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Consider this situation:  Company A voluntarily pays approximately $172,000 in medical and temporary disability benefits to Worker.  Company A demands reimbursement from Company B believing that Company B is the true employer.  Worker never files a claim petition against Company A or B.  Can Company A file a claim petition in the name of Worker and recover from Company B all $172,000 that Company A voluntarily paid?            

That is the issue in Diocese of Metuchen, a/s/o/ Elissa Martinez v. Sisters of the Immaculate Heart of Mary, A-1441-14T4 (App. Div. Sept. 6, 2016).  It is the most interesting decision in many decades to come out of New Jersey on the right of a company to seek reimbursement from another company in a non-PIP situation through the Division of Workers’ Compensation.

Elissa Martinez was severely burned in the face, neck and torso while working as a cook at the convent of the Sisters of the Immaculate Heart of Mary (IHM).  The convent, a high school, and an elementary school are part of the Immaculate Conception Church, all owned by the Diocese of Metuchen.  Martinez was hired by the Mother Superior of IHM to cook for a net wage of $175 per week by checks issued by IHM.  The Mother Superior directed the activities of Martinez.  IHM issued a W-2 tax form to Martinez but clearly believed that Martinez was an employee of the Diocese.

The financial relationship of the Sisters at IHM and the Diocese is unusual because the sisters take a vow of poverty.  Hence, no individual sister receives a check.  However, the Diocese pays a stipend for each sister to IHM, which then allocates an amount per month to the sisters of the convent for their living expenses.  An extra stipend of $600 per month also was paid to IHM by the high school and the elementary school.  This stipend, however, was stopped after the accident to Martinez.

After Martinez’s accident, IHM notified its workers’ compensation carrier and the Diocese.  The Diocese paid Martinez’s medical and temporary disability benefits on a “charitable basis.”  Thereafter the Diocese demanded that IHM’s workers’ compensation carrier immediately assume responsibility for making all payments.  When that did not happen, the Diocese filed a workers’ compensation claim on Martinez’s behalf underN.J.S.A. 34:15-15.1  The Diocese denied that Martinez was its employee, and IHM also denied that Martinez was its employee.

As part of the claim petition which the Diocese filed, a motion was also filed to require IHM’s carrier to accept the claim and pay benefits.  The medical provider, St. Barnabas Medical Center, also intervened seeking repayment of $399,017 for in-patient hospital services paid to Martinez.  The Judge of Compensation heard testimony and ordered IHM’s carrier to reimburse the Diocese and pay outstanding medical bills, as well as make payment of $50,000 for counsel fees and pay permanent disability benefits to Martinez.  It is important to note that Martinez herself never filed a claim petition in this case.

The first issue which IHM raised was jurisdiction of the court to hear this case.  The Appellate Division agreed with the Judge of Compensation that the Division had jurisdiction to handle a claim filed by one entity on behalf of a petitioner for reimbursement of benefits.  That conclusion flowed from N.J.S.A. 34:15-15.1 which allows claims for reimbursement to be filed when benefits “have been paid by any person, organization or corporation on behalf of such petitioner.”  This provision is a little known part of the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act:

Whenever the expenses of medical, surgical or hospital services, to which the petitioner would be entitled to reimbursement, if such petitioner had paid the same as provided in section 34:15-15 of the Revised Statutes, shall have been paid by any insurance company or other organization by virtue of any insurance policy, contract or agreement which may have been procured by or on behalf of such petitioner, or shall have been paid by any person, organization or corporation on behalf of such petitioner, the deputy directors or referees of the Division of Workmen’s Compensation are authorized to incorporate in any award, order or approval of settlement, an order requiring the employer or his insurance carrier to reimburse such insurance company, corporation, person or organization in the amount of such medical, surgical or hospital services so paid on behalf of such petitioner.

The Appellate Division distinguished this sort of petition for reimbursement from a claim for contribution by one employer against the other, saying contribution claims like this are prohibited under the case of Conway v. Mr. Softee, Inc., 51 N.J. 254, 258 (1968).  The difference in this case was, according to the Appellate Division, that “the Diocese did not file a claim on its own behalf, but rather, as permitted by the statute, filed the claim on behalf of Martinez.” The Court said, “The claim in Conway was for contribution from the other employer, where the present claim is on behalf of the employee for reimbursement.”  In Conway, one employer tried to file a claim against another employer, and the Court said that cannot be done in the Division of Workers’ Compensation.

The next issue that the Appellate Division decided concerned employment by IHM.   It recited the two tests for employment, namely the “control” test, and the “relative nature of the work” test, and under both tests the Court found Martinez was an employee of IHM.   The decision does not make clear whether IHM argued that the Diocese was a “joint employer.”  Presumably that argument was advanced, but one cannot tell from the Appellate Division decision.  Control was established by the Mother Superior providing direction to Martinez.  The relative nature of the work test was met because Martinez cooked daily meals for the sisters in the convent and worked exclusively for the sisters in the convent.  She had no written agreement with the Diocese.

IHM also challenged the counsel fee award of $50,000.  For one thing, IHM argued that $50,000 constituted more than 20% of the award.  The Court noted that the Diocese had paid $172,182 as of January 13, 2015, and St. Barnabas had a claim for $399,017.  The Court said, that an award of $50,000 was far less than twenty percent of the combined amount paid by the Diocese and the amount owed to St. Barnabas.

Interestingly, the Appellate Division reversed an award of permanency to Martinez because Martinez never filed a claim petition and the Judge never explained the basis for the award.

This case is one of a kind, and there are really no other non-PIP cases like it that have been reported.  It is somewhat astonishing because the Diocese volunteered initially to pay medical bills without any court order or claim petition having been filed.  Yet the Diocese managed to obtain full reimbursement after paying $172,182 on a charitable basis by resort to filing a claim petition on behalf of the petitioner pursuant to N.J.S.A.34:15-15.1.   The language that the court focused on would suggest that employers can utilize this procedure rather easily: the standard set forth in the statute is  whether the petitioner would have been entitled to reimbursement had petitioner made the payments herself.  

Until this case, this particular statute has been used almost exclusively by PIP carriers to obtain reimbursement for medical bills and temporary disability benefits that PIP is required to pay under contract with rights over against the workers’ compensation carrier for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. Based on this case, this statute now has a much wider potential use than just PIP reimbursement actions.

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John H. Geaney, Esq., is an Executive Committee Member and a Shareholder in Capehart Scatchard's Workers’ Compensation Group.  Mr. Geaney concentrates his practice in the representation of employers, self-insured companies, third-party administrators, and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation, the Americans with Disabilities Act and Family and Medical Leave Act. Should you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Mr. Geaney at 856.914.2063 or by e‑mail at jgeaney@capehart.com.

REEFER MADNESS CLOUDS PENNSYLVANIA

By Kevin L. Connors, Esquire

Released in 1936, the movie classic Reefer Madness captured the social hysteria of drug addiction amid a cloud of marijuana smoke.

Originally titled as Tell Your Children, with alternate titles beingThe Burning Question, Dope Addict, Doped Youth, the movie was an American drama highlighting melodramatic events after High School students were lured by drug pushers to try smoking marijuana, resulting in their slow descent into madness due to marijuana addiction, in the course of which the students were involved in hit and run accidents, suicide, rape, hallucinations, and homicide. 

80 years later, enlightened by time, science, and relativity, although marijuana remains a controlled and prohibited substance under Federal law, there is a growing consensus in the medical community that marijuana can serve a utilitarian purpose in the treatment of serious medical conditions, with 25 states, including Pennsylvania, having legalized medical marijuana.

On April 17, 2016, Governor Tom Wolf, signed the Pennsylvania Medical Marijuana Act (commonly referred to as “Senate Bill 3”, to be referenced herein as the “MMA”), into law, effectively making Pennsylvania the 24th state to legalize medical marijuana.

This enactment will effectuate sweeping changes in Pennsylvania, legalizing the use of medical marijuana, subject to its dispensing and utilization being regulated under the MMA, while marijuana still remains illegal under Federal law, specifically under the Controlled Substance Act (“CSA”), which went into effect in 1970, and classified cannabis as a Scheduled I substance.

Although marijuana is a controlled and prohibited substance under Federal law, the Federal Government is not forcing states that have legalized medical marijuana to criminalize its use, as there are no known cases of Federal prosecution involving the use of medical marijuana in the 25 states that have legalized its use.

In effect, cultivating, distributing, and/or possessing cannabis, even for medical treatment purposes, remains a Federal crime, complicating the issue of who will have to pay for medical marijuana treatment in Pennsylvania, once the MMA is fully implemented in Pennsylvania.

For this very reason, Section 2012 of the MMA, specifically states that “nothing in this Act shall be construed to require an insurer or a health plan, whether paid for by Commonwealth funds or private funds, to provide coverage for medical marijuana.”

So, where do you go to get into line to get your prescription filled?

First, it will take months, if not years, for the MMA to be fully implemented, before prescriptions are being dispensed.

Secondly, the MMA specifically requires that a patient must be diagnosed with a “serious medical condition” to qualify for medical marijuana.  These conditions are listed below:

·                     Cancer;

·                     HIV/Aids;

·                     Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS);

·                     Parkinson’s Disease;

·                     Multiple Sclerosis;

·                     Damage to the nervous tissue of the spinal cord with objective neurological indication of intractable spasticity;

·                     Epilepsy;

·                     Inflammatory Bowel Disease (IBS);

·                     Neuropathy;

·                     Huntington’s Disease;

·                     Crohn’s Disease;

·                     Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD);

·                     Intractable Seizures;

·                     Glaucoma;

·                     Sickle Cell Anemia;

·                     Severe Chronic or Intractable Pain of Neuropathic Origin or Severe or Intractable Pain in which conventional therapeutic intervention and opiate therapy is contraindicated or ineffective; and,

·                     Autism.

Conditions not specifically listed above are considered to be excluded, as the Legislature intended to limit the conditions considered to be serious enough to warrant the use of medical marijuana as a treatment therapy.

Reviewing the list of “serious medical conditions” identified under the MMA, there are several that could potentially impact on workers’ compensation claims, involving work-related injuries arising within the course and scope of employment, likely being limited to the potential contraction of HIV/Aids, sometimes occurring in the medical profession, spinal cord injuries with intractable spasticity, neuropathies, post-traumatic stress disorder, and severe chronic or intractable pain of neuropathic origin.

If diagnosed with one of the enumerated “serious medical conditions”, the next question is how would a patient go about gaining access to medical marijuana?

The MMA provides several provisions that impact on accessibility, to include the patient being required to secure a medical marijuana card that can only be issued to a patient with a “serious medical condition”.  This will require the patient to be under the continuing care of a physician registered with the Pennsylvania Department of Health. 

The physician will be required to provide a signed certification to the patient, stating that the patient has a “serious medical condition”, with that certification then permitting the patient to apply to the Department of Health for an identification card.

So identified, the patient can then purchase medical marijuana at an authorized dispensary.

So now that the patient has been diagnosed with a “serious medical condition” and has secured the requisite identification card, and has been prescribed medical marijuana by a properly-certified physician, where will the prescription be filled for the patient? 

To regulate dispensement issues, the Pennsylvania Department of Health will require physicians, whether medical or osteopathic doctors, to apply to the Department of Health to become registered as “practitioners”, in the course of which the physicians must complete formal training before becoming a registered practitioner.

Being registered as a “practitioner” will allow physicians to certify patients to use medical marijuana.

Similar registration and training procedures will be implemented for pharmacies to dispense medical marijuana.

How will the enactment of the MMA impact upon workers’ compensation claims and litigation in Pennsylvania?

Well, the MMA contains several provisions, specifically impacting upon employment relationships, to include:

·                     An Employer cannot discharge, threaten, refuse to hire, or, otherwise, discriminate or retaliate against an Employee, solely on the basis of the Employee being certified to use medical marijuana;

·                     There is no requirement that an Employer must accommodate the use of medical marijuana on the premises or property of the Employer;

·                     There is also nothing in the MMA that would limit an Employer’s right to discipline an Employee for being “under the influence of medical marijuana” when working, nor does the MMA prohibit the Employer from disciplining an Employee whose performance falls below the standard of care normally accepted for that position “while under the influence of medical marijuana…”;

·                     There is also nothing in the MMA requiring the Employer to commit any act that would put the Employer in violation of Federal law;

·                     The MMA also allows an Employer to prohibit an Employee from performing certain tasks, deemed to be life-threatening to the Employee or other Employees, if the Employee has a blood content of more than 10 nanograms of active THC per milliliter of blood;

·                     The MMA also allows an Employer to prohibit an Employee who is prescribed medical marijuana from performing any duty or task that is a safety risk, regardless of the financial harm to the Patient/Employee; and,

·                     The MMA also does not allow an Employee to be under the influence of medical marijuana, or be impaired, during the work day, or while performing his or her duties in the workplace.

Signed into law 6 months ago, the Pennsylvania Department of Health estimates that the process of actually implementing the state’s Medical Marijuana Program will take between 18 to 24 months, before access is actually available.

An unresolved question for Employers, Workers’ Compensation Insurers, and Administrators, will be whether to accept or decline liability for paying for medical marijuana prescriptions. 

Consider that two of the “serious medical conditions” listed in the MMA, to include neuropathy and severe chronic pain, are currently regularly treated with excessive opiates, while the alternative of using medical marijuana as a substitute for pain medications might actually result in significant savings for Employers/Insurers.

To date, no specifics have been provided regarding the billing and pricing for medical marijuana treatments, nor is there any requirement under the MMA for Employers and Insurers to be responsible for the payment of medical marijuana prescriptions.

The opening scrawl in Reefer Madness was “the motion picture you are about to witness may startle you.  It would not have been possible, otherwise, to sufficiently emphasize the frightful toll the new drug menace, which is destroying the youth of America in alarmingly increasing numbers.  Marijuana is that drug—a violent narcotic—an unspeakable scourge—the Real Public Enemy Number One!”

Has the world gone mad?

The Takeaway

So, the truth is, beyond the “trust us, we just get it”, that we are not mad, and that we are about to embark on a regulatory framework that will have significant impact on not simply the administration of workers’ compensation claims, but upon the actual workplace, in terms of issues related to accommodation, discrimination, and performance.

Enactment of the MMA will almost necessarily create procedural and administrative frustrations for Employers and Insurers, as it could well take years to streamline the implementation of the MMA, and the regulations that will need to be enacted to manage its impact on treatment and dispensing.

ConnorsO’Dell LLP

Trust us, we just get it!  It is trust well spent!

We defend Employers, Self-Insureds, Insurance Carriers, and Third Party Administrators in Workers’ Compensation matters throughout  Pennsylvania.  We have over 100 years of cumulative experience defending our clients against compensation-related liabilities, with no attorney in our firm having less than ten (10) years of specialized experience, empowering our Workers’ Compensation practice group attorneys to be more than mere claim denials, enabling us to create the factual and legal leverage to expeditiously resolve claims, in the course of limiting/reducing/extinguishing our clients’ liabilities under the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act.

Every member of our Workers’ Compensation practice group is AV rated.  Our partnership with the NWCDN magnifies the lens for which our professional expertise imperiously demands that we always be dynamic and exacting advocates for our clients, navigating the frustrating and form-intensive minefield pervasive throughout Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation practice and procedure.

On September 9, 2016, the Alabama Court of Appeals released its decision in Kennamer Bros., Inc. v. Stewart, in which it affirmed the Circuit Court of Marshall County determination that Stewart’s shoulder injury was compensable. In that case, the truck driver-employee was involved in a rollover accident and sustained multiple injuries. However, the primary issue was whether Stewart’s right shoulder injury was compensable. Stewart had been airlifted to a hospital after the accident, where he was treated for head injuries. He underwent several procedures to remove shards of glass from his scalp and was prescribed antibiotic and pain medications. After he came off of pain medications for his head injury, he then noticed pain his right shoulder and was later diagnosed with a rotator cuff tear. However, Stewart did not report his alleged right shoulder pain to his treating physician until nearly five months after the alleged accident. The physician testified that while it would be very unusual for a person with a rotator cuff tear to not experience immediate pain, it was possible that pain from more severely injured parts of his body and/or pain medications administered for others injuries could mask the symptoms of a rotator cuff tear. The physician further testified that Stewart’s symptoms were consistent with his self-reported medical history and were consistent with a rotator cuff injury. Kennamer Brothers failed to present evidence of any subsequent accident or injury that would explain Stewart’s symptoms.

Stewart was ultimately released to return to work in February 2013, but was unable to drive for Kennamer Brothers because the employer could not secure insurance coverage for him due to the fact that he had been involved in several automobile crashes. In January 2014, Stewart went to work for a different employer.

Based on the evidence, the trial court found that Stewart’s right shoulder injury was compensable, and awarded TTD benefits through January 2014. Kennamer Brothers appealed. The Alabama Court of Appeals noted that the employee’s burden of proof is to produce substantial evidence tending to show that the alleged accident occurred and that it caused or was a contributing cause of the injury. The Court of Appeals held that Stewart met this burden of proof, and noted that symptoms that first appear a few hours, days, or even months after a traumatic event may nonetheless properly be deemed causally related if no intervening event has occurred and no alternative medical explanation is provided for the presence of symptoms.

The Court of Appeals acknowledged that TTD benefits may not be owed if the injured employee is able to work and earn his pre-injury wages, but he is prevented from working for reasons unrelated to his workplace injury. However, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court had a sufficient basis on which to determine that the reason for the termination of Stewart’s employment (i.e. his uninsurability) was related to the injury he sustained. The Court noted that had Stewart not been involved in the crash, he probably would not have been an impossibly high insurance risk. Based on this, the Court of Appeals stated it could not conclude that Stewart failed to show a causal link between his injury and his diminished earning capacity, and affirmed the portion of the order awarding TTD benefits through January 2014.

About the Author

This article was written by Charley M. Drummond, Esq. of Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC. Fish Nelson & Holden is a law firm located in Birmingham, Alabama dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers, and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation cases and related liability matters. Drummond and his firm are members of The National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network (NWCDN). The NWCDN is a national and Canadian network of reputable law firms organized to provide employers and insurers access to the highest quality representation in workers’ compensation and related employer liability fields. If you have questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the author at cdrummond@fishnelson.com or (205) 332-3414.

Three cases were heard together in the New Jersey Appellate Division regarding the right of employers to obtain reimbursement under N.J.S.A. 34:15-40 in situations involving car accidents where medical treatment was potentially recoverable under PIP.  The cases are Lambert v. Travelers Indemnity Company of America, Reed v. Qual-Lynx and Township of Marlboro, and Agar v. Qual-Lynx and Township of Hazlet, App. Div. A-1073-14T3, A-3040-14T1, A-3071-14T1 (App. Div. August 24, 2016).

The first case involved Jennifer Lambert who worked for the Howell Township Board of Education as a school bus aide.  She was injured in a work-related car accident.  Travelers Insurance Company paid $94,705.22 for medical expenses and $54,695.87 for indemnity benefits.  Lambert sued the other driver and recovered $300,000.  Her lawyer refused to reimburse Travelers anything for medical expenses but agreed to reimburse two thirds of indemnity benefits.

The second case involved Paul Reed, who  worked for the Township of Marlboro as a police officer.  Reed was redirecting traffic during work when he was struck by a vehicle.  Marlboro belonged to the Monmouth Municipal Joint Insurance Fund and its third party administrator, Qual-Lynx, paid $60,430.48 for medical expenses and $44,578.29 for indemnity benefits.  Reed recovered $100,000 in his third party law suit.  Counsel for Reed offered to reimburse the JIF two thirds of indemnity benefits but refused to reimburse any medical expenses.

The third case involved William Agar, who worked as a police officer for the Township of Hazlet.  Officer Agar was injured on June 26, 2011 while sitting in his police car, which was struck by another vehicle.  The Township of Hazlet also belonged to the Monmouth County Municipal Joint Insurance Fund and the JIF paid $4,331.02 for medical expenses and $15,693 for indemnity benefits.  Agar recovered $60,000 in his third party law suit and refused to reimburse any of the medical expenses.

All three cases went before the same Judge of the Superior Court, who ruled based on the unreported Dever decision that the plaintiff injured workers did not have to reimburse the portion of the workers’ compensation lien corresponding to medical expenses.  The Superior Court Judge concluded that since a no-fault insured cannot make a recovery from a third party tortfeasor for medical expenses, the workers’  compensation carrier could not seek reimbursement under N.J.S.A. 34:15-40.

The Appellate Division reversed in all three cases and said that the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act  (AICRA) did not negate the right of employers to subrogation of medical expenses.  The Court explained that the way N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6 of AICRA works is that workers’ compensation becomes the primary payor in a work-related car accident.  The PIP carrier must pay initially by contract but ultimately the workers’ compensation carrier must reimburse the PIP carrier.  “N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6 ‘relieves the PIP carrier from the obligation of making payments for expenses incurred by the insured [, including medical expenses] which are covered by workers’ compensation benefits.”   The Court also noted that workers’ compensation benefits “shall be deducted from the benefits collectible under [PIP].”

The Court added, “The collateral source rule does not make workers’ compensation part of the PIP no-fault system; rather it shifts the burden of providing insurance from the automobile insurance system to the workers’ compensation system.”  The Court concluded, “. . . nothing in that statutory language suggests that the Legislature intended to treat a workers’ compensation insurer as if it were an automobile insurer.”   The Court added, “Nor is there any suggestion that the Legislature intended to treat workers’ compensation insurers as if they were PIP insurers.  It is fair to assume that had the Legislature intended to effectuate such a major change, it would have used express language in the statute and discussed that incorporation in AICRA’s legislative history.”

These cases make clear that the unreported decision in Dever is bad law insofar as its ruling on subrogation.  These three decisions have been reported and should end the controversy over recent years about whether a work-related plaintiff injured in a car accident must reimburse the employer for medical expenses when a third party recovery is made.

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John H. Geaney, Esq., is an Executive Committee Member and a Shareholder in Capehart Scatchard's Workers’ Compensation Group.  Mr. Geaney concentrates his practice in the representation of employers, self-insured companies, third-party administrators, and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation, the Americans with Disabilities Act and Family and Medical Leave Act. Should you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Mr. Geaney at 856.914.2063 or by e‑mail at jgeaney@capehart.com. 

On Thursday, August 11 and Friday August 12, 2016, the workers’ comp bar descended on Austin for the

Workers’ Compensation Section’s Annual Conference for a two-day event of continuing legal education,

networking, and camaraderie. In addition to several other informative presentations, attendees were regaled

with knowledge about the Division’s rule-making authority by our own Jane Stone, and provided with a

thorough update on the designated doctor system by our DD guru, Erika Copeland. The social events this year

included a bowling tournament presented by the Workers’ Compensation Section. Led by David “The

Kingpin” Swanson, SLS tied for first place in the tournament.

Preparations for the Inaugural Reception for Kids’ Chance of Texas are being completed and we are

excited! SLS Partner Jane Stone is in charge of the event which will be held October 22, 2016 at

The Bullock Texas State History Museum in Austin from 6 to 8 p.m. Governor Greg Abbott, TDI

Commissioner David Mattax, DWC Commissioner Ryan Brannan, and our first scholarship

recipients (we already have two!)are among the invited speakers. There will be food, drink, a

presentation and a silent auction. If you would like to attend, please send your name, mailing

address, and email address directly to jstone@slsaustin.com and we will send you an invitation.

Individual tickets are $150. If you cannot attend but would like to make a donation, you can go to

www.kidschanceoftexas.org for PayPal, or send a check to P. O. Box 30111, Austin, Texas 78755.

Rabiat Ngbwa has been hired as the newest Hearing Officer in the Division of Workers’

Compensation. Most recently, Ms. Ngbwa served as a reviewing attorney at the Texas Workforce

Commission, where she was a Hearing Officer. Between her stints at the TWC, Ms. Ngbwa worked

as a consultant at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and then as an attorney with

Synergy Legal Professionals. She received her B.A. from Texas Lutheran University in 1997 and

her J.D. from Houston College of Law in 2003. She is also certified in both human resources and

mediation. Ms. Ngbwa will be the third traveling Hearing Officer in the Division’s central office.

Last month we informed you of Commissioner Brannan’s decision to authorize contested case

hearings to be held in the Metro Center Building, a.k.a., “Austin Central.” The expansion of

hearings sites was initiated as a “quick fix” to the surplus of recent work comp claims in the Austin

area and the Division’s inability to set disputes within the statutorily-mandated 60-day deadline for want of docket space. Officially, Austin has just one Hearing Officer, and the field office has only

one hearing room. Originally this temporary solution was to have extended only into September,

but because the high volume of cases has continued without abatement, the project has been

extended through at least December. How much longer this “temporary” remedy remains temporary

is anyone’s guess.

Maximum Attorney Fees Rate MIGHT Increase. The proposed rule would establish a new

maximum rate of $200/hour for attorneys and $65/hour for legal assistants. The proposed change

serves as the Division’s recognition that the cost of goods and services has increased significantly

in the last quarter-century. However, the Division’s hourly rate for legal services, which it adopted

in 1991, has not been updated until now. The low rates were beginning to discourage attorneys from

taking workers’ compensation cases when other, higher paying work is available. The increased rate

will provide injured workers with greater access to quality representation which is important to the

health of the system. The proposed new attorney fee rules will be found at DWC Rules 152.3, 152.4,

and 152.6.

DD Requests to be Attached to the DD Orders . . . Finally. Over the last few years, the DWC has

more than once reminded (admonished?) system participants to exchange the DWC 32 with the

opposing party when a DD request is made to the Division so that all are informed of what

information is being asked of the DD. The reminders were ineffective. Frequently, Carriers would

receive an order for a DD exam on extent of injury, for example, without having received the DWC

32. In the absence of the DWC 32, the Carriers were left without an understanding of what was the

injury the DD was asked to address. To resolve the “failure to exchange” problem, the Division has

elected a practical solution. Effective September 1, 2016, the Division will attach the DWC 32 to

the DD Order. Despite this practical solution, system participants are reminded that DWC 32s must

still be exchanged with all parties.

The Hearing Officer determined that the claimant, a truck driver, who stopped to assist a motorist

injured in an accident that did not involve the claimant sustained a compensable injury when his

knee later began to swell. The road on which he had been traveling was still blocked by the

accident, so after he rendered his aid, the claimant turned around and followed an alternate route to

his office. The Appeals Panel disagreed with the Hearing Officer’s determination that the claimant

had remained in the course and scope of his employment when he stopped to assist the motorist.

Although such aid rendered in the event of an emergency could arise during the course and scope

of employment if the employment is not deserted and the claimant’s actions are reasonable for

advancing the employer’s work interests, there was no evidence in this case that the claimant was

performing any action that he thought necessary for the employer’s business interests. His assistance of the motorist did not serve to clear the road, and an alternate route was available to him

to proceed with his work duties.