State News

In Arneson v. GR Mgmt., LLC, 2024 S.D. 61, 13 N.W.3d 206, the claimant, Mr. Michael Arneson (“Arneson”), worked as a maintenance manager at a hotel and casino in Deadwood, South Dakota. On July 18, 2018, Arneson was working on a commercial exhaust fan for his employer (Employer”) when the fan shorted and sent 440 volts of electricity through Arneson’s hand, which exited through his foot (“the Work Injury”).

Arneson when to the emergency room for treatment. Within the next few days, he began suffering from mild heart palpitations. Almost two weeks later, Arneson went to the hospital for his heart palpitations and was diagnosed with hyperthyroidism and Atrial Fibrillation (“AFib”).

Arneson then brought a petition for workers’ compensation benefits arguing that the Work Injury caused his AFib and that he was permanently and totally disabled.

Arneson’s treating doctor, Dr. Holloway, provided an expert opinion that Arneson’s AFib was likely caused by his hyperthyroidism and the Work Injury.  Dr. Holloway acknowledged that Arneson’s hyperthyroidism could cause AFib itself. However, he also opined that electrical shocks like the Work Injury can cause heart arrythmias, such as AFib. Dr. Holloway did not provide an opinion on how commonly hyperthyroidism causes AFib or how commonly electrical injuries, like the Work Injury, cause AFib. He simply stated he believed both hyperthyroidism and the Work Injury causally contributed to Arneson’s AFib.

Employer countered by providing testimony from two non-treating experts. First, Employer presented the testimony of a cardiologist, Dr. Brody. Dr. Brody stated that he has rarely treated electrical injuries and that electric shock-induced AFib is extremely rare, occurring in less than 1% of cases based on his review of medical literature. In contrast, Dr. Brody testified that “the association” between hyperthyroidism and AFib “is a lot stronger” and more well accepted in the medical community. Dr. Brody then opined that the Work Injury was unlikely to have caused Arneson’s AFib, and the more likely cause was Arneson’s hyperthyroidism.  Employer also provided the testimony of Dr. Elkins. Dr. Elkins, like Dr. Brody, stated that it was statistically far more likely that hyperthyroidism caused Arneson’s AFib than an electrical shock like the Work Injury.

The Department of Labor (“Department”) found that the Work Injury was a major contributing cause of Arneson’s AFib and that he was permanently and totally disabled. Employer appealed arguing it was error for the Department to accept Dr. Holloway’s testimony that the Work Injury caused Arneson’s AFib when Employer presented unrebutted evidence that the Work Injury was statistically highly unlikely to have caused Arneson’s AFib.

The South Dakota Supreme Court (“Court”) rejected Employer’s argument and relied on a Minnesota case in support, stating “[a]n opinion based solely on statistical improbability ignores the fact that, by definition, improbable events do occur.” Arneson v. GR Mgmt., LLC, 2024 S.D. 61, ¶ 35, 13 N.W.3d 206, 217 (citing Ingram v. Syverson, 674 N.W.2d 233, 237 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (noting “medicine is an imperfect science and a plaintiff's symptoms may not always be proven by tests and statistics.”). The Court then found Dr. Holloway’s opinion was sufficient to show the Work Injury was a major contributing cause of Arneson’s AFib and affirmed the Department.

While the Court has still not defined “major contributing cause.” The Arneson opinion provides additional information on what “major contributing cause” is not. In this case, the Court was offered an opportunity to define major contributing cause in terms of probability and soundly rejected it. Employers should be aware of cases like this that continue to define the casual standard for compensable injuries.  

The NH Department of Labor has issued the following guide to assist parties when corresponding with them:

DOLHEARINGS@dol.nh.gov    -    Continuances/Withdrawal Requests, 1st level CD/Transcript Requests, Attorney Fee                                 Requests, Reconsideration/Clarification Requests, Add Issue/Time Requests, Video/Telephonic Requests

DOLSCHEDULING@dol.nh.gov    -    Hearing Requests, LSS Hearing Requests, Attorney Availability/Unavailability,                     Notification/Withdrawal of Representation, Hearing Submissions (medical and non-medical), Witness Disclosure

FirstReport@dol.nh.gov    - First Reports of Injury, Memos of Denial

MOPSUBMISSION@DOL.NH.GOV    -    Memos of Payment, Notices of Accidental Injury/Occ Disease, General WC                                                                        questions

WorkersComp@dol.nh.gov    -    Permanent Impairment Awards, Reimbursement for Job Modification, COLA, Death                                                             Allocation, Administrative Suspension/Termination, Third Party Settlement Approval, Pro Se                                                             Dispute Resolution

WorkersCompRecordsRequests@dol.nh.gov    -    Copy Requests, Employment Verifications

DOL.CABAppeals@dol.nh.gov        -    Appeal Requests, Appeal Submissions     

 SIFMC@dol.nh.gov     -    Second Injury Fund, Managed Care, Third Party Administrator Licensing    

NHCoverage@dol.nh.gov    -    General Coverage Requirements Questions, Verification of Coverage in Place,                                                     Questionnaires/Exclusions  

DOL.WCCarrier@dol.nh.gov    -    Certificates of Insurance, Coverage from Carriers, Requests for Penalty Waivers

NHLeasing@dol.nh.gov    -    Leasing Applications, Client Add/Term Forms, Quarterly Audits

DOL.WCSelfInsurance@dol.nh.gov    -    Self-Insurance

On July 16, 2024, the New Hampshire Supreme Court  issued a decision in Petition of City of Manchester & a., Docket No. 2022-0696.  This case was accepted by the full court from Bernard & Merrill’s Writ of Mandamus requesting that the Court address whether employers and their insurance carriers have a right to a department level hearing when the Second Injury Fund denies claims pursuant to RSA 281-A:43, I(a).

This Writ of Mandamus (an order directing a government official to properly fulfill their official duty or correct an abuse of discretion) was filed on behalf of eight employers who had filed claims against the New Hampshire Second Injury Fund (Fund) seeking reimbursement for indemnity and medical benefits paid out on behalf of claimants who sustained a prior permanent condition.  In all eight cases, the Fund denied the reimbursement claims, and the Department of Labor (DOL) refused to grant the employers a first level hearing to address the merits of the claims.  The question presented for review was whether the DOL was statutorily required to grant a request to hold a department level hearing when an employer’s request for reimbursement from the Fund is denied.

The Court agreed with the petitioner’s that RSA 281-A:43, I(a) grants employers a department level hearing before an authorized representative of the commissioner when they have been denied reimbursement from the Fund.  The Court disagreed with the DOL that hearings under this section of the statute are only allowed when the issue to be addressed is whether a claimant is entitled to benefits and that petitioner’s rights instead fall under the Administrative Procedures Act. The Court stated that it did not read the statute so narrowly and that at issue is “who is ultimately responsible for the payment of compensation to the employee-the employer or the Fund.”  The Court interpreted RSA 281-A:43,I(a) to provide for review of a denial of reimbursement and held, “to construe the statute otherwise – to provide no right to a contested hearing -a as the DOL would have us do, would subvert the purpose of the statute.” 

The Court observed that their interpretation of the statute “serves the purpose sought to be advanced by the statutory scheme” noting that the purpose of the Fund was “created to encourage employers to hire or retain employees with permanent physical or mental impairments of any origin by reducing the employer’s liability for workers’ compensation claims.”  Finally, it noted that  the legislature is free to amend the statute if it disagreed with their construction.

The Second Injury reimburses carriers and self-insured employers upwards of 16 million dollars annually.  The right to a first level hearing provides employers and their carriers the opportunity to flush out the basis of a denial and has resulted in a number of decisions awarding Second Injury Fund reimbursement.  

Michelle A. Broadhurst, Esquire

Bernard & Merrill PLLC

814 Elm Street, Suite 407

Manchester, NH 03101

Tel: 603-622-8454

Fax: 603-626-8490

E-mail: michelle@bernard-merrill.com

Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Update 

BWC Actions

The Board of the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (“BWC”) met in January 2025to discuss another potential rate reduction for Ohio’s private employers. The proposed rate reduction would be 6% which would amount to almost $60 million less in premiums paid by Ohio private employers. It would apply to the next fiscal year effective July 1, 2025. If approved at the Board’s next meeting on February 28, 2025, this reduction would be the sixth straight reduction since Governor DeWine took office and the 16th rate decrease in the last 17 years going back to 2008.  Overall, the average rate levels for the 257,000 private and public Ohio employers are at their lowest in over 60 years.

The proposed 6% rate cut represents an average statewide premium change, including administrative costs. The actual premium paid by individual private employers depends on several factors, including the expected future claims costs in their industry, their company’s recent claims history, and their participation in various BWC programs.

Ohio Judicial Decisions

Temporary Total Compensation 

State ex rel. Ohio State Univ. v. Pratt, 169 Ohio St.3d 527, 2022-Ohio-4111, 206 N.E.3d 708

On June 20, 2017, the claimant, a food and beverage manager for OSU at the Blackwell Inn, submitted her two-week notice, to resign on July 5, 2017. She had an offer of employment from a different employer. Four days later, on June 24, 2017, the claimant sustained a trip and fall injury. The claimant’s claim was allowed, and she underwent surgeries on June 27, 2017, and May 29, 2018, and was paid TTD compensation. The employer moved to terminate TTD. The commission’s SHO determined TTD was payable because the claimant did not voluntarily abandon the workforce as she was leaving her position at OSU for another position. The commission voted not to exercise continuing jurisdiction, but, in the dissent, one commissioner asserted the majority misinterpreted and misapplied State ex rel. Klein v. Precision Excavating & Grading Co., 155 Ohio St.3d 1446, 2018-Ohio-3890, 119 N.E.3d 386, by evaluating whether the claimant intended to abandon the workforce instead of whether the claimant intended to abandon her former position of employment.

The Court of Appeals granted the employer’s requested writ of mandamus and ordered the commission to vacate the award of TTD after July 5, 2017. The commission’s order was issued after the decision in Klein but before the effective date of the amendment to R.C. 4123.56(F). The Court found that, under Klein, the commission is to consider only whether the claimant has voluntarily abandoned her former position of employment and not whether she has removed herself from the workforce generally.

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and found that the commission did not abuse its discretion by determining that, but for the injury, the claimant would have remained in the workforce. The Supreme Court explained that while Klein referenced whether the claimant “voluntarily removes himself from his former position of employment,” the analysis was specific to the facts of the case and that “Klein’s abandonment of his former position was therefore equivalent to abandonment of the workforce during the period for which he sought TTD compensation.” Thus, the Supreme Court concluded, “The question is whether those circumstances demonstrate a voluntary abandonment of the workforce – permanent or temporary – such that the injured worker’s wage loss is not the result of the work injury. In other words, do the circumstances indicate that the injured worker would be working – somewhere – but for the injury?”

 Permanent Partial Disability

State ex rel. Hobbs v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 22AP-308, 2023-Ohio-1759

Tenth District Court of Appeals found the commission did not abuse its discretion in denying the claimant’s application for another increase in his percentage of permanent partial disability under R.C. 4123.57(A). The commission found the request was not supported with “substantial evidence of new and changed circumstances developing since the time of the hearing on the original or last determination,” as required by R.C. 4123.57(A). The record did not show the clamant underwent any medical treatment since 2002, that his condition became disabling following his last treatment, or that the claim was amended to include an additional medical condition, nor does the record support employee's contention that he testified that his medical condition was worsening since no such testimony appears in the record. The Tenth District Court of Appeals found the claimant failed to meet the burden in mandamus to demonstrate a clear right to relief, and denied the claimant’s requested writ of mandamus. Following this decision, the claimant filed a Notice of Appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, which is currently pending.

Scheduled Loss

State ex rel. Harris v. Indus. Comm., Supreme Court of Ohio, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3081. The claimant sustained a head injury that impacted his vision. The commission denied his motion for scheduled loss of vision compensation pursuant to R.C. 4123.57(B), relying on a physician’s medical opinion that the claimant’s vision impairment was not due to an actual injury to the eyes. The Tenth District Court of Appeals found the commission did not abuse its discretion and denied the requested writ, finding there was some evidence in the record that established the claimant’s loss of vision was not attributable to damage to the structure or function of the claimant’s eye, but was due to the loss of brain function. R.C. 4123.57(B) did not authorize loss of use compensation when the loss of brain function was the cause of the vision loss rather than actual damage to the eye structure itself. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision and denied the writ of mandamus, albeit on different grounds. The Supreme Court determined the commission’s order, which was based upon “the absence of a credible assessment” of loss of vision, was based upon some evidence. The Supreme Court declined to address the Smith case, finding the commission’s order did not deny compensation in reliance upon that case.

Substantial Aggravation of a Preexisting Condition

Dunn v. Devco Holdings, Inc., 3d Dist. Union No. 14-22-18, 2023-Ohio-680

The claimant suffered a workplace injury to her hip, and she later filed for additional psychological conditions in her workers’ compensation claim. The commission additionally allowed the claim for “substantial aggravation of persistent depressive disorder, with anxious distress, late onset, with persistent major depressive disorder, moderate.” The employer appealed to common pleas court under R.C. 4123.512. The trial court found in favor of the claimant, finding the testimony of Dr. Black to be persuasive in that her diagnosis is based upon objective diagnostic findings, objective clinical findings, or objective test results as required by R.C. 4123.01(C), and that the psychiatric condition arose from the injury.

The employer appealed, arguing the claimant did not present evidence of objective diagnostic findings, objective clinical findings, or objective test results that demonstrated a substantial aggravation of her psychological condition. Specifically, the employer argued the MMPI-2 test that Dr. Black had administered to the claimant is not an objective test and did not show substantial aggravation. The Third District Court of Appeals found Dr. Black testified at trial that the MMPI-2 is a standardized objective test. It gives you the idea of the person’s personality characteristics and helps with your diagnosis formulation. It has 567 true and false questions and the responses are combined together and scored to give you kind of a concrete and quantifiable results. She added that the MMPI-2 was developed out of standardized testing and provides a concrete and quantifiable result. She explained that although the person’s answers are subjective, the actual results and scoring of it makes it objective. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision, finding the Dr. Black’s testimony showed that the MMPI-2 test provided objective results, and her testimony that the claimant’s injury substantially aggravated a pre-existing condition was based on objective findings, as required by R.C. 4123.01(C).

© Copyright 2025 by Christopher Ward and Raymond Tarasuck Calfee, Halter & Griswold, LLP. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.

Is injured worker failing to report to offered light duty work, or failing to keep medical appointments or schedule medical procedures recommended by the authorized treating physician for work injury care?  A valuable tool in Indiana to control uncooperative employees is the ability of the adjustor or defense attorney to suspend benefits under Indiana Code 22-3-3-11 for not reporting to light duty work, and 22-3-3-4(c) for refusing medical treatment or services.

Often simply noticing the injured employee, in writing, of the plan to suspend TTD and/or medical treatment is enough to convince the employee that compliance is mandatory.  The Indiana Board Form, 54217, is available on the Indiana Board website, www.wcb.in.gov, and must be submitted in completed form to the Board through 1) the adjustor portal or 2) by the defense attorney, with copy to the injured worker or its attorney, and benefits may be suspended.   Only when the injured employee begins complying, benefits are reinstated.

The Commonwealth Court recently addressed the use of CBD oil in Schmidt v. Schmidt, Kirifides & Rassias, P.C., _ A.2d _ (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023).  There the claimant’s treatment for a back injury treatment was mostly pain management, for which he was prescribed various medications, and CBD oil.  The CBD oil was prescribed to avoid the use of increased narcotics.  The employer refused payment on the basis that CBD oil is not a pharmaceutical drug.  Consequently, the claimant filed a Penalty Petition.  The Workers’ Compensation Judge granted the Penalty Petition, concluding that the CBD oil was a medical supply under the Act, and was reasonable and necessary.  While the Judge ordered payment, she did not assess a penalty.

On appeal, the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board reversed the decision and order of the WCJ.  The Board concluded that CBD oil could not be a reasonable and necessary medical treatment when the FDA has issued several warning letters to firms marketing CBD products for violating federal law.  The WCAB also reasoned that the claimant did not submit the required medical reports and forms to trigger the employer’s reimbursement obligations.  The claimant appealed to the Commonwealth Court.

As was the case in the medical marijuana decisions of Fegley and Appel, dealing with the issue of whether medical marijuana is payable as treatment for a work injury, the Commonwealth Court reversed the decision of the Board.  This decision, as did the medical marijuana reimbursement cases, reflected a lack of understanding by the Court regarding application of the Medical Cost Containment Regulations in Pennsyvlania.  If there is no submission of medical bills with reports, the time frame to issue payment under the Medical Cost Containment Regulations never starts to run.  In fact, in this matter, the claimant’s medical provider appears to have “prescribed” topical treatment and the Claimant, on his own volition, elected to change what was “prescribed” or recommended to be ingestible CBD oil.  Thus, the treatment that was subject to reimbursement may not have actually had been “prescribed” by the medical provider.

If all that is required is a “recommendation” by the medical provider for medical marijuana or a CBD product or any other potential treatment modality, do we no longer need to have specific prescription provided for this to be treatment for which a insurer/employer/carrier is required to issue payment for reimbursement?  Why are reimbursements to be treated differently than payment of a medical bill under the Act and Regulations?  A medical provider does not simply indicate in a note that he is prescribing or recommending “narcotics” or pain medication and the Claimant is then allowed to determine the type, dosage, and frequency of what pain medication they feel works best.  The narcotic medication is actually being prescribed by a physician in terms of type, amount, dosage and frequency. 

This may now not necessarily be the case in Pennsylvania with recent reimbursement cases being handed down by the Commonwealth Court.  The Court either did not consider this issue or lost sight of what actually happens when there is a prescription provided by a medical provider.  The Claimant now apparently simply gets “prescribed” medical marijuana or a CBD product and then has carte blanche to determine what he or she wants so as to obtain this “treatment” without any actual further guidance from his or her medical provider.

With narcotics or any other actual prescription, a Utilization Review can find it to be reasonable and necessary but at a lower dosage or frequency than what was actually prescribed by the treating physician if the matter is referred to utilization review.  With reimbursement cases, there will not be ongoing bills submitted along with office notes from the prescribing physician so as to trigger the time period to file for utilization review.   If the submission of the invoice by the Claimant is what triggers the need to file Utilization Review, it is the Claimant who is picking the strain and amount of medical marijuana or the type and amount of CBD product such that the Claimant may potentially be the “provider” subject to review since they are actually determining what is being purchased and used as “medical treatment” based upon a recommendation as opposed to an actual prescription.  If so, there is no reviewer of the same specialty, as is required to be the peer conducing Utilization Review, given the Claimant is not an actual medical provider such that a proper Utilization Review may not be able to be properly performed.  A Utilization Review of the “prescribing” doctor would not be able to comment on what is actually being prescribed if there is no actual prescription in terms of type, amount, dosage, frequency, which is what is present on a normal prescription should it be subject to utilization review.

Regardless of how one feels about the benefits of medical marijuana and CBD oil, there is an established body of law and procedures to deal with these very issues of prescription medication and recommended medical treatment. However, years established procedures are now being short-circuited by the Court in allowing for unregulated “prescriptions” and treatment in the form of medical marijuana and CBD products for which the employer is responsible.  This same issue could later be applied to other “treatment” modalities for which reimbursement is sought.  This could be recommendations for a “firm bed”, “soaking tub” or “transportation device” or other such “treatment” where the Claimant has carte blanch to interpret as they see fit and then seek reimbursement for what is “prescribed.”

Do any and all recommendations of a medical provider that result in the Claimant purchasing a something arguably related to treatment of a work injury now need to be reimbursed in Pennsylvania given the recent Court holdings concerning reimbursement or should payment for all medical treatment still be subject to the terms and provisions of the Act and corresponding Regulations before payment need be made for such “treatment”? The recent holdings are problematic as they allow for circumvention of the Act and Regulations and if they continue to be followed by the Court, can allow for potential abuses and deny Employers and Carriers the rights afforded under the Act and Regulations before payment is required to be remitted for treatment of a work-related injury.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has granted allowance of appeal in the Schmidt matter such that hopefully these issues can be further reviewed and properly addressed by the Court. 

Bradley R. Andreen, Esq.

Rulis & Bochicchio LLC 

On June 3, 2025, Goodyear will celebrate 100 years of soaring over America’s favorite sporting events. Approximately 3.5 years after Goodyear blimps first began flying across the country, the company announced that it would build a tire manufacturing plant in the moderately sized city of Gadsden, Alabama. It would be the first such plant in the South. Gadsden had nudged out a bevy of other suitors such as Atlanta due to its central location, abundant natural resources, and a readily available workforce. The Gadsden plant opened in July of 1929, with a ceremony and dedication. Although the community was happy to cut the ribbon and start making tires, the real excitement came with the news that one of the Goodyear blimps would soon be paying a visit. In December of the following year, the Goodyear airship “Defender” traveled from Nashville to Gadsden. During the trip, the blimp became lighter due to expended fuel and sandbags that were dropped to help navigate in the face of a strong headwind. When several Gadsden plant employees attempted to secure the blimp by grabbing the ropes hanging from the blimp, a gust of wind caused Defender to unexpectedly lunge upwards. All but two employees dropped their rope. One of the two remaining rope holders let go at approximately 25 feet and sustained a back injury from the ensuing fall. Unfortunately, the other man did not drop his rope when he had the chance. As the airship climbed higher, the pilot tried to maneuver the ship over the Coosa River to offer the man a softer landing. Unfortunately, the man ran out of grip strength before the blimp was over the river. After holding on for close to 10 minutes, Iken Douglas Phillips plummeted 150 feet to his death. In one disastrous incident, the Gadsden plant had incurred two of its first Alabama workers’ compensation claims.

My Two Cents:

In the last two years, there has been a concerted effort by a few Alabama plaintiffs’ attorneys to have the entire Alabama WC Act declared unconstitutional. One of the challenges recently made it to the Alabama Supreme Court. Fortunately, the Act survived that round. Had Alabama’s high court agreed with the plaintiff’s position, it would have eradicated more than 100 years of the Grand Bargain which offers indemnity and medical benefits through no fault insurance in exchange for said benefits being the exclusive remedy against the employer.

So, what would have happened to the injured Goodyear employee and what recourse would the deceased employee’s dependents have had without the Alabama WC Act to provide no fault benefits? The answer is that they would have had to prove that Goodyear or perhaps the blimp pilot breached a duty of care and, said breach, caused the accident. Even if they were able to prove negligence or even wantonness against one or more of the defendants, the defendants would have asserted that the employees were contributorily negligent and/or assumed the risk by not letting go of the rope like their co-employees. Let’s not also forget that the stock market crash leading to the Great Depression had occurred a few months after the plant opened and Goodyear had become THE EMPLOYER of Etowah County. The reality was that no juror was going to bite the proverbial hand that was feeding the community. That means the employee and the dependents would have been on their own without any recourse, benefits, or financial assistance to help them.

A Few More Cents:

In the last 105 years, the Alabama WC Act has grown from a meager 33 pages to more than 450 pages. Despite the many statutory additions, changes, and court interpretations, the Grand Bargain remains in effect. The recent constitutional challenges have been unsuccessful to date, but they are occurring more often and with new and inventive arguments. Unless updates are made to some of the more obviously outdated provisions, we can expect the challenges to keep coming. As they say, even a blind squirrel sometimes finds a nut. This nut will send Alabama into the pre-Grand Bargain work accident dark ages.

More Info:

If you are looking for more information about the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act or the recent constitutional challenges, check out the Alabama Workers’ Comp Blawg at https://www.alabamaworkerscompblawg.com.

About the Author:

This article was prepared by Mike Fish, an attorney with Fish Nelson amp; Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers, and third-party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Fish by e-mailing him at mfish@fishnelson.com or by calling him directly at 205-332-1448.

On September 20, 2024, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals released its opinion in the case Zackery v. Huntley wherein it reversed both the District Court and the Circuit Court’s judgment in favor of plaintiff that awarded workers’ compensation benefits. The appellate Court’s decision to reverse the WC judgments was due to the plaintiff initially and improperly filing the WC lawsuit in District Court. The Circuit Court was only involved because the employer appealed the final judgment to the Circuit Court for a de novo review. In Alabama, Circuit Courts have original jurisdiction in workers’ compensation cases. Since plaintiff originally filed the WC matter in District Court, the Circuit Court did not properly obtain jurisdiction since it was only involved in its capacity as an appellate court.

My Two Cents: In may types of civil matters, a lawsuit can be filed in the District Court if the amount in controversy is $20k or less. Reasons for filing in District Court include a cheaper filing fee, less formality, and a quicker path to a bench trial. Any District Court judgment can be appealed to the next level which is the Circuit Court. The Circuit Court judge handles the appeal de novo which is Latin for anew or from the beginning. Basically, that means the judge is not supposed to consider the prior judgment and basically wipe the slate clean.

This blog submission was prepared by Mike Fish, an attorney with Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers, and third-party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this submission or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Fish by e-mailing him at mfish@fishnelson.com or by calling him directly at 205-332-1448.