment program or no weaning. The employer/carrier will be required to cover the cost of any addiction treatment program or weaning protocol. If the WCLJ orders enrollment in an addiction treatment program, after 30 days the employer/carrier will only be liable for payment of narcotic prescriptions written by an addiction treatment program physician. The Board has developed a brochure with the cooperation of the NYS Office of Alcoholism and Substance Abuse Services with information regarding addiction treatment services available throughout the State.  
 
Certainly, these are continuing moves in the right direction on this issue.

Court of Appeals Issues Two Decisions in November

The Court of Appeals is the highest court in the State of New York and the Court of last resort in New York Workers' Compensation matters. Decisions from the Court of Appeals on workers' compensation matters are rare as only a few cases each year are accepted by the Court for review.   

In Ace Fire Underwriters Insurance Company v. Special Funds Conservation Committee, the Court ruled that the Special Disability Fund’s written consent to settlement of a third party action settlement must be obtained but if it was not, the carrier has the right to compel Special Funds’ consent via an order nunc pro tunc

In Diegelman v. City of Buffalothe Court ruled that municipalities electing not to provide workers’ compensation coverage for police officers may be sued by officers injured in the line of duty. General Municipal Law (GML) §207-c does not bar such an action.  Presumably the right to sue would also apply to firefighters covered under GML §207-a but not by an employer’s workers’ compensation plan. This decision shows that the General Municipal Law does not provide the same exclusive remedy provisions to employers afforded by the Workers' Compensation Law. 
 

H&W Obtains §114-a Fraud Finding at Appellate Division

In Leising v. Williamsville Central School District,our firm successfully convinced the Appellate Division to reverse a Board finding that the claimant did not commit workers' compensation fraud under WCL §114-a. This case involved a claimant who was working in a seasonal job at a golf course while collecting indemnity payments. Claimant initially disclosed her job at the golf course to the carrier, but then subsequently rescinded the disclosure, stating that it was a mistake and that she was not working. Later, claimant also failed to disclose the employment during a telephone conversation with the carrier’s claims handler when asked if she was working. The claimant inadvertently tipped the carrier off to her job by calling the claims handler from the golf course, causing her employer’s name to show up on the caller ID display. 
 
The WCLJ found a fraud violation and imposed a lifetime disqualification from indemnity awards. Claimant appealed and the Board reversed, inexplicably finding that any misrepresentations by claimant about her work activities were not material for purposes of the fraud statute. Eventually realizing their mistake, the Board then issued a modified decision simply finding insufficient proof that claimant concealed her employment from the carrier. 
 
The Appellate Division reversed under the substantial evidence rule, finding no rational reading of the evidence in the record could support the Board’s finding. This holding by the Appellate Division is notable for two reasons. First, reversals under the substantial evidence rule are rare. The Court almost always defers to factual findings by the Board. Second, the Court is normally bound by the Board’s credibility findings when assessing the weight of witness testimony. However, in this case the court parsed the facts in the record closely, and held that the Board credibility findings were irrelevant, stating that no credibility issue existed on the important points of testimony from the carrier’s main witness. This holding by the Court could arguably be interpreted as stating that no credibility issue exists as a matter of law when the important points of witness testimony are not contradicted and there is no other reason to question the veracity of that testimony. Additional decisions from the Court may be needed to clarify to whether this is what the Court intended. The case now returns to the Board for a modified decision regarding whether the misrepresentations identified in the Court’s decision were material.  

Appellate Division Rules that Federal Lawsuit for Sexual Discrimination, Assault is 3rd Party Action Requiring Carrier's Consent to Settle

Shiner v. SUNY at Buffalo stemmed from an incident in December, 2010, when one of claimant’s supervisors sexually harassed and groped her at an office holiday party. Claimant filed a workers’ compensation claim, and also sued her supervisor and the employer in federal court, alleging a hostile work environment, discrimination, battery, and assault. The workers’ compensation claim was established for post-traumatic stress disorder and a neck injury. Claimant settled her federal lawsuit against the supervisor and employer for $255,000.00, with both the employer and supervisor contributing funds to the settlement.  $65,000.00 of the settlement amount was specifically allocated for “back and front pay.” Claimant did not obtain consent from the carrier before settling the federal lawsuit. 
 
Upon learning of the settlement, the carrier sought disqualification from all future workers’ compensation benefits under WCL §29 based on claimant’s failure to obtain its consent to the federal lawsuit settlement. Claimant argued that the federal lawsuit was not a third-party action within the meaning of the WCL §29, highlighting language in the statute referring to “the negligence or wrong of another not in the same employ.” Claimant also argued that the lawsuit stemmed from intentional actions of a co-worker, and that this took the lawsuit outside of the scope of a third-party action. 
 
The Appellate Division noted that a portion of the claimant’s recovery from the lawsuit was for lost wages. Citing a previous decision from the Court of Appeals, the Appellate Division stated, “[w]henever a recovery is obtained in tort [a specific form of civil lawsuit] for the same injury that was a predicate for the payment of compensation benefits,” it would be unreasonable to bar reimbursement for workers’ compensation payments made by the carrier simply because the claimant recovered money from the pockets of a co-worker or the employer as opposed to from a stranger. An exception to this rule applies where the actions by the co-worker or employer are done in furtherance of the employer’s business, which is clearly not the case for a sexual assault. 
 
The bottom line is that when there is any doubt about whether a claimant’s civil lawsuit falls within the scope of the definition of a third-party action under WCL §29, the claimant acts at his or her peril by settling that lawsuit without first seeking consent of the workers’ compensation carrier.  

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buffalo@hwcomp.com

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Rochester, NY 14614
585-262-6390
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