State News

NWCDN is a network of law firms dedicated to protecting employers in workers’ compensation claims.


NWCDN Members regularly post articles and summary judgements in workers’ compensations law in your state.  


Select a state from the dropdown menu below to scroll through the state specific archives for updates and opinions on various workers’ compensation laws in your state.


Contact information for NWCDN members is also located on the state specific links in the event you have additional questions or your company is seeking a workers’ compensation lawyer in your state.


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Thomas Howell HIGHT JR.
 
Thomas Hight, Jr., an Administrative Law Judge at the Dallas field office of the Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers’ Compensation, passed away on August 19, 2025.

He was widely regarded as one of the Division’s most knowledgeable ALJs. More important than that, he was a kind and gentle soul. He will be greatly missed.

Copyright 2025, Stone Loughlin & Swanson, LLP

Predicting the Future is Too Often a Swing-and-a-Miss - Connecting the Dots

  

This month DWC published a proposed rule amending Rule 130.102 concerning eligibility for Supplemental Income Benefits. But those of you hoping that DWC would put some teeth in the rule to require a SIBs applicant to prove that he made a genuine effort to find work will be sorely disappointed. It has about as many teeth as our snuff-dipping granny.

The impetus: The proposed revision appears to be in response to a decision from the Austin court of appeals in Texas Dep’t. of Ins., Div. Workers’ Comp. v. Accident Fund Ins. Co. of America, et al., in which Accident Fund, represented by SLS, challenged the validity and applicability of parts of the rule. In that case, the insurance carriers argued that SIBs applicants who claim to be looking for work on their own (without going through a vocational rehabilitation program or requesting the assistance of the Texas Workforce Commission), cannot qualify for SIBs merely by making “work search contacts” (which can be emails or telephone calls) but, instead, they must submit actual job applications to prospective employers. A Travis County district court ruled for the carriers and enjoined DWC from awarding SIBs to applicants who make only work search contacts, and the court of appeals affirmed that injunction. As a result, DWC saw the need to revise its rule.

The new rule is an improvement: The new rule proposed by DWC would require a SIBs applicant to document a work search with job applications submitted. And it would clarify that “job application” means “a physical or electronic form or other document that is submitted to an employer . . .” so that an applicant could not claim that he submitted a job application if he merely called a business by telephone and asked if they are hiring.

But it could be so much better: The proposed rule would not require a SIBs applicant to provide the insurance carrier with a copy of the job application he submitted so that the carrier can verify that he submitted a complete application. It would not require a SIBs applicant to cooperate with a prospective employer that asks to set up an interview. And it would not require a SIBs applicant to apply only for jobs that the applicant has a reasonable chance of being able to perform given his education, skills, and functional limitations.
 
Why it matters: The current SIBs rule does not work. Too many claimants abuse it as a hand out, not a hand up. If DWC adopts the new rule as proposed, little, if anything, is likely to change. Those claimants will continue to “go through the motions” to obtain SIBs rather than making a genuine effort to find work. They will continue to submit job applications that are not completely filled out, they will continue to ignore any invitations to interview, and they will continue to apply for jobs that they have no earthly chance of being able to perform with the sole purpose of satisfying the requirements of the rule. And DWC will contribute to their dependency on SIBs by ordering carriers to pay them, quarter after quarter after quarter.

There’s still hope: But there’s still time for DWC to come through. This is just a proposed rule. DWC is requesting oral and written comments at a public hearing on the rule on October 1, 2025, and it will continue to accept written comments until October 6, 2025. SLS will be submitting written comments and we urge other system participants to do the same. Together, let’s urge DWC to revise the rule so that it supports claimants who demonstrate that they are truly trying to find work -- but not those who don’t.

Copyright 2025, Stone Loughlin & Swanson, LLP 


Earthquakes: Facts about why the Earth moves | Live Science
 


The legal landscape in Texas is changing as Texas judges begin to apply the Supreme Court of Texas’ holding in University of Texas Rio Grande Valley v. Oteka, which the Court issued in June.

Flashback: In Oteka, the Court addressed the circumstances under which DWC has exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a worker was in the course and scope of employment at the time of an injury. The case arose after Rita Oteka, a nursing professor at the university, voluntarily attended a commencement ceremony. Afterward, as she was walking to her car, a vehicle driven by a university police officer struck and injured her.

The university, which is self-insured for purposes of workers’ compensation, reported the injury to its claims administrator which denied the claim asserting, among other things, that Oteka was not in the course and scope of her employment. Oteka did not challenge that denial or file a workers’ compensation claim. Instead, she sued the police officer for negligence.

The university asserted the affirmative defense that recovery of workers’ compensation benefits was Oteka’s exclusive remedy because the injury was related to her work.  Oteka asserted that the injury was not work-related because she voluntarily attended the ceremony and had already left when she was injured.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the exclusive remedy defense, but before the trial judge could rule on the motions the university’s claims administrator reversed course and sent a letter to Oteka explaining that her injury had been accepted as compensable and benefits would be paid. Then the university filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that DWC had exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether Oteka was injured in the court and scope of her employment. The trial judge denied the plea to the jurisdiction and the court of appeals affirmed. The supreme court also affirmed and held that DWC does not have exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether an injury occurred in the course and scope of employment when (1) the issued was raised by the employer’s affirmative remedy defense and (2) the employee’s lawsuit does not hinge on entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits.

Where we are now: Now that Texas judges are applying the holding in Oteka, they are reaching some surprising outcomes. One such surprise is a procedural ruling in favor of the injured worker in B & T Dependable Services, LLC v. Santos.
That case arose when Edward Santos, a landscape worker for B & T, finished his work for the day and then jumped into the bed of B & T truck that was towing a trailer carrying B & T equipment.  During the ride, Santos fell out of the truck bed and was run over by the trailer.
 
B & T reported the injury to its workers’ compensation carrier, Texas Mutual Insurance Company, which began paying workers’ compensation income and medical benefits. Santos accepted those benefits, which totaled more than $663, 894. He even applied for eight separate quarters of Supplemental Income Benefits and represented in each application that B & T was his employer. Nevertheless, Sanchez sued B & T for negligence, asserting his district court pleadings that he was not B & T’s employee but was, instead, an independent contractor.

B & T and Texas Mutual filed a plea to the jurisdiction and a motion for summary judgment arguing, among other things, that the suit was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act. The trial court denied the plea to the jurisdiction and the motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed, citing Oteka, and held that DWC did not have exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether Santos’ injury occurred in the course and scope of employment for B & T. It said “although Oteka is factually distinguishable, it is legally guiding . . . in this case, just like Oteka, Santos’ [district court] claims are not based on his entitlement to benefits.”
                           
Copyright 2025, Stone Loughlin & Swanson, LLP 

 

On July 24, 2025, the Texas Eleventh Court of Appeals in Eastland reversed a judgment awarding an old law claimant $750,000 in “bad faith” damages from his workers’ compensation insurance carrier plus attorney’s fees of $75,950.
 
Donald Bristow was permanently paralyzed in a motor vehicle accident in 1990.  Bristow’s claim is considered an “old law” claim because he was injured prior to January 1, 1991 when the new workers’ compensation law took effect.  Therefore, Bristow’s claim is governed by the law that was in effect prior to 1991.
 
In 1993, Bristow and his workers’ compensation insurance carrier, Sentry Insurance, entered into a compromise settlement agreement that included a provision that Sentry would pay Bristow $3,650 per month for Bristow’s ongoing home health care.
 
This case began in 2018 when Sentry Insurance filed a motion to terminate its obligation to pay Bristow for home health care services on the grounds that he no longer needed the services.  Bristow brought counter-claims against Sentry for bad faith claim handling and violations of the Texas Insurance Code. 
 
In 2022, a Nolan County jury awarded Bristow $250,000 in mental anguish damages and $500,000 in additional damages under the Texas Insurance Code.  Sentry appealed the trial court’s judgment partly on the basis that Bristow’s claims are barred by the Texas Supreme Court’s 2012 holding in Texas Mutual Insurance Company v. Ruttiger. 
 
In Ruttiger, the Texas Supreme Court held that the new workers’ compensation law “prescribes detailed, [DWC]-supervised, time-compressed processes for carriers to handle claims and for dispute resolution” and that it contains “multiple, sometimes redundant but sometimes additive, penalty and sanction provisions for enforcing compliance.”  Therefore, the new law “effectively eliminates the need for a judicially imposed cause of action.”
 
Bristow argued that Ruttiger is limited to new law claims and that a 2016 decision holding otherwise from the 14th Court of Appeals in Houston was wrongly decided.  That case was In Re Illinois Employers Ins. of Wausau (Wausau II).
 
However, the Eastland Court followed Ruttiger and Wausau II and held that Bristow’s statutory and bad faith claims are barred.  The Eastland Court explained that it is the date of the alleged misconduct, not the date of the injury that dictates the applicability of Ruttiger.  You can read the Eastland Court’s decision here.
 
Bristow can petition the Texas Supreme Court to review the Eastland Court’s decision but it may be less likely to hear the case due to its limited impact since it has been over 34 years since the last old law claim.


Copyright 2025, Stone Loughlin & Swanson, LLP 


The Texas Supreme Court in Ruttiger based its decision to eliminate the common law cause of action for “bad faith” claim handling in workers’ compensation partly on the detailed enforcement process provided to DWC in the new workers’ compensation law. 
 
DWC takes that responsibility seriously as we can see from a review of this month’s disciplinary orders.  DWC issued 17 disciplinary orders in July with all but one against an insurance carrier.  The largest fine against a carrier in July was $51,000 (Disciplinary Order 2025-9389). 
 
To determine the fine amount, DWC considers a number of aggravating factors.  For example, in Disciplinary Order 2025-9393 DWC found the following factors to be aggravating:
 
  1. The violations are serious, involving $ in late medical benefits, income benefits, travel reimbursement, and attorney fees. Further, Respondent did not comply with the interest payment obligation in File No. 36758 until it received notice of enforcement action. Also, Respondent’s failure to comply with six DWC orders is a priority investigation under Tex. Lab. Code § 402.0235;
  2. Respondent has a history of 195 administrative violations since , including 54 violations involving attorney fees, medical bill payment,• and travel reimbursement;
  3. A penalty is necessary to deter future violations considering Respondent has had 195 administrative violations since ;
  4. Respondent received an economic benefit from the prohibited acts to the detriment of multiple system participants; and Respondent is the 11th largest workers’ compensation insurance carrier in Texas and has a heightened awareness of the legal duty to comply with the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act and DWC rules.
 
For carriers that are slow learners, it can be costly.  Therefore, we recommend perusing DWC’s disciplinary orders as one of the best ways for system participants to learn what to do and what not to do.
 
The takeaway here is that we can all learn a lot from “Ruttiger”: https://youtu.be/1S2D431Gbks?si=Ft1jyZU9oCfLWCeU

Copyright 2025, Stone Loughlin & Swanson, LLP


On June 1, 2025, the revised Texas Administrative Code §133.30 (“Telemedicine, Telehealth, and Teledentistry Services”) went into effect.  As of that date, treating doctors—though not Designated Doctors or Required Medical Examiners—are permitted to perform MMI evaluations remotely via telemedicine.  The certifying doctor is only allowed to determine if MMI has been attained and, if so, to provide a determination of no permanent impairment. 
 
The rule specifies, “The term [telemedicine services] does not include an examination to assign an impairment rating” under Rule 130.1.  The injured worker must have been examined by the treating doctor for the same condition(s) at least once prior to the telemedicine exam, and he/she must agree to be certified in that manner. 
 
Injuries to be rated in this manner must qualify for no impairment, cannot require further treatment, and must be considered “minor” in accordance with Rule 130.2(a)(2).  That subsection allows a treating doctor to provide an MMI certification without scheduling an examination only if the injured employee is not receiving Temporary Income Benefits and has been released from treatment without the expectation of further treatment.

Copyright 2025, Stone Loughlin & Swanson, LLP

New Rollout: ICA Introduces Updated Form 101 – Employer’s Report of Accident

The Industrial Commission of Arizona (ICA) has officially launched its newly updated Form 101 – Employer’s Report of Accident as part of a modernization initiative directed by the Governor’s Office. A recent presentation by the ICA introduced the changes and provided important rollout details for employers and stakeholders.

What’s New?

This updated form aims to simplify the reporting process while ensuring critical information is captured:

  • Simplified layout and removal of outdated or unnecessary fields.
  • New fields added, such as dominant upper extremity, which plays a role in determining permanent disability awards.
  • Web-based submission only – The Commission will not accept service via fax or mail.

Compliance Deadline

Per ARS § 23-908(G), employers must report workplace injuries within 10 days.
The new online-only form was released on April 7, 2025, and the ICA is allowing a 90-day transition period.
Effective Monday, July 7, 2025, the ICA will no longer accept faxed or mailed versions of Form 101.

Complete the new form here:
https://www.azica.gov/forms/employers-report-injury-form

Signature Process & Confirmation

After the form is completed:

  1. The submitter will receive an email requesting a digital signature.
  2. Once signed, a confirmation email will be sent along with the option to download a copy for records.

Access Issues

There was some confusion about the form’s visibility on the ICA Community page:

  • It is supposed to appear under “Claims” as the second form at the bottom.
  • However, if logged into the ICA account, the form may not appear due to a technical issue. ICA is working to resolve this.
  • In the meantime, the direct link above remains functional.

Employer Outreach & TPA Clarification

ICA encourages carriers to notify employers of this change and recommend attending upcoming training sessions. More presentations are scheduled next week, and ICA may add additional sessions based on demand.

At the present time, Third-Party Administrators (TPAs) can submit this form on behalf of employers. The Commission has indicated they will issue separate direction concerning TPA processing of this form. Ritsema will update clients regarding any administrative guidance received from the Commission.


New Rollout: ICA Introduces Updated Form 105 – New Notice of Suspension Informational Meeting

The Industrial Commission of Arizona (ICA) has proposed a new Form 105 – Notice of Suspension, intended for use by carriers or self‑insured employers to formally notify injured workers when their workers’ compensation benefits are suspended (e.g. due to noncompliance or missed medical requirements).

⚠️ The form is not yet effective. To review and provide feedback, the ICA is hosting an informational stakeholder meeting on October 8, 2025.
🔗 Join the stakeholder meeting on 10/08/2025

Why this matters:

  • Stakeholders can ask questions, offer commentary, and help shape how Form 105 will be implemented.

  • Employers, claims professionals, attorneys, providers, and injured worker advocates should participate to stay ahead of compliance changes.

  • After the meeting, ICA will issue a formal announcement of the effective date and procedural guidelines.

The N.Y.S. Board is in a "form frenzy" lately, with required use of the CMS-1500, two recent updates to the C-32 cover sheet for settlements, and a forthcoming overhaul of the medical bill objection C-8.1 form. 

Providers are now required to submit medical reports and bills electronically on the CMS-1500. The form, and accompanied narrative if desired, are submitted to the Board and carriers or self-insured employers via Board approved electronic partners, engaged by the providers.  The providers may bill the carriers and self-insured employers to cover the cost of the electronic submission partner. 

The new C-32 is extended from one to two pages. Parties are required to check boxes addressing outstanding medical present in a file before settlement, as well as resolution of C-8.1 bill objections. Both issues have long been addressed in the narrative portions of full and final or medical only settlement agreements. 

The revised C-8.1 requires the objecting party to specifically cite the basis of the objection, such as documentation in the Board file or specific sections of the Medical Treatment Guidelines. The enhancement contrasts sharply with the earlier C-8.1s which provided stock objections in boxes that could simply be checked by the submitter. 

The CMS-1500, C-32 and C-8.1 are available on the N.Y.S. Workers Compensation Board website. 

The Arkansas Court of Appeals recently dealt a blow to what’s known as the “Shipper Transport defense” when it found that a claimant was not barred from receiving workers compensation benefits for a torn bicep tendon even though he lied about having preexisting neck, back and shoulder issues on his post-offer/pre-placement health questionnaire which may have led to him being placed in a position which the employer likely would not have placed him in if they had been given an accurate medical history. Int'l Paper Co. v. Steward, 2024 Ark. App. 465, 700 S.W.3d 204. In 1979, the Arkansas Supreme Court established the Shippers Transport defense when it held that a workers compensation claimant would be barred from receiving workers compensation benefits if Respondents proved (1) that the employee knowingly and willfully made a false representation as to his/her physical condition, (2) that the employer relied upon the employee’s false representation, with such reliance playing a substantial factor in the hiring of the employee, and (3) that there was a causal connection between the false representation and the claimant’s injury.  Shippers Transp. of Ga. v. Stepp, 265 Ark. 365, 369, 578 S.W.2d 232, 234 (1979). In affirming the Full Commission’s and Administrative Law Judge’s narrow interpretation of Shippers Transport, the Arkansas Court of Appeals found that the Respondent Employer failed to satisfy the second prong of the test in establishing that they relied on the claimant’s false misrepresentations in hiring the claimant because the claimant had already been hired when he filled out the health questionnaire and lied about his preexisting conditions. Int'l Paper Co., 2024 Ark. App. 465 at 11.

Although the rationale behind the rulings of the Commission, Administrative Law Judge and Court of Appeals was fairly straightforward, it leaves employers beholden to the representations of newly hired workers regarding their physical limitations and preexisting injuries. At first glance, an Arkansas employer may want to avoid the dilemma that International Paper Company found itself in by having a job applicant fill out a health questionnaire before any employment offer is made so that the employer can figure out whether they have any open jobs that are suitable for the applicant’s physical condition while still being able to fall back on the Shippers Transport defense in case the applicant lies about their medical conditions. However, the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits employers from asking a job applicant if they are disabled, asking about the severity or nature of any impairment, or having the applicant fill out a medical questionnaire before the employer makes a job offer. This leaves Arkansas employers in a legal Catch-22 because on one hand they are barred under federal law from asking applicants about their physical condition prior to making a job offer, and on the other hand, they are required to prove that they relied on the claimant's pre-offer misrepresentations about their physical condition in deciding to hire the claimant to successfully assert the Shippers Transport defense.

As suggested by Arkansas Workers Compensation Commissioner Michael Mayton in his dissenting opinion, “[t]he rule of law in the Shippers Transport case should be expanded beyond the actual moment of hiring to encompass the entire hiring process, including job placement.” Ronald Steward, Emp., Claimant v. International Paper Co., Emp., Respondent & Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs. Inc., Carrier/TPA, Respondent, No. H109777 (Ark. Work. Comp. Com., May 2, 2023), at *13. Employers like International Paper Company should be able to rely on the representations of new employees completing post-offer medical questionnaires and undergoing medical examinations in determining which job most safely suits those employees’ medical conditions and physical restrictions without worrying that they’ll be stuck footing the bill for an aggravation of a preexisting injury that could have been avoided if the employee was honest about their medical history in the first place. 

Unfortunately, we do not know how the current Arkansas Supreme Court would have applied the Shippers Transport defense to the facts of this case because the case was not appealed after the Court of Appeals issued its opinion affirming the award of benefits to the claimant. Therefore, Arkansas employers should ensure that they ask one of the few questions allowed under the Americans with Disabilities Act during the interview process, which is whether the applicant can perform the specific duties of a job with or without reasonable accommodation. Arkansas courts have not yet considered whether an employer would satisfy the second prong of the Shippers Transport test if they proved that they relied on the claimant’s dishonest answer to the foregoing question in hiring the claimant. However, employers would undoubtedly have a better chance of successfully asserting the Shippers Transport defense in the above scenario than if they continued to only have new employees fill out post-offer health questionnaires or undergo medical examinations where the employee will be able to lie about their preexisting health condition and physical restrictions without the risk of being barred from receiving workers compensation benefits. When inquiring about the applicant’s ability to perform job duties though, it’s imperative that employers avoid asking if the applicant is disabled or probing further by asking about the nature or severity of that applicant’s disability because such questions would leave the employer at risk of being sued for violating the applicant’s civil rights by discriminating against them in the hiring process on the basis of their disability. 

NWCDN Ohio State Law Update - October 2025


Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Update

 

BWC Actions

 

Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Unveils New Substance Use and Prevention Recovery Program

On July 16, 2025, the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (BWC) unveiled its new Substance Use Prevention and Recovery Program (SUPR). The innovative SUPR Program brings together the Drug Free Safety Program (DFSP), DFSP Safety Grants, and the Substance Use Recovery and Workplace Safety Program (SUR) under one umbrella designed to focus on workplace use and misuse of drugs and alcohol.  The voluntary program is designed to assist State Funded Employers in effectively preventing workplace injuries by integrating drug free initiatives into their workplace safety programs. The program changes are effective as of July 1, 2025.

According to BWC Administrator/CEO Stephanie McCloud, “…[C]ombining the key pieces of our previous programs into one creates a better and more efficient experience for our customers. The Substance Use Prevention and Recovery Program is focused on helping Ohio’s business manage and prevent substance use in their workplaces.”

Basic eligibility requirements for State Funded Employers or Public Employer Taxing Districts to participate in the SUPR program include: 1) being current on all payments due to the BWC; 2) having an active policy status; 3) not having cumulative lapses in coverage in excess of 40 days within the preceding 12 months; and (4) reporting actual payroll for the preceding policy year with payment of any additional premiums that may be due.

The SUPR program offers Employers a choice of four participation options: 1) Advance Level; 2) Basic Level; 3) Comparable Program; and 4) SUPR Reimbursement, with Advance Level and Basic Level participants being eligible for 7% and 4% bonuses respectively based upon their premium payments. Basic Level participation requirements include accident analysis training; written drug free workplace policies; employee education requirements; supervisor testing; drug and alcohol testing; and employee assistance. The Advance Level participation requirements include all of the Basic Level requirements in addition to random drug testing, and employee support and employee retention requirements. Those that choose the Comparable level program will be required to have a drug free workplace policy; education requirements; supervisor training; and drug and alcohol testing, while the Reimbursement Level does not require any training, reporting or drug testing like the other levels. Despite your level of participation, all employers are eligible for reimbursement of certain costs incurred in the management and prevention of substance use issues in the workplace.

What are some of the changes in the new SUPR program? Most participants will now automatically be eligible for reimbursement grants. Employers with “second chance” policies are now eligible for reimbursement of substance use assessments, and year-round enrollment in the program is also available. Additionally, an online portal is being developed for Employers to report on program requirement completion and request reimbursement of activities all in one place. For a summary of the changes to the program please click here.

Ohio Judicial Decisions

 

Violation of a Specific Safety Requirement (VSSR)

State ex rel. Prime Roof Solutions, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 2025-Ohio-4399 (September 23, 2025)

In a per curiam opinion of the Ohio Supreme Court, the 10th District Court of Appeals decision was affirmed finding that some evidence in the record supported the Ohio Industrial Commission’s granting of the claimant’s VSSR petition and finding that the employer had failed to provide him with the required fall-protection gear. (See Adm.Code 4123:1-3-03(J)(1) (requiring that fall-protection gear be provided to employees exposed to hazards of falling). The 10th District found that the employer failed to establish that Industrial Commission failed to perform a legal duty or abused its discretion in granting claimant’s application for VSSR award for violation of Adm.Code 4123:1-3-03(J)(1). The Court affirmed that some evidence supports commission’s finding that claimant was not assisting in installation of fall-protection system when he fell.

 

Permanent Total Disability (PTD)

State ex rel. Urban v. Wano Expediting, Inc., 2025-Ohio-3009 (August 29, 2025).

In another per curiam decision from the Ohio Supreme Court, the Court reversed the 10th District Court of Appeals judgment and denied the writ of mandamus. The Ohio Industrial Commission had denied claimant’s application for PTD, finding that he retains the ability to perform sustained remunerative employment with limitations at a sedentary level. Claimant filed a complaint at the 10th District seeking a writ of mandamus directing the Commission to vacate its order and issue a new order. The 10th District granted the writ, concluding that the Commission had failed to comply with Ohio Admin. Code 4121-3-34)D)(3)(i), an administrative rule under which it was required to consider claimant’s allowed psychological conditions in combination with his allowed physical conditions.

 

© Copyright 2025 by Christopher Ward and Raymond Tarasuck Calfee, Halter & Griswold, LLP. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.

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