In the wake of Hurricane Harvey making landfall in numerous counties this past August, the Division had issued a bulletin directing insurance carriers and system participants to extend deadlines for medical examinations, authorize payment for pharmacies to dispense 90-day supplies of medications, reimburse for emergency and non-emergency health care services out of network, and expedite change-of-address processing.  Additionally, the bulletin had suspended deadlines for claims notifications and filing, electronic data reporting, medical and income payments, medical billing, and medical and income benefit disputes. 

The Division has issued a subsequent bulletin directing system participants to resume normal claims processing and dispute resolution operations effective January 10, 2018, stating that it is now practical and in the best interests of the workers’ compensation system to do so.  All standard workers’ compensation deadlines and procedures are now back in effect.

~ This blog submission was prepared by Erin Shanley, an attorney with Stone Loughlin & Swanson, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers, and third party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Stone Loughlin & Swanson is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network (NWCDN). If you have any questions about this submission or Texas workers’ compensation in general, please contact Erin by e-mailing her at eshanley@slsaustin.com or by calling her directly at (512) 343-1300.

After a report conducted by the Workers’ Compensation Research and Evaluation Group concluded there was no statistical difference in disability duration between CARF-accredited and non CARF-accredited programs, the Division has proposed amendments to Division Rules 134.600 (regarding preauthorization, concurrent utilization review, and voluntary certification of health care) to remove the exemption status from CARF-accredited facilities.   The Division is also proposing to amend Rule 134.230 (regarding return to work rehabilitation programs)  to set one fee schedule for work hardening and work conditioning services, regardless of a facility’s accreditation status, by removing the increased payment to CARF-accredited facilities providing these services. 

The proposed amendments are additionally intended to implement Senate Bill 1494 of the 85th Legislative Regular Session, which amended Texas Labor Code Section 413.014 to require preauthorization and concurrent utilization review for health care facilities providing work-hardening (WH) or work-conditioning (WC) programs.  Currently, health care facilities that are accredited by the Commission on Accreditation of Rehabilitation Facilities (CARF) are exempt from preauthorization and concurrent review requirements for WH and WC.  The bill no longer requires, but instead permits, the commissioner, by rule, to exempt a credentialed health care facility providing WH and WC services from preauthorization and concurrent review requirements.

The Division is accepting comments for the amendments.  The informal working draft is available atwww.tdi.texas.gov/wc/rules/drafts.html.  The comment period closes on February 2, 2018 at 5:00 p.m.

~ This blog submission was prepared by Erin Shanley, an attorney with Stone Loughlin & Swanson, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers, and third party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Stone Loughlin & Swanson is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network (NWCDN). If you have any questions about this submission or Texas workers’ compensation in general, please contact Erin by e-mailing her at eshanley@slsaustin.com or by calling her directly at (512) 343-1300.

On January 2, 2018, Medical Advisor Patrick M. Palmer, M.D., sent out a notice advising system participants that the Medical Quality Review Panel (MQRP) had finalized its CY 2018 Medical Quality Review Annual Audit Plan (Annual Plan).  The Annual Plan sets priorities for the types of audits the MQRP will initiate during the year.

According to the Annual Plan as approved by Commissioner Brannan, the two categories of focus will be: (1) the appropriateness of a health care provider’s decision and recordkeeping for prescribing opioids; and (2) the appropriateness and necessity of health care providers (excludes designated doctors) referring for testing.  Notably, the following specific services were specifically mentioned as being subject to review:  muscle testing, range of motion (ROM) testing, needle electromyography (EMG), and nerve conduction tests.

The Division had solicited input from workers’ compensation participants on November 20, 2017 regarding the two potential categories for the Annual Plan, but received no input.  Therefore, Commissioner Brannan approved the plan as proposed on December 27, 2017.
 
The Division plans to obtain stakeholder input on the development of each individual plan-based audit proposal for categories within the Annual Plan, and will then post a plan-based audit that, according to the Medical Advisor, includes: inclusion and exclusion criteria; service time frame to be audited; sample size; and subject and case file selection.  All medical quality reviews initiated on or after January 1, 2018 will be performed in accordance with this approved medical quality review process.  

~ This blog submission was prepared by Erin Shanley, an attorney with Stone Loughlin & Swanson, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers, and third party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Stone Loughlin & Swanson is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network (NWCDN). If you have any questions about this submission or Texas workers’ compensation in general, please contact Erin by e-mailing her at eshanley@slsaustin.com or by calling her directly at (512) 343-1300.

The Division is currently accepting public comments on proposed amendments to Division Rules 134.500, 134.530, and 134.540 affecting the provision of compound prescription drugs in the workers’ compensation system.  The proposed amendment to Rule 134.500 would exclude from the closed formulary all compound prescription drugs, and proposed amendments to Rules 134.530 and 134.540 would require preauthorization of compound prescription drugs for both network and non-network claims.

The proposed rule changes would not prohibit the use of compounded drugs, but those drugs would need to be determined to be medically necessary via preauthorization through utilization review prior to being dispensed to a workers’ compensation claimant. 

According to the Division’s data on pharmacy billing and its ongoing audit of doctors’ practices, the cost of compounded drugs doubled from 2010 to 2014, increasing from $6 million to $12 million.  Although the average cost per prescription was $829 in 2016, increasing from $356 in 2010, our firm saw multiple individual prescriptions topping $10K per 30-day supply in 2016.  And a May 2017 report by the Division’s Research and Evaluation group found that the number of compounded drugs increased from 18,020 prescriptions in 2010 to 26,380 in 2014.  Of that, almost a third of compounded drug prescriptions were to treat back injuries.  The Division found these numbers concerning because compounded drugs aren’t recommended as first line medications in treatment guidelines for injured employees, and members of the House Committee on Business & Industry asked the Division to address the issues through a new rule.   As a result, on June 16, 2017, the Division announced an informal draft rule to require that compounded drugs be preauthorized.

Compounded drugs are not FDA-approved, nor does the FDA verify their safety, quality, or effectiveness. In fact, the FDA has found that the labeling of compounded drugs often omits important information.  Moreover, poor compounding practices can result in serious drug quality problems, such as contamination or medications that do not possess the purity, strength, and quality they are intended to have.  Finally, the FDA has reported its concern that some compounding pharmacies and pharmacists produce drugs for patients even though an FDA-approved drug may have been medically appropriate for them.

Commissioner Ryan Brannan believes the preauthorization process will strike a balance against these concerns.  “We want to make sure the use of these drugs is being reviewed and that physicians are considering efficacy and appropriateness of alternatives while still ensuring that patients who need compounded drugs will still be able to get them,” Brannan said.

The Division is accepting written comments to the proposed rule changes until 5:00 p.m. February 20, 2018, and will conduct a public hearing relating to the proposed changes on Thursday, February 15, 2018 at 10:00 a.m. in the Tippy Foster Room of the Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers’ Compensation, 7551 Metro Center Drive in Austin, Texas 78744.  The hearing will also be audio streamed and the audio stream may be accessed via the DWC Calendar at www.tdi.texas.gov/wc/events/index.html.

~ This blog submission was prepared by Erin Shanley, an attorney with Stone Loughlin & Swanson, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers, and third party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Stone Loughlin & Swanson is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network (NWCDN). If you have any questions about this submission or Texas workers’ compensation in general, please contact Erin by e-mailing her ateshanley@slsaustin.com or by calling her directly at (512) 343-1300.

“If you require it, you buy it.”  So said the Honorable Ray A. Farrington, former Supervising Judge of Compensation in Hackensack in reference to situations where an employer required an employee to perform a task that would otherwise be clearly not work related.  The concept of compulsion is an important one to understand in the law.  This concept must be contrasted with mere permission granted by an employer to perform some task or activity.

One of the best examples of compulsion comes from McCarthy v. Quest Intern. Co.,285 N.J. Super. 469 (App. Div. 1995), certif. denied, 134 N.J. 518 (1996).  In that case the petitioner was a bookkeeper for Quest International Corporation.  Her company purchased Unilever and scheduled a joint company picnic, sending out a memorandum stating that attendance was required.  The purpose of the picnic was to help employees in both companies get to know one another.

Ms. McCarthy advised the head of personnel that she did not wish to attend.  She was told that a salary deduction could be taken in that case.  She was also advised that she should set an example for other employees and attend.  The president of the company encouraged employees to socialize with other employees.

Based on this advice, McCarthy attended the joint company picnic.  Once there she was asked by the president if she was going to participate in the tug-of-war.  McCarthy took this as a mandate and then injured herself during the activity.  She filed a workers’ compensation claim and won.  Her employer appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing that McCarthy was just engaging in a recreational activity whose purpose was nothing more than promoting morale.   The Appellate Division agreed with the Judge of Compensation that the injury was compensable, relying on reasoning of Professor Arthur Larson for the principle that an employer has the power to enlarge one’s job duties by assigning tasks outside the usual scope of employment.  By directing the petitioner to perform these duties, the employer in effect bought the injury.

Years later the New Jersey Supreme Court expanded on this principle in Lozano v. Frank DeLuca Const., 178 N.J. 513 (2004).   In that case the petitioner, Mr. Lozano, was a skilled mason who could not drive.  After a long day of work on a large private property, the owner of the property asked Mr. Deluca, who was Mr. Lozano’s boss, if he wanted to take a ride with him on his large go-cart track.  Mr. DeLuca and the owner drove around the go-cart track.  Then Mr. DeLuca asked Mr. Lozano if he wanted to take a ride.  Mr. Lozano declined because he could not drive.  Mr. DeLuca repeated that Mr. Lozano should get in the go-cart and take it for a drive.  At this point Mr. Lozano got into the cart, and he proceeded to seriously injure himself by driving into a parked truck.  The Supreme Court said “that when an employer compels an employee to participate in an activity that ordinarily would be considered recreational or social in nature, the employer thereby renders that activity a work-related task as a matter of law.”

This principle make sense, but what if the employer is aware of the activity taking place and allows it, and the permitted activity leads to injury?  Is that compensable?  The Supreme Court said no in Jumpp v. City of Ventnor, 177 N.J. 470 (2003).   In that case the petitioner was a pumping station operator who drove around the city inspecting stations.  He would pass the town post-office during his drives from one station to the next.  He asked the city administrator for permission to pull off the main road and get his personal mail during his route.  The city administrator gave him that permission.  While walking in the post office parking lot, petitioner fell and fractured his pelvis.

Mr. Jumpp argued that he had permission to make a slight deviation from his route to get his mail.  The Supreme Court acknowledged that petitioner had permission to do what he did but felt that this activity constituted a major deviation from work.  It said it made no difference whether the employer allowed the activity to take place:  the act of getting one’s personal mail constituted a major deviation from work.  Permission was not the same as direction.

So too in Sarzillo v. Turner Const. Co., 101 N.J. 114 (1985), a petitioner had permission to play a paddle ball game every day on the construction site during breaks.  Mr. Sarzillo was injured while playing the game.  The Court said that permission did not change the fact that the activity promoted nothing more than morale.  Under N.J.S.A. 34:15-7, activities whose primary purpose is to promote morale or health are not compensable.

Employers must be careful to consider whether they have directed or required an activity or whether they have merely permitted something to occur.  If an employer does not want to expand the job duties, the employer should make it clear in memoranda that the activity – whether it is a holiday party, picnic or bowling night — is not required.

This lesson emerged in Rose v. Joey Sinopoli’s Haircutters, No. A-0049-05T1 (App. Div. August 14, 2006), certif. denied, 189 N.J. 426 (2007).  The petitioner suffered a serious injury leaving a coffee shop on the way to work.  She always stopped to purchase coffee for co-employees and understood that this was part of her job.  She was reimbursed for the cost.   Her employer testified that if she did not do this, someone else would have had to do so.   Again, the decision makes sense because the employee felt a sense of compulsion and employer direction in purchasing coffee each morning.   Had the employer not made this a requirement, the injury would not have been held compensable.

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John H. Geaney, Esq., is an Executive Committee Member and a Shareholder in Capehart Scatchard's Workers’ Compensation Group.  Mr. Geaney concentrates his practice in the representation of employers, self-insured companies, third-party administrators, and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation, the Americans with Disabilities Act and Family and Medical Leave Act. Should you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Mr. Geaney at 856.914.2063 or by e‑mail at jgeaney@capehart.com. 

The NWCDN and Thomas A Robinson of LexisNexis recently partnered as Co-editors-in-chief to prepare the 2017 edition of “Workers’ Compensation Emerging Issues Analysis.”  This is an excellent book which is an essential tool for attorneys, risk managers, and insurance professionals. The book is a reference guide to issues and cases as well as a 50 state survey of trends and developments.  Approximately 40 NWCDN members contributed as authors.  The book can be purchased athttp://www.lexisnexis.com/wcrisk or by calling 1-800-223-1940 (mention WCRisk to receive a discount).

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About the Author

This submission was prepared by Mike Fish, an attorney with Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers, and third party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this submission or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Fish by e-mailing him at mfish@fishnelson.com or by calling him directly at 205-332-1448.

In the past few years there has been a rise in the number of cases where injured workers have been loaned money in advance of their workers’ compensation settlements by private pre-settlement companies.  This practice is more common in other states like Pennsylvania, but it is now creeping into New Jersey.  Companies which make private advances or loans to injured workers then attempt to appear at settlement and seek judicial enforcement of the amount due their company by placing their company’s loan on the settlement sheet.  In that way, the lending company can obtain a court order for direct payment by the employer, carrier or third party administrator.

In our office’s opinion, this recognition on the order approving settlement is improper.  We believe that pre-settlement companies have no right to be listed as an expense or payee on a court order, whether on a Section 20 or an Order Approving Settlement.  One of my partners has a case now involving a Pennsylvania resident injured in New Jersey who was advanced a large sum of money by a pre-settlement company unknown to any party other than petitioner and his attorney.  The claim petition was filed in New Jersey, and the parties have reached a substantial settlement on an order approving settlement under Section 22 (petitioner retains reopener rights).  The lawyer for the pre-settlement company appeared in court, asking the Judge of Compensation to include the loan as an expense to be paid by respondent on the order approving settlement.  We opposed this request.

N.J.S.A. 34:15-29 states, “Claims or payments due under this Chapter shall not be assignable, and shall be exempt for all claims of creditors from levy, execution or attachments.”   Child support liens and TDB liens are recognized as valid obligations in New Jersey.  Medical providers by statute also have a right to file a claim for reimbursement in New Jersey.  However, there is nothing in the statute or the rules of the Division that permit pre-settlement companies from appearing in court as a represented party to protect their loans or seek enforcement from a Judge of Compensation.

The Division of Workers’ Compensation has an interest in preventing such companies from expanding in New Jersey.  These companies do not make such loans out of charity:  they do so for reasons of financial gain at the expense of the injured worker.  One could argue that the whole practice of advancing a settlement with an injured worker in exchange for subsequent repayment violates the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act because under our law, only a Judge of Compensation can approve a settlement.  These are in essence private partial settlements between a lending company and petitioner as to future rights of compensation. They really constitute an end around the statute.

Another argument against placing a loan on an OAS is that it contravenes the rules against commutations.  An employer cannot make a commutation in New Jersey without filing a motion and obtaining court permission.  Paying a lending company in advance on unaccrued monies would be an illegal commutation without a motion for a commutation being first filed by the petitioner.  In New Jersey, most settlement are under Section 22.  Payments are made in weekly amounts, sometimes over several years, with claimants retaining reopener rights.  Pre-settlement lending companies have no right to step in and alter the statutory rules of payment.   Settlements in Pennsylvania and many other states involve lump sums, often rather large, but that is not how most settlements in New Jersey resolve.

Our office takes the view that all payments go to the petitioner under the Order Approving Settlement or Section 20 order.  This is prescribed under N.J.S.A. 34:15-64. The pre-settlement company has its contract with the petitioner and the petitioner only, and it must negotiate its terms of repayment directly with the petitioner without involving employers, carriers, third party administrators or Judges of Compensation.

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John H. Geaney, Esq., is an Executive Committee Member and a Shareholder in Capehart Scatchard's Workers’ Compensation Group.  Mr. Geaney concentrates his practice in the representation of employers, self-insured companies, third-party administrators, and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation, the Americans with Disabilities Act and Family and Medical Leave Act. Should you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Mr. Geaney at 856.914.2063 or by e‑mail at jgeaney@capehart.com. 

The case of Billups v. Emerald Coast Utilities Authority, 33 AD Cases 1312 (11^th Cir. October 26, 2017) presented a challenge by an injured employee to his company’s six month limitation of leave.

Mr. Billups injured his shoulder on December 18, 2013 doing his work as a Utility Service Technician II. He felt a pop in his shoulder while opening an air-release valve.  The case was accepted by the workers’ compensation carrier.  Billups’ job was a very physical one, requiring use of heavy tools such as a jackhammer.  He began FMLA leave on December 19, 2013.

After several months of physical therapy, Billups was referred on February 11, 2014 to an orthopedic surgeon, who scheduled Billups for a shoulder procedure.  That surgery had to be postponed due to Billups’ reaction to anesthesia.  The surgery finally took place on April 16, 2014.  Billups’ 12 weeks of FMLA expired on March 14, 2014, but the company policy granted 26 weeks of leave for work injuries.

Following surgery, Billups was informed by his doctor that it would likely take six months for his shoulder to recover to the degree that he could perform the essential functions of the job.  The need for Billups to return to work became more acute on April 30, 2014 when the county was struck by severe flooding damage to the water and sewer infrastructure.  Personnel were stretched trying to cope with the flooding.

On May 27, 2014, the surgeon signed a workers’ compensation form stating Billups was restricted to sedentary duty alone.  The company sent Billups a notice in early June 2014 that he would be terminated if he could not return to full duty by June 18, 2014, which was the end of his six month period of leave.  Billups was offered a predetermination hearing, which he attended.  Billups argued at the hearing that his surgery was delayed due to an uncontrollable health reaction to anesthesia.  Emerald Coast gave Billups one day to obtain a more definitive statement from his doctor regarding his full-duty return to work date.

The very next day Billups produced a note from his physical therapist stating that he could return to work full duty after he completed physical therapy.   But the anticipated discharge from PT was not until July 21, 2014.  Billups was not able to get a doctor’s note saying he could return to full duty on July 21, 2014.  On June 23, 2014, the company notified Billups that he was fired.  The company noted that his continued absence from work was creating a hardship on the company.

It turned out that Billups did not get discharged from PT until August 13, 2014.  He was not cleared by his doctor to return to work full duty until October 23, 2014.  Even when the doctor cleared Billups to return to work, it was with a limitation of no lifting more than 20 pounds overhead and working with his arms close to his body.

Billups filed a law suit against his employer for failing to provide a reasonable accommodation.  The district court ruled for the employer and dismissed the case.  The court said that “Billups had not identified a reasonable accommodation that would allow Billups to perform the essential functions of the job.”

Billups appealed to the United States Court of Appeals, 11^th Circuit, and argued that a short period of leave would have been a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.   The Court said, “Billlups has not shown his requested accommodation would have allowed him to return to work ‘in the present or in the immediate future.’” The Court added,  “But an accommodation is unreasonable if it would only allow an employee to ‘work at some uncertain point in the future.’”  The Court added:

As Billups foreshadowed at the hearing, his physician in mid-July 2014 limited him to lifting no more than twenty pounds overhead and advised him to complete all work with his arms close to his body.  According to Dawson (Department Director), those limitations would have prevented Billups from performing the essential functions of the UST-2 position.  Although Billups believed he could perform the job with those limitations, his testimony reflects that he could only perform ‘most’ of the work, but not all of it.  And even a ‘relatively infrequent inability to perform a job’s essential functions is enough to render a plaintiff not a ‘qualified individual’ under the ADA.

The Court interpreted Billups’ request for additional leave under the ADA as a request for indefinite leave.  Virtually all courts have held that requests for indefinite leave are not reasonable.

The Court also rejected Billups’ argument that Emerald Coast’s six-month leave policy for work-related injuries violates the ADA because, according to Billups, it does not consider individual circumstances.  The Court commented, “While Emerald Coast’s policy provides, as a general rule, six months for an employee who suffered an on-the-job injury to return to employment, it also expressly incorporates an individual assessment of the employee’s ability to work.”  The Court noted that the Department Head in consultation with HR may extend time past six months in certain circumstances.

This case is helpful because it focuses on a situation where the request for additional leave was actually for a rather short period of time, perhaps a month or two, just until PT finished. Yet, the employer correctly considered this as a request for indefinite leave because there was no expectation that the employee would be able to return to full duty even with the additional leave being granted.  The Court of Appeals concluded that just because the request for leave was short in duration, that fact alone does not make it reasonable if the employee cannot show he or she would be able to return to work and perform all the essential job functions.

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John H. Geaney, Esq., is an Executive Committee Member and a Shareholder in Capehart Scatchard's Workers’ Compensation Group.  Mr. Geaney concentrates his practice in the representation of employers, self-insured companies, third-party administrators, and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation, the Americans with Disabilities Act and Family and Medical Leave Act. Should you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Mr. Geaney at 856.914.2063 or by e‑mail at jgeaney@capehart.com. 

It is challenging for a petitioner to relate an increase in disability or need for treatment to a relatively modest award that has remained unchanged for over a decade.  That was the situation in Batts v. Flag House, A-5616-15T4 (App. Div. January 16, 2018).   The case involved an award of 50% disability of the right foot and 10% psychiatric disability going back to 2003.  Petitioner was originally injured on April 2, 1998 when a forklift ran over his right ankle in the course of employment.

Petitioner reopened the case several times – but only with respect to the foot.  In 2007 his foot award was increased to 57.5%.  Five years later, his foot award was increased again to 60%.  But the psychiatric aspect was not increased.  It remained at 10%.

The same day petitioner received an increase to 60% of his foot, he filed a modification application along with a motion for medical and temporary disability benefits seeking psychiatric treatment.

At trial, petitioner testified that his increased level of depression was due to his foot injury.  He said that he developed intimacy issues with his wife leading to his divorce nine years earlier.  He also alleged that he gained 50 pounds and was diagnosed with depression following the accident.

Petitioner presented Dr. Devendra Kurani as an expert in psychiatry.  Dr. Kurani stated that petitioner’s divorce, lack of mobility, weight gain, hypertension, diabetes, unemployment, financial concerns, inability to socialize, and depression were all due to his 1998 accident.  Dr. Kurani said petitioner needed psychotherapy and medication.  Up to that point in time, petitioner had never been prescribed any psychiatric medication.

Respondent produced Dr. David Gallina, who agreed that petitioner had depression.  However, Dr. Gallina testified that the depression was not due to the work accident in 1998.  He felt that his obesity and loneliness were due to his divorce.   Respondent pointed out that petitioner had not had any psychiatric treatment throughout the life of his case and had not been prescribed psychiatric medications.

The Judge of Compensation ruled against petitioner.  The Judge noted that petitioner had never sought psychiatric treatment from 1998 to 2016.   Although his awards had been increased for the foot, his underlying foot condition had not changed all that much.  The Judge felt petitioner failed to link his divorce to the ankle injury in 1998.  According to the Judge, Dr. Gallina’s testimony made more sense in that petitioner made certain lifestyle choices which could account for his obesity.

Petitioner appealed and argued that res judicata principles applied and the Judge was bound by the prior acceptance of the psychiatric aspect of the case.  The Appellate Division disagreed:  “Thus, there is no basis for the assertion that petitioner had a right to have his psychiatric disability award increased because of a prior court order.”  The Appellate Division stated that petitioner simply failed to prove that his current depression was caused by his 1998 accident.

The case illustrates that employers can win reopener claims at trial.  The case was extraordinary in that petitioner was seeking psychiatric treatment after an accident going back to 1998 with no intervening psychiatric treatment.

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John H. Geaney, Esq., is an Executive Committee Member and a Shareholder in Capehart Scatchard's Workers’ Compensation Group.  Mr. Geaney concentrates his practice in the representation of employers, self-insured companies, third-party administrators, and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation, the Americans with Disabilities Act and Family and Medical Leave Act. Should you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Mr. Geaney at 856.914.2063 or by e‑mail at jgeaney@capehart.com.