NWCDN Members regularly post articles and summary judgements in workers’ compensations law in your state.
Select a state from the dropdown menu below to scroll through the state specific archives for updates and opinions on various workers’ compensation laws in your state.
Contact information for NWCDN members is also located on the state specific links in the event you have additional questions or your company is seeking a workers’ compensation lawyer in your state.
The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals recently released its opinion in Frederick Roosevelt Dunning, Jr. & Janice Dunning Sandifer v. Lula Mayhew, in which it determined Roosevelt and Lula were married at common law. Although the Alabama legislature abolished common law marriage in Alabama effective January 1, 2017, any common law marriage that existed prior to that date is still valid. The Court of Appeals reiterated that a common law marriage requires proof by clear and convincing evidence of capacity to marry; a present mutual agreement to permanently enter into a marital relationship to the exclusion of all other relationships; public recognition of the relationship as a marriage; a public assumption of the marital duties; and cohabitation. The Court of Appeals further stated that while there was conflicting evidence presented at trial concerning the second two elements, the trial court is tasked with making credibility determinations and resolving conflicting evidence and that the appellate courts may not disturb the trial court’s findings in that regard as long as they are supported by substantial evidence.
My Two Cents:
The issue of common law marriage comes up frequently in workers’ compensation death benefits cases. Interestingly, as this case points out, a party must prove a common law marriage by clear and convincing evidence, whereas the standard to recover workers’ compensation benefits is generally a preponderance of the evidence. Nevertheless, an appellate court will not re-weigh the evidence on appeal, so the trial court’s findings of fact are generally final. The trial judge is in the unique position of being able to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and the appeals courts cannot substitute their own judgment in that regard.
About the Author
This article was written by Charley M. Drummond, Esq. of Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC. Fish Nelson & Holden is a law firm located in Birmingham, Alabama dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers, and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation cases and related liability matters. Drummond and his firm are members of The National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network (NWCDN). The NWCDN is a national and Canadian network of reputable law firms organized to provide employers and insurers access to the highest quality representation in workers’ compensation and related employer liability fields. If you have questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the author at cdrummond@fishnelson.com or (205) 332-3414.
On August 1, 2016, a new federal law, The Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act of 2015, went into effect which required all federal agencies to adjust their monetary penalties to account for inflation. One such agency, the Occupational Health & Safety Administration (OSHA), increased its maximum penalty for "serious", "other than serious", and posting requirements violations to $12,675 per violation, and its maximum penalty for willful or repeated violations to $126,749 per violation. For the last year, all citations issued by OSHA have been subject to the "new" higher penalties. However, it seems that OSHA may have put the cart ahead of the horse, and as a result is charging violators more than the law actually allows.
OSHA, like all federal agencies, gets its rule making and enforcement authority from its authorizing statute, and that authorizing statute generally supercedes subsequent laws like The Federal Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act. The problem for OSHA is that the Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act) has not been amended to allow for the higher penalties. Under the OSH Act, OSHA cannot issue penalties higher than the levels set way back in 1990, which are up to $7,000 for "serious" violations, and up to $70,000 for repeat/willful violations.
My Two Cents:
The discrepancy between the statutory caps under the OSH Act and the current fine levels creates a situation that is ripe for litigation. Employers are likely on the winning side of that battle, especially under the current, more "business friendly" federal administration. It is probably only a matter of time before a court strikes down the "new" penalties as unauthorized. When that happens, OSHA may very well have to start issuing refunds.
About the Author
This article was written by Charley M. Drummond, Esq. of Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC. Fish Nelson & Holden is a law firm located in Birmingham, Alabama dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers, and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation cases and related matters. If you have questions about this article or OSHA citations in general, please feel free to contact the author at cdrummond@fishnelson.com or (205) 332-3414.
On July 21, 2017, The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals released its opinion in Laura Wyatt v. Baptist Health System, Inc. In Wyatt, the employee was a patient-care tech that experienced a sharp pain in her back when she was lifting and twisting. The pain was followed by a burning sensation and pain down into her legs and toes. She was diagnosed with transverse myelitis and continues to experience weakness in her legs, trouble with walking and balance, and has issues with her bladder and bowels.
The employee filed a workers’ compensation lawsuit in Jefferson County and it subsequently transferred to Shelby County upon motion of the employer.
At trial, the testimony of three doctors was received into evidence. Dr. Meador, who examined the employee, was of the opinion that the employee likely impinged an artery in her lower back during the act of lifting and twisting which resulted in a spinal cord stroke which, in turn, lead to her condition. Drs. Kirschberg and Counce conducted record reviews and offered testimony that rebutted the opinions of Dr. Meador. Dr. Kirschberg testified that a twisting motion would not cause the employee’s condition. Dr. Counce, who testified live in court, opined that the employee’s condition was not caused by trauma of by work activities. She further testified that the employee did not suffer from an impingement. Rather, it was her opinion that the condition and symptoms were more likely related to a severe vitamin B-12 deficiency.
Based on the evidence at trial, the trial judge was of the opinion that the testimony of Drs. Kirschberg and Counce was more well-reasoned, medically sound, and persuasive. As such, judgment was rendered in favor of the employer. The employee timely appealed the decision.
Among the reasons for appeal, the employee noted that the trial court erred in failing to resolve reasonable doubts in the evidence in favor of the employee. The Court of Civil Appeals noted that the requirement of liberally construing the construction of the Workers’ Compensation Act to effectuate its beneficent purposes had nothing to do with the assignment of weight to the evidence. Rather, judges in workers’ compensation matters should consider the evidence and assign weight as they would in any other civil matter. Since the trial judge obviously assigned much more weight to the testimony of Drs. Kirschberg and Counce, it was clear that substantial evidence supported the judge’s ruling in favor of the employer. As such, the judgment was affirmed.
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This blog submission was prepared by Mike Fish, an attorney with Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers, and third party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this submission or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Fish by e-mailing him at mfish@fishnelson.com or by calling him directly at 205-332-1448.
On July 21, 2017, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals released its opinion in Felisha Bailey v. Jacksonville Health and Rehabilitation Center. In Bailey, the employee was a certified nursing assistant who sued her employer and the third party administrator (TPA) handling her workers’ compensation claim. Count One of her complaint was against her employer for workers’ compensation benefits related to her claim of contracting scabies and the related psychological issues. Count Two was against the TPA for outrageous conduct. Count Two was subsequently dismissed upon motion of the TPA.
Rather than proceed to trial on the workers’ compensation issues, the employer elected to first file a motion for summary judgment. In support of the motion, the employer offered evidence which demonstrated that the employee never contracted scabies. Rather, the employee more likely suffered from delusional parasitosis whish is a disorder that causes a person to believe that they are infested by parasites. The evidence in support of this theory was compelling and the judge granted the motion for summary judgment. The employee timely filed her appeal.
On appeal, the employee pointed out that the trial judge improperly weighed the evidence in granting the employer’s motion for summary judgment. Since there was some evidence that could arguably support the employee’s theory, the Court of Civil Appeals agreed with the employee that granting summary judgment was improper. As such, the judgment was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
My Two Cents:
Unless there is evidence introduced at trial that is not referenced in the Court’s opinion, the time and expense associated with appealing the trial court’s decision is probably all for naught.
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This blog submission was prepared by Mike Fish, an attorney with Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers, and third party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this submission or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Fish by e-mailing him at mfish@fishnelson.com or by calling him directly at 205-332-1448.
Beginning July 1, 2017, the maximum workers’ compensation payable in Alabama was raised to $843.00 per week and the minimum was raised to $232.00 per week.
Ombudsmen Patricia Fraley and Ted Roose are now located in the new Career Center located at 3216 4th Avenue South (Birmingham). Because of this new location they are able to handle Benefit Review Conferences at their office. They plan to keep regular office hours on the 2nd and 4th Tuesdays of the month from 9-12 and 1-4 for anyone who wants to submit a settlement for their review. There is no need to make an appointment for these times, just drop by and one of them will be there. The dates for July are the 11th and 25th, from 9-12 and 1-4.
This blog submission was prepared by Mike Fish, an attorney with Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers, and third party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this submission or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Fish by e-mailing him at mfish@fishnelson.com or by calling him directly at 205-332-1448.
A lot of buzz was recently created when a Circuit Court Judge in Jefferson County entered an interlocutory order declaring the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act unconstitutional. The ruling put a bright spotlight on the fact that the Act has not seen substantial change since 1992. Over the years, there have been numerous bills introduced in the legislature that would amend the Act in regard to a variety of issues. However, with few exceptions, most of those bills died in committee because they were introduced by one interest group or the other, and not by a consensus of employers, insurers, and labor representatives.
In 1992, it took cooperation and input between all interested parties to bring about substantial, and much-needed change. Most people involved with the workers’ compensation system on a day-to-day basis agree that is what needs to happen again. However, nobody seems to be able to agree on what is necessary to get the ball rolling. When Utah was recently faced with similar issues, its state legislature created a "workgroup" aimed at bringing the parties together to institute change. A similar approach may be the best place to start, because it addresses each of the various concerns that proposed bills have attempted to address over the last few years. Here is a proposed Alabama version of the Utah statute which created the workgroup.
Workers’ Compensation Workgroup– Creation– Membership–Compensation–Duties–Report
(Proposed)
(1) There is created the Workers’ Compensation Workgroup within the Alabama Department of Labor, consisting of the following members:
(a) the Director of Workers’ Compensation, or the Director’s designee;
(b) one member of the Senate, appointed by the President or current presiding officer of the Senate, and one member of the House, appointed by the Speaker or current presiding officer of the House;
(c) four representatives of the worker’s compensation insurance industry:
(i) two of whom are practicing attorneys with significant experience with workers’ compensation claims in the state of Alabama; and,
(ii) two of whom represent a commercial insurer with significant experience in workers’ compensation claims in the state of Alabama or the self-insured industry; and
(d) four representatives of the labor side of workers’ compensation, appointed by the chair:
(i) at least two of whom are practicing attorneys with significant experience with Alabama workers’ compensation law.
(2) The chair may appoint one or more individuals with an interest in workers’ compensation to serve as ex officio, non-voting members of the Workgroup.
(3) The Director of the Workers’ Compensation Division or the Director’s designee shall be the Chair of the Workgroup.
(4) (a) A majority of the members of the Workgroup constitutes a quorum.
(b) The action of a majority of a quorum constitutes the action of the Workgroup.
(c) In the case of a tie vote, the Chair and the member of the Senate appointed under Subsection (1)(b) shall break the tie.
(5) (a) The salary and expenses of each member of the Workgroup who is a legislator shall be paid in accordance with proper Alabama legislative procedure outlining compensation for such.
(b) A member of the Workgroup who is not a legislator may not receive compensation, benefits, per diem, or travel expenses for the member’s service on the Workgroup.
(6) The Alabama Department of Labor shall provide staff support to the Workgroup.
(7) The Workgroup shall review and make recommendations on the following issues:
(a) the process for determining the amount of weekly payments in Permanent Partial Disability (PPD) cases, including but not limited to, the implementation of a weekly cap on payment of permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits to injured employees;
(b) the award of attorney fees in workers’ compensation cases, including but not limited to, the implementation of a cap on contingency fees;
(c) the totality of employer liability regarding all permanent disability payments, including but not limited to, the length of the period(s) in which payments must be paid, and any factors that would qualify the cessation of such payments;
(d) the totality of employer liability for medical payments to injured employees who have stopped receiving claim-relevant treatment for a fixed period of time;
(e) the outlines for determining criminality of worker’s compensation fraud, and appropriate procedure in achieving just and equitable remuneration for all victims of such fraud;
(f) the qualifying factors necessary to substantiate workers’ compensation claims for psychological injuries;
(g) the proper procedures for employee drug and alcohol testing and the consequences of failed drug and/or alcohol tests;
(h) any additional issues that the Workgroup:
(i) determines to be an important issue related to worker’s compensation; and,
(ii) decides to review.
(8). The Workgroup shall present a final report on the items described in Subsection (7), including any legislative recommendations, to an appropriate committee in the Alabama Senate within one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the formation of the Workgroup.
Our Two Cents
As it is in the other 49 states, the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act has always been known as the great compromise or grand bargain between employers and employees. Therefore it is unreasonable to think that all concerned parties will get everything they want. However, the statutory creation of a workgroup would likely yield some positive changes that all concerned could live with.
About the Authors
This article was written by Mike Fish and Charley Drummond of Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC. Fish Nelson & Holden is a law firm located in Birmingham, Alabama dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers, and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation cases and related liability matters. Drummond and his firm are members of The National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network (NWCDN). The NWCDN is a national and Canadian network of reputable law firms organized to provide employers and insurers access to the highest quality representation in workers’ compensation and related employer liability fields. If you have questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the authors atmfish@fishnelson.com and cdrummond@fishnelson.com or (205) 332-3414.
On May 19, 2017, the Alabama Supreme Court released its opinion in SSC Selma Operating Company, LLC, d/b/a Warren Manor Health & Rehabilitation Center and SavaSeniorCare Administrative Services, LLC v. Jackie Fikes in which it reversed the trial judge’s order denying the employer’s motion to compel arbitration of a retaliatory discharge claim brought pursuant to §25-5-11.1.
On appeal the Court noted that there was no question as to whether or not the employment dispute resolution program (hereinafter EDR Program), was valid and that the parties had agreed to be bound by it. However, the issue on appeal was whether or not the language in the EDR Program that stated disputes not covered under the EDR Program include claims that relate to workers’ compensation...would also exclude a retaliatory discharge claim filed pursuant to §25-5-11.1 of the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act. §25-5-11.1 specifically states that an employee cannot be terminated solely for bringing a workers’ compensation claim. On appeal the employer stated that the EDR Program specifically stated that it covered employment matters related to termination, discrimination, retaliation and harassment and other legally protected rights. The employer acknowledged that the EDR Program specifically stated that disputes not covered under the program are ones that relate to workers’ compensation, unemployment benefits, health, welfare and retirement benefits and claims by companies for injunctive relief to protect trade secrets and confidential information.
On appeal, the employee relied solely on the provision that stated claims related to workers’ compensation are not covered under the EDR Program and argued that the language was plain and unambiguous and, therefore, the discharge claim pursuant to §25-5-11.1 should be excluded from the EDR Program. However, the employer argued that, while the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act gives rise to the discharge claim, that the retaliatory discharge claim pursuant to §25-5-11.1 is not a claim in the nature of a workers’ compensation claim and is actually a tort claim that was clearly intended to be included in the EDR Program requiring arbitration. In its opinion, the Supreme Court stated that it was apparent from the language in the EDR Program that the intent of the program was to submit to arbitration those employment related disputes where the plaintiff would ordinarily be entitled to have resolved by a jury, specifically noting claims arising from tort law and not claims governed by specific statues such as the Workers’ Compensation Act. The Court specifically stated that while a discharge claim pursuant to §25-5-11.1 arises out of the workers’ compensation factual setting, the claim is never the less a tort action and governed by general tort law. This includes the ability to recover damages for mental anguish and lost wages. The Court noted that while there are claims that relate to workers’ compensation laws, that those claims are generally for occupational disease and accident injuries as opposed to claims alleging retaliatory discharge. They also pointed out that the two claims, a workers’ compensation claim and tort claim (retaliatory discharge claim), are mutually exclusive.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court stated that the trial court erred in denying the employer’s Motion to Compel Arbitration of the employee’s retaliatory discharge claim since it was the clear intent of the EDR Program to have employment related disputes such as a retaliatory discharge claim brought pursuant §25-5-11.1, resolved by arbitration as opposed to a jury trial. Therefore, the Court held that the employee’s retaliatory discharge claim was not “related to” disputes concerning workers’ compensation laws, which are governed by the Workers’ Compensation Act, and are instead governed by the general rules of tort law.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
This article was written by Joshua G. Holden, Esq., a member of Fish, Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers and insurance carriers in worker’s compensation and related liability matters. Mr. Holden is AV rated by Martindale-Hubbell, which is the highest rating an attorney can receive. Holden and his firm are members of the National Worker’s Compensation Defense Network (NWCDN). The NWCDN is a national network of reputable law firms organized to provide employers and insurers access to the highest quality of representation in workers’ compensation and related employer liability fields. If you have any questions about this submission or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Mr. Holden by emailing him at jholden@fishnelson.com or calling him directly at 205-332-1428.
A few days ago, we reported on the recent case of Nora Clower v. CVS Caremark, in which the Circuit Court of Jefferson County entered an order declaring The Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act unconstitutional. My initial knee-jerk reaction, like the reaction of many others, was that it would have state-wide implications on workers’ compensation law in Alabama. The sky was falling, and the workers’ compensation system as we know it just came to a screeching halt. However, spending a lot of time pouring over the order, the background of the case, and applicable Alabama law, I now have amuch different take on it.
For starters, I think it’s important to give a little more of the relevant background of the case. Clower filed her Complaint on November 20, 2013. In her Complaint, she alleged only a workers’ compensation claim arising out of an alleged accident occurring in and arising out of her employment with CVS on June 30, 2013. Clower did not allege any tort claims against CVS in her original Complaint, and she did not subsequently amend her Complaint to add any other claims against CVS. This is significant, because, ostensibly, if The Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act were to be struck down, the exclusivity provisions of the Act would go down with it.
Next, it’s important to understand that the Court’s May 8, 2017 order declaring the Act unconstitutional did not just come out of the clear blue sky. That order was the Court’s ruling on Clower’s "Motion for Relief: Constitutional Challenge to Two Statutes". Clower filed that motion on January 31, 2017, and CVS filed its response to that motion on February 10, 2017. When Clower filed her motion, she directed it to be served upon Alabama Attorney General Luther Strange, who was at that time serving his final days as the A.G. The Alabama Declaratory Judgment Act requires, among other things, that when the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, the Attorney General must be served with the pleading which raises the challenge, so that he has an opportunity to defend the statute in question.
As you may recall, then-Senator Jeff Sessions was nominated for the position of United States Attorney General by President-elect Donald Trump shortly after the November election. Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on Sessions’ nomination began on January 10, 2017, and Sessions was confirmed on February 8, 2017. Of course Sessions had to immediately resign his Senate seat, and none other than Attorney General Luther Strange was then appointed to take Sessions’ place, on February 9, 2017, thus leaving the Alabama Attorney General position temporarily vacant. Three days later, Steve Marshall was sworn in as the new Alabama Attorney General. Needless to say, there wasjust a little bit of chaos at the Alabama Attorney General’s office between the time Clower filed her motion on January 31 and April 25, when Marshall was finally served with Clower’s motion.
The most important factor in the ultimate implications of the Circuit Court’s decision, however, lies in Alabama Code § 6-6-227. That section, which is part of the Alabama Declaratory Judgment Act, provides in its pertinent part:
"All persons shall be made parties who have, or claim, any interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding..."
In other words, when a party is seeking a declaration of law, such as a declaration by the court that a particular statute is unconstitutional, everyone whose interests would be affected by the declaration must be made a party. In the event that doesn’t happen, the declaration shall not prejudice the rights of anyone who is not a party to the action. InGuy v. Southwest Alabama Council on Alcoholism, 475 So.2d 1190 (Ala.Civ.App. 1985), the Alabama Court of Appeals held that when a party challenges the constitutionality of any provision of The Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act, the provisions of The Alabama Declaratory Judgment Act are triggered. That means that Clower’s motion triggered § 6-6-227. Yet, the only parties to the action are Clower and CVS Caremark. Yes, Steve Marshall was served with the motion, and yes Marshall declined to defend the Act (whether that was due to the curious timing of the motion, or some other reason). However, that does not change the fact that the only parties that would be affected by the Circuit Court’s recent ruling are Clower and CVS Caremark. In any other court, in any other county, involving any other parties, The Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act is still constitutional. The only way that would ever change isif CVS appeals the Circuit Court’s ruling, and the appellate court(s) affirm the Circuit Court.
It may seem like a foregone conclusion that CVS will appeal. I mean, surely CVS Caremark will appeal to avoid the possibility of facing tort liability, right? They may not. Since Clower only alleged a workers’ compensation claim, she would have to amend her Complaint in order to sue CVS in tort. The problem for Clower though, is that every conceivable statute of limitations for any tort claims against CVS have long since expired. If she ever had a viable tort claim against CVS, she can no longer bring such a claim, because it would be time-barred. Additionally, it is possible that Clower could now be judicially estopped from arguing that she is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. In other words, if the Circuit Court’s order becomes final and is never overturned by the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court, Clower could conceivably recovernothing from CVS.
Whether you believe CVS will appeal or not appeal, it should be interesting to see how this plays out in the next 4 months.
About the Author
This article was written by Charley M. Drummond, Esq. of Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC. Fish Nelson & Holden is a law firm located in Birmingham, Alabama dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers, and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation cases and related liability matters. Drummond and his firm are members of The National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network (NWCDN). The NWCDN is a national and Canadian network of reputable law firms organized to provide employers and insurers access to the highest quality representation in workers’ compensation and related employer liability fields. If you have questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the author at cdrummond@fishnelson.com or (205) 332-3414.
Perhaps you have already heard as news travels fast but on May 8, 2017, a Jefferson County Circuit Court Judge issued an Order declaring the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act to be unconstitutional. That’s right… the entire Act. I am sure that you have many questions. Here are a few answers.
QUESTION: Is the judge stating that the entire Act is unconstitutional? If not, why does he not just strike down the parts that are and leave the remainder intact?
ANSWER: The Judge is not saying that the entire Act is unconstitutional. However, he is of the opinion that (1) the statute which places a $220 weekly cap on permanent partial disability awards and (2) the statute that places a 15% contingency fee cap on legal fees are both unconstitutional. Since the Judge has found those 2 statutes to be unconstitutional, it has the effect of declaring the entire Act unconstitutional due to a non-severability (all or none) statute.
QUESTION: Can he do that?
ANSWER: Yes. A Circuit Court Judge is empowered to consider the constitutionality of statutes. In fact, there is an obligatory duty on courts to do so. However, it is important to remember that the proverbial buck does not stop there. In the event that this Order becomes final, then the parties will have the right to appeal the issue to the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals which has original jurisdiction over workers’ compensation matters. From there the parties can appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court.
QUESTION: The Judge gave the Alabama legislature 120 days to fix the parts of the Act that he deems unconstitutional. Do you think that is enough time and, if so, will amended bills get passed?
ANSWER: Probably not. There is not enough time with only 6 meeting days left in the 2017 Regular Session. Even if there was enough time, the issue has come up many times over the years. Bills are introduced which include too many controversial provisions. For the $220 cap or the 15% contingency fee to change, there needs to be a serious conversation between employee and employer interests to figure out the best way to effectuate that change. Simply introducing a bill and trying to force it down the other side’s throat is not going to work. Major changes were implemented in 1992 and that was due to a couple of years of meetings between all interested parties until a consensus was formed.
QUESTION: What happens if the Appellate Courts agree with the Circuit Judge?
ANSWER: Before I answer that, let me first address why they probably will not agree. The reason they probably will not agree is because it is a function of the legislature to make this needed change. The Circuit Judge has put a spot light on the need for the change and that is a good thing. However, the Appellate Courts are probably not going to send Alabama into the work accident dark ages because of 2 statutes regardless of how unfair they are deemed to be. The more likely scenario is that the Appellate Courts will either disagree and reverse or agree but reverse on the grounds that it is the legislature’s responsibility. In that scenario, my guess is that the Courts will encourage employer, employee, and medical interests to get together as they did 25 years ago in order to effectuate change.
QUESTION: What if you’re wrong?
ANSWER: Let’s all hope that I’m not! Workers’ Compensation was created for a couple of reasons. First, it provided immediate indemnity and medical benefits to injured employees through a system of no fault insurance. Second, it provided employers with protection from tort liability through the Exclusivity Doctrine. This was known as the Grand Bargain. Scrapping this system would result in the following:
Employers would no longer have any protection against tort lawsuits since the Exclusivity Doctrine would be gone.
Employees would be able to maintain tort lawsuits against employers.
Plaintiffs’ attorneys would enjoy much higher percentage contingency fees because there would be no statute placing any restrictions on how much they could take from the award or settlement of an injured employee.
In order to prevail against the employer, the employee would have to prove at a bare minimum the elements of negligence. In other words, they would have to prove that the employer breached a duty of care and said breach caused the accident and injury.
In all situations where an employee was injured and it was not the fault of the employer, the employee would have no access to a tort recovery or workers’ compensationbenefits. In other words, the employee would be receiving nothing.
A flurry of motions to dismiss pending workers’ compensation lawsuits will be filed all over the state.
Many employees in the insurance and legal industry would be out of a job.
In a nutshell, employee, employer, insurance, medical, and legal interests will all be adversely affected. While our system is far from perfect, it is the only one that we have. The alternative is far worse. Rather than pursue a final order deeming our current system to be void as unconstitutional, let us use this recent Order as a wakeup call to all concerned and open a dialogue between all interested parties. In 2019, we will celebrate 100 years of workers’ compensation in Alabama. Let’s work together to make sure that the system we have in place at that time is improved and fair to all concerned.