State News : Alabama

On May 19, 2014, The New Mexico Court of Appeals ruled that Redwood Fire & Casualty must reimburse an injured mechanic for the cost of marijuana he was prescribed for pain due to his on-the-job injury. Gregory Vialpando injured his lower back in 2000 while working for Ben’s Automotive Services. Vialpando’s physician stated that Vialpando’ resulting pain was among the most intense, frequent and long-lasting out of thousands of patients the doctor had treated. In 2013, the workers’ compensation board approved Vialpando to use marijuana as treatment, but Redwood objected to reimbursing him for the cost of the drug due to its illegal status under federal law. While New Mexico passed theLynn and Erin Compassionate Use Act in 2007, legalizing the use of cannabis for treatment of debilitating medical conditions,The Controlled Substances Act of 1970 still classifies marijuana as a Schedule I drug under federal law with "no acceptable medical use", and makes its sale, possession, and distribution illegal. The Court of Appeals stated in its decision that neither Redwood nor Ben’s cited to any specific federal law that they would violate by reimbursing Vialpando for his herbal purchases.

MY TWO CENTS

It is unclear exactly what positions Ben’s Automotive and Redwood took at trial. However, it would appear that there are valid arguments to support denying reimbursement. By paying for Vialpando’s marijuana, Redwood would arguably be enabling Vialpando to purchase drugs that are illegal under federal law and, therefore, could arguably be considered to be conspiring to violate federal law. Section 846 of theControlled Substances Act of 1970 provides that any person who conspires to commit any other drug offense shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense itself. If reimbursing a person for buying drugs amounts to conspiracy to violate The Controlled Substances Act, Redwood’s concerns would certainly be understandable. Additionally, from Redwood’s perspective, insurance policies are contracts, so contract defenses would apply. Illegality is a defense to a breach of contract claim, so Redwood may have a valid defense in that regard, depending on what state’s law governs the insurance contract.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

This article was written by Charley M. Drummond, Esq. of Fish Nelson, LLC. Fish Nelson is a law firm located in Birmingham, Alabama dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers, and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation cases and related liability matters. Drummond and his firm are members of The National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network (NWCDN). The NWCDN is a national and Canadian network of reputable law firms organized to provide employers and insurers access to the highest quality representation in workers’ compensation and related employer liability fields. If you have questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the author at cdrummond@fishnelson.com or (205) 332-3414.

The Court of Appeals recently reversed a trial court’s decision awarding benefits outside of the statutory schedule inAmerican Cast Iron Pipe Company v. Sharon Blackmon. The Court also reversed the trial court’s decision to grant the employee an additional authorized treating physician after she had already chosen a doctor from a panel of 4.

Blackmon worked as a pipe processor for ACIPCO, and sustained injuries to her wrist in 2008 and to her ankle in 2010. There was no dispute that the injuries were compensable, but there was disagreement over whether Blackmon’s injuries were subject to the statutory schedule.

At trial, Blackmon testified that her wrist pain did not normally extend to or affect other parts of her body, but that the pain would sometimes run up her arm. As for her ankle injury, the evidence indicated that prolonged standing would cause aching, but it did not prevent her from taking care of herself. There was no evidence that the ankle injury affected other parts of Blackmon’s body.

The trial court considered evidence provided by Blackmon’s vocational expert, and found that Blackmon suffered a 35% permanent partial disability, and awarded benefits outside of the statutory schedule. The court also granted Blackmon’s request that ACIPCO provide her treatment with a new physician of her choice.

On appeal, ACIPCO argued that the evidence did not support the trial court’s decision to award benefits outside of the statutory schedule and that the trial court should not have considered vocational evidence. The Court of Appeals agreed and stated that injuries may only be removed from the schedule when the effects of an injury to a scheduled member extend to other parts of the body and interfere with their efficiency. The Court found no substantial evidence indicating that the effects of either scheduled injury extended to or interfered with other parts of Blackmon’s body. The Court also noted that vocational evidence is generally irrelevant when compensation is limited to the statutory schedule.

The Court also agreed that ACIPCO should not have to provide Blackmon with yet another treating physician. The evidence was clear that Blackmon had already exercised her right in selecting a new treating physician from a panel of 4, and the Court held that she was not entitled to another new doctor.

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About the Author

This post was written by Trey Cotney, Esq. of Fish Nelson LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation matters. Fish Nelson is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Network (NWCDN). If you have any questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the author at tcotney@fishnelson.com or any firm member at 205-332-3430.

The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals recently released an opinion wherein it considered the difference between a temporary flare versus a permanent aggravation of a preexisting condition. InMadison Academy v. Hanvey, the plaintiff, worked as a janitor on the defendant’s campus. In May and June 2011, Hanvey was exposed to chemicals at work which aggravated her respiratory system. The symptoms continued to get worse over the next few months.

It was not until September 2011 that Hanvey was finally diagnosed with a rare disease known as myesthenia gravis (MG). Her doctors treated the disease, and by March 2012, Hanvey’s symptoms were gone and her condition was stable. Although MG cannot be cured, it can be controlled with the right medication. The medical evidence showed that Hanvey’s MG existed before her exposure to the chemicals at work and was not caused by the exposure. Her doctors stated that the preexisting condition was temporarily aggravated by the chemicals, but not worsened.

The trial court found that Hanvey was totally and permanently disabled due to her exposure to the chemicals at work. On appeal, Madison Academy argued that the root of Hanvey’s disability was her MG which the evidence indicated was not caused by her employment. And since the temporary flare up had resolved, they believed they were no longer responsible for providing benefits under the Act.

The Appeals Court noted that Hanvey’s MG was aggravated, but found that there was no evidence that the chemicals had worsened the underlying condition. Once the temporary aggravation had resolved, Hanvey was back to her baseline condition and no longer entitled to benefits since there was no permanent injury. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court’s award of permanent and total disability benefits.

My Two Cents:

The Court of Appeals has made it very clear that employers in Alabama will not be responsible for disability stemming from preexisting conditions which are not permanently worsened by a work accident. In cases where the employment temporarily exacerbates a preexisting condition, the employer is only responsible for providing benefits for the temporary disability period caused by a work accident. Any other resulting disability from the natural progression of an underlying or preexisting condition is not compensable.

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About the Author

This post was written by Trey Cotney, Esq. of Fish Nelson LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation matters. Fish Nelson is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Network (NWCDN). If you have any questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the author at tcotney@fishnelson.com or any firm member at 205-332-3430.

Sheila W. Austin, as admin. of the estate of Rose W. McMillan v.

Providence Hosp. and Sedgwick Claim Management. Services, Inc.

Released March 21, 2014

The deceased employee’s representative appealed Summary Judgment entered by the Mobile Circuit Court in favor of the employer and its claims administrator. The underlying case was based on a breach of contract claim filed by the estate against the employer and administrator. The alleged breach of contract was based on an agreement to settle future medical benefits.

On October 27, 2011, the parties agreed to settle McMillan’s future medical benefits for $75,000.00. However, McMillan was a eligible for Medicare so the parties submitted the Medicare Set-Aside proposal to CMS for approval. On November 29, 2012 CMS determined that of the $75,000.00, $35,951.00 had to be reserved for future medical care and drug expenses. The parties had agreed that the settlement was to be court approved. However, on December 9, 2012, McMillan passed away before the court could approve the settlement. Providence and Sedgwick indicated that the settlement would not be honored because it had not been approved by the court. As a result, Austin filed the breach of contract claim.

The Trial Court entered summary judgment in favor of the employer and administrator based on the exclusivity provision of the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act. The Trial Court also concluded that the agreement was not valid because it had not been approved and could not be made valid due to the employee’s death. The Trial Court specifically said that because future medical benefits are payable without time limitation any lump sum payment would reduce the benefits available and require court approval.

Austin argued on appeal the agreement to settle was a binding contract and survived the death of McMillan pursuant to §§ 6-5-462 and 6-5-465, Ala. Code 1975. Austin argued that the agreement became unconditional after CMS approved the medicare set-aside proposal and it was not required to be court approved because the settlement exceeded the monetary value of the future medical benefits as determined by CMS. As a result, Austin argued that § 25-5-56, Ala Code 1975, did not require approval of the settlement by the court.

The Court of Civil Appeals did not address Austin’s argument because Austin failed to address the Trial Court’s primary ground for entering summary judgment, the exclusivity provision. The Court of Civil Appeals stated that Austin failed to argue or explain how the subject claim would fall outside of the exclusivity provision. The Court of Civil Appeals stated that because the Trial Court had an alternate basis for granting summary judgment, if the appellant fails to show error as to each basis, the appellant waives any argument on those grounds and this results in an automatic affirmance of the judgment.

My Two Cents:

While the Court of Civil Appeals did not actually rule on Austin’s argument, I find it interesting that they chose to write an opinion pointing out the exclusivity provision and breach of contract. This is the first time I have seen the exclusivity provision and breach of contract mentioned at the same time. The exclusivity provision prevents recovery by any other method, unless provided for under the Act, for injury caused by an on-the-job injury. § 25-5-52, Ala. Code 1975. The question created by this case is, does a breach of contract claim qualify as a claim based on the workers’ compensation injury? The argument could definitely be made that once a valid contract to settle is entered into, that an attempt to recover under the theory of contract is no longer based on the injury itself. This would then fall outside of the exclusivity provision.

In this case it does not appear there was a valid contract to enforce because the parties had agreed to have it approved by the court making the contract contingent upon court approval. Had that not been the case, the fact that the payment was in excess of what CMS determined necessary to cover future medical benefits may have resulted the agreement not being continent upon court approval. § 25-5-56 only requires court approval when settlement is for an amount less that the amount stipulated by the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act. Therefore, if there had not been a contingency the estate might have succeeded in arguing the exclusivity provision does not apply to a breach of contract claim because the recovery is based on the contract and not the workers’ compensation injury.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

The article was written by Joshua G. Holden, Esq. a Member of Fish Nelson, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation and related liability matters. Mr. Holden is AV rated by Martindale-Hubbell, which is the highest rating an attorney can receive. He is the immediate past chair of the ABA/ TIPS Workers’ Compensation and Employers’ Liability Committee.

Holden and his firm are members of The National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network (NWCDN). The NWCDN is a national and Canadian network of reputable law firms organized to provide employers and insurers access to the highest quality representation in workers’ compensation and related employer liability fields.

If you have questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the author atjholden@fishnelson.com or 205-332-1428.

On March 14, 2014, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals released its opinion in the case ofMichael Brown v. Dixie Contracting Company and Salter’s Exterminating Company, Inc. In that case, Brown sued Dixie and Salter’s for injuries he allegedly suffered in an automobile accident while working for them. The vehicle that Brown was driving at the time of the accident was owned by the owner of Dixie. Dixie and Salter’s are related companies, as the owner of Dixie was a majority shareholder in Salter’s. The two companies operated out of the same building, and they shared a secretary and receptionist. Salter’s performed termite inspection and extermination services, and Dixie would often repair termite damage discovered through Salter’s inspections. Brown alleged Dixie and Salter’s were essentially the same company, and that his injuries occurred in and arose out of his employment with both defendants. Dixie contended that Brown did not work for Dixie, and Salter’s contended that Brown was an independent contractor.

Brown testified that at the time he was hired, the owner of Dixie never specified whether Brown was being hired as an employee or independent contractor. He also testified that he did not sign a contract with Salter’s or Dixie. Brown testified that he considered himself to be an employee and that his supervisor told what time to be at work and when he could leave. Brown testified that his supervisor would tell him on any given day whether he was to sell pest control services or was to work construction. Brown testified that on some days he would sell pest control services for Salter’s, and on other days, he would perform construction work for Dixie. Brown further testified that when performing inspections for Salter’s, he was instructed to call Dixie if any termite damage was located so that Dixie could quote the repairs. Salter’s payroll records listed Brown as a 1099 "employee" who was to be paid a "draw" against commissions and sales. However, those same records indicated that Brown was actually paid at a flat rate of $80.00 per day for sales work, while he was paid at an hourly rate for construction work he performed for Dixie. Brown’s supervisor testified that he had hired Brown to work for Salter’s as a subcontractor in sales, but that Brown was also an "at will employee" that could be terminated for any reason. He testified that Brown was required to report to work by 8:00 a.m. each day. The defendants produced evidence that Brown was always paid by Salter’s and never by Dixie, and that Brown only performed construction work after the accident. However, Brown’s evidence also established that several other employees performed work for Dixie but were paid by Salter’s.

The trial court found that Brown was an independent contractor of Salter’s and that Brown did not perform any work for Dixie until after the alleged accident occurred. Based on this, the trial court denied workers’ compensation benefits. Brown appealed on the grounds that the trial court’s order did not include adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law, and was not supported by substantial evidence. The Alabama Court of Appeals agreed that the findings of fact and conclusions of law set out by the trial court were insufficient, which allowed them to look to the record in order to determine whether substantial evidence supported the trial court’s determination. The Court of Appeals noted that the primary factor in determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor is whether the purported employer has reserved the right to control the manner in which the worker performs the duties of the work. In order for a worker to be considered an employee, the prospective employer must retain the right to direct not only what shall be done but also how it shall be done. The Court further pointed out that the four factors to be considered in determining whether an "employer" has retained the right of control include: (1) direct evidence demonstrating a right or an exercise of control; (2) the method of payment for services; (3) whether equipment is furnished; and (4) whether the other party has the right to terminate the employment. However, the Court also pointed out that no one fact by itself can create an employer/employee relationship, and that the retention of control necessary to establish such a relationship is determined on a case-by-case basis considering the totality of the evidence.

Based on the evidence, the Court of appeals found that Salter’s controlled nearly every aspect of Brown’s employment. Salter’s controlled whether Brown would perform tasks in pest control sales or construction as Salter’s or Dixie needed. Salter’s controlled the manner in which Brown would be paid for the different jobs he did and capped his weekly pay at $400.00. Salter’s provided the very equipment he was driving at the time of the accident. There was no contract between Brown and his employers that would prevent Brown from quitting his job at any time. Based on the totality of the evidence, the Court found that the trial court’s Order was not supported by substantial evidence, and that Brown was an employee. The case was then remanded to the trial court to determine the amount of workers’ compensation benefits Salter’s owes to Brown.

MY TWO CENTS

Employers need to be aware that paying a contractor via a 1099 as opposed to a W-2 does not necessarily preclude the contractor from recovering workers’ compensation benefits in the event of an injury. As this case demonstrates, if an employer retains the right to set the employee’s schedule, dictates which tasks he is to perform on any given day, provides his equipment, and pays him like a salaried or hourly employee, the contractor will be considered an employee.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

This article was written by Charley M. Drummond, Esq. of Fish Nelson, LLC. Fish Nelson is a law firm located in Birmingham, Alabama dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers, and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation cases and related liability matters. Drummond and his firm are members of The National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network (NWCDN). The NWCDN is a national and Canadian network of reputable law firms organized to provide employers and insurers access to the highest quality representation in workers’ compensation and related employer liability fields. If you have questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the author at cdrummond@fishnelson.com or (205) 332-3414.

St. Louis attorney, J. Bradley Young, recently posted an interesting blog article entitledThis Story Shows Why Employers are Frustrated with Workers Comp Judges. In the article, he reported on a New Jersey case in which the claimant was involved in a car accident while driving off of her employer’s property. She was actually in the process of turning out of the employer’s property at the time of the collision. The Coming and Going Rule would have been an excellent defense except for the fact that it was established that the rear bumper of the car was still hanging over the employer’s property at the time of impact. Since New Jersey is a Positional Risk Doctrine state, it was easy for the employee to win once the Court determined that she was, at least partially, on her employer’s property. In Positional Risk Doctrine states, the employee only need show that the accident would not have happened but for her employment. In other words, if she had not been leaving work that day, the accident would have never happened.

MY TWO CENTS:

If this had happened in Alabama, the result would have been different. Assuming that the Alabama judge also agreed that a hanging bumper thwarted the Coming and Going Rule, the employee would still have had her work cut out for her. The reason being that Alabama is an Increased Risk Doctrine state. This means that the employee must prove that the employment somehow increased the risk to the employee of such an accident occurring. Since car accidents happen to people on and off the job, she would have had to show that the employer’s exit was located in a place that made her more susceptible to getting hit. Of course, if that was the case, the employer would have wanted to accept it as a workers’ compensation matter in order to be afforded the protections of the Exclusivity Doctrine.

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About the Author

This article was written by Michael I. Fish, Esq. of Fish Nelson LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation matters. Fish Nelson is a member of The National Workers’ Compensation Network (NWCDN). If you have any questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the author atmfish@fishnelson.com or any firm member at 205-332-3430.

Ex parte Southern Erectors, Inc.

Petition for Writ of Mandamus

On February 21, 2014, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals granted Southern Erectors, Inc.’s (SEI) Petition for Writ of Mandamus. The trial court had denied SEI’s summary judgment motion that was based on the Alabama court not have subject matter jurisdiction over the on the job injury that occurred in Kansas. The Alabama Court Civil of Appeals agreed with SEI and remanded the case with an order to dismiss the workers’ compensation case based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The employee lived in Alabama and learned of a job opening in 2010 with SEI in Wyoming. He left Alabama and traveled to Wyoming for the job. The plaintiff worked on several different job sites in various states over the year for SEI. In February of 2011, the employee, while in Alabama, learned of another job with SEI in Kansas. Once he was told the date he should arrive he left and, upon arrival, completed a new application, Kansas Employee’s Withholding Certificate and stayed in a Kansas Hotel while performing the job. On March 14, 2011 the employee was injured while performing his job in Kansas. He was provided benefits under Kansas Workers’ Compensation and even completed a Kansas Workers’ Compensation form.

On March 13, 2013, the employee file suit for workers’ compensation benefits under the Alabama Act. In agreeing with SEI and ordering that the workers’ compensation claim be dismissed, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals stated that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. The Court of Civil Appeals pointed out that in order for an out of state injury to be compensable under the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act the requirements of §25-5-35(d) must be met. Subsection (2) and (3) of this section applicable to this case state that benefits are owed for an injury that occurs out side of this state if benefits would have been owed had the injury occurred in Alabama, provided that at the time of injury (2) he was working under contract for hire made in this state in employment not principally localized in any state, and (3) he was working under a contract of hire made in this state in employment principally localized in another state whose workers’ compensation law was not applicable to his employer. The Court of Civil Appeals found that the employee impliedly accepted the job offer by traveling to Kansas.See Ex parte Robinson, 598 So. 2d 901, 904 (Ala. 1991). Therefore, the employee was under a contract for hired entered into in Alabama. However, the Court of Civil Appeals stated that this conclusion does not automatically mean that the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act applies. See Ex parte Fluor Corp., 960 So. 2d 701 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006). §25-5-35(d)(2)&(3) requires that the court also consider the principal location of the employment as defined in §25-5-35(b). The Supreme Court stated inEx parte Flour Corp. that principally localized pursuant to §25-5-35(b) merely means the employee worked for the employer at a designated place within a state.

The Court of Civil Appeals considered the following factors to determine the principal location of employment in the present case: (1) the application was completed in Kansas, (2) work was being performed in Kansas at the time of injury, (3) he was living in a Kansas hotel at the time of the accident, (4) he completed Kansas tax withholding forms and (5) SEI was operating out of Kansas for that job creating a place of business there. For these reasons, the Court of Civil Appeals found that the employee’s employment was principally localized in Kansas. Therefore, §25-5-35(d)(2) would not apply because SEI was principally localized in Kansas and §25-5-35(d)(3) would not apply because there was no evidence that Kansas workers’ compensation laws were not applicable to SEI.

The Court of Civil Appeals rejected the employee’s argument that the employer had to have a permanent and continuous presence in the state to establish a principal location in the state (the employee had cited an Alabama Federal case that used this language but that case applied to venue and not §25-5-35(d)).

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

The article was written by Joshua G. Holden, Esq. a Member of Fish Nelson, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation and related liability matters. Mr. Holden is AV rated by Martindale-Hubbell, which is the highest rating an attorney can receive. He has been selected as a "Rising Star" by Super Lawyers. He is the past Chair of the ABA/ TIPS Workers’ Compensation and Employers’ Liability Committee. Holden and his firm are members of The National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network (NWCDN). If you have questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the author atjholden@fishnelson.com or 205-332-1428.

The Annual Midwinter Conference will be held this year in Chicago from March 13 until March 15 at the Conrad Chicago Hotel. It is a jointly sponsored by the ABA Tort Trial & Insurance Practice Section and the Section of Labor an Employment Law.

The Seminar begins on Thursday afternoon to allow for morning travel and will finish up at mid-day on Saturday with a presentation on mediation and negotiation techniques presented by the National Association of Workers’ Compensation Judges and the College of Workers’ Compensation Lawyers.

New this year will be several sessions specifically designed for the Medical community such as back-to-back sessions on Thursday,The Litigators Guide to Understanding Medicine and Evaluating & Treating Back Painand Healthcare Reform’s Impact Nationally and on Workers Compensation, and a presentation on Friday,CMS Regulations and Medicare Legislation.

This not to be missed program is open to all. The stellar speakers will discuss rainmaking, social media and ethical considerations, MSAs, healthcare reform’s impact on workers’ compensation, insurance premium fraud, opioid use and abuse, best practices, negotiation and mediation techniques, and diagnostic medicine.

Following this blockbuster program, the College of Workers’ Compensation Lawyers

will hold their annual dinner on Saturday evening. This is an invitation only event and

tickets are required.

For more information, please feel free to contact Mike Fish or Josh Holden. Both are former ABA TIPS Committee Chairs and would be happy to assist you. Contact information below.

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Mike Fish and Josh Holden are both members of Fish Nelson LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation matters. Fish Nelson is a member of The National Workers’ Compensation Network (NWCDN). If you have any questions about this post, please feel free to contact Mike atmfish@fishnelson.com or 205-332-1448 or Josh atjholden@fishnelson.com or 205-332-1428.

On January 24, 2014, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the Circuit Court of Shelby County Alabama’s decision, without opinion, in the case ofVinson v. G & R Mineral Services, Inc. However, Chief Justice Roy Moore pinned an interesting dissent. The employee, David Vinson, Jr., sought employment with G & R, a contractor that provided services to Chemical Line Company of Alabama in Calera. G & R then directed Vinson to a temporary employment agency, Diversified Sourcing Solutions (DSS), to apply for the job. Vinson was then hired by DSS to work for G & R at the Chemical Lime baghouse, where his job involved changing out lime filters. On his second day of employment, Vinson allegedly inhaled lime dust, had to be hospitalized, and never returned to work. Vinson sought workers’ compensation benefits from DSS. However DSS’s workers’ compensation carrier later became insolvent, so the Alabama Insurance Guarantee Association (AIGA) assumed responsibility for paying for Vinson’s care. AIGA eventually discontinued the payment of benefits, and Vinson then filed a lawsuit against G & R seeking workers’ compensation benefits. However, G & R’s workers’ compensation carrier convinced Vinson to dismiss the action on the grounds that DSS, and not G & R, was Vinson’s employer.

Vinson then filed an action for negligence against G & R. G & R moved for summary judgment, asserting that it was a "special employer" of Vinson, and was therefore immune from tort liability. Vinson moved to strike G & R’s special employer defense. The trial court found that DSS was merely a temporary employment agency and that Vinson had an implied contract of special employment with G & R. Based on these findings, the trial Court entered summary judgment in favor of G & R. On appeal, Vinson argued that G & R’s insistence in the workers’ compensation case that it was not his employer, created a genuine issue of fact as to whether it should be considered Vinson’s employer in the negligence case. In support of that position, Vinson produced a letter to the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) from G & R’s safety officer stating that Vinson was an employee of DSS and not G & R, and that DSS was paying Vinson’s workers’ compensation benefits. Despite this evidence, the Supreme Court upheld the trial Court’s ruling.

In his dissent, Judge Moore stated that G & R’s opportunistic switch from non-employer to employer was sufficient to raise a factual question as to whether G & R was a special employer immune from tort liability under the exclusivity provisions of the Act. Judge Moore stated that since that question was not one purely of law, but of fact, reasonable persons might draw different conclusions as to whether G & R was a special employer. Based on that, Judge Moore stated that the issue of whether G&R was a special employer should have been one decided by the jury.

MY TWO CENTS

Although Judge Moore was the only judge that dissented, I believe that the principals of judicial estoppel support his opinion. A party is generally precluded from taking a position in a case which is contrary to a position they have taken in earlier legal proceedings. Employers need to be aware that if they deny that they are the employer, they may be estopped from seeking protection under the exclusivity provisions of The Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act in the event a tort claim is later brought by the employee. Therefore, it is critical that employers and their attorneys consider the pros and cons of pleading tort immunity at the outset of any case.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

This article was written by Charley M. Drummond, Esq. of Fish Nelson, LLC. Fish Nelson is a law firm located in Birmingham, Alabama dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers, and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation cases and related liability matters. Drummond and his firm are members of The National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network (NWCDN). The NWCDN is a national and Canadian network of reputable law firms organized to provide employers and insurers access to the highest quality representation in workers’ compensation and related employer liability fields. If you have questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the author at cdrummond@fishnelson.com or (205) 332-3414.

Now that I have your attention, let me elaborate. An Australian federal employee was on a business trip when she met up with a man and had sex with him in her hotel room. While engaged in the act of intercourse, a light fixture above the bed fell onto her face causing injury to her nose and mouth. In addition to her claim for physical injuries, the claimant alleged depression.

The administrative tribunal denied benefits because it determined that sex is not an ordinary incident of an overnight stay such as showering, sleeping, or eating.

A Federal Court Judge overturned the decision analogizing the sex act to playing a game of cards. In his opinion, if she had been injured while playing cards in her room it would be compensable and, therefore, she should also be compensated for her sex injuries. There was no comment on how a light fixture might come loose while playing cards but, then again, there was also no comment on how the light fixture came loose during the sex act.

Fortunately for the employer, the High Court agreed with the rational of the administrative tribunal and ruled that benefits were not owed. The Australian Employment Minister hailed the ruling as a victory for common sense.

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About the Author

This article was written by Michael I. Fish, Esq. of Fish Nelson LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation matters. Fish Nelson is a member of The National Workers’ Compensation Network (NWCDN). If you have any questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the author atmfish@fishnelson.com or any firm member at 205-332-3430.