State News : Alabama

In Ex Parte Diamond Scaffold Services Group, Inc., the employee filed suit for workers’ comp benefits in Washington County, Alabama. Diamond objected asserting that Washington County was not a proper venue since the accident occurred in Mobile County and it did not conduct business in Washington County. In support of its request that the case be transferred to Mobile County, Diamond submitted evidence that the company was doing work as a subcontractor for ThyssenKrupp, and, although ThyssenKrupp did business in both Washington and Mobile County, the accident occurred in Mobile County.

The employee responded with evidence that ThyssenKrupp did business in Washington County, but the employee did not present any evidence indicating that Diamond also did business in Washington County. In any event, the trial court denied Diamond’s change of venue request. Diamond then filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus asking that the trial court’s order be set aside and for the case to be transferred to Mobile County.

The Appeals Court noted that when a defendant is a corporation, like Diamond, venue is proper in the county where the accident occurred, where the defendant’s principal office is located, or where the plaintiff resides if the defendant conducts business in that county. The Appeals Court noted that the plaintiff presented no evidence to the trial court that Diamond was conducting business in Washington County, and it was undisputed that the accident occurred in Mobile County. Although the plaintiff pointed out that ThyssenKrupp conducted business in Washington County, the Appeals Court noted that Diamond was the only defendant in the lawsuit, and therefore, the locations where ThyssenKrupp did business was irrelevant. The Court stated that Diamond was an agent of ThyssenKrupp, and held that it was shown no authority which would allow an action against an agent in any county where its principal does business. The Court noted that such a rule could yield shocking results. Specifically, the Court explained that ThyssennKrupp was an international corporation doing business at locations throughout the world, and it would make no sense to hold that an agent such as Diamond, which does business only in one county, might be subject to being sued anywhere its principal does business.

The Appeals Court ruled that there was nothing in the record which would allow the case to proceed against Diamond in Washington County, and ordered the trial court to transfer the case to Mobile County. In effect, employers who are subcontractors for larger companies are not automatically subject to suit in every county where the larger companies’ do business.

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About the Author

This blog post was written by Trey Cotney, Esq., of Fish Nelson & Holden LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation matters. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of The National Workers’ Compensation Network (NWCDN). If you have any questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the author attcotney@fishnelson.com or any firm member at 205-332-3430.

On July 25, 2014, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals considered an interesting scenario where the trial judge granted an employee’s motion to strike the employer’s defenses to compensability that were asserted in its Answer and then entered an Order requiring the employer to pay for disputed medical treatment. The court also denied the employer’s motion for an independent medical examination. As a result, the employer petition the Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus as to all three rulings.

The genesis for the above referenced flurry of motions, was a general denial filed by the employer in its Answer. This means that the employer disputed each and every allegation in the Complaint and admitted nothing. The employee took issue with the inconsistent nature of denying all allegations in the Complaint while, at the same time, paying indemnity and medical benefits, and asserting a statutory right to an IME. Basically, it was the position of the employee that the employer could not, on one hand, deny the claim while, on the other hand, treat it as accepted.

In Alabama, if the compensability of a claim is denied, then medical treatment cannot be compelled until the issue of compensability has been determined by either a trial on the merits or by way of a successful motion for summary judgment. Rather than proceed with either of these two options, the employee sought to simply have the denial itself removed from the Answer thus clearing the way for the judge to order that medical treatment be provided. While the employee gets creativity points for this approach, the Court of Appeals pointed out that the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act and the Alabama Rules of Evidence prohibit an employee from using the payment of indemnity and/or medical benefits against an employer as an admission of compensability. Further, the employee was unable to provide any legal support for the proposition that filing a motion for an IME amounted to an admission of compensability. Since there was no apparent inconsistency between the employer’s Answer and its subsequent actions, the Court of Appeals granted the petition as to the struck defenses and the order to compel medical treatment. However, it denied the petition as to the employer’s IME request.

My Two Cents:

Even when a claim is denied and indemnity benefits are not provided, employers often times continue to provide medical care until a final ruling is made by a judge. When this option is exercised, it allows employers to retain control of the medical treatment, just in case they eventually lose. It also allows the employee to continue to receive medical treatment during the litigation process. If the Court of Appeals had ruled differently in this case, it would have likely had a chilling effect on the payment of early medical benefits. This was a good ruling for employers and employees alike.

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About the Author

This article was written by Michael I. Fish, Esq. of Fish Nelson & Holden LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation matters. Fish Nelson is a member of The National Workers’ Compensation Network (NWCDN). If you have any questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the author atmfish@fishnelson.com or any firm member at 205-332-1448.

Earlier this month, we reported on a case where a trial court denied an employer’s motion to transfer venue based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals subsequently denied the employer’s petition for a writ of mandamus noting that such a petition is an extraordinary remedy and will only be granted if the trial court clearly abused its discretion. That opinion was clearly an example of when the first to file was rewarded by filing first.

More recently, the Court of Civil Appeals released an opinion on July 11, 2014, wherein it, again, refused to grant the employer’s petition for a writ of mandamus. This time, it was the party that placed second in the race to the courthouse that ended up winning the venue battle.

Specifically, the employer filed a workers’ compensation complaint in Mobile County. The employee then filed a motion to transfer the action to Clarke County based, in part, on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. It was undisputed that the employer’s principal place of business was in Mobile County and that the employee had been transferred to a Mobile hospital on the day of the accident. It was further undisputed that the employee resided in Clarke County at the time of the accident and on the date of filing the lawsuit, the accident occurred in Clarke County, and that at least some of the employee’s medical treatment and therapy occurred in Clarke County. There was a dispute as to whether or not there existed any witnesses to the accident.

Based on the foregoing, the trial judge granted the employee’s motion and transferred the matter to Clarke County. In denying the employer’s petition, the Court of Appeals noted that it could not find that the trial court exceeded its discretion in transferring the action.

My To Cents:

Although this appears on its face to be a different result than the case reported on earlier this month, the Court of Appeals’ basically ruled the same way. In both cases, the Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

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About the Author

This article was written by Michael I. Fish, Esq. of Fish Nelson & Holden LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation matters. Fish Nelson is a member of The National Workers’ Compensation Network (NWCDN). If you have any questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the author atmfish@fishnelson.com or any firm member at 205-332-1448.

Beginning July 1, 2014, the maximum worker’s compensation payable was raised to $794 per week and the minimum was raised to $218 per week. This change was based on the Commissioner of Labor’s determination that the State’s average weekly wage was $794.27, and the change is effective for any injury occurring on or after July 1, 2014.

With Tennessee implementing its new administrative system this week, Alabama is now one of the only states left to use state courts to adjudicate its workers’ compensation cases. For that reason, if more than one venue is proper, it is still possible to gain a strategic advantage in Alabama by filing the lawsuit first.

Case in point, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals released its opinion in Ex parte Blair Logistics, LLCon June 27, 2014. In Blair, the Court considered a situation where the plaintiff filed a complaint for workers’ compensation benefits in Jefferson County. A little over 7 months later, the employer filed a motion to have the venue transferred to Chilton County. The employer claimed that it was entitled to the transfer based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens which allows for such transfers for the convenience of the parties and witnesses or if it betters serves the interests of justice.

In support of its motion, the employer pointed out that the plaintiff was living in Chilton County at the time of the accident and at the time the complaint was filed. It also noted that the plaintiff received some medical treatment in Chilton County including the initial treatment following the accident. Finally, the employer stated that the accident occurred at the plaintiff’s home in Chilton County and that it intended to call as witnesses certain Chilton County residents such as the plaintiff’s wife and some medical service providers.

The plaintiff supported his objection to the motion by noting that the employer’s principal place of business was in Jefferson County and that the depositions of the employer representatives and the plaintiff had already taken place in Jefferson County. Further, the plaintiff pointed out that all of the relevant medical treatment had occurred in Jefferson County. Finally, the evidence revealed that there existed an employment contract that provided that all disputes be resolved in Jefferson County.

Based on the above facts, the trial court denied the employer’s motion and the employer filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. Such a petition is an extraordinary remedy and will only be granted if the trial court clearly abused its discretion.

The Court of Appeals noted that it was conceded by the parties that both venues were proper. It further noted that the employer had the burden of proving that the inconvenience and expense of defending the action in Jefferson County was so great that the plaintiff’s right to choose the venue should be overcome. In other words, the employer had to prove that Chilton County was significantly more convenient than Jefferson County.

With facts obviously supporting the convenience of the parties and the interests of justice for both counties, it could not be said that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion. As such, the employer’s petition was denied.

MY TWO CENTS:

When you have multiple proper venues, it is a good idea to look at the pros and cons of each venue early on. The Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act provides that either party can file the lawsuit. Since the party seeking a venue transfer has the burden of proving that another venue is significantly more convenient, it is better to be the party that initially filed the lawsuit. In the above case, had the employer filed in Chilton County, the plaintiff (or in that case, the defendant) would not likely have been successful in having the case transferred to Jefferson County. In fact, in either scenario, had the trial court granted the motion to transfer venue, the Court of Civil Appeals would likely have granted a petition for writ of mandamus and ordered the trial court to reverse its decision since, at least based on the above facts, it is unlikely that either party could have satisfied its burden of proof.

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About the Author

This article was written by Michael I. Fish, Esq. of Fish Nelson & Holden LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation matters. Fish Nelson is a member of The National Workers’ Compensation Network (NWCDN). If you have any questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the author atmfish@fishnelson.com or any firm member at 205-332-1448.

On June 13, 2014, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals issued its opinion in Alabama Forrest Products Industry Workmen’s Compensation Self Insurer’s Fund v. Harris. In 1990, Harris sustained a severe work-related injury to his pelvis and right leg. As a result of his injuries, Harris was permanently and severely limited in his lifting, bending, stooping, squatting, climbing, and walking. Those limitations allegedly prevent him from performing ordinary activities of daily living without assistance. Since his injury, Harris’s daughter had been assisting him in getting in and out of bed, using the bathroom, bathing, dressing, administering his medications, and preparing meals. In the fall of 2011, Harris sent notice to his employer’s insurer, Alabama Forrest Products, that he wanted his future son-in-law to replace his daughter as his designated care giver. However, Alabama Forrest Products later discovered that the future son-in-law was employed full time in another town, and stopped paying him to take care of Harris. Harris then filed a declaratory judgement action, requesting that the trial Court order Alabama Forrest Products to reinstate the payments.

Alabama Forrest Products took the deposition of Harris’s authorized treating physician, who stated that Harris continued to require assistance with activities of daily living. The doctor also testified that although the attendant care provided by Harris’s daughter in the past had not improved his underlying physical condition and further attendant care would not improve his condition, it did allow and would continue to allow Harris to maintain his function and prevent deterioration of his condition. The doctor further testified that without in home attendant care provided by his family, Harris would have to be admitted into a skilled nursing facility. Based on the testimony of Harris’s family members and his doctor, the trial Court ordered Alabama Forrest Products to reinstate the payments, and Alabama Forrest Products appealed.

On appeal, Alabama Forrest Products argued that an injured employee has no right to payment for attendant care based on the holdings inOsorio v. K & D Erectors, Inc. and Ex parte City of Guntersville, which previously held that employers were only responsible to reimburse an employee for services designed to improve his condition. Harris argued that the case ofEx parte Mitchell overruled Osorio, in that it held that preventive and functional aids aimed at preventing the deterioration of an employee’s condition or improving his function are also compensable.

In its analysis, the Court of Appeals noted that Alabama Administrative Code Rule 480-5-5-.30 provides that authorized services by non-professional family members may be reimbursable when certain conditions are met. Based on this, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial Court’s decision and ordered Alabama Forrest Products to reinstate payment to Harris’s family for his in-home care.

MY TWO CENTS

Given the potential impact this decision on the cost of workers’ compensation claims, I expect that Alabama Forrest Products will petition the Supreme Court for review. If this decision stands, it could increase the costs of many workers’ compensation claims by over $21,000 per year (based on current minimum wage). One possible end-around that the Court of Appeals mentioned, but did not address (because the issue was not raised), would be to challenge the Department of Labor’s authority to promulgate and enforce the provisions of Rule 480-5-5-.30. The Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act does not explicitly provide for non-medical treatment such as the services at issue in this case, so the question is whether the Act gives the Department of Labor the authority to require benefits that were not specifically enumerated by the legislature in the Act.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

This article was written by Charley M. Drummond, Esq. of Fish Nelson, LLC. Fish Nelson is a law firm located in Birmingham, Alabama dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers, and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation cases and related liability matters. Drummond and his firm are members of The National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network (NWCDN). The NWCDN is a national and Canadian network of reputable law firms organized to provide employers and insurers access to the highest quality representation in workers’ compensation and related employer liability fields. If you have questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the author at cdrummond@fishnelson.com or (205) 332-3414.

Guyoungtech USA, Inc. v. Dees

On June 6, 2014 the Supreme Court of Alabama issued a lengthy opinion covering many issues related to a Retaliatory Discharge case tried in Conecuh County Circuit Court.

Dees, the employee, was injured on March 14, 2011, 4 months after she was hired. Shortly before hiring Dees HMMA reduced its orders from Guyoungtech. In November of 2010 Guyoungtech laid off 300 employees and then another 212 in May of 2011. Dees was one of the layoffs in May of 2011. As a result Dees filed the retaliatory discharge claims alleging she was fired because of her workers’ compensation in violation of § 25-5-11.1 of the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act. The jury order Guyoungtech to pay $1,000,000.00 in compensatory damages and $2,500,000.00 in punitive damages. The Trial Judge remitted the damages to $300,000.00 in compensatory damages and $900,000.00 in punitive damages. Dees accepted the remitted amounts and Guyoungtech appealed the decision.

Guyoungtech argued that Dees was part of a corporate layoff and not terminated, but was definitely not terminated as a result of her workers’ compensation claim. Dees argued that Guyoungtech used the layoff as a mask to conceal the wrongful termination. Dees pointed to the proximity in time and a safety director denying knowledge of her injury which seemed implausible. The Supreme Court noted that mere proximity of time is typically not enough to establish sufficient evidence in a retaliatory discharge claim. However, the jury could have found the safety director’s testimony that she/he did not know about the injury was not credible. That, in addition to the proximity was sufficient for the jury to find liability and the Supreme Court stated they were not in a position to substitute their judgment for the jury.

However, the errors as it related to the damages resulted in the Supreme Court reversing liability and ordering a new trial.

In regards to the lost wages component of the compensatory damages, the Supreme Court pointed out that no expert testified as to Dees’ lack of employability, or restricted access to the labor market, as a result of her termination. They stated that Dees’ testimony that she was under treatment and restrictions and hampered in looking for work does not provide evidence that the discharge itself rendered her less employable. The Supreme Court stated that the extent of her disability and its effect on her ability to work was part of the workers’ compensation trial, which was severed from the discharge trial, and not at issue in the discharge case. The Supreme Court then pointed out that Guyoungtech had given her a letter stating she was laid-off, and not fired, so there was no stigma of being terminated when she went to secure employment. Therefore, no evidence was present to show the termination caused Dees to be less marketable in the work force.

As to the mental anguish component of the compensatory damages, the Supreme Court pointed out the broad discretion given to the jury in determining mental anguish. However, the Supreme Court pointed to two other decisions where the employee presented evidence of mental health medication, mental health treatment, divorce, loss of home and/or inability to pay bills where one employee was awarded $30,000.00 for mental anguish and the other was award $75,000.00. The Supreme Court stated that Dees only presented evidence of concern for the stability of her marriage. Dees did not present evidence that she had lost her home, could not pay bills, or that she required mental-health treatment.

The Supreme Court also opined that the trial court erroneously admitted Mortality Tables into evidence. Guyountech argued that Dees life expectancy was not relevant to the discharge claim, as Dees offered no evidence she could never work again. The Supreme Court pointed out that Mortality Tables are admissible when there is evidence that the plaintiff suffers from permanent personal injury.Drummond Co. v. Self, 622 So. 2d 336, 337 (Ala. 1993). The Supreme Court stated that the trial court was in error when it instructed the jury to use the mortality tables if they were reasonably satisfied that the injuries were permanent when there was no expert medical testimony that the injuries were permanent.

The verdict form did not itemize the compensatory damages and both, lost wages and mental anguish, were infected by the error of allowing the mortality table into evidence. As such, the error constituted grounds for reversal.

The Supreme Court then pointed out that for a jury to award punitive damages there must be compensatory damages.Life Ins. Co. of Georgia v. Smith, 719 So. 2d 797, 806 (Ala. 1998). Based on the reversal of the compensatory damages the punitive damages were due to be reversed as well. However, the Supreme Court offered guidance to the trial court upon remand as to the issue of punitive damages. At the trial level Dees’ argument for punitive damages was based on Guyountech’s failure to report some smaller workers’ compensation claim despite Dees’ claim being properly reported. The Supreme Court stated that punitive damages for the purpose of punishing a defendant for harm it did to others, not the plaintiff, is not supported by case law.Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 354, (2007). As a result, the Supreme Court pointed out that punitive damages must be based on harm to Dees, not potential harm to other individuals not a party to the litigation.

As a result of the error involving the compensatory and punitive damages a new trial was necessary because the question of damages and liability were too intertwined for the jury to just consider the issue of damages.

MY TWO CENTS

It is always important to sever your workers’ compensation trial from the discharge trial to assure there is no confusion that the disability, or inability to work due to the disability, should not be considered when determining damages in the discharge trial. Even if the judge instructs the jury not to consider the disability you can almost be sure that it will factor in if they are allowed to hear it. This will help keep the focus of the damages in the discharge trial on the termination only.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

The article was written by Joshua G. Holden, Esq. a Member of Fish Nelson, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation and related liability matters. Mr. Holden is AV rated by Martindale-Hubbell, which is the highest rating an attorney can receive. Holden and his firm are members of The National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network (NWCDN). The NWCDN is a national and Canadian network of reputable law firms organized to provide employers and insurers access to the highest quality representation in workers’ compensation and related employer liability fields.

If you have questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the author atjholden@fishnelson.com or 205-332-1428.

In Ex parte Schnitzer Steel Industries, Inc., released on September 27, 2013 (summarized on our blog September 28, 2013), the Alabama Supreme Court granted the employer’s petition for writ of mandamus and held that the post-accident report was prepared in anticipation of litigation and, therefore, was considered work product and not discoverable.

On May 30, 2014, the Alabama Supreme Court decided not to get involved in a work product issue inEx parte USA Water Ski, Inc. and denied the petition for writ of mandamus filed by USA Water Ski, Inc. The issue came before the Supreme Court previously when USA Water Ski, Inc filed a petition for writ of mandamus in June of 2013. In June the Supreme Court found that the post accident report at issue was work product and directed the trial court vacate its order that USA Water Ski, Inc. produce the report. Upon remand additional evidence came to light suggesting the post accident report was not prepared in anticipation of litigation. The trial court once again ordered that USA Water Ski, Inc. produce the post accident report. USA Water Ski, Inc. once again file a petition for writ of mandamus and this time the Supreme Court denied the petition without an opinion. However, Chief Justice Moore wrote a concurring opinion. According to Chief Justice Moore a writ of mandamus is not proper in the context of discovery issues and the Supreme Court should not get involved. Chief Justice Moore opined that the trial court is in a better position to deal with discovery issues and petitions for writ of mandamus require the need for extraordinary remedy which is normally not present in discovery issues.

My Two Cents:

It seems that once the trial court orders a party to produce a post accident report the Supreme Court is most likely going to defer to the trial court’s opinion and not get involved. For this reason it is important for employers to establish the reason behind the creation of the post accident report. As the Supreme Court ruled in Ex parte Schnitzer Steel Industries, Incthe report does not have to be solely prepared in anticipation of litigation but there must be evidence that the employer could have reasonably assumed litigation was expected, and for that reason, as well as standard procedure or other reasons, prepared the post accident report. If the employer can establish this at the trial level the post-accident report should not be discoverable. However, if the trial court orders that it be produced the Supreme Court has indicated that they are not likely going to get involved in discovery issues.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

The article was written by Joshua G. Holden, Esq. a Member of Fish Nelson, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation and related liability matters. Mr. Holden is AV rated by Martindale-Hubbell, which is the highest rating an attorney can receive. Holden and his firm are members of The National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network (NWCDN). The NWCDN is a national and Canadian network of reputable law firms organized to provide employers and insurers access to the highest quality representation in workers’ compensation and related employer liability fields.

If you have questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the author atjholden@fishnelson.com or 205-332-1428.

On May 16, 2014, the Alabama Court of Appeals released its opinion in Jesse Stutts, Inc. v. William Hughey overruling a trial court’s finding that the employee’s new injury was a direct and natural result of his prior compensable injury. In Alabama, if an employee’s injury is found to be the direct and natural result of a previous compensable workers’ compensation injury, then the previous employer may be responsible for benefits resulting from the new injury, even if it the injury did not occur while working for the employer. However, when it cannot be shown that the first injury was the direct cause of the second injury, then the employee cannot recover additional compensation benefits for the new injury from the original employer.

Hughey, the employee in the case at hand, injured his back while working for Jesse Stutts, Inc., in 2002, and Stutts remained responsible for medical treatment for that injury. In 2011, while working for Cracker Barrel, Hughey claimed that he fell and re-injured his back due to his leg giving out. He also claimed that his leg weakness was related to his 2002 accident and that he had fallen numerous times as a result of the weakness. From the very beginning, Hughey wanted Stutts to pay for the treatment he would need for this new injury. For reasons unknown, he never sought benefits from Cracker Barrel.

At trial, the medical evidence made no clear connection between Hughey’s legs giving out and his 2002 injury. Although it was suggested that the 2002 injury could result in weakness, there was no medical evidence directly connecting Hughey’s new injury to his 2002 accident. However, despite the evidence, the trial court found that Hughey’s 2011 fall was the direct and natural result of his 2002 injury.

On Appeal, Stutts argued that Hughey had not presented substantial evidence to support the trial court’s decision, and the Court of Appeals agreed. It was noted that there was evidence suggesting that Hughey’s legs were weak and that they would give out on him at times, causing him to fall. However, the Court also noted there was no medical evidence supporting Hughey’s contention that the weakness was the cause of his new injury. In addition, the Court pointed out that Hughey had sustained other falls and incidents which were just as likely to have caused Hughey’s condition.

The Court of Appeals found that the trial court’s determination that Hughey’s fall was the result of his 2002 injury was speculation and not supported by the evidence, and therefore, overruled the trial court’s decision.

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About the Author

This post was written by Trey Cotney, Esq. of Fish Nelson LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation matters. Fish Nelson is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Network (NWCDN). If you have any questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the author at tcotney@fishnelson.com or any firm member at 205-332-3430.

The Alabama Legislature recently passed HB-107, which would amend § 25-5-56 of The Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act. HB-107 was introduced by District 55 Representative Rod Scott (D) on January 14, 2014. The legislature passed the bill in March, and it has been sent to Governor Bentley for his signature. Under current law, if an employee dies as the result of an accident occurring in and arising out of his employment, the employer must pay burial expenses up to a maximum of $3,000.00. If Governor Bentley signs HB-107, the maximum burial expense would be increased to $6,500.00.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

This article was written by Charley M. Drummond, Esq. of Fish Nelson, LLC. Fish Nelson is a law firm located in Birmingham, Alabama dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers, and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation cases and related liability matters. Drummond and his firm are members of The National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network (NWCDN). The NWCDN is a national and Canadian network of reputable law firms organized to provide employers and insurers access to the highest quality representation in workers’ compensation and related employer liability fields. If you have questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the author at cdrummond@fishnelson.com or (205) 332-3414.