NWCDN Members regularly post articles and summary judgements in workers’ compensations law in your state.
Select a state from the dropdown menu below to scroll through the state specific archives for updates and opinions on various workers’ compensation laws in your state.
Contact information for NWCDN members is also located on the state specific links in the event you have additional questions or your company is seeking a workers’ compensation lawyer in your state.
VERMONT WORKERS' COMPENSATION UPDATE
JANUARY TO MARCH 2013
by Keith J. Kasper Esq.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR HEARING DECISIONS
LeClaire v. Ford of Brattleboro Inc., Opinion No. 1-13WC (Jan. 3, 2013).
Defendant's attempt to terminate TTD benefits due to concurrently disabling heart condition denied. "As it was in Wood, the critical fact here is that during the time when Claimant's non- work-related condition precluded treatment, his work-related injury continued to be totally disabling. Given the express language of the statute, which mandates that temporary total disability benefits be paid for so long as the work injury 'causes total disability for work,' 21 V.S.A. §642, sufficient grounds for discontinuing them in this case do not yet exist."
Roy v. The Howard Center, Opinion no. 2-13WC (Jan. 10, 2013).
Claimant's mental-mental claim found compensable as finding dead co-worker satisfies unusual stress standard. Treating psychiatrists' opinion found more credible than that of IME doctor's opinions as more objectively based.
Kibbie v Killington/Pico Ski Resort, Opinion No. 3-13WC (Feb. 5, 2013).
Request for Summary judgment denied as prior settlement agreement which left open treatment for TBI did not necessarily foreclose proposed physical therapy recommendation.
Pawley v Booska Movers, Opinion No. 4-13WC (Feb. 5, 2013)
Attorney fees awarded to Claimant for one carrier initially denying claim compensable but then retracting that defense after depo of Defendant's expert witness. "Were this the first time Claimant had sought to establish the compensability of either incident, I likely would conclude that Dr. Pulde's report provided a reasonable basis for his employer to deny his claim for benefits. The fact is that Claimant's employer previously had accepted compensability, however. True, this occurred while another carrier was on the risk. But the statute equates employer with insurer, so both are thereby bound. 21 V.S.A. §601(3); Workers' Compensation Rule 2.1190. Given this particular circumstance, I conclude that Vanliner had no reasonable basis for denying the compensability of Claimant's August 2011 DVT on the grounds that it was not related to his employment."
Puzic v Huber + Suhner, Opinion No. 5-13WC (Feb. 5, 2013).
Defendant's IME opinion found credible even though Hearing Officer did "not accept as credible his conclusion that Claimant's ongoing symptoms were most likely due to rheumatoid arthritis or to her 2009 fall while shopping. However, I do accept as credible his conclusion that there is no medical basis whatsoever for relating Claimant's symptoms back to her 2002 work injury. That injury, which was diagnosed at the time as a myofascial strain caused by repetitive shoulder activities, resulted in no permanent impairment, no documentable structural defects, no objectively verifiable range of motion limitation and only minor functional restrictions. I conclude that there is no medical process by which Claimant's ongoing symptoms, which in the nine years since have both worsened and become more diffuse, reasonably can be attributed to her initial work-related insult."
Maluk v Plastic Technologies of Vermont, Opinion No. 6-13WC (Feb. 5, 2013).
Pro se Claimant fails to qualify for TTD benefits. "Here, the uncontradicted medical evidence establishes that claimant was capable of working, albeit with modified duty restrictions, at all times subsequent to his November 30, 2011 injury. The credible evidence further establishes that Defendant was providing suitable modified duty work. By first calling in sick and then abandoning his job, Claimant removed himself from the work force without a medical basis for doing so. Whatever wages he lost thereafter were a function of that decision, not his work injury."
Simmons v Landmark College, Opinion No. 7-13WC (Feb. 28, 2013)
Defendant's IME doctor's opinion as to reasonableness of fourth neck surgery found more credible than that of treating surgeon. Symptoms found compensable as related to issues covered by Form 22, but not surgery to correct said symptoms.
DeChantal v Sears, Opinion No. 8-13WC (Feb 28, 2013)
Claimant's low back injury found compensable based upon Claimant's IME opinion that work activities caused a "'classic presentation'...[as] Claimant's symptoms progressed from feeling a 'twinge' or pop while engaged in a vehicle repair job at work on July 19th to being unable to get out of bed on July 21st."
Randall v Health Services Group, Opinion No. 9-13WC (Mar. 12, 2013).
Treating physician's opinion as to proposed cervical surgery found not as persuasive as treating surgeon's opinion as to causation of cervical condition and reasonableness of proposed cervical surgery. IME doctor "has not explained adequately h ow it is that the benefit Claimant derived (or not) form her shoulder surgeries is likely to be an accurate predictor of whether she will (or will not)benefit from cervical surgery."
Haskins v Green Mountain Coffee Roasters Opinion No. 10-13WC (Mar. 18, 2013)
IME expert's opinion rejected over that Claimant's treating physician. "Had there been evidence from which he could determine, to the required degree of medical certainty, that the carpal tunnel symptoms Claimant was exhibit form September through November 2011 were due to a burgeoning systemic inflammatory response or autoimmune disorder, I might have found his opinion persuasive." However, DOL accepts IME doctor's opinion that chiropractic treatment of CTS was not reasonable.
MISSOURI WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
CASE LAW UPDATE
JANUARY 2013 – MARCH 2013
Percentage of Disability Alleged in Claim Not Deemed Admitted if Employer Does Not File
Answer Timely
Ray Taylor v. Labor Pros, LLC, Case No. WD75174 (Mo. App. 2013).
FACTS: The claimant was striking a wooden block with a sledge hammer when a piece of wood broke off and struck him in his left eye. The claimant was seen by Dr. Becker at the request of the employer, who opined he had 30% PPD to his left eye. The claimant offered no medical testimony regarding the percentage of disability he sustained to his eye. He filed a Claim for Compensation and in the box titled "parts of body injured," he put 75% disability to the left eye. At the hearing, the claimant objected to the admission of any evidence regarding the percentage of disability to his eye based on the fact that the employer failed to file a timely Answer, and therefore, all factual issues alleged in the Claim were deemed admitted, specifically, that he sustained 75% disability to his left eye. The Commission rejected this argument and a warded the claimant 30% PPD to his left eye consistent with medical evidence. The claimant appealed.
HOLDING: The Court noted that the issue in this matter was whether a percentage of disability added to a Claim should be considered a "statement of fact" subject to being deemed admitted when an employer fails to timely file an Answer. The Court noted the failure to timely answer results in the factual statements in the claim being admitted, but does not result in the admission of a legal conclusion such as whether the injury arose out of or in the course of the employment. The Court further noted that it was well established that "the determination of a specific amount or percentage of disability awarded to a claimant is a finding of fact within a special province of the Commission." Furthermore, the Commission may consider all evidence including the testimony of a claimant and draw reasonable inferences in arriving at a percentage of disability, and in fact, Appellate Courts have affirmed disability ratings made by the Commission which exceeded the highest of the percentages expressed in medical opinions. Therefore, the Court noted that a disability determination alleged within the Claim is not to be deemed admitted, nor is the Commission bound by it. The Court, therefore, affirmed the Award of 30% disability.
Commission Has Authority to Review Temporary Award of ALJ and Issue Final Award if
Employer Initially Denied ALL Liability
David Johnson v. Land Air Express, Inc., and Franklin Trucking Company, Case No. WD74821 (Mo. App. 2012).
FACTS: The claimant sustained an injury to his lower back on December 1, 2008, while working for Land Air Express. On January 1, 2009, Land Air Express sold its operation to Franklin Trucking Company, and the two companies had common ownership and were both covered by the same workers' compensation insurer. The claimant continued to perform his job duties, however, eventually was diagnosed with a disc herniation and underwent a discectomy at L5-S1.
The claimant filed two Claims for Compensation. The first was for a specific injury on December 1, 2008 and the second was for an occupational disease occurring on December 1, 2008, and every day he worked before and after that time. Both employers deniedall liability. The claimant requested a hardship hearing and the ALJ found that he sustained a work injury on December 1, 2008, but did not suffer from an occupational disease. The ALJ issued a Final Award finding that Land Air Express was liable for the claimant's medical treatment and TTD benefits. Land Air Express provided medical treatment and TTD benefits, but appealed the ALJ's Decision to the Commission. The Commission overturned the ALJ's Decision, and issued a Final Award denying all compensation and medical treatment to the claimant. The claimant appealed the Commission's reversal.
The issues before the Court were whether the Commission had authority to render a Final Award on an appeal from the ALJ's Temporary Award and if the Commission did have that authority, was the Commission's Award actually a Final Award since there was still the question of who was responsible for the claimant's medical expenses that Land Air Express was ordered to pay pursuant to the ALJ's Temporary Award.
HOLDING: The Court found that the Commission had authority to enter a Final Award. The Court noted that nothing in the Statute indicates that the Commission does not have the authority to issue a Final Award after an appeal from a Temporary Award by an ALJ, or that another hearing after the hardship hearing is required to enter a Final Award. The Court did note that the Commission will not review an ALJ's Temporary Award unless the employer has deniedall liability, and has asked for a review as to whether there is liability under the Statute. There was no dispute that Land Air Express denied all liability, and therefore, the Commission had authority to review the award even though the ALJ issued a Temporary Award.
Furthermore, the Commission had the statutory authority to issue a Final Award. The claimant argued that the Commission's Award was not final because the Commission did not determine whether the claimant or the employer/insurer was responsible for payment of medical services provided pursuant to the ALJ's Temporary Award. The claimant argued that the issue of who is responsible for paying the already-incurred medical expenses prevents the Commission from issuing a final award. The Court disagreed.
The Court noted that the Statute and Regulations allow a final award to be issued by the Commission even if medical providers might still be owed money for the services provided to the claimant. Medical providers have a separate avenue to collect, which is through Medical Fee Disputes.
The Court further found that it is not relevant that the employer/insurer authorized treatment between the ALJ's Temporary Award and the Commission's Final Award. The Court found that Land Air Express simply complied with the Temporary Award. The Court noted that if Land Air Express would have failed to provide the treatment and the Commission would have issued an awarding affirming the ALJ's Temporary Award, its liability would have doubled for the unpaid portions of the awarded compensation. The claimant equates the making of payments as establishing that Land Air Express authorized the treatment. However, the Court did not agree. After the ALJ entered his award they continued to deny liability for the ordered medical treatment by seeking the Commission's review of the award.
The Court also noted that it understood that the Regulations allow for medical providers to pursue either the employer/insurer or employee for fees for "medical treatment that is found by award or settlement not to be compensable." The Court did understand the difficult position that the claimant was in, which was that medical providers that remained uncompensated could come after him for payment of medical services. However, the Commission found no clear legal basis to say the Commission's Award was not final. Therefore, the Court affirmed the Final Award of the Commission.
SIF Cannot Be Compelled to Pay a Claimant Benefits Because the SIF is Insolvent
Skirvin v. Treasurer of the State of Missouri et. al., Case No. WD75541 (Mo. App. 2013).
FACTS: On May 11, 2011, the Commission awarded PTD benefits to the claimant against the SIF. On July 8, 2011, the SIF wrote the claimant acknowledging his Award, but advised that it was unable to make a payment due to its current balance and projections for the remainder of the fiscal year. It further advised that he would be notified in the event the SIF is able to make a payment in the future. On September 27, 2011, the claimant filed a Petition in the Circuit Court, seeking to compel payment of the Award. A hearing was held before the Court who ruled that the SIF must pay the claimant his benefits. The SIF filed a Motion to Reconsider for a New Trial arguing that the judgement would wreak havoc on the SIF by promoting a "run on the bank," making it impossible to attempt to orderly pay claimants out of the SIF's limited funds. The Motion was denied. The SIF filed an appeal.
HOLDING: The Court noted that the question in this case is can the SIF be compelled to pay PTD Awards on a first come first served basis when the SIF is admittedly unable to pay all present and future PTD awards. The Court found that because the SIF is legally insolvent, it cannot be compelled to make full payment to the claimant. The Court did transfer this case to the Missouri Supreme Court because of the general interests or importance of the question involved.
Injury in Parking Lot Compensable because Employer Owned, Maintained and Controlled
Lot
In Jackie Maize v. Preferred Family Healthcare, Inc., Injury No. 11-006324, the claimant was a residential care technician whose job duties included cleaning rooms, checking on residents and doing the laundry. He had completed his work shift and prepared to go home. He walked outside to his pick-up truck, which was parked in the employer's parking lot under an overhead light that was surrounded by a circular concrete curb and filled with river gravel. He stepped up onto the curb and his right foot slipped on the gravel that was on top of the curb, at which time he fell sustaining an injury to his right knee. The claimant testified that the employer owned the lot and controlled and maintained it, and employees were allowed and encouraged by the employer to park their vehicles in this area. There was no evidence to the contrary. The ALJ found that the claimant's injury did arise out of and in the course of his employment because it occurred on the parking lot which the employer owned, and the employer controlled and maintained the area. The Commission affirmed the Award of the ALJ.
Fall on Employer's Parking Lot Curb Not Compensable
In Hemenway v. North American Montessori Child Care,Injury No. 10-107564, the claimant, a teacher, slipped and fell on an icy curb in the employer's parking lot. The ALJ denied the claim finding that the claimant sustained an injury but concluded it did not arise out of and in the course of her employment. The Commission agreed and found that the claimant's injury occurred on the edge of the employer's parking lot while she was"off the clock" and returning from her smoke break. The claimant had to smoke in the parking lot next door because smoking was not allowed on school property. The Commission noted that the claimant was not in the icy parking lot as a direct function of her employment, and was there due to the fact that she was taking an unpaid smoke break. The Commission further noted that the claimant's injuries did not arise out of and in the course of her employment because the fall did not occur at a place where she was reasonably fulfilling the duties of her employment or engaging in something incidental to her employment.
Doctor Not Credible because Changed Opinion on Cross-examination
In John Shelton v. Missouri Department of Public Safety/Missouri Veterans Home, Injury No. 09-065061, the claimant was a CNA and sustained an injury to his lower back while lifting a patient. The claimant presented the medical testimony of Dr. Musich, who in both his report and on direct-examination failed to rate any permanency resulting from the work injury. On cross-examination, Dr. Musich changed his testimony and opined that the claimant had 35% disability referable to the injury, as well as two subsequent injuries. The employer presented expert testimony of Dr. Randolph, who did not rate any permanency resulting from the injury. The ALJ found Dr. Randolph to be credible and found that the claimant did not sustain any permanent disability as a result of the injury. The Commission agreed and noted that Dr. Musich's testimony was little help in this matter as he waited until he was prompted on cross-examination to correct an apparent error in his opinions which demonstrated that he paid little attention to detail. Therefore, his opinion was found to lack credibility.
Costs Awarded Against Employer Because Employer Denied Claim Without Any
Investigation
In Patricia Nouraie v. Missouri Baptist Medical Center,Injury No. 10-111746, the claimant reported to her employer that she was having back problems on February 4, 2010. She also advised that she believed that it was because of her work duties. The employer's occupational health nurse told the claimant to apply ice and take Ibuprofen.
The next day, February 5, 2010, the employer acknowledged that the claimant reported a work injury. That same day the manager of the employer's Workers' Compensation Administration sent the claimant a letter noting that she reviewed "the claimant's report of injury of 12/22/09 and multiple unknown dates of injury and the records of Occupational Health" and based on review of those records the claimant was denied workers' compensation benefits.
The Commission reviewed the records that the employer's Workers' Compensation Administration relied on to deny benefits and found no "report of injury" but simply an "Employee Report of Work-Related Injury, Illness or Exposure" from BJC Healthcare signed by the claimant on February 4, 2010, the day she reported her back pain to the employer. In this report, it is noted that the claimant had back pain for about a month which began after moving a heavy resident. However, the Commission noted that there was no date of 12/22/09 in the record or any other record. There was also a handwritten note from the claimant noting that she had back pain for about a month after helping move a large resident. Then she had two other incidents at work when she felt a strain in her back. In light of this information, the claim was denied by the employer's Workers' Compensation Administration.
The claimant was seen by her own doctor on February 19, 2010, and she was taken off work until March 8, 2010. The claimant called the employer on numerous occasions asking to be taken off the schedule. Eventually, the claimant obtained an attorney and demanded medical care. Two weeks later she was fired for not timely returning an Application for Personal Leave. The employer did not have the claimant examined until April 2011, more than a year after learning of her injury. The ALJ concluded that the employee sustained a work-related injury by occupational disease. The ALJ also found that the employer did not act unreasonably in denying the claim.
The Commission agreed that the claimant had an occupational disease. However, the Commission found that the employer acted unreasonably in denying the claim. The employer argued that its denial of benefits before sending the claimant for examination was appropriate conduct because the Statute imposes no obligation on an employer to provide medical treatment to a claimant until the claimant proves her claim is compensable. The Commission rejected the employer's suggestion that an injured worker must prove her injury is compensable before the employer has any obligation to provide medical examination or treatment. The Commission noted that the employer should provide medical treatment to cure and relieve the effects of the injury, and the Statute does not make the employer's obligation to provide such medical treatment contingent upon a medical opinion finding the injury compensable. The Commission noted that it is clear that employers have an obligation to investigate alleged work injuries before denying benefits.
Furthermore, where the claimant is available to discuss the injury, the Commission believes that any reasonable employer conducting an investigation regarding an injury would discuss the alleged injury with the worker, which was not done in this case. The Commission found that the employer's act of denying workers' compensation benefits to the claimant before even discussing the alleged injury constituted an egregious offense. Therefore, the employer denied this claim at the outset without reasonable ground and costs were awarded.
If Doctor Doesn't Address Future Medical Treatment Cannot Assume that Doctor Does Not
Believe Future Treatment is Needed
In Carol Herrington v. Cedar Ridge Manor, Injury No. 08-051320, the ALJ found that the employer was liable for future medical treatment. Dr. Volarich, the claimant's expert, opined that it was reasonable and probable that the claimant would need future medical care for her pain syndrome. Dr. Mirkin, the employer's expert, was silent on the issue of future medical treatment. The ALJ found that Dr. Volarich was credible, and therefore, the employer was liable for future treatment. On appeal, the employer/insurer argued that Dr. Mirkin's silence regarding future medical care should be treated as if the doctor did not recommend any future treatment. The Commission did not agree, and noted that the ALJ found Dr. Volarich's opinion credible and so did they. Furthermore, Dr. Mirkin's silence had no probative value in the face of a credible affirmative expert opinion on the issue of future medical care. The Commission agreed that the claimant was entitled to future medical treatment.
Claimant Found Not Credible Therefore Examining Doctors Not Credible
In Tammy Stroud v. Poplar Bluff Regional Medical Center,Injury No. 06-022475, the claimant alleged she was PTD due to a combination of her primary injury and her pre-existing conditions. All of the experts except Dr. Bassett, the psychiatrist for the employer, rendered the opinion that the claimant was PTD due to a combination of her pre-existing conditions and her work injury. The ALJ, however, found these opinions lacked credibility on the rationale that the claimant was not credible with respect to her own limitations and abilities. Therefore, the experts who relied on the claimant's subjective reports of her limitations and abilities did not have an accurate factual basis from which to form their opinions on the issue of PTD.
The Commission agreed and noted that the claimant changed her testimony about activities before and after her injuries. Specifically, she initially described doing jumping jacks, step aerobics, tight rope balancing and going from a squatting to a standing position quickly all while playing the Nintendo Wii Fit before her work injury. However, on cross-examination she did admit that this game did not come out prior to her injury, and therefore, she must have played it after her work injury. The Commission noted that the claimant's testimony was not reliable about her present abilities and limitations, and although the evaluating doctors found the claimant's subjective complaints to be inconsistent with their objective findings, none of the experts diagnosed any conscious or deliberate symptom magnification on the claimant's part. The Commission found that the claimant's inconsistent testimony regarding her physical abilities was due to her psychiatric difficulties rather than a deliberate attempt to misrepresent the nature or extent of her disability. In any event, the Commission found that the claimant's testimony as to her post-injury abilities and limitations was demonstratively unreliable, and therefore, the Commission questioned the true nature and extent of her disability and agreed with the ALJ that she was not PTD despite the doctors' opinions.
Employer Not Entitled to Reduction for Safety Violation Because Did Not Make Effort to
Insure Rule was Followed
In Dennis Carver v. Delta Innovative Services, Inc., Injury No. 07-134522, the claimant was a roofer who sustained an injury carrying an item up a ladder. The ALJ awarded the claimant compensation, however, reduced his award by 50% because he willfully violated a safety rule. The ALJ noted that the claimant was the foreman, was aware of the rule and was responsible for making sure that the rules were followed. However, he went to work and specifically violated a rule which resulted in his injury. Therefore, in this instance the employer was entitled to a 50% reduction in benefits, which is the maximum allowed by Statute. The Commission affirmed the decision of the ALJ. The claimant appealed and the Court found that the Commission's findings were insufficient for the Court of Appeals to determine whether there was sufficient evidence that the employer was entitled to a reduction in benefits. Therefore, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the Commission to make that determination.
Before remanding this matter back to the Commission the Court identified four elements that must be proven by the employer to take a reduction: 1) Employer adopted a reasonable rule for the safety of employees; 2) Employee's injury was caused by the failure of the employee to obey the safety rule; 3) Employee had actual knowledge of the rule; 4) Prior to the injury, the employer made a reasonable effort to cause employees to obey the rule.
The relevant facts follow: the employer required employees to watch safety videos and also required them to attend an initial safety orientation and ongoing periodic "toolbox talks." The employees who testified were aware of the "three point contact" rule, which precluded employees from carrying anything up the ladder. There was testimony that this rule was well known throughout the roofing industry, and although the record lacked evidence of the specific content of the safety video, orientation or toolbox talks, the Commission believed there was sufficient evidence to find that the employer made its employees aware of the existence of the "three point contact" rule. The record also revealed that the employees misunderstood and routinely violated the rule.
There was also evidence that the owner knew the employees broke the rules all the time. An employee did testify that employees violating the rule would be reprimanded by a foreman. However, this employee was found to be not credible, and therefore, the Commission found no credible evidence that the employer ever warned, sanctioned or took any disciplinary steps against employees who broke the rule. Therefore, the Commission found that although the employer took steps to make its employees aware of the three point contact rule, the employer did not take any steps or make any effort to insure that the rule was actually followed. Thus, the employer was not entitled to a reduction in benefits.
Claim Denied Because Claimant Found Not Credible
In Kristine Gibbons v. St. Louis University Hospital, Injury No. 07-130590, the claimant alleged that she sustained an injury to her low back on May 15, 2007, when she was helping restrain a combative patient. She testified that she twisted and turned to the left, and she heard a pop. She also admitted that she did not report the alleged injury that same day. The claimant also testified that at one point she told her supervisor that her back was hurting. However, she admitted she did not say it was work-related. The claimant did have prior back problems. The claimant also testified that she left work early the day of her injury. However, the records showed she left for a "family emergency."
The ALJ found that the claimant failed to meet her burden of proving she had an accident. The ALJ noted that he did not believe the claimant was credible. He noted that her testimony at the hearing with respect to how she was injured differed from the descriptions she provided to evaluating physicians. The ALJ further noted that the symptoms she reported to various physicians also differed. Also, the experts for both the employer and the claimant noted that her physical complaints were magnified. The ALJ further found that she attempted to minimize her pre-existing issues and problems, and that she testified inconsistently with the medical records which pre-existed her injury.
Therefore, the Judge found that he could not rely on the claimant's testimony or statements, and also could not rely on the physicians' opinions, due to the fact that they relied heavily on the claimant's statements, descriptions and complaints in reaching their conclusions. Therefore, their opinions and conclusions were also flawed. The ALJ concluded that the claimant failed to meet her burden of proof that she sustained an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment, and that any disability was medically causally connected to that alleged accident. The Commission affirmed the decision of the ALJ.
Claimant Found to Be Employee Not Independent Contractor Because Employer Had Right
to Control Work
In John Cutsinger v. Area 151 Nightclub, Injury No. 10-082553, the claimant worked for the employer, a nightclub, on five occasions in 2010 customizing lighting for MMA fights. The last time he worked he sustained an injury to his ankle. The issue in this case was whether he was an employee or independent contractor. The ALJ noted that the Court has considered the following factors to determine whether a claimant is an employee or independent contractor: 1) is the work part of the regular business of the employer; 2) is the job a distinct occupation requiring special skills; 3) could the alleged employee hire assistants or must the work be performed by the individual personally; 4) is there supervision; 5) whose tools were used; 6) the existence of a contract for a specific piece of work at a fixed price; 7) the length of time the person is employed; 8) the method of payment, whether by time or by the job; and 9) who controls the details of the work.
The ALJ found that the claimant was an employee. She noted that although the MMA fights only occurred a few times a year, the evidence indicated that the employer regularly conducted special events. The Judge did note that while the claimant was called to work because he possessed knowledge necessary to customize lighting, she found that this was not an occupation that required special skills. The Judge also found there was no evidence that the employer would have allowed the claimant to hire assistants or substitutes. Furthermore, the employer had the right to hire, discharge and determine the claimant's pay. The employer also owned all of the equipment including the lights, microphones and computers. The Judge also noted that the claimant was paid by the hour, which was indicative of an employment relationship. The ALJ also found that there was a continued relationship since the employer regularly called the claimant to perform these services, despite the fact that he only worked five separate occasions. The Judge did note that the details of the work were controlled by the claimant suggesting independent contractor status. The Judge also noted that the claimant was paid by a 1099 which would also suggest independent contractor status. However, after reviewing all of the evidence in the record, the Judge noted that the weight of the evidence supported that the claimant was an employee. The Commission affirmed.
No Evidence for ALJ's Award of TTD and ALJ May Order a Change in Provider But Cannot Direct
Employer to Use Specific Provider
In Lisa Bush v. West Chester House, Injury No. 10-109482, the ALJ issued a Temporary or Partial Award in which he opined that the claimant was entitled to 6 weeks of TTD benefits as a result of a carpal tunnel release which was performed on November 12, 2010. The ALJ based his Award on Dr. Crandall's testimony that a surgery such as the one performed on the claimant generally requires 6 weeks of recovery. The Commission noted that there was no testimony in the record regarding the claimant's ability to compete in the open labor market or the total amount of time she missed from work due to her surgery. Therefore, the claimant failed to meet her burden of proving her entitlement to 6 weeks of TTD benefits awarded by the ALJ.
The Commission also addressed the ALJ's decision to award treatment with a specific physician. The ALJ ordered a change in provider to Dr. Glogovac. The Commission first noted that the claimant did not prove that the employer waived its right to direct her medical treatment, and the ALJ did not even make that finding in his Award. Second, the claimant failed to prove that her health and recovery had been endangered by the medical treatment provided by the employer. Furthermore, the Commission noted that even if the claimant met this burden, the only relief provided under the statute was that the Division or Commission may order a changein physician, surgeon, hospital or other requirement. The statute does not authorize the Division or Commission to appoint a specific doctor to provide the claimant's medical treatment. Therefore, the Commission found that the ALJ erred in ordering the claimant's medical treatment to be provided specifically by Dr. Glogovac.
The Legislature is Back in Town - Take Heed!
The Legislature is considering a number of bills involving changes to comp – some minor, somenot so minor. The bills which would have the greatest impact on system participants if passed include:
• HB 3022 - Creates a deadline for disputing extent of injury, requiring the carrier to dispute the treating doctor’s determination of the extent of the compensable injury by requesting a DD exam or BRC within 90 days of receiving the treating doctor’s report.
• HB 2630 - Provides that the right to dispute extent of injury is waived if not contested within 60 days of the date that the carrier receives written noticeof a "new manifestation of the original injury, an additional injury, or an additional diagnosis." The bill does not clarify what constitutes written notice for the purposes of this section. If passed, this will have a huge impact on carriers, as every medical bill and report received will need to be carefully reviewed immediately upon receipt for any mention of a new diagnosis or condition.
• HB 2627 - Provides that a party need only "contest" the first valid certification of MMI and IR within 90 days to prevent it from becoming final, clarifying thatcontesting the certification only requires the party to file a written notice with the Division, which shall not serve as a request for a BRC, and expressly stating that a BRC should be requested when the party is fully prepared to enter into the dispute resolution process.
• HB 2660 - Provides that a party may not call an expert to testify on an issue during a CCH or in court unless the party exchanged a report of the expert witness in accordance with the exchange rules.
• HB 2629 - Provides that the Division shall use the range of motion model from the 4th edition of the AMA Guides to determine impairment for all lumbar injuries, instead of the injury or diagnosis-related estimates model.
• HB 1468 - Provides that communications between the carrier and the employer are confidential and privileged if the communication is: (1) in furtherance of the employer’s rights under chapter 408, 409, or 410; (2) in anticipation of an administrative or judicial proceeding; or (3) for the purpose of facilitating the provision of professional services by the carrier to the employer.
• HB 1155 - Removes the word "temporary," so that the statute would allow a carrier to suspend payment of any kind of income benefits if an employee fails to submit to a designated doctor exam.
• HB 2249 - Provides that a claimant is also entitled to LIBs for a whole person IR of 85% or higherbased on the 6th edition or a subsequent edition of the AMA Guides that is the result of compensable injuries suffered in a single incident.
• HB 3280 - Provides that a health care provider cannot seek reimbursement for health care from the injured worker unless the injury has been finally adjudicated not compensable,or the employee fails to request a BRC to dispute the carrier’s denial of compensability within 45 days after receipt of the denial.
Participants Weigh In On Proposed Change To Rule 130.1
WorkCompCentral.com reports that based on the comments received by the Division, carriers and defense attorneys are largely supportive of proposed changes to Rule 130.1, which would clarify that certifications of impairment ratings based on dates other than the date of MMI are barred from evidence. The Division proposed the changes in response to a ruling by the Court of Appeals for the 6th Appellate District inSORM v. Joiner that a hearing officer could consider a doctor’s report that based the claimant’s IR on his condition as of July 5, 2006, even though the claimant did not reach MMI until five days later. The OIEC is opposing the proposal.
A Reminder Never Hurts - Medical Fee Dispute Process
For medical fee disputes filed on or after June 1, 2012, a party may appeal the decision by requesting a BRC within 20 days of receipt in accordance with 133.307(g). In the absence of a timely request for a BRC, the decision becomes final. If the dispute is not resolved at the BRC, a party may elect to resolve the dispute through binding arbitration, or the party can request a SOAH hearing by filing a written request with the Division’s Chief Clerk of Proceedings no later than 20 days after the BRC. However, the losing party is required to reimburse the Division for the costs of SOAH’s services and any applicable interest. Information on SOAH costs can be found athttp://www.tdi.texas.gov/wc/mfdr/documents/soahmfdcchcosts.pdf.
2013 Disciplinary Actions
Disciplinary orders were entered against doctors John Gray Andrew, Howard Thomas Douglas III, George Howell Johnson, Sr., Charles W. Kennedy, Jr., and Asra Oberoi for failure to comply with requirements for designated doctor examination and reporting. Dr. Darey Allen Philbrick was removed from the workers’ compensation system and no longer has a medical license.
Another system participant, Dr. Ernest Roman, permanently surrendered his license to practice medicine per the terms of an agreed order in lieu of further disciplinary proceedings against him before the Texas Medical Board for alleged improper operation of a pain management clinic.
Governmental Immunity May...Or May Not Cover Third-Party Administrators
The Amarillo Court of Appeals recently affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment disposing of claims for damages alleged by the injured worker to be the result of tortious conduct by MHMR, the Risk Management Fund, and the Division. The Court of Appeals agreed that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the defendants are immune from suit, finding no clear or unambiguous waiver of that immunity in the Labor Code or Texas Tort Claims Act that would permit suit against them for intentional torts. However, the Court reversed the judgment with respect to defendant JI Specialty Services, holding that the record did not establish that governmental immunity precluded the trial court’s jurisdiction over the claims against MHMR’s third party administrator. The Court found the cases relied on by Specialty Services inapplicable, as they were decided on other grounds rather than any finding that the third-party administrator shared the government entity’s immunity. The Court noted that an Austin Court of Appeals opinion not cited by either party holding that the third party administrator for a state agency was entitled to assert sovereign immunity was based on the relationship between the administrator and the agency as defined by the terms of their contract, while there was no contract in evidence in this case, but cautioned the parties not to read into the discussion any suggestion of the Court’s opinion regarding whether a more developed record might support Specialty Services’ claim of immunity.Taylor v. Lubbock Regional MHMR, JI Specialty Services, Inc., Texas Council Risk Management Fund and TDI-DWC, issued January 8, 2013.
When an employee moves for legitimate reasons, but labor market research cannot be performed in the new hub community, the community at the time of injury should be used. Here, because the appointed counselor could not perform labor market research in the town in Mexico where claimant moved, the trial court erred in finding the hub for determining loss of earning capacity (LOEC) was Mexico. The Court also held that in a modification action to terminate a running TTD award, the employer’s burden of proving a decrease in incapacity was satisfied by showing the claimant reached MMI. The burden of proving entitlement to permanency remained with claimant.
Case Report – By Karin L. Weingart, March 29, 2013
Gore v. WVOIC and Boone County Parks & Recreation Comm’n, (W.Va. 3/28/2013)
On March 28, 2013, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals issued a decision supporting the ranges of permanent impairment in spinal injuries which limit excessive permanent partial disability awards. In a Memorandum Decision inGore v. WVOIC and Boone County Parks & Recreation Comm’n, No. 11-0612 (W.Va. 3/28/2013), the Court addressed the petitioner’s challenge to the Rule 20 tables for ranges of permanent impairment for spinal injuries. In West Virginia, the basic operation for permanent impairment ratings for lumbar, thoracic, and cervical injuries requires the IME physician to assess impairment pursuant to the range of motion model for impairment found in the American Medical Association’s Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 4th Edition. The resulting impairment rating is then applied to the appropriate category in the corresponding table in W. Va. C.S.R. § 85-20 (“Rule 20”) and adjusted accordingly, if needed, to fall within the appropriate range.
The claimant challenged the rule and procedure, arguing that although the workers’ compensation statute gives the Commission authority to “adopt standards for the evaluation of claimants and the determination of a claimant’s degree of whole body medical impairment” the Legislature clearly intended that a claimant be compensated based upon medical impairment personal to him. The claimant argued that W. Va. C.S.R. §§ 85-20-64.1 and 64.2 are in direct conflict with W. Va. Code § 23-4-6(i). The claimant asserted that each claimant is to be compensated commensurate with the degree of his or her medical impairment, not a preconceived estimate of impairment based upon diagnostic codes. The claimant argued that the Rule 20 tables for ranges of impairment base permanent partial disability awards on diagnosis rather than actual whole person medical impairment specific to the claimant. He also noted that the Court had previously determined in Repass v. Workers’ Compensation Division, 212 W.Va. 86, 569 S.E.2d 162 (2002) that diagnosis based disability ratings were invalid and unreliable because they conflict with the proper time for such ratings, the proper treatment of progressive injuries, the procedure for reopening, and consideration of second injuries.
In theGore opinion, an unanimous Court recognized that the Legislature charged the Board of Managers in W. Va. Code § 23-4-3b with the task of adopting ranges of permanent partial disability for common injuries. The Court further found that the Board’s decision to determine impairment by using the AMA Guides Range of Motion model and applying that to the appropriate table is consistent with the intention of the Legislature as expressed in W. Va. Code § 23-4-6(i). The Court also cited to their prior decision in Simpson v. West Virginia Office of Insurance Commissioner, 223 W. Va. 495, 678 S.E.2d 1 (2009), where the Court stated that W. Va. C.S.R. Table § 85-20-C (2004) is valid and is a proper exercise of the rule-making authority delegated to the Workers’ Compensation Board of Managers by the Legislature in W. Va. Code § 234-3b(b) (2005).
The Goredecision upholds a standard developed by the Board of Managers and which has been a key factor in containing what had previously been rather excessive PPD awards for common spinal injuries.
Karin L. Weingart, Esq.
Spilman Thomas & Battle, PLLC
On March 1, 2013, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals released its
opinion in Ex Parte Russell Threadgill wherein it denied in part and
granted in part the employee’s petition for mandamus relief.
At trial, the employee claimed that he had two accidents. His first
accident allegedly resulted in injuries to his back, left leg, right
arm, and right shoulder. His second accident allegedly resulted in
injuries to his left ankle and right shoulder. The employee testified
that his second accident was the direct and natural consequence of
injuries resulting from the first accident. Specifically, he claimed
that the tingling and numbness in his left leg from the first accident
caused him to fall. The employer presented medical evidence that
rebutted the employee’s claims by demonstrating that the employee had
not been experiencing those problems prior to the second accident. The
judge ultimately held that the employee’s second accident was not a
direct and natural consequence of his previous injuries. Additionally,
the judge found that the second accident was not compensable because the
employee could not show that his employment caused him to roll his
ankle and fall.
The Court of Civil Appeals agreed that substantial evidence supported
the trial judge’s finding that the employee’s job did not cause the
second accident and that the second accident was not a direct and
natural consequence of his previous injuries. However, the Court found
that the trial judge erred in denying benefits for the right shoulder
injury solely on the grounds that the second accident was not
compensable. The Court stated that evidence indicated the shoulder
injury may have been the result of the first accident and that the trial
judge failed to resolve that dispute. The trial judge was therefore
directed to determine whether or not the right shoulder injury was the
result of the first accident.
My Two Cents:
Because the Court granted the employee’s petition in part, the trial
judge will likely do one of two things: Either find the shoulder injury
was the result of the first accident and award benefits or find that the
shoulder injury was not the result of the first accident and deny
benefits.
_________________________________________
About the Author
This blog post was written by Trey Cotney, Esq. of Fish Nelson LLC, a
law firm dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers and
insurance carriers in workers’ compensation matters. Fish Nelson is a
member of The National Workers’ Compensation Network (NWCDN). If you
have any questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation
issues in general, please feel free to contact the author at
tcotney@fishnelson.com or any firm member at 205-332-3430.
Taking a Look at the Latest on Affordable Care Act
Eric E. Kinder
Erin Jones Adams
Spilman Thomas & Battle, PLLC
Employers nationally continue to struggle with how to respond and adapt to the ever- changing landscape that is the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (often known as ObamaCare or the ACA). We at Spilman Thomas & Battle will continue to work with you through 2013 and beyond as the implementing regulations for the ACA continue to be issued. We are working to identify strategies to help employers navigate the process in the manner that best serves their respective industries.
Before discussing guidance issued recently regarding wellness programs that are part of a health care plan, there is news of a bit of a reprieve. Originally all employers were to provide notice to their employees regarding their state health insurance exchange no later than March 1 of this year. The written notice would inform employees of the existence of the health exchanges in their state, the manner in which an employee may contact the exchanges and information on how an employee may be eligible for a premium tax credit if the employee purchases a health plan through an exchange and other related tax issues. States, however, have been slow to decide if they were going to establish an exchange, and if so, what the rules for that exchange would be. Accordingly, the Department of Labor has stated that employers are not required to comply until it issues regulations regarding employer compliance with these notice requirements. Currently, the Department of Labor expects the timing for distribution of notices to be late summer or fall of this year, and it is considering providing model generic language that employers can use. We will send out information to employers when these regulations are issued.
A question many employers have asked relates to the establishment or continuation of their wellness programs. The federal government recently issued draft regulations on how employers can ensure their wellness programs are nondiscriminatory under the law. These rules would apply to all wellness programs that are part of a health plan, including those already in existence.
An initial matter, the regulations do not apply to wellness programs not connected to a health plan; employers who have wellness programs separate and apart from their plans need not worry. Employers with programs offering health insurance premium reductions need to read on.
The regulations established two categories of wellness programs. The first is participatory wellness programs available to all employees (or all similarly-situated employees) that either do not provide a reward or do not condition the reward based on the individual meeting certain health criteria. Examples of participatory wellness programs include programs that reimburse all or part of the costs of membership in a fitness center or that provide a reward to employees who attend a monthly, no-cost health education seminar. In general, participatory wellness programs are legal without further review.
On the other hand, health-contingent wellness programs are only permitted where they meet five specific standards. A health-contingent wellness program requires an individual to satisfy a standard related to health to obtain a reward. To survive legal scrutiny, a health-contingent wellness program must meet the following five conditions.
(1) Frequency of opportunity to qualify – The program must provide the employees the opportunity to qualify for the reward at least once per year.
(2) Size of reward – In general, a health-contingent wellness program reward may not exceed more than 30% of the cost of employee-only health care coverage. Programs designed to prevent or reduce tobacco use, however, may offer rewards up to 50% of the cost of employee-only health care coverage.
(3) Uniform availability and reasonable alternative standards - A reward under a health-contingent wellness program must be available to all similarly-situated individuals, which means a “reasonable alternative standard” (including a waiver of an otherwise applicable standard) must be provided for meeting the goal if it is either unreasonably difficult due to a medical condition or where it is medically inadvisable for the employee to attempt to satisfy the standard. In defining what a reasonable alternative standard is, the regulations provide a few rules. First, if the reasonable alternative standard is an educational program, the plan insurer must make the program available (as opposed to telling the employee to find the program) and must pay for it. Where the reasonable alternative standard is a diet program, the employer does not need to pay for the costs of the dietary food, but must pay for any membership or participation fee. And where the reasonable alternative standard is compliance with the recommendations of a medical professional, the plan must provide reasonable alternative standards that can be met within recommendations provided by the individual’s physician.
(4) Reasonable design – Health-contingent wellness programs must be reasonably designed to promote health or prevent disease, may not be overly burdensome, cannot be a subterfuge for discrimination based on a health factor or disability and may not be highly suspect in the method chosen to promote health or prevent disease. That said, plans and insurers may conduct screenings and measurements in order to target wellness programs effectively, but the program must still be made available to all individuals who do not meet this standard. Again, the program must also provide different, reasonable means for qualifying for the same reward.
(5) Notice of other means of qualifying for the rewards – Plans and insurers must disclose the availability of other means for qualifying for the reward for the possibility of waiver of the otherwise applicable standard and all plan materials describing the terms of the health-contingent wellness program. If, however, plan materials merely mention that a program is available without describing its terms, this disclosure is not necessary. To be safe, plans should include language such as the following in the description of all health-contingent wellness programs: “Your health plan is committed to helping you achieve your best health status. Rewards for participating in a wellness program are available to all employees. If you think you might be unable to meet a standard or a reward under this wellness program, you might qualify for an opportunity to earn the same reward by a different means. Contact us at [insert contact information] and we will work with you to find a wellness program with the same reward that is right for you in light of your health status.”
The draft regulations make clear the federal government is increasingly supportive of the use of workplace wellness programs as a means to promote health and prevent disease. While the proposed regulations offer employers certain flexibility in developing and maintaining wellness programs, employers must not forget to vet their wellness programs against other laws that impact the provision of wellness programs, such as the ADA or GINA. The draft regulations are intended to apply to plan or policy years beginning on or after January 1, 2014. Employers who currently sponsor wellness programs should review and consider revising those programs pursuant to the proposed requirements. Employers who aim to develop wellness programs should consider the conditions discussed above, keeping in mind that the final regulations have not yet been issued. If you have questions about the ways in which the ACA impacts your existing or planned wellness program, please contact Eric Kinder at 304.340.3893 orekinder@spilmanlaw.com.
How to Survive the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Enforcement
By Carl H. Hellerstedt, Jr.
As most employers know, the federal wage/hour law under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) includes the requirement to pay “non-exempt” employees time and one half of their “regular rate” for work in excess of 40 hours in a work week. The U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) is charged with enforcing the FLSA through its Wage and Hour Division. (It is currently engaged in a multi-year ongoing enforcement initiative focused on vendors performing services for the fracking and pipeline industry that has recovered nearly $200,000 in wages in that industry alone.) Prudent employers will want to be diligent to ensure compliance with wage and hour matters in light of the DOL’s willingness to audit employers.
How Can You Protect Yourself from a DOL Audit?
Employers should perform an internal audit at least once a year, addressing the following topics:
· Record-keeping: Computer-based payroll systems will contain the information necessary to meet most DOL requirements. Time worked and bonus calculation records should be kept as part of the pay records, which should be kept for a minimum of three years.
· Employee vs. Independent Contractor: The distinction between an employee and an independent contractor is not governed solely by how the parties title themselves; the DOL has specific tests to determine who is an employee and who is an independent contractor and often focus on who controls the manner of work. Employers using independent contractors should be careful to ensure that they are not directing, or only minimally directing, how and when independent contractors are performing their duties.
· Exempt vs. Non-Exempt: The exemptions from the overtime requirements which are often at issue in the shale industry include whether the employee meets the criteria to be exempt under the “salaried basis,” “professional,” “executive” or “administrative” categories. Determining if the employee meets the exemption criteria can be extremely fact-intensive.
· Compensable Time: A major area of litigation in recent years has centered on what should be considered to be time worked and therefore compensable and count toward overtime hours. This includes the use of cell phones and computers outside of normal working hours. Travel time can also be an issue in circumstances where the employer provides a take-home vehicle. The employer should have a written policy on the use of take-home vehicles to insure that the commute from home to work is not compensable.
Be Aware That Noncompliance with the FLSA Can Result In Considerable Costs!
The FLSA has provisions for doubling the amount of unpaid wages and overtime, attorney fees and for a special form of class action. When current or former employees hire private counsel to prosecute FLSA claims, the employer can expect a class action suit for double damages going back three years under the FLSA, as well as a companion claim of violations of the applicable state wage payment law and state overtime law. State laws are often used because some state law provisions are actually more favorable to the employee than the FLSA. Such is the case in matters including the use of class actions, the scope of exemptions and the calculation of overtime.
For more information, please contact:
Carl H. Hellerstedt, Jr.
412.325.3308
Immigration Reform May Affect All Employers
On January 29, 2013, President Obama announced his plan for comprehensive immigration reform. While the proposal to require mandatory, phased-in electronic employment verification has obvious implications for employers, the proposal to provide a pathway to earned citizenship may have an unforeseen effect on employers, as well. While surprising to some, many individuals in all walks of life do not have work authorization but are still members of the workforce.
Consider the following scenario: a long-term employee approaches you or a supervisor in your company and advises you that she provided you with a false social security card at the time she was hired, but that she now has a valid social security card and that she would like to update her records. How should an employer handle such a situation?
Several different issues are implicated in this and similar situations. At the outset, the employer will need to determine whether the employee was authorized to work in the past and whether the employee has current (and future) work authorization. Section 274A of the Immigration and Nationality Act provides that it is unlawful for an entity to hire an individual knowing the individual is unauthorized to work. The statute also provides that it is unlawful for an entity tocontinue to employ an individual knowing she is or has become unauthorized for employment.
In the scenario we presented, the employer may have a defense to any charges that it knowingly employed an alien unauthorized to work in the United States in the past because the employer completed the I-9 process and determined that the employee’s offered documents were valid at the time. If the employee does not have current work authorization at the present time and going forward, however, the employer will be liable for violating the Immigration and Nationality Act if it continues the employee’s employment.
If the employee is currently authorized to work, the employer must consider the separate issue of the employee’s misrepresentation during the hiring process. The employer must review the particular facts of the situation, including whether the employee provided false information on the employment application, the I-9 form, or other company documents. The employer will need to review its policies and procedures, as well as its past practice in similar situations. Is there a written policy that provides for disciplinary action for falsification of employer documents? Does the employment application state that the individual represents that all of the information provided is accurate? Has the employer previously allowed an employee to continue their employment after discovering a misrepresentation in similar circumstances (for example, on a resume)? The employer should focus on its specific policies, whether the employee had notice of its policies, and treating employees with consistency for similar misconduct.
The most difficult issue for employers to face is when a long-term, well-loved, star employee advises her employer that she is or was undocumented. Even if it is possible to continue this employee’s employment in the future without violating the Immigration and Nationality Act, the employer must carefully consider whether maintaining the employment relationship will establish a precedent for other similar situations.
When confronted with this or a similar situation, the employer should gather all the facts and then contact legal counsel for assistance in navigating all the issues that may arise.
For more information, please contact:
Larissa C. Dean
304.291.7924
ldean@spilmanlaw.com