NWCDN Members regularly post articles and summary judgements in workers’ compensations law in your state.
Select a state from the dropdown menu below to scroll through the state specific archives for updates and opinions on various workers’ compensation laws in your state.
Contact information for NWCDN members is also located on the state specific links in the event you have additional questions or your company is seeking a workers’ compensation lawyer in your state.
Interim Commissioner Named
The Governor has named the senior Deputy, Michelle (Miki) McGovern, as the new acting Workers’ Compensation Commissioner effective immediately. She will remain in this capacity until the Governor formally appoints a new Workers' Compensation Commissioner subject to confirmation by the Senate.
This should immediately address the backlog of decisions that has accrued over the several weeks since Commissioner Godfrey resigned. During that time, Deputy Commissioners have not issued arbitration decisions based upon a concern that there would be no certainty as to whether or not those decisions would have reflected final agency action in the absence of a Commissioner, thereby causing problems with the handling of appeals. Going forward, Acting Commissioner McGovern will handle or direct all inter-agency appeals, and it is anticipated that arbitration decisions will start issuing immediately.
Call Mark Bosscher or Lee Hook with any questions @ 515-243-2100. We’d be happy to help, whether it be a quick or a complex issue!
Hooks v. Coastal Stone Works, Inc.
Released September 5, 2014
The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals ruled that an officer of a corporation must take action to revoke previous certification of exemption from workers’ compensation coverage pursuant to § 25-5-50(b).
On May 24, 2006, Hooks, along with two other officers of Coastal Stone Works, Inc., signed a certificate of exemption to be exempted from coverage under the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act pursuant to § 25-5-60(b). On November 23, 2011, Hooks was injured and sought benefits under the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act and filed suit. Coastal Stone Works, Inc. file a motion for summary judgment, which was ultimately granted the second time it was filed. It’s position was Hooks exempted himself in 2006 and never revoked the exemption. Hooks asserted that, if he did not file a certification of exemption each year, the exemption automatically revoked itself. There was no dispute that Hooks did not sign or file anything other than the certification of exemption submitted in May of 2006.
Hooks argued that § 25-5-60(b) states an officer of a corporation may elect annually to be exempt from coverage on the workers’ compensation act. Hooks interpreted this section to require him to annually elect to be exempted from coverage and if he did not the exemption was automatically revoked. Coast Stone Works, Inc. argued that this the provision goes on to state that the exemption may be revoked upon an officer filing a written certification electing to be covered. Coastal Stone Works, Inc. argued that this showed that the legislature intended the requested exemption to remain in effect until the officer revoked the exemption in writing.
The Court of Civil Appeals agreed with Coastal Stone Works, Inc. and stated that if the legislature had intended the exemption to revoke each year unless the officer requested the exemption again it would not have provided the method for revoking the exemption. The Court of Civil Appeals opined that § 25-5-60(b) required an officer to take action to revoke the previous certification of exemption as opposed to the revocation being automatic unless they file another certification of exemption.
MY TWO CENTS:
Any time you are dealing with an injury involving an officer of a corporation make sure to verify that they never submitted a written certification of exemption to the carrier and the Alabama Department of Labor.
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
The article was written by Joshua G. Holden, Esq. a Member of Fish, Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation and related liability matters. Mr. Holden is AV rated by Martindale-Hubbell, which is the highest rating an attorney can receive. Holden and his firm are members of The National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network (NWCDN). The NWCDN is a national and Canadian network of reputable law firms organized to provide employers and insurers access to the highest quality representation in workers’ compensation and related employer liability fields.
If you have questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the author atjholden@fishnelson.com or 205-332-1428.
In an effort to reduce painkiller abuse and misuse, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) announced last week that it is reclassifying hydrocodone as a Schedule II Controlled Substance. Under the new regulation, which will go into effect on October 5, 2014, doctors will no longer be able to call in prescriptions for drugs like Lortab and Vicodin. Additionally, patients will only be allowed one 90-day prescription per doctor visit, and will have to actually see their doctor in person before obtaining a refill. According to DEA Administrator Michele Leonhart, "Almost seven million Americans abuse controlled-substance prescription medications, including opioid painkillers, resulting in more deaths from prescription drug overdoses than auto accidents." The official DEA release can be found here.
My Two Cents
The effects of the new regulation on employers could be two-fold. Employers can most likely expect an increase in claims management costs associated with more frequent doctor visits for injured workers who are in long-term opiate therapy. However, the new regulation could also greatly reduce the financial burden placed on employers by "pill mills" that dole out drugs like candy after seeing a patient only once or twice. In either case, employers and claims managers need to be aware of the new regulation to ensure that the medical providers they select to care for injured workers comply with these guidelines.
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About the Author
This article was written by Charley M. Drummond, Esq. of Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC. Fish Nelson & Holden is a law firm located in Birmingham, Alabama dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers, and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation cases and related liability matters. Drummond and his firm are members of The National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network (NWCDN). The NWCDN is a national and Canadian network of reputable law firms organized to provide employers and insurers access to the highest quality representation in workers’ compensation and related employer liability fields. If you have questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the author at cdrummond@fishnelson.com or (205) 332-3414.
Kevin Durnien worked as a tractor-trailer driver for United Parcel Service (UPS) from 1996 to 2008. He was diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease in 2003 but continued to drive for UPS for several years.
On October 25, 2007, Durnien was injured when he fell on his elbow while making a warehouse pickup. He injured his rotator cuff and underwent arthroscopic surgery on his shoulder. The case was accepted and benefits were paid.
Several weeks after his surgery, Durnien noticed that his Parkinson’s disease was getting worse: he was experiencing tremors and his medication was increased.
Durnien filed a claim petition against UPS on December 5, 2007 for his shoulder injury. On April 6, 2009, he applied for Second Injury Fund benefits claiming he was totally disabled as a result of a combination of a work injury and a preexisting Parkinson’s condition. Durnien was separated from his employment in October 2008.
The matter was tried before the Chief Judge of Compensation, the Honorable Peter J. Calderone. Four experts testified in the case, two for each side. The Chief Judge found that the work injury did not materially worsen petitioner’s Parkinson’s disease, nor was petitioner entitled to Second Injury Fund benefits. However, he did award petitioner 20% permanent partial disability for the shoulder. Petitioner appealed.
The Appellate Division first focused on the issue of whether the work accident materially worsened petitioner’s Parkinson’s disease. The Court noted that Judge Calderone rejected the testimony of petitioner’s neurologist, Dr. Bereanu, because she was “not a credible witness [and was] ill prepared for her testimony which was essentially a repetitive without foundation assertion that the work accident somehow aggravated petitioner’s Parkinson’s Disease in some non-measurable way.”
In respect to respondent’s neurologist, Dr. Steven Mandel, the Court observed that the Chief Judge found his testimony to be sound in stating that the Parkinson’s condition was not aggravated by the work accident. The Chief Judge was impressed as well that Dr. Mandel actively treats patients with Parkinson’s disease.
In regard to the entitlement to Second Injury Fund benefits, the Court again affirmed the Chief Judge because the claimant, following his separation from employment in 2008, actually applied for unemployment benefits. As the Court said, one must be able to work and be available for work to obtain unemployment benefits underN.J.S.A. 43:21-4 (c) (1). In essence, the petitioner’s application for unemployment benefits was inconsistent with his contention that he was totally disabled, which is a requirement for Second Injury Fund eligibility.
The Court also agreed with the Chief Judge that an independent reason to reject the Second Injury Fund claim was that petitioner’s Parkinsons’s condition progressed AFTER the work injury. The statute precludes Fund benefits“[i]f a person who is rendered permanently partially disabled by the last compensable injury subsequently becomes permanently totally disabled by reason of progressive physical deterioration or preexisting condition or disease.” N.J.S.A. 34:15-95 (d).
While it was true that the Parkinson’s condition preexisted the work injury, petitioner had been able to work and had been certified for a CDL license. The condition apparently worsened after the work accident for reasons unconnected to the accident. The Court said, “Although Durnien’s physician would not certify him for a CDL, Durnien testified that he was capable of continuing to work at UPS and sought a position that did not require a CDL. He failed to obtain a lighter-duty job not because of a disability, but due to his lack of seniority.”
This case illustrates several important points. First and foremost, practitioners need to spend time choosing the right expert witness. In this case, UPS made a wise choice in selecting its expert because he was well qualified and treated patients with Parkinson’s disease. Secondly, Second Injury Fund eligibility depends on preexisting conditions and will not be available to those whose prior condition worsens after the work injury and only then become totally disabled. Lastly, the case illustrates that an expert’s testimony must contain more than just a bald assertion that a given condition is work related. The Chief Judge rejected the expert opinion of the petitioner’s neurologist because there was no scientific foundation for it.
Flanagan Lumbar Co., Inc. v. Tennison
Released August 22, 2014
The Alabama Court of Civil once again ruled that devices to be considered "other apparatus" set out in §25-5-77(a) of the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act should be decided on a case by case basis. The Court of Civil Appeals pointed out that the Alabama Supreme Court has previously ruled in Ex parte Mitchell, 989 So. 2d 1083, 1092 (Ala. 2008) that the definition of "other apparatus" is an item that is "(a) reasonably necessary and (b) intended to improve the injured employee’s condition, to prevent the further deterioration of the employee’s condition, or to relieve the employee from the effect of his condition by restoring the employee to a basic level of appearance or functioning. The determination of what constitutes a reasonably necessary ‘other apparatus’ should be made on a case-by-case basis."
Tennison had settled his worker’s compensation claim for a back injury with Flanagan Lumbar and medical benefits were to be left open. Tennison’s authorized treating physician was Dr. John Roberts. At some point during treatment Dr. Roberts recommended pool therapy. However, Tennison indicated that this made his condition worse so he stopped going. Some time later Tennison presented to Dr. Robert’s and asked that he prescribe a walk-in bathtub for Tennison’s home. Tennison told Dr. Robert’s he had not had an actual bath in 3 years and was unsteady stepping in and out of the regular tub in his home. He also told Dr. Robert’s the water would benefit him and allow him to do his general strengthening exercises at home rather than go to water therapy. Based on this request Dr. Robert’s recommended that the walk-in tub be approved as reasonably necessary. Dr. Robert’s stated in his letter to the carrier that he felt the walk-in tub would help prevent falls getting in and out of the tub and that because of Tension’s disability and de-conditioned body the walk-in tub was reasonable. Flanagan Lumbar refused to approve the walk-in tub and Tennison sought relief from the Circuit Court of Limestone County. The trial court reviewed deposition testimony from Tennison as well as deposition testimony from Dr. Roberts and found that the walk-in tub met the definition of "other apparatus" and, therefore, should be paid for by Flanagan Lumbar. Flanagan Lumbar appealed the decision which the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals reviewed de novo, having to give no weight or deference to the trial court’s findings of fact based on the only evidence presented being via deposition and not live testimony.
On appeal the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals stated that the walk-in tub in this case did meet the definition of "other apparatus" because Dr. Robert’s testified that the walk-in tub was not solely to allow Tennison a access to the bath, unlike like the scooter lift in Ex parte Mitchell. In this case Dr. Robert’s testified that the walk-in tub was a method to prevent falling and water therapy could assist with back pain. Therefore, a walk-in tub could meet the definition of "other apparatus" and did in this case. However, the Court of Civil Appeals then turned to whether substantial evidence was presented to support that the tub was reasonably necessary to 1)improve Tennison’s condition, 2) to prevent the further deterioration of his condition, or 3) relieve him from the effect of his condition by restoring him to basic level of function and appearance.
The Court of Civil Appeals stated that the walk-in tub would not improve his condition based on Dr. Robert’s testimony that he did not believe anything would improve Tennison’s condition. Dr. Robert’s stated that the tub would be helpful to provide potential and temporary pain relief but the Court of Civil Appeals stated that this does not constitute improving someone’s condition. The Court of Civil Appeals also pointed out that reducing the fall risk would not meet the standard in order to establish improving one’s condition.
They then turned to whether it would prevent Tennison’s condition from deteriorating. Dr. Robert’s testified that if Tennison did not get the tub his condition would probably not deteriorate. While Dr. Robert’s testified that it would help prevent Tennison from falling, there was no evidence to support that presented at trial. In fact, the Court of Civil Appeals pointed out that Flanagan Lumbar had present an alternative transfer bench that costs much less than the $18,500.00 walk-in tub.
The Court of Civil Appeals went on to find that the potential temporary symptom relief would not rise to the level of restoring Tennison to the basic level of function and appearance. While Dr. Robert’s testified that it might be helpful from a hygienic standpoint, there was no testimony that Tennison’s showers were inadequate for this.
As a result, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals ruled that a walk-in tub can meet the definition of "other apparatus" but in this case the evidence did not establish that the walk-in tub was reasonably necessary.
Judge Terry Moore wrote in concurrence to point out that he questioned whether the case should be reviewed de novo and whether the tub actually met the definition of "other apparatus." Judge Moore pointed out further evidence to support his concurring opinion which included Tennison testifying that pool therapy had made his back worse so he stopped going, as well as Dr. Robert’s testifying that the walk-in tub would not be big enough to perform the strengthening exercises, which Tennison claims was the reason for getting the walk-in tub. Judge Moore also pointed out the Dr. Robert’s recommendation for the walk-in tub was based solely on the employee’s request for the tub as opposed to medical reasons that would meet the requirements set out inEx parte Mitchell. Therefore, Judge Moore did not feel the walk-in tub in this case would meet the definition of "other apparatus" as the majority opinion stated. However, he did agree that if it did meet the definition sufficient evidence was not presented to establish it was reasonably necessary.
MY TWO CENTS:
When dealing with a recommendation for a medical device/aid requested pursuant to the "other apparatus" provision of §25-5-77(a) make sure the authorized treating physician gives a detailed explanation of his reason behind ordering the device and not just that he or she believes it is reasonably necessary.
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
The article was written by Joshua G. Holden, Esq. a Member of Fish, Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation and related liability matters. Mr. Holden is AV rated by Martindale-Hubbell, which is the highest rating an attorney can receive. Holden and his firm are members of The National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network (NWCDN). The NWCDN is a national and Canadian network of reputable law firms organized to provide employers and insurers access to the highest quality representation in workers’ compensation and related employer liability fields.
If you have questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the author atjholden@fishnelson.com or 205-332-1428.
On August 22, 2014, the Alabama Supreme Court released an opinion wherein it considered whether an adult child can be considered a partial dependent for purposes of receiving death benefits. InDonna Banks v. Premier Service Company, Inc., it was stipulated by the parties that the 22 year old child received regular financial support from her father prior to his death. The Trial Court noted in its final order that the adult child was not working but pursuing a double major at college. Since there was no evidence that the adult child was physically or mentally handicapped, the Court held that she did not qualify as a partial dependent. The Court of Appeals agreed noting that the same would hold true even if the adult child was totally dependent upon a deceased worker for support.
Practice Pointer:
The Court noted that the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act provides that a child is considered a dependent until the age of 18. This is different that the recognized age of majority in Alabama which is 19. When determining the dependency status of a teen, it is important that you apply the correct cut off age.
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About the Author
This article was written by Michael I. Fish, Esq. of Fish Nelson & Holden LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers and insurance carriers in workers' compensation matters. Fish Nelson is a member of The National Workers' Compensation Network (NWCDN). If you have any questions about this article or Alabama workers' compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the author at
mfish@fishnelson.com or any firm member at 205-332-1448.
On August 22, 2014, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals released its opinion inTotal Fire Protection, Inc. v Jonathan Jean, affirming the Trial Court’s order denying Total Fire Protection’s Motion to Terminate Medical Benefits based on the Last Injurious Exposure Rule. Jean injured both of his wrists in April 2005 while working for Total Fire Protection (TFP). Jean’s authorized treating physician performed surgery on both of his wrists, including the placement of hardware in the right wrist. Five months later, the Trial Court approved a settlement of indemnity and vocational benefits, with future medical benefits remaining open. After the settlement, Jean went to work for another employer. In June of 2006, TFP filed a Motion to Terminate Medical Benefits, asserting that Jean had developed carpal tunnel syndrome as a result of his job with his subsequent employer, and that TFP was no longer responsible for Jean’s medical treatment under the Last Injurious Exposure Rule. The Trial Court granted TFP’s motion.
In April of 2008, Jean filed a Motion for Relief from the June 2006 Order terminating his medical benefits, seeking to hold TFP responsible for further treatment. The Trial Court granted Jean’s motion, and entered an order reinstating Jean’s medical benefits, and TFP appealed.
On November 13, 2008, the Court of Appeals dismissed TFP’s appeal because it determined that it had been taken from a non-final judgment, since the Trial Court had not adjudicated TFP’s liability for all of the employee’s medical issues, most specifically his alleged carpal tunnel syndrome, and that the Trial Court had not issued findings of fact and conclusions of law in its June 16, 2008 judgment as required under the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act. After the appeal was dismissed, TFP moved the Trial Court to include findings of fact and conclusions of law in its judgment, which the Trial Court never ruled on. On May 30, 2012, TFP filed another motion to terminate Jean’s medical benefits, asserting identical grounds set out in the 2006 Motion. The parties then deposed the authorized treating physician and submitted his deposition transcript to the Trial Court. On August 9, 2013, the Trial Court entered a judgment finding that there was no conclusive evidence that Jean ever developed carpal tunnel syndrome and that the pain in his right wrist was directly related to the original injury with TFP. The Trial Court Ordered TFP to pay for Jean’s surgery to remove the hardware in his wrist and other treatment related to the original injury. TFP then appealed again, asserting that the Trial Court exceeded its discretion in granting Jean’s Motion for Relief from the June 2006 Order, and the Trial Court had no basis for setting aside that Order.
In its recent opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Trial Court’s decision, stating that the September 2005 settlement became a binding judgment with the same affect as any other final judgment, and that the settlement preserved Jean’s right to future treatment for any injuries sustained in the April 2005 accident. The Court of Appeals further pointed out that those rights could only be extinguished through the procedures set out in the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act. §25-5-56 of the Act allows a party to have a settlement vacated within six months after settlement only for fraud, undue influence, or coercion. A settlement may also be set aside on other grounds, as provided in the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the Court of Appeals pointed out that TFP did not assert any of the procedural grounds outlined in the Rules of Civil Procedure nor did they assert fraud, undue influence or coercion. The Court noted that this case is the first attempt by an employer to use the Last Injurious Exposure Rule to terminate its agreed liability for future medical expenses via post judgment practice, and that TFP had not been able to cite any case in which such a procedure had been followed or approved. While the 2006 settlement explicitly left the issue of future medical benefits open so that the Court retained jurisdiction over any controversy that might arise as to further treatment, the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act requires that an employer disputing its liability for an injury must file a Complaint so that the issue can be resolved by trial in which both parties have a chance to present evidence. Citing the holding inEx parte Publix Supermarkets, Inc., the Court noted that just as a trial court may not award an employee medical benefits based on an allegation and a motion, a trial court cannot terminate an employee’s right to medical benefits based on allegations in a motion. The Court of Appeals therefore held that the June 2006 Order terminating Jean’s medical benefits violated Jean’s due process, and was therefore, void.
Turning to TFP’s substantive argument that the Trial Court misapplied the Last Injurious Exposure Rule, the Court held that when an employee experiences expected ongoing symptoms from an original compensable injury as a result of routine physical activities in his subsequent employment, in the absence of evidence of some additional harmful change to the underlying anatomical condition of the employee, those expected ongoing symptoms will be treated as a recurrence of the symptoms from the original injury, and not an aggravation of the original injury. Under those circumstances, the Court found that while the repetitive gripping and grasping in Jean’s new employment increased his pain and swelling in his wrist on a temporary basis, the fact that it did not cause any permanent worsening of his baseline physical condition required a finding that he had experienced a recurrence of the 2006 injury, and not an aggravation or new injury with his subsequent employer.
My Two Cents
This decision provides guidance for employers when there is a dispute as to whether medical treatment continues to be owed. According to this holding, the employer needs to file a Complaint and ask for a trial on the merits rather than filing a motion. In any case where the Last Injurious Exposure Rule applies, the employer would also need to add the subsequent employer as a defendant in the lawsuit.
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About the Author
This article was written by Charley M. Drummond, Esq. of Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC. Fish Nelson & Holden is a law firm located in Birmingham, Alabama dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers, and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation cases and related liability matters. Drummond and his firm are members of The National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network (NWCDN). The NWCDN is a national and Canadian network of reputable law firms organized to provide employers and insurers access to the highest quality representation in workers’ compensation and related employer liability fields. If you have questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the author at cdrummond@fishnelson.com or (205) 332-3414.
On August 22, 2014, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals released its opinion inGoodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Stephen Bush. Bush alleged on February 11, 2011, he was walking down some stairs when he stumbled and fell onto his right knee. He then climbed back up the stairs and notified his supervisor of the accident, which both Bush and his supervisor reportedly laughed off. Bush did not report that he had injured his knee at that time, but he apparently told his supervisor that his knee was swollen and painful a few weeks later. Goodyear denied Bush’s workers’ compensation claim based on Bush’s alleged failure to provide timely and adequate notice of the injury, and Bush filed suit.
The parties proceeded to trial in May 2013. Following trial but before the trial court entered judgment, the parties reached a settlement agreement, which they presented to the trial court for approval in July. The trial court determined that the settlement was not in Bush’s best interest because it would have closed his medical benefits, and rejected the settlement. A few days later, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Bush. The trial court ultimately found that Bush’s testimony that he reported pain and swelling within 90 days of the accident more credible than his supervisor’s testimony that Bush never reported the injury. The court also found that Bush’s right knee injury had limited him to working light duty jobs which required no stooping, squatting, kneeling, climbing or lifting over twenty pounds, and that those restrictions prevented him from returning to work as an automobile mechanic, which was his primary occupation for over forty years. The trial court rejected Goodyear’s argument that Bush’s compensation should have been limited to that set out in the schedule for the leg, and concluded that Bush was permanently and totally disabled. Goodyear appealed, asserting that the trial court exceeded its discretion in refusing to approve the settlement. Goodyear also asserted that the trial court erred (1) in finding that Bush provided adequate notice of his injury, (2) in finding that Bush’s compensation was not limited to the schedule for the leg, and (3) in finding that Bush was permanently and totally disabled.
In regard to the Trial Court’s rejection of the settlement, the Court of Appeals stated that when a settlement is approved by an Alabama Department of Labor Ombudsman, it may only be set aside upon a showing of fraud, coercion or undue influence within 60 days of the settlement. However, when a settlement is presented to the circuit court for approval, it is the duty of the trial judge to ensure that the settlement is in the employee’s best interest. The Court of Appeals held that since the parties chose to submit the settlement to the court for approval, the trial judge had discretion to determine whether the settlement was in Bush’s best interest, and that the judge did not abuse his discretion by rejecting the settlement.
In regard to Goodyear’s notice defense, the Court of appeals stated that while the Act requires notice of an accident, case law indicates that the pertinent inquiry is whether the employer has received actual notice of the injury, such to enable the employer to provide immediate medical diagnosis and treatment in an effort to minimize the seriousness of the injury and facilitate the earliest possible investigation of the facts surrounding the injury. The appellate court noted that Goodyear did not argue that Bush’s alleged notice was insufficient to put Goodyear on inquiry notice. The Court of Appeals stated that since the trial judge had the opportunity to hear and observe the witnesses first hand, the fact that it found Bush’s testimony credible was sufficient to support a finding that Bush gave proper notice of his injury.
However, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s finding that Bush was permanently and totally disabled, because the trial court failed to make a finding that the effects of Bush’s knee injury extended to and affected the use and efficiency of other parts of his body. Citing Advantage Sales of Alabama, Inc. v Clemons, the Court of Appeals reiterated that if the employee does not prove that the injury to the scheduled member prevents him from using the uninjured parts of his body, the injury shall be classified as a permanent partial disability as a matter of law, and no evidence of vocational disability is to be considered.
My Two Cents
The Court of Appeals’ reliance on Advantage Sales of Alabama, Inc. v Clemons is good news for employers, as it resolves what is somewhat of a chicken-egg argument. Employees’ attorneys have long argued that permanent total disability was effectively an exception allowing compensation outside of the schedule. However, as this ruling points out, an inquiry into the effects of the scheduled-member injury on the other parts of the body is necessary before a determination of whether evidence of vocational disability can even be considered. Assuming totally or virtually totally disabling pain or psych are not issues, even if an employee has a severe knee injury, his compensation is limited to 200 weeks unless the effects of his knee injury somehow extend beyond his leg and permanently affect the efficiency of other body parts.
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About the Author
This article was written by Charley M. Drummond, Esq. of Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC. Fish Nelson & Holden is a law firm located in Birmingham, Alabama dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers, and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation cases and related liability matters. Drummond and his firm are members of The National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network (NWCDN). The NWCDN is a national and Canadian network of reputable law firms organized to provide employers and insurers access to the highest quality representation in workers’ compensation and related employer liability fields. If you have questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the author at cdrummond@fishnelson.com or (205) 332-3414.
SUPER CONGRATULATIONS
By Kevin L. Connors, Esquire
ConnorsLaw proudly congratulates its partners, Kevin L. Connors, Chair of its General Liability Practice Group, and Robert F. Horn, Esquire, Chair of Its Subrogation Practice Group, as both have been named as 2014 Super Lawyers, and we think it about time for this professional acclamation and affirmation of their peer-generated reputations.
Evincing the high professional standards maintained by both Kevin and Bob, their practices include:
· General Liability Defense;
· Product Liability Defense;
· Automobile Liability Defense;
· Workers’ Compensation Defense;
· Workers’ Compensation Subrogation;
· General Property Subrogation.
On behalf of ConnorsLaw, their clients and contacts, we proudly congratulate Kevin and Bob on their sensational success.
ConnorsLaw LLP
Trust us, we just get it! It is trust well spent!
Defending workers’ compensation claims throughout Pennsylvania for employers, self-insureds, insurance carriers, and third party administrators, our 100+ years of cumulative experience defending our clients against compensation-related liabilities, empowers our workers’ compensation practice group attorneys to be more than mere claim denials, entrusting us to create the factual and legal leverage to expeditiously resolve claims, in the course of limiting/reducing/extinguishing our clients’ liabilities under the Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act.
With every member of our workers’ compensation practice group being AV-rated, our partnership with the NWCDN magnifies the lens through which our professional expertise imperiously demands that we always be dynamic and exacting advocates for our clients, businesses, corporations, and insurance carriers, seeking our trial and compensation acumen, navigating the frustrating and form-intensive minefield pervasive throughout Pennsylvania workers’ compensation practice and procedure.
FORMOLOGY UNDER PENNSYLVANIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW
By Kevin L. Connors, Esquire
In a brave and emboldened attempt to chart a Pennsylvania workers’ compensation claim by tracing the etiology of forms necessary to accept, deny, and/or administer the claim under the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act, this is intended to assist all Pennsylvania stakeholders, whether employers, insurance carriers, third-party administrators, as well as other stakeholders, including medical providers and third parties, to illustrate the necessity of viewing a Pennsylvania workers’ compensation claim under the microscope of the controlling or governing form, under which liability for compensation claims and benefits is either accepted, denied, administered, and/or compromised.
A list of the most often-used Pennsylvania workers’ compensation claim forms is set forth below:
· Agreement for Compensation for Disability or Permanent Injury – LIBC-336;
· Agreement for Compensation for Death – LIBC-338;
· Agreement to Stop Weekly Workers’ Compensation Payments – LIBC-340;
· Answer to Petition for Commutation – LIBC-35;
· Answer to Petition to: - LIBC-377;
· Application for Supersedeas Fund Reimbursement – LIBC-662;
· Appeal from Judge’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law – LIBC-25/26;
· Application for Executive Officer Exception – LIBC-509;
· Application for Fee Review – LIBC-507;
· Authorization for Alternative Delivery of Compensation Payments – LIBC-10;
· Claim Petition for Workers’ Compensation – LIBC-362;
· Compromise & Release Agreement – LIBC-755;
· Defendant’s Answer to Claim Petition – LIBC-374;
· Employee Report of Wages and Physical Condition – LIBC-760;
· Employee Verification for Employment – LIBC-760;
· Employee’s Report of Benefits – LIBC-756;
· Employer’s Report of Occupational Injury or Disease – LIBC-344;
· Fatal Claim Petition for Compensation by Dependents of Deceased Employees – LIBC-363;
· Fatal Claim Petition for Compensation by Dependents for Death Resulting from Occupational Disease – LIBC-386;
· Fatal Claim Petition for Compensation by Dependents for Death Covered by the Act – LIBC-384;
· Impairment Rating Evalutions Face Sheet & Appointment – LIBC-765;
· Informal Conference Agreement Form – LIBC-754;
· Notice of Ability to Return to Work – LIBC-757;
· Notice of Change of Workers Compensation Disability Status – LIBC-764;
· Notice of Compensation Payable – LIBC-495;
· Notice of Reinstatement of Workers’ Compensation Benefits – LIBC-763;
· Notice of Suspension for Failure to Return – LIBC-762;
· Notice of Temporary Compensation Payable – LIBC-761;
· Notice of Workers’ Compensation Benefit Offset – LIBC-761;
· Notice of Workers’ Compensation Denial – LIBC-496;
· Notice Stopping Temporary Compensation – LIBC-502;
· Notice to Claimant – LIBC-758;
· Notification of Suspension or Modification – LIBC-751;
· Occupational Disease Claim Petition – LIBC-396;
· Peer Review Request – LIBC-620;
· Peer Review Transmittal Sheet – LIBC-621;
· Petition for Commutation of Compensation – LIBC-34;
· Petition for Joinder of Additional Defendant – LIBC-376;
· Petition for Penalties – LIBC-686;
· Petition for Physical Examination – LIBC-499;
· Petition for Review of Utilization Determination – LIBC-603;
· Physician’s Affidavit of Recovery – LIBC-497;
· Request for Designation of a Physician to Perform an Impairment Rating Evaluation – LIBC-766;
· Statement of Account of Compensation Paid – LIBC-392;
· Statement of Wages – LIBC-494;
· Supplemental Agreement for Compensation for Death – LIBC-339;
· Supplemental Agreement for Compensation for Disability of Permanent Injury – LIBC-337;
· Third Party Settlement Agreement – LIBC-380;
· Utilization Review Determinate Face Sheet – LIBC-604;
· Utilization Review Request for Consideration – LIBC-602;
· Utilization Review Request – LIBC-601;
· Workers’ Compensation Medical Report Form – LIBC-9;
In the beginning, there is the Report of Injury, identified as LIBC-344, with the Act and the Bureau’s Regulations requiring that it be filed by the employer, typically prepared and filed by the insurer or administrator, after an injury is reported by the employee to the employer or insurer within 48 hours of a work-related fatality, or whenever disability (lost time) exceeds 1 day.
This form is relatively generic, leaving little to the imagination, in terms of name, rank, SSN, DOB, relevant contact information for claimant, for employer, insurer, with other relevant information being the claimant’s original date of hire, date the claimant reported the injury or lost time to the employer, and a very brief description of how the injury is reported to have occurred, with no diagnostic impression of the injury being included.
The Report of Injury is akin to an OSHA report of injury.
The filing of the Report of Injury, with it being absolutely critical to understand that this Report is never admissible as evidence in a workers’ compensation litigated proceeding, then requires the employer/insurer/administrator to investigate the claim, to either accept, deny, or otherwise “compromise”, the claim within 21 days of the injury (lost time) being reported.
Consider further that Pennsylvania is a wage loss/disability jurisdiction, devoid of any true permanency standard that has any real relevance in terms of claim resolution, other than the utilization of an Impairment Rating Examination, which is simply a claim mechanism for capping the payment of temporary total disability benefits, being wage loss benefits that are payable when a claimant is unable to perform the time-of-injury job, at a total of 604 weeks of disability benefits.
Do the math!
So, an injury/lost time has been reported, and that requires the employer/insurer/administrator to either issue one of three forms, within 21 days of the injury/lost time being reported, with there being no suggestion of priority, in terms of the form to be utilized, the forms being:
1. The employee did not suffer a work-related injury. The definition of injury also includes aggravation of a pre-existing condition, or disease contracted as a result of employment.
2. The injury was not within the scope of employment.
3. The employee was not employed by the defendant.
4. The employee has not suffered a loss of wages as a result of an already accepted injury.
5. The employee did not give notice of his/her injury or disease to the employer within 120 days within the meaning of Sections 311-313 of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
6. Other good cause. Please explain fully in the space below.
Oftentimes, the utilization of “other good cause” on the NCD is utilized when there is insufficient information upon which to accept a claim, such as the claim has not been medically verified through medical reports, diagnostic impressions, or causation opinions.
This form, like most Pennsylvania forms, must be “served”, meaning mailed, to all parties involved with the claim, to include the Bureau now requiring electronic submission, by the insurer.
This filing almost always triggers the filing of a Claim Petition, which is the mechanism for the claimant to formally allege that he/she is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits, requiring 16 disclosures by the claimant, to include how he/she was injured, a description of the injury, when notice was given, when disability first occurred, as well as the types of benefits that the claimant is seeking for the claim.
If the claim is not being denied at the outset, two other forms come into play.
One form is a Notice of Compensation Payable, identified as LIBC-495.
Under this form, liability for the Workers’ Compensation claim is being accepted, with the parties being identified, the injury being described, the mechanism of injury being described, and the benefits being paid also being described, with the employer/insurer/administrator having an election as to whether to pay indemnity and medical compensation benefits, or only medical compensation benefits, as there had been a complete derailment of sanity at the Bureau level, in a wake of several appellate decisions that seemingly made no statutory rational sense whatsoever, when a workers’ compensation claim was a “medical only” claim, as there is no statutory requirement for an employer/insurer/administrator to file any forms for “medical only” claims, which would seem to be the much more rational approach to the issue, given the number of “medical only” claims that routinely arise without ever evolving into “lost time” claims, although there is now decisional authority under several Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court decisions, essentially predicated on claimants being forced to litigate the compensability of “medical only” claims, prior to the expiration of the three year statute of limitations for a claimant to file a Claim Petition to prove the compensability of an injury, irrespective of whether that injury results in medical treatment only, or also involves lost time.
The most notable “medical only” decisions by the Commonwealth Court are as follows:
· Waldameer Park, Inc. v. WCAB (Morrison), 819 A.2d 164 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003)
· City of Philadelphia v. WCAB (Brown), 830 A.2d 649 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003)
· Orenich v. WCAB (Geisinger Wyoming Valley Medical Center), 863 A.2d 165 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004)
So, the third form that might appear before you, when deciding to deny, accept, or alternatively, to pay temporary compensation benefits, with no admission of liability, for the first 90 days post-injury, is a Notice of Temporary Compensation Payable, identified as LIBC-501.
The three forms that we have discussed so far, are the Notice of Compensation of Denial (NCD), identified as LIBC-496, which results in outright denial of the compensability of the claim, the Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP), identified as LIBC-495, which results in an outright admission of liability for the compensability of the claim, and the Notice of Temporary Compensation Payable as LIBC-501 (“NTCP”, or “TNCP”), depending upon how much coffee you have had that morning, allowing you to pay temporary compensation benefits with no admission of liability for the first 90 days of disability, although that NTCP/TNCP will automatically convert to an NCP, where you are again back to an outright admission of compensability for injury and disability, if the NTCP/TNCP is not “stopped” with a Notice to Stop Temporary Compensation Payable (“NSTC”), identified as LIBC-502, under which temporary compensation benefits are “stopped”, although it must be concurrently filed with a Notice of Compensation Denial, indicating the reason for denial of the compensability of the claim.
Oh what a wicked web of forms we weave!
To repeat, we have now covered the Report of Injury, the Notice of Compensation Denial, the Notice of Compensation Payable, the Notice of Temporary Compensation, the Notice to Stop Temporary Compensation, and where are we now?
Well, that is a form of a completely different number.
And that depends upon whether you have denied or accepted the claim.
If you have denied the claim, the claim most likely is headed into court, with a claimant most likely filing a Claim Petition, which is LIBC-362.
The claim petition contains 16 paragraphs, the answers to which are essentially a claimant’s burden of proof for establishing the compensability of both injury and disability.
The 16 paragraphs deal with the basic elements of a workers’ compensation claim, including date of injury, description of injury, mechanism of injury, when notice was given to the employer, when disability began, the claimant’s compensation wage rates, requiring both the pre-injury wage and the compensation payable rate for payment of weekly workers’ compensation benefits, as well as requiring the claimant to specify exactly what benefits the claimant is seeking, there being five basic compensation benefits as follows:
The Claim Petition also allows a claimant seeking workers’ compensation benefits to claim entitlement to unreasonable contest to attorneys’ fees under Section 440, if it can be proven that a claim denial does not have a “reasonable basis”.
The filing of a Claim Petition with a Bureau results in the Bureau randomly assigning the petition to workers’ compensation Judge for a hearing and disposition. The petition is assigned to a workers’ compensation Judge in the hearing district in which the claimant lives, typically assigned according to the county where the claimant lives.
There are 22 hearing districts in Pennsylvania.
There are a total of approximately 82 workers’ compensation Judges, appointed by the Department of Labor and Industry and the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, after being formally tested as to their knowledge of workers’ compensation law.
The assignment of a claim petition to a workers’ compensation Judge requires the employer/insurer/administrator to file an answer to the Claim Petition, within 20 days of the Bureau’s assignment of the Petition to a workers’ compensation Judge. The assignment is perfected through issuance of a Notice of Assignment, with the assignment date placed in the top, right hand corner of the NOA.
Filing an answer to a Claim Petition requires that the answer be filed on Bureau form LIBC-374 with it being required that every allegation in the Claim Petition be specifically answered, in terms of either an admission and/or a denial, with the Answer also requiring an identification of affirmative defenses under the Act, the most recognized affirmative defenses, tracking the same grounds for denial on a Notice of Compensation Denial, to include:
· The claimant did not sustain a work-related injury;
· Include an alleged aggravation of pre-existing condition;
· The alleged injury did not occur within the course of scope of employment;
· The claimant was not employed by the defendant;
· The claimant did not suffer a loss of wages as a result of an injury;
· The claimant did not give notice of the injury within 120 days as required under Section 311-313 of the WCA; or,
· That “other good cause”, requiring explanation as to the basis thereof.
After the Answer is filed, through the WCAIS Link, launched by the Bureau in September of 2013, the claim proceeds through administrative litigation, subject to the Special Rules of Practice and Procedure before Workers’ Compensation Judges.
After the assignment of the petition to a Workers’ Compensation Judge, the judge is required, by the WCA and the Bureau regulations, to schedule hearings, with WCJ’s electing to either schedule serial hearings, usually every 90 days, or to schedule “one day trials”, which results in a pre-trial hearing being scheduled at the outset of the litigation, and a final hearing being scheduled prior to the record being closed and briefs being submitted by the parties, with all evidence required to be presented to the WCJ at the final hearing.
That is all evidence by all parties.
If the claim is denied and a Claim Petition is filed, the claim is then litigated, either until it is settled, resolved by stipulation, or decided by the workers’ compensation Judge under a Bureau-circulated Decision, which becomes final and non-appealable, if not appealed within 20 days of its circulation.
If a workers’ compensation claim is accepted, the employer/insurer/administrator is then required to continue to make regular payments of workers’ compensation benefits to the claimant, paying temporary total disability benefits consistent with the claimant’s pre-injury average weekly wage and compensation payable rate and to pay reasonable necessary and related medical expenses, subject to fees schedules, within 30 days of bill receipt.
When paying temporary total disability benefits, the payments must be made on the same payment schedule as when the claimant was working.
When medical bills are received by the employer/insurer/administrator, the medical bills must be reviewed for relatedness, and then reviewed for reasonableness and necessity, with the medical bills then being subject to Medicare reimbursement rates, with medical bills required to be paid within 30 days of bill receipt, absent the filing of a Utilization Review, which can only challenge the reasonableness and necessity of the treatment being provided and billed for the work injury.
Requesting Utilization Review requires the filing of an LIBC-601 form, with all medical bills required to be submitted by the provider with an attached Workers’ Compensation Medical Report form, LIBC-9.
Utilization Reviews are filed with the Bureau and randomly assigned to utilization reviewers, who are then required to make utilization review determinations on LIBC-604, a Utilization Review Determination Face Sheet.
Once a claim is accepted as compensable and work-related, and benefits are paid to the claimant in accordance with the WCA, the workers’ compensation benefits must continue to be paid absent one of the following conditions occurring:
(1) The Claimant dies, and compensation benefits terminate by operation of death;
(2) The Claimant voluntarily returns to work in their pre-injury capacity, and there is no continuing wage loss post-return to work, such that the Claimant’s compensation benefits are suspended;
(3) The Claimant returns to work in a modified-duty capacity, with some reduction in return-to-work wages, such that the Claimant’s compensation benefits are modified, and temporary partial disability benefits are paid, subject to the 500 week limitation;
(4) The Claimant executes a Supplemental Agreement, perfecting either a termination, suspension, or modification of the Claimant’s workers’ compensation benefits;
(5) The Claimant signs a Final Receipt (almost never used), under which the Claimant agrees that all compensation benefits have been paid;
(6) The Claimant is deported by virtue of not being able to prove legal immigration status;
(7) The claim is settled under a Compromise and Release Agreement, perfecting some type of compromise of the indemnity and medical compensation benefits liability associated with the claim; and,
(8) The Claimant’s compensation benefits are terminated, modified, or suspended by order of a workers’ compensation judge, with the employer/insurer carrying the burden of proving the entitlement to a change in the Claimant’s benefit entitlement status.
To match the requisite forms with the triggering events listed above, the following forms are relevant:
Like the Claim Petition, the Petition for Termination results in assignment to a WCJ, with hearings convened for the presentation of evidence, in the WCJ deciding the case on the evidence presented, the parties stipulating to a claim resolution, or entering into a Compromise & Release Agreement.
Other forms necessary for review are:
The employer and employee to agree on the compensation to be paid as well as the period for which the benefits are being paid, with the Agreement limiting the benefits to those reflected in the Agreement, although medical compensation benefits can remain open;
· The Agreement for Compensation for Death (LIBC-338), seemingly self-explanatory;
· Application for Supersedeas Fund Reimbursement (LIBC-662), where an overpayment of compensation benefits has occurred and the employers/insurer/administrator seeks reimbursement from the Supersedeas Fund;
· Appeal from Judge’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (LIBC-25/26), required to be filed within 20 days of the issuance of a WCJ decision, and requiring specificity with regard to the Findings of Fact being appealed, as well as to the Conclusions of Law in dispute;
· Application for Fee Review (LIBC-507), filed by a medical provider contesting a fee schedule or fee reimbursement by and employer/insurer/administrator;
· Authorization for Alternative Delivery of Compensation Payments (LIBC-10), required to be executed by a claimant, when an employee requests that compensation benefits payments be mailed to an alternate address;
· The Employee Report of Wages and Physical Condition (LIBC-750), required to be executed by a claimant within 30 days of issuance, with use limited to every 6 months;
· Employee Verification for Employment (LIBC-760), again requiring execution within 30 days of issuance, and use limited to every 6 months, although claimant’s failure to return the executed form within 30 days results in a suspension of compensation benefits, requiring issuance of a Notice of Suspension for Failure to Return (LIBC-762);
· Fatal Claim Petition (LIBC-363), used to seek fatal claim benefits for a work-related fatality;
· Impairment Rating Evaluation Face Sheet (LIBC-765), when an impairment rating is being requested by an employer/insurer/administrator, although impairment ratings can only be requested after:
(1) The claimant has received 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits; and,
(2) The claimant has reached maximum medical improvement;
· Notice of Ability to Return to Work (LIBC-757), required to be issued and served on the claimant whenever the claimant is released to return to some level of work, and the issuance of this form must pre-date work being offered to the claimant, if there is any contest as to the claimant’s compensation benefits being suspended or modified based on a job offer or RTW;
· Notice of Change of Workers’ Compensation Disability Status (LIBC-764), used after an IRE, resulting in an impairment rating establishing that the claimant’s “whole person impairment” is less than 50%, with the claimant’s compensation benefits then being “automatically converted” from temporary total to temporary partial disability benefits, limiting the claimant to receiving temporary partial disability benefits for 500 weeks under Section 306 (b) Act, with a conversion of temporary total to temporary partial being “automatically converted” if the IRE is requested either 60 days before or 60 days after the claimant receives 104 weeks of compensation benefits, requiring the employer/insurer/administrator to litigate the “conversion” from temporary total to temporary partial and disability benefits, if the IRE request is made more than 60 days after the claimant has received 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, ultimately requiring the “conversion” to be decided by the WCJ;
· Notice of Reinstatement of WC Benefits (LIBC-763), utilized if there has been a suspension of compensation benefits, for failure to return an Employee Verification of Employment (LIBC-760);
· Peer Review Request (LIBC-620), rarely used;
· Petition for Commutation of Compensation (LIBC-34), rarely used since the statutory approval of Compromise & Release Agreement in 1996;
· Petition for Joinder of Additional Defendant (LIBC-376), required to filed within 15 days of the party seeking joinder having evidence supporting the joinder;
· Petition for Penalties (LIBC-686), utilized by claimants alleging violations of the Act;
· Petition for Physical Examination (LIBC-499), utilized by employers and insurers seeking independent medical examination under Section 314 of the WCA, which allows IMEs of claimants every six months;
· Petition for Review of Utilization Determination (LIBC-603), filed when a party seeks review before a WCJ of a Utilization Determination, with the employers and insurers, carrying the burden of proof before the WCJ as to the UD;
· Request for Designation of a Physician to Perform an IRE (LIBC-766), requested by employer/insurer/administrator seeking an IRE of a claimant;
· Statement of Account of Compensation Paid (LIBC-392), utilized by employers and insurers as a final statement of the compensation of benefits that have been paid on a particular WC claim;
· Statement of Wages (LIBC-494), requiring the calculation of the claimant’s pre-injury wage in compensation benefit payable rate, a reliance upon disclosure of the claimant’s quarterly wages for the fifty-two (52) weeks preceding the alleged work injury;
· Third Party Settlement Agreement (LIBC-380), required to be filed to reflect the resolution of a workers’ compensation subrogation lien when a claimant secures a third party recovery.
As is probably self-evident, the Pennsylvania WCA and the Bureau’s Regulations effectively require that every change in the status of a workers’ compensation claim be reflected with the issuance and filing of a form reflecting that change, as Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Law absolutely prohibits an employer’s “self-help” in stopping or discontinuing workers’ compensation benefits, after acceptance of a workers’ compensation claim, except in very limited circumstances, such as when a claimant returns to work, and refuses or fails to notify the employer/insurer/administrator of the return to work, as well as refusing or failing to execute the appropriate documentation to reflect the stoppage or reduction in the workers’ compensation benefit payments, although even then there is some risk that the workers’ compensation claim remains open, and can be subject to reinstatement, if the stoppage is litigated as being violative of the WCA by a claimant whose status might change after returning to work, i.e., and the claimant stops working, for whatever reason, with the potential being that the claimant can file for reinstatement of compensation benefits, typically granted by WCJs, except for very limited circumstances, with it being best to secure claim closure through the filing of a Suspension or Modification Petition for protection against the a claim that disabilities have recurred.
This summary is intended to be a compendium contracting the most important and most often used workers’ compensation forms into a synoptic abbreviation of their utilization.
Questions concerning the utilization of workers’ compensation forms in Pennsylvania, that we have identified as being relevant for the administration of Pennsylvania workers’ compensation claims, can be directed to our brilliantly and sagaciously-experienced workers’ compensation partners, including:
Kevin L. Connors, Esquire
Kate O’Dell, Esquire
Jeffrey D. Snyder, Esquire
Lisa A. Miller, Esquire
ConnorsLaw LLP
Trust us, we just get it! It is trust well spent!
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With every member of our workers’ compensation practice group being AV-rated, our partnership with the NWCDN magnifies the lens through which our professional expertise imperiously demands that we always be dynamic and exacting advocates for our clients, businesses, corporations, and insurance carriers, seeking our trial and compensation acumen, navigating the frustrating and form-intensive minefield pervasive throughout Pennsylvania workers’ compensation practice and procedure.