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NWCDN is a network of law firms dedicated to protecting employers in workers’ compensation claims.


NWCDN Members regularly post articles and summary judgements in workers’ compensations law in your state.  


Select a state from the dropdown menu below to scroll through the state specific archives for updates and opinions on various workers’ compensation laws in your state.


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The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals recently released its opinion in Kirby v Jacks Family Restaurants, LP.In that case, the plaintiff filed claims for workers’ compensation benefits, retaliatory discharge, and the tort of outrage against Jacks, its insurance fund, its third party administrator, and its case management company. All of the defendants filed Motions to Dismiss the outrage claim and the trial court granted them. The trial court further certified the judgment on the dismissal of the outrage claims to be a final judgment for purposes of appeal. However, the Court of Appeals held that even though the Order contained language certifying it as final, such certification was not appropriate in the case because the plaintiff’s workers’ compensation and retaliatory discharge claims were so intertwined with the outrage claims. The Court of Appeals noted that the plaintiff relied on facts and circumstances surrounding her injury and her termination to support her claim for the tort of outrage, and that she would rely on the same set of underlying facts in her remaining claims. The Court of Appeals held that it is improper for the trial court to certify a dismissal as "final" when at least some of the issues presented in the claim still pending in the trial court are the same as the issues presented in the claims addressed in the judgment, and repeated appellate review of the same underlying facts would be a probability in the case. Therefore, the Court of Appeals dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal as having been taken from a non-final judgment.

My Two Cents:

When tort claims accompany a workers’ compensation claim, it is common for the trial court to either sever the claims completely and assign new case numbers or keep the claims together and hold separate trials. When the trial court merely orders separate trials, the claims remain joined in one civil action, and any order disposing of anything less than all of the claims and all of the parties will generally not be considered a final order for purposes of appeal. The trial court may include language in an order certifying the order as final (as in this case), but sometimes, that is still insufficient to render an order final for purposes of appeal. On the other hand, if a tort claim is severed from a related workers’ compensation case (assigned a separate civil action number), an order granting summary judgment would be a final order for purposes of appeal. Therefore, it is often wise to ask the trial court to sever an outrage claim, rather than only asking for separate trials.

About the Author

This article was written by Charley M. Drummond, Esq. of Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC. Fish Nelson & Holden is a law firm located in Birmingham, Alabama dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers, and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation cases and related liability matters. Drummond and his firm are members of The National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network (NWCDN). The NWCDN is a national and Canadian network of reputable law firms organized to provide employers and insurers access to the highest quality representation in workers’ compensation and related employer liability fields. If you have questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the author at cdrummond@fishnelson.com or (205) 332-3414.

 

The Supreme Court recently released its opinion in Foster v North American Bus Industries, Inc. in which it reversed the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of the employer on a retaliatory discharge claim. The employer, NABI is a bus manufacturer in Anniston that has what it refers to as a "no fault, points based attendance and absenteeism policy". Under the policy, NABI assigns points to each absence or tardiness. Foster worked for NABI as a Harness Technician and alleged that she sustained an injury in July 2012. Foster went to the hospital and reported the alleged workplace injury and NABI told the representative at the hospital that Foster’s injury was not work-related. Foster was evaluated and treated at the hospital and given a work/school absence form excusing her from work. Foster missed some time from work and was subsequently terminated for violation of NABI’s absenteeism policy. Foster then filed an action for retaliatory discharge against NABI. NABI moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, and Foster appealed.

On appeal, the Supreme Court found that Foster had presented a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge, and that the burden of proof should have been shifted to NABI to present evidence that Foster’s employment was terminated for a legitimate reason. NABI argued that its absenteeism policy was followed in all instances, whether the employee had a work-related injury or not. NABI offered evidence that it had terminated 44 employees for violating the same policy and that it had not made any exceptions to this policy. However, the Supreme Court noted that there was evidence before the trial court that NABI had made an exception to the policy on prior occasions and that those exceptions, which dealt with the method of delivering a medical excuse note, created a genuine issue of material fact that precluded summary judgment. Specifically, the Supreme Court found that Foster introduced sufficient rebuttal evidence in support of her position that NABI’s stated reason for terminating her employment was pretextual.

About the Author

This article was written by Charley M. Drummond, Esq. of Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC. Fish Nelson & Holden is a law firm located in Birmingham, Alabama dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers, and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation cases and related liability matters. Drummond and his firm are members of The National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network (NWCDN). The NWCDN is a national and Canadian network of reputable law firms organized to provide employers and insurers access to the highest quality representation in workers’ compensation and related employer liability fields. If you have questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the author at cdrummond@fishnelson.com or (205) 332-3414.

 

The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals recently released its opinion in Frederick Roosevelt Dunning, Jr. & Janice Dunning Sandifer v. Lula Mayhew, in which it determined Roosevelt and Lula were married at common law. Although the Alabama legislature abolished common law marriage in Alabama effective January 1, 2017, any common law marriage that existed prior to that date is still valid. The Court of Appeals reiterated that a common law marriage requires proof by clear and convincing evidence of capacity to marry; a present mutual agreement to permanently enter into a marital relationship to the exclusion of all other relationships; public recognition of the relationship as a marriage; a public assumption of the marital duties; and cohabitation. The Court of Appeals further stated that while there was conflicting evidence presented at trial concerning the second two elements, the trial court is tasked with making credibility determinations and resolving conflicting evidence and that the appellate courts may not disturb the trial court’s findings in that regard as long as they are supported by substantial evidence.

My Two Cents:

The issue of common law marriage comes up frequently in workers’ compensation death benefits cases. Interestingly, as this case points out, a party must prove a common law marriage by clear and convincing evidence, whereas the standard to recover workers’ compensation benefits is generally a preponderance of the evidence. Nevertheless, an appellate court will not re-weigh the evidence on appeal, so the trial court’s findings of fact are generally final. The trial judge is in the unique position of being able to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and the appeals courts cannot substitute their own judgment in that regard.

About the Author

This article was written by Charley M. Drummond, Esq. of Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC. Fish Nelson & Holden is a law firm located in Birmingham, Alabama dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers, and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation cases and related liability matters. Drummond and his firm are members of The National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network (NWCDN). The NWCDN is a national and Canadian network of reputable law firms organized to provide employers and insurers access to the highest quality representation in workers’ compensation and related employer liability fields. If you have questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the author at cdrummond@fishnelson.com or (205) 332-3414.

 

On August 1, 2016, a new federal law, The Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act of 2015, went into effect which required all federal agencies to adjust their monetary penalties to account for inflation. One such agency, the Occupational Health & Safety Administration (OSHA), increased its maximum penalty for "serious", "other than serious", and posting requirements violations to $12,675 per violation, and its maximum penalty for willful or repeated violations to $126,749 per violation. For the last year, all citations issued by OSHA have been subject to the "new" higher penalties. However, it seems that OSHA may have put the cart ahead of the horse, and as a result is charging violators more than the law actually allows.

OSHA, like all federal agencies, gets its rule making and enforcement authority from its authorizing statute, and that authorizing statute generally supercedes subsequent laws like The Federal Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act. The problem for OSHA is that the Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act) has not been amended to allow for the higher penalties. Under the OSH Act, OSHA cannot issue penalties higher than the levels set way back in 1990, which are up to $7,000 for "serious" violations, and up to $70,000 for repeat/willful violations.

My Two Cents:

The discrepancy between the statutory caps under the OSH Act and the current fine levels creates a situation that is ripe for litigation. Employers are likely on the winning side of that battle, especially under the current, more "business friendly" federal administration. It is probably only a matter of time before a court strikes down the "new" penalties as unauthorized. When that happens, OSHA may very well have to start issuing refunds.

About the Author

This article was written by Charley M. Drummond, Esq. of Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC. Fish Nelson & Holden is a law firm located in Birmingham, Alabama dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers, and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation cases and related matters. If you have questions about this article or OSHA citations in general, please feel free to contact the author at cdrummond@fishnelson.com or (205) 332-3414.

by Jessie Zaylia, Partner

Independent medical review (“IMR”) has survived another challenge in court.  On June 14, 2017, the California Supreme Court denied a petition for review regarding the Third District Court of Appeal’s decision inRamirez v. WCAB (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 205.

The applicant raised constitutional challenges to IMR, claiming that IMR violates both the California Constitution and the United States Constitution.  The court rejected each of the petitioners’ challenges and upheld the constitutionality of IMR.

The petitioners argued that IMR violated the California Constitution’s separation of powers and due process clauses.  The court embracedStevens v. WCAB to reject this argument. In Stevens, the court noted that Article XIV, Section 4 of the California Constitution vests the legislature “with plenary power,unlimited by any provision of this Constitution, to create, and enforce a complete system of workers’ compensation, by appropriate legislation.”  It found, however, that the constitution’s separation of powers and due process clauses yield to Section 4: the separation of powers clause does so expressly, whereas the due process clause excludes amendments “as to the subject matter of the new provision.”  Relying on theStevens court’s findings, the court held that IMR did not violate these constitutional clauses.

The petitioner also argued that IMR conflicted with Section 4 of the due process clause since Labor Code section 4610.6(i) restricts the ability of appellate courts to review IMR determinations.  TheRamirez court, however, “perceive[d] no conflict.”  It noted that Section 4 requires that all WCAB decisions are “subject to review by the appellate courts [. . .].”  It also noted that section 4610.6(i) only prohibits appellate courts from making a determination contrary to “determination of the independent medical review organization.”  The petitioner argued that section 4610.6(i)’s language does not permit a court of appeal to review the Board’s decision as required by Section 4.  The court opined, however, that section 4610.6(i) does not “impair[] the ability of the appellate courts to review decisions of the Board,” as an applicant may petition a court for review on grounds enumerated in section 4610.6(h).  For this reason, the court held that IMR did not conflict with Section 4.

Lastly, the petitioner argued that IMR “strip[ped] him of his right to a substantive appeal” as an appellate court could not make a determination contrary to IMR.  The court rejected this challenge by reference toStevens.  The Stevens court noted that due process requires that a state provide someone “sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard” before “depriv[ing] them of a property or liberty interest [. . .].”  It found that IMR presented a low “risk of erroneous deprivation of [medical] services” to applicants and that the government had a compelling interest when it established IMR.  As such, theStevens court concluded that an applicant “is afforded ample process.”  Agreeing withStevens’s conclusion, the court in Ramirez held that “the [IMR] process in its entirety provides sufficient due process protections” to applicants.

This is the second district to reject a constitutional challenge to IMR and the second time that the California Supreme Court has refused to review an appellate court’s decision.  As it stands, IMR looks as though it is here to stay.

 

CMS Expands WCMSA Re-Review Process to Allow Submission of New Evidence

 

Traditionally, the submission of a WCMSA to CMS was a one-shot affair. Once the parties received a WCMSA approval letter from CMS, the set-aside amount indicated in the letter was not subject to re-review unless CMS made an obvious mistake of fact or evidence that pre-dated the original submission that was not included in that submission was discovered. Except for these narrow circumstances, CMS would not consider newly submitted evidence in a request for re-review of a previously determined WCMSA.
 
With the publication of its latest WCMASP User Guide, Version 5.1 (7/10/17), CMS has expanded its re-review process to include what it callsAmended Review. This will allow the parties to a workers' compensation settlement to submit new medical evidence to CMS, even after receipt of the WCMSA approval letter from CMS, subject to certain limitations described below. Why would someone want to do this? Amended review would allow the parties to apply for a lower WCMSA than that approved by CMS if new medical evidence supported the request. For example, if CMS included lifetime use of opioid medication in its WCMSA approval letter, but subsequent to the issuance of the approval letter the claimant weaned from the prior medications, the parties can submit medical evidence showing the successful weaning and apply to CMS for approval of a lower set-aside amount.
 
Amended Review is not without its limitations, however. Cases subject to Amended Review are subject to the following parameters:
 
1) The original submission of the WCMSA for pre-settlement approval was submitted 1 to 4 years from the date of the requested re-review;
 
2) Only one Amended Review request can be made per case. If Amended Review is denied, another cannot be requested; and
 
3) The new proposed WCMSA must differ from the original approved WCMSA amount by 10% or $10,000, whichever is greater.
 
The Amended Review process will allow parties to reconsider settlement of claims previously thought too expensive to settle due to a high WCMSA approved by CMS, assuming medical evidence exists to support the request for a lower WCMSA. For assistance in reviewing a case for potential Amended Review by CMS or for an initial WCMSA submission to CMS, please do not hesitate to contact one of our Statewide MSA/Section 32 Department leaders, Dan Bowers, Joe DeCoursey, or Nicole Graci.

 

Board Clarifies Law on Attachment to Labor Market, Provides New Forms in July 2017 Subject Number

 

Subject Number 046-958 provides an outline of the Board’s current interpretation of the state-of-the-law on labor market attachment. The Subject Number leads by noting that the "only significant recent change" in the Workers' Compensation Law with respect to labor market attachment arose from Part NNN of Chapter 59, Laws of 2017, Subpart A, which among other things amended WCL Section 15(3)(w) to eliminate the need for claimants found entitled to benefits at the time of classification to demonstrate ongoing attachment to the labor market. The Board is careful to note that temporarily partially disabled claimants and those claimantsnot attached to the labor (or otherwise not entitled to benefits) at the time of classification remain obligated to demonstrate their attachment to the labor market. 
 
The Subject Number reminds readers that claimants can demonstrate labor market attachment by adhering to the now familiar American Axle standard that has been the state of the law since 2010. The Board recognizes that many job applications are completed online via email or internet submission and permits modification of the American Axle standard under the Suffolk County Health Services case to allow for this. Most importantly, the Subject Number warns claimants that an independent job search must be "timely, diligent, and persistent." Moreover, a claimant engaged in other attachment to the labor market efforts such as use of a One-Stop career center must provide documentation showing the claimant's "active participation" in these efforts. 
 
To assist claimants in documenting their attachment to the labor market efforts, the Board has issued a revised C-258 form and introduced a new form, the C-258.1. The C-258 form now allows claimants to enter information about other attachment efforts such as participation at a One-Stop career center, rehabilitation or retraining efforts, and attendance at an accredited educational institution. Claimants seeking to prove labor market attachment through an independent job search are directed to use the new C-258.1 form, which provides more direction and space for claimants to produce the information required by theAmerican Axle decision in detailing their independent job search efforts. 
 
The Board also provides a reminder in the Subject Number that although a claimant found entitled to benefits at the time of classification need not produce proof of attachment to the labor market, there can remain a question as to whether the claimant's disability was the reason why the claimant ceased full-time work. In citing to theLauner and Smith cases, the Board is suggesting that employers and carriers look carefully at the reasons for a claimant's reduction in earnings before accepting reduced earnings awards. However, the claimants inSmith and Launer were done in by their own testimony, which may prove difficult to obtain given the Board's stinginess with re-openings on classified claims. 
 
The Board’s comments here should also serve as a reminder that although a claimant found entitled to benefits at the time of classification need not demonstrate ongoing labor market attachment, we believe that the defense of voluntary withdrawal from the labor market remains available for employers and carriers to pursue. We would recommend reading our article from our May 2017 newsletter for recommendations on how to pursue the voluntary withdrawal defense after classification. In short, employers and carriers will need to compile evidence not unlike that which was used in the past to seek a re-opening of claims following classification such as questionnaires sent to the claimant asking if the claimant was looking for work, offers of vocational services, job leads sent to the claimant, and the results of follow up on those leads.
 
We believe that the Subject Number will prove useful in day-to-day litigation on labor market attachment issues in temporary disability cases. This Subject Number is in alignment with the position we have been taking since theAmerican Axle decision regarding claimant's requirements for proving labor market attachment and will provide a further point of authority to direct WCLJs and the claimant's bar in arguments over labor market attachment.
 
If you have any questions about the defense of labor market attachment or interpretation of this Subject Number, please do not hesitate to contact any ofour attorneys.

 

Appellate Division Rules that Section 15(3)(v) Awards Subject to Same Cap on Benefits as 15(3)(w) Awards

 

On 6/29/17, the Appellate Division, Third Department, decided Mancini v. Office of Children and Family Services. This decision is notable for two reasons. First, the court explicitly held that payments under WCL §15(3)(v) are subject to the statutory cap on awards set forth in WCL §15(3)(w). A loss of wage earning capacity (LWEC) finding must be made by the Board, as in classification cases, to set the length of the capped awards.  Second, the court affirmed a finding by the Board that the cap on §15(3)(v) awards does not begin until the date when the Board makes a LWEC finding, rather than the date on which claimant’s schedule loss of use award allocation ends. 
 
For context, WCL §15(3)(v) allows claimants with a greater than 50% schedule loss of use award for certain injuries to request additional payments after the schedule loss of use award allocation expires. Claimants seeking §15(3)(v) awards must prove compliance with various criteria. The language of §15(3)(v) specifically references WCL §15(3)(w) for payment of the additional benefits. For quite some time, our office has taken the position that this means benefits under WCL §15(3)(v) should be capped, and the Court has now confirmed this.

The two takeaways from this decision are that WCL §15(3)(v) awards are subject to the statutory caps in WCL §15(3)(w), and the cap on awards begins effective the date of the loss of wage earning capacity finding by the Board once a claimant makes a successful §15(3)(v) claim.

 

WCB Chairman Munnelly Announces His Retirement

 

At the July 2017 meeting of the Commissioners of the Workers’ Compensation Board, Chairman Kenneth J. Munnelly announced that he would be retiring from the Board in September. As of this writing, we have no information regarding whom the Governor may appoint to replace him as Chair.

 

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by Jessie Zaylia, Partner

On April 26, 2017, the Third District Court of Appeal issued its decision in City of Jackson v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (Rice) resolving the question whether “heritability and genetics” may be properly considered to apportion causation for a disability caused by a degenerative disease. (No. C078706, publication pending).  The court answered the question in the affirmative.

In City of Jackson (Rice), the applicant police officer filed a claim for his disability caused by a cervical degenerative disc disease.  The qualified medical examiner found the applicant suffered a cumulative neck injury and initially apportioned 25% causation to “heritability and genetics.”  In a supplemental report, however, the QME changed the apportionment to 49%.  In support, the QME cited three medical studies that found genetics to be “a significant causative factor in cervical spine disability [. . .].”  In response to the applicant’s petition for reconsideration, the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board’s disregarded the QME’s apportionment and ordered an unapportioned disability award for the applicant.  The Third District granted the City of Jackson’s petition for writ of review and annulled the Board’s decision.

The court’s ruling in City of Jackson (Rice) is notable in two respects.  First, the court held that Labor Code section 4663 permits consideration of an applicant’s genetics when apportioning causation in a degenerative disease case.  The court dismissed the Board’s concern that “apportioning causation to genetics opens the door” to apportioning causation to “impermissible immutable factors.”  It cited two previous rulings where the Board permitted such apportionment “though it may not have used the term ‘genetics.’”

Second, the court did not require an inquiry into the applicant’s familial medical history to justify the apportionment.  Rather, the published medical studies that the QME relied on were substantial medical evidence in and of their own right to justify apportionment at 49%. The medical studies “indicated that genetics or heredity was a majority factor in all cases of degenerative disc disease,” “unless there [wa]s a clear traumatic injury.”  In light of this, the court found that an inquiry into the applicant’s familial medical history was “unnecessary.”

City of Jackson (Rice) will undoubtedly assist defendants in developing non-industrial apportionment for their claims.  The case highlights the importance of raising the issue of genetics when presenting an apportionment defense.  It also underscores the importance of using peer-reviewed medical journal articles during med-legal cross-examinations as well as within requests for reporting so that doctors can render conclusions based on substantial, industry-established grounds for apportionment.

Written by: Elizabeth Ligon and Bruce Hamilton

The North Carolina Court of Appeals left the Industrial Commission scrambling when it issued its September 20, 2016 Opinion in Bentley v. Jonathan Piner Construction, holding the plain language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-84 was violated when the Commission based its opinion and award on an opinion issued by a deputy commissioner who was not present at the original hearing and did not hear the evidence. The defendants in Bentley petitioned the Court for a rehearing, which was granted. On July 18, 2017, the Court of Appeals issued a new decision that superseded and replaced their prior decision. In its new Opinion, the Court held that Plaintiff was barred from raising this issue as a defense because he failed to raise the issue before the Commission.

Following the release of the new Bentley decision, Senate Bill 489 was signed into law by Governor Roy Cooper on July 20, 2017. As part of the new legislation, § 97-84 was revised to allow the Commission to assign another deputy to decide a case and issue an award if the deputy that appeared at the hearing and heard the evidence was no longer available. The new § 97-84 reads as follows:

“§ 97‑84.  Determination of disputes by Commission or deputy.

     The Commission or any of its members or deputies shall hear the parties at issue and their representatives and witnesses, and shall determine the dispute in a summary manner. The Commission shall decide the case shall be decided and issue findings of fact issued based upon the preponderance of the evidence in view of the entire record. The award, together with a statement of the findings of fact, rulings of law, and other matters pertinent to the questions at issue shall be filed with the record of the proceedings, within 180 days of the close of the hearing record unless time is extended for good cause by the Commission, and a copy of the award shall immediately be sent to the parties in dispute. The parties may be heard by a deputy, in which event the hearing shall be conducted in the same way and manner prescribed for hearings which are conducted by a member of the Industrial Commission, and said deputy shall proceed to a complete determination of the matters in dispute, file his written opinion within 180 days of the close of the hearing record unless time is extended for good cause by the Commission, and the deputy shall cause to be issued an award pursuant to such determination. If the deputy or member of the Commission that heard the parties at issue and their representatives and witnesses is unable to determine the matters in dispute and issue an award, the Commission may assign another deputy or member to decide the case and issue an award.

RISK HANDLING HINT: The new legislation is effective and applies to claims pending on or after the effective date of the act. The legislative fix is intended to resolve any potential dispute over the Commission’s ability to reassign a file to a different Deputy when the hearing Deputy is unable to issue an opinion and award. This is an important legislative fix, since it will eliminate the need to retry cases before a second Deputy when the case had previously been tried before the original Deputy Commissioner. Retrying cases in this manner would have created significant additional litigation costs, created significant confusion between which transcript (the first hearing, the second hearing or both hearings) would be used during any appeal to the Full Commission or Court of Appeals and was not necessary given that the Full Commission is the ultimate finder of fact in Workers Compensation claims.

Have you ever had a Claimant allege that he or she is entitled to permanent total disability benefits and move to a new community before any determination can be made? If so, you are probably wondering whether to use the community where the Claimant was injured or the new community when determining potential job opportunities that would allow the Claimant to get back into the workforce. The job search question gets more difficult when the Claimant moves from a populated area to a rural area with less work opportunities.

The short answer is that you use the Claimant’s current community when determining potential available jobs the Claimant could perform.  In Reede v. State Dept. of Transp., 2000 S.D. 157, 620 N.W.2d 372, the claimant lived and worked in the Black Hills at the time she was injured. After her injury, the claimant did not seek additional employment, instead choosing to home school her daughter. Prior to hearing, the claimant moved several times, either to follow her family or to find work, and she eventually followed her sister to Montana, where she lived with her sister. The claimant was able to show that, while in Montana, she unsuccessfully attempted to obtain employment. The main question for the Court was whether the claimant’s Montana residence should be used for the purposes of determining whether there was available employment within her community such that she could secure more than sporadic employment. The Court held that, because the Department of Labor had found that the claimant’s move was not specifically intended to withdraw herself from the workforce or to aid in obtaining benefits, but instead was a good faith move based on financial necessity, the Montana residence should be used as the claimant’s “community” for the purposes of determining her eligibility for workers compensation benefits.

So, unless there is a showing that the Claimant moved for purposes of withdrawing from the workforce in order to obtain aid in obtaining benefits, you must look to the Claimant’s current community when determining whether jobs are available. As always, if you have any questions, please don’t hesitate to contact us.

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MISSOURI WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CASE LAW UPDATE

April 2017 – June 2017

 

 

Parties Could Not Commute Award Under 287.530 Because Statute Requires Unusual Circumstances and Commission Lacked Authority Under 287.390

Dickemann vs. Costco Wholesale Corporation, Case No. ED105266 (Mo. App. 2017)

FACTS:  The claimant was injured at work in July 2010, and an Award of PTD benefits became final in April 2014.  In November 2016, the claimant and employer filed a joint motion with the Commission to commute the Award to a lump sum, which the Commission denied because it found that 287.530 only allows commutation under unusual circumstances, and no unusual circumstances were alleged in the parties’ motion. Also, the Commission found it did not have authority to commute the Award under 287.390 because there was no longer an open Claim in light of the fact that the Award was already finalized.

On appeal by both parties, the claimant argued the Commission was required to approve the motion to commute because it met the requirements of 287.390.1 and the Western District previously held that 287.530’s requirements only apply tocontested commutations.

HOLDING:  The Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District affirmed the Commission’s decision to deny the motion and held that the Western District failed to correctly interpret Sections 287.390 and 287.530 using strict construction and 287.530 should actually be applied even where both parties voluntarily agreed to commute an Award.

Claimant Awarded PPD For Hearing Loss Due to Industrial Noise Exposure Despite Wearing Hearing Protection at Work and Exposure to Firearms Outside of Work

Abt vs. Mississippi Lime Company, Injury No. 13-074707

The claimant worked for 40 years in the plant, which was extremely noisy.  He testified that he religiously wore hearing protection while working until the late 1980’s, at which time they started using radios while operating cranes.  He subsequently stopped wearing hearing protection all the time in order to hear the radio, and he always kept the left side of the crane door open due to the extreme heat.  The employer performed annual hearing tests, which showed the claimant had mild to moderate hearing loss.  He retired on January 7, 2013 and testified he has been in a quiet environment ever since.  He testified he began having problems with his hearing 12 years prior to retiring and experienced humming/ringing in his ears and had difficulty understanding people when they talked to him. The claimant also testified he goes deer hunting once a year, previously went turkey hunting with a 12-gage shotgun until four years earlier, and also participates in 20 shooting matches per year using a 12-gage shotgun. He testified he has worn noise canceling headphones while shooting since the 1970’s and has always worn some type of hearing protection since he was in high school.

The claimant treated on his own with Dr. Mason, who diagnosed mild to moderate hearing loss in the left ear and bilateral Tinnitus, which he opined were both work related. Dr. Mason found it unsurprising that he had hearing loss only in the left ear in light of the fact that the right side of his head was in the interior of a crane away from the noise.

The employer sent the claimant to Dr. Mikulec, who noted that his hearing loss in his left ear did not significantly change until after he retired in 2013 and opined that his left-sided hearing loss was age-related or due to an underlying medical condition, and his Tinnitus was causally related to his non-occupational hearing loss.

At a Hearing, the ALJ held that the claimant’s left-sided hearing loss was work related, although his bilateral Tinnitus was not work related, and found that he sustained 3% PPD of the left ear due to exposure to occupational noise. On appeal, the Commission affirmed the ALJ’s decision and Award.

Injury Compensable When Claimant Re-Tore Rotator Cuff While Performing Mandatory Physical Capability Evaluation Prior to Returning to Work

Duncan vs. Allied Aviation, LLC, Injury No. 15-072795

After undergoing surgery to repair a non-work related right rotator cuff tear, the claimant presented to work for a physical capability evaluation (PCE) prior to returning to work. The PCE was mandatory before a worker could return to work, and it was scheduled and paid for by the employer. The claimant performed PCE on May 12, 2015, at which time he felt a pop in his right shoulder followed by immediate pain. An MRI of the right shoulder showed a large full thickness rotator cuff tear, which the claimant’s prior treating doctor, Dr. Lingenfelter, opined was a new injury.

At a Hearing, the claimant testified that he was ready to return to work prior to the PCE and had no limitations with respect to his right shoulder, was pain free, and was not taking any medications. He testified that following the PCE, he experiences significant pain and limited range of motion in his right shoulder.

Dr. Gilliam, who works for the company that performs the PCE, testified on behalf of the employer/insurer that the PCE testing machines are not capable of producing an injury. Also, the employer/insurer argued that the claimant=s injury did not arise out of and in the course and scope of his employment because he had not yet returned to work.

The ALJ found that the claimant=s injury arose out of and in the course of his employment because the test was mandatory under company policy, and declining to undergo the same could be grounds for termination. Also, the employer scheduled the PCE, instructed where and when to attend, and paid for the test. Also, the risk of injury sustained by the claimant during the PCE was not one to which he would have been equally exposed outside of employment in his normal nonemployment life. Therefore, the employer/insurer was ordered to provide medical care, including surgery. On appeal, the commission affirmed the ALJ=s decision and award.

Right Shoulder Injury Sustained While Wrestling Co-Worker Not-Compensable

Grayson vs. Thorne & Son Asphalt Paving Co., Injury No. 15-089660

The claimant sustained a right rotator cuff tear while wrestling a coworker at work, which required surgical repair. According to written statements from witnesses, the two employees voluntarily agreed to wrestle, and although workers would occasionally play around by knocking off hard hats or throwing water or pebbles at each other, such behavior was not permitted at work, and no one had wrestled at work prior to the date of injury.

At a Hearing, the ALJ noted that injuries that occur as a result of horseplay are generally not compensable unless the horseplay is so pervasive in the workplace that it becomes an incident of employment. Factors considered by the courts include the frequency of horseplay, the employer’s awareness of the activity, and whether or not the employer took affirmative steps to discourage the activity. The ALJ found that horseplay was clearly in violation of company policy in light of the fact that all employees were aware it was not allowed. Also, wrestling was substantially different than the types of horseplay usually engaged in by employees. Therefore, the claimant’s right shoulder injury was not compensable.

On appeal, the Commission affirmed the ALJs decision and Award with a supplemental opinion. The Commission found the claimant’s injury was not compensable because the risk source of the claimant’s injury was his own voluntary consent to horseplay, which was unrelated to his employment and to which he would have been equally exposed outside of work in his normal life.

Claimant’s Testimony Credible and Injury Compensable Despite Inconsistent Statements Regarding How Injury Occurred

Brown vs. Christian County, Missouri, Injury No. 14-063533

The claimant sustained injuries to the right wrist/hand and right shoulder when she fell. She was standing next to a rolling file cabinet immediately prior to her injury. At the hospital, the claimant advised that she thought she fell after she lost her footing and also that it felt like her ankle gave out. In a subsequent recorded statement, she stated that she lost her footing, did not believe she caught her foot on anything, and did not really know what happened. At the Hearing, the claimant testified that her foot became caught underneath the rolling filing cabinet in the gap between the cabinet and the floor, against the wheel, which caused her to fall when she turned.

The employer pointed out the claimant’s inconsistent statements regarding how she was injured. However, the ALJ found the claimant’s testimony credible and found that she fell after her foot became caught under the filing cabinet. The ALJ also found that the injury was in the course and scope of employment because the risk source of injury was not merely standing, walking, or turning, but was instead placing her left foot underneath the filing cabinet. Therefore, the injury was compensable. The ALJ also opined it was understandable that the claimant’s initial account of her accident was inaccurate or incomplete in light of the fact that she was in distress, taking pain medications, and was not sleeping well. The employer was responsible for PPD benefits with respect to the claimant’s right hand/wrist and right shoulder.

On appeal, the Commission affirmed the ALJ’s decision and Award and noted that the claimant’s Hearing testimony need not be discredited simply because she previously gave different, less detailed, or incomplete accounts of her accident.

Court Cannot Dismiss Wrongful Death Petition Based On Exclusivity Doctrine Until the Commission Determines the Injury is Compensable

Channel vs. Cintas Corporation No. 2, et al., Case No. WD79673 (Mo. App. 2017)

FACTS:  The claimant was employed as a delivery driver when he died of heat stroke.  His spouse filed a Claim for Compensation on his behalf and also filed a wrongful death petition against the claimant’s supervisor and the employer (Defendants).  The Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that under the exclusivity doctrine, Workers’ Compensation is the exclusive remedy for a work-related death or injury.  The Circuit Court agreed and granted summary judgment, finding the claimant’s death was the result of an accidental injury that could only be addressed by the Commission.

The claimant’s spouse appealed and argued that the Circuit Court did not have authority to determine whether his death was due to an accident under Workers’ Compensation law while the Workers’ Compensation Claim was still pending.

HOLDING:  The Appeals Court held that the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether an employee’s injury resulted from an accident under Workers’ Compensation law and reversed the Circuit Court’s Decision and remanded the case with an Order to Stay Proceedings until the Claim was resolved.  The Commission held that it would be inappropriate for a court to enter summary judgment based on the exclusivity doctrine before the Commission decides the question of accidental injury, because granting summary judgment would prevent the claimant’s spouse from refiling her civil law suit if the Commission subsequently found that it was not an accidental injury.

Flu Vaccine Not Prevailing Cause of Claimant’s Congestive Heart Failure

Johnson vs. Barnes-Jewish West County Hospital, Injury No. 09-112063

The claimant’s doctor gave her a permanent exemption from receiving the flu vaccine.  However, the claimant was subsequently advised that the H1N1 vaccination was mandatory and underwent the same on December 7, 2009. She testified that she developed immediate numbness, tingling, and burning in her hands, and she developed flulike symptoms within one week after her shot. She testified that she had flare-ups of those symptoms, and in June 2010, a flare-up caused her to go to the emergency room, where she was diagnosed with cardiomegaly. Her condition progressively worsened, and she was ultimately diagnosed with congestive heart failure. She treated on her own and continues to take medications for her heart condition. She alleged that she developed her heart condition as a result of the mandatory H1N1 flu vaccination she received from the employer.

Both medical experts diagnosed the claimant with congestive heart failure. The claimant’s expert, Dr. Wolfson, testified that the H1N1 vaccine caused her cardiomyopathy and permanent disability. The employer’s expert, Dr. Schuman, testified that the claimant did not sustain a work injury and there is no known correlation between the vaccination and myocarditis. He also noted that the claimant did not seek medical treatment until six months after her vaccination.

At a Hearing, the ALJ found the claimant’s condition was not compensable because she failed to prove that the flu vaccine was the prevailing factor in causing her congestive heart failure. The ALJ found Dr. Schuman’s opinion more persuasive with respect to causation and noted the extensive gap between when the claimant received the vaccination and when she first sought treatment.  On appeal, the commission affirmed the ALJs decision and Award.

Driving School Bus Was Prevailing Factor Causing Bilateral Carpal Tunnel Syndrome

Lammert vs. Festus R-VI School District, Injury No. 16-006646

The claimant worked as a school bus driver for 11 years. Before 2015, she drove older buses, which required flipping a switch with her left hand, engaging an emergency break, and operating a manual door with her right hand at each stop. The steering wheels on the older buses vibrated continuously. In May 2015, the claimant began driving newer buses, which did not require her to manually engage an emergency break or open the door, were much easier to steer, and had much less vibration. She first developed symptoms in her hands/wrists in August or September 2015, months after she switched to the newer buses and after she was off work for approximately three months for summer break.

The claimant’s expert, Dr. Schlafly, testified that driving a school bus was the prevailing factor causing her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, which he believed developed over years of driving the older buses, although it did not manifest until after the change to newer buses in 2015. Dr. Crandall testified for the employer and opined her job duties were not hand intensive enough to cause carpal tunnel syndrome and noted there were no studies to suggest that carpal tunnel syndrome could be caused by driving a bus. Both doctors agreed that the claimant required bilateral carpal tunnel releases.

At a Hearing, the ALJ found Dr. Crandall’s testimony more persuasive and noted that although operating the old buses was hand intensive, her complaints did not begin until months after she started operating newer buses, and she developed carpal tunnel syndrome in her left hand, although she only operated the manual door on the older buses using her right hand. The ALJ also noted that Dr. Schlafly could not identify any scientific studies relating bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome to driving a bus. Instead, the ALJ opined that the claimant’s age, gender, obesity, hypertension, and menopause all predisposed her to carpal tunnel syndrome, and her condition was therefore not compensable.

On appeal, the Commission reversed the ALJs opinion and Award and found that Dr. Schlafly’s medical opinion was more persuasive than Dr. Crandall’s opinion. The Commission ordered the employer to pay past medical expenses and provide future medical care, including bilateral carpal tunnel releases.

Employer Responsible for PTD Benefits After Left Shoulder Injury

Maryville R-2 School District vs. Paydon and Treasurer of the State of Missouri Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, Case No. WD80070 (Mo. App. 2017)

On March 10, 2014, the claimant, a fifty-eight-year-old employee, helped a co-worker lift a soccer goal that weighed 200 pounds, at which time he injured his left shoulder.  He treated on his own with Dr. Atteberry, who diagnosed a rotator cuff tear and performed left shoulder surgery on May 12, 2014.  He subsequently filed a Claim against the employer for PTD benefits.

At a Hearing, the claimant testified that his left shoulder pain interrupts his sleep and he now has to lie down or recline multiple times during the day and sometimes has difficulty concentrating due to sleep deprivation.  Dr. Koprivica evaluated the claimant and issued permanent work restrictions as a result of the work injury alone, including the need to recline and take naps on an unpredictable basis during the work day. Both parties’ vocational experts agreed that, assuming Dr. Koprivica’s restrictions, the claimant would be unemployable in the open labor market.

The ALJ found the claimant’s testimony and Dr. Koprivica’s opinion credible, held that the claimant was PTD due to the 2014 work injury alone, and ordered the employer to pay PTD benefits and provide future medical treatment.  The Commission affirmed the ALJ’s decision.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission’s decision and Award.

Claimant PTD from Last Injury Alone Due to Combination of Left Upper Extremity Injury and Psychiatric Condition.

Bass vs. Board of Police Commissioners of Kansas City, Missouri, Injury No. 08-006183

On January 23, 2008, the claimant was exiting a police vehicle when she slipped and fell on ice and sustained an injury to her left elbow and shoulder. She underwent left shoulder surgery with Dr. Hood in 2008 followed by two more left shoulder surgeries performed by Dr. Satterlee in 2009 and 2011. Dr. Satterlee released her from care on December 22, 2011 with permanent restrictions.

The claimant also treated on her own with Dr. Logan for depression, which the doctor opined she developed as a result of her left upper extremity injury and was exacerbated by a significant degree of preexisting panic disorder. Mr. Cordray, a vocational expert, testified that the combination of her physical pain and psychological issues would prevent her from presenting to work on a consistent basis, which made her unemployable in the open labor market.

Dr. Hughes examined the claimant on the employer’s behalf and opined 80% of her psychological condition was unrelated to her work injury. Vocational expert Ms. Sprecker opined she was able to perform low stress jobs with minimal repetitive use of the left upper extremity and was not PTD.

At a Hearing, the ALJ found that the claimant was not PTD and assessed 45% PPD of the left shoulder, 10% of the left elbow, and 10% of the body referable to her psychiatric condition. The employer was not responsible for future medical care.

On appeal, the Commission found Dr. Logan and Mr. Cordray’s opinions most credible and held that the claimant was PTD due to a combination of her left upper extremity injury and psychiatric condition, which was associated with the left upper extremity condition. The employer was ordered to provide future medical care as well as PTD benefits.

Employer Responsible for PTD Benefits for Combination of Back Injury and Psychological Condition, Both Caused by Primary Injury

Pulliam vs. RPCS, Inc. and Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of Second Injury Fund, Injury No. 11-056403

The claimant sustained a back injury when lifting a 70-pound box and ultimately underwent a spinal fusion from T7 – T9 and was given permanent work restrictions.  He alleged that he could not sit, walk, or stand longer than 15 minutes after his work injury and had difficulty sleeping and concentrating due to pain.  A surveillance video showed him driving, shopping, going up and down steps, walking without a cane, carrying bags, reaching, and bending.

Dr. Koprivica evaluated the claimant, recommended permanent restrictions including the ability to frequently change positions and use of a cane, and opined he was PTD as a result of his last injury alone.  Mr. Eldred performed a vocational evaluation, noted he had to alternate between sitting and standing, lie down during the day, and use a cane, and he opined the claimant was unemployable in the open labor market as a result of his last injury alone.

Dr. Halfaker performed a psychological evaluation at the claimant’s attorney’s request and noted symptom magnification, which he opined was the result of somatoform disorder associated with chronic pain syndrome rather than malingering. 

The treating physician, Dr. Corsolini, opined the claimant was not PTD.

At a Hearing, the ALJ found that the claimant sustained a herniated disc of the thoracic spine and a psychological injury as a result of his work accident. The ALJ reviewed the surveillance video and agreed that he was likely magnifying his symptoms, but the ALJ agreed with Dr. Halfaker that it was likely due to a psychological condition that resulted from his work injury. Therefore, the ALJ found the claimant was PTD as a result of his last injury alone and ordered the employer to pay PTD benefits. On appeal, the Commission affirmed the ALJs decision and Award.

Employer Responsible for PTD Benefits After Shoulder, Hip, and Back Injury

Gwin vs. Southeast Missouri Mental Health Center, Injury No. 10-011144

On February 17, 2010, the claimant was working for the employer as a Psych Aide and was helping to carry a resident on a litter/stretcher when the resident kicked her, causing her to fall to the floor, at which time she sustained injuries to her right shoulder, left hip, and lumbar spine. She treated through the employer with Dr. Wayne and Dr. Collard, who performed a right rotator cuff repair. She also received lumbar and hip injections.  After she was released from care, the claimant had continued shoulder, lumbar spine, and left hip pain and sought treatment on her own.  She continued to miss significant time from work and felt she could no longer work as a Psych Aide.  She applied for a sedentary position with the employer as a receptionist, but her application was denied and she was fired.

Dr. Wayne and Dr. Collard believed the claimant was not PTD, as did her treating doctor, Dr. Krause, and medical expert, Dr. Robson.  Dr. Musich evaluated the claimant at her attorney’s request and opined she was PTD as a result of her work injury.  Mr. Weimholt performed a vocational evaluation and also opined she was unemployeable due to her level of education and lack of transferable skills.  Mr. England performed a vocational evaluation and noted she did not exhibit observable pain behaviors and would make a good impression at an interview.  He believed she was employable given the permanent restrictions from Dr. Wayne, Dr. Collard, and Dr. Krause.

At a Hearing, the ALJ noted that the claimant attended some college and completed a program at Metro Business College, her employment history included supervisory duties, and she did not appear to have any problems with reading or math. The ALJ also noted she did not appear to be in a lot of pain during the Hearing, found the opinions of Dr. Wayne, Dr. Collard, Dr. Krause, and Dr. Robson more persuasive, and held that she was not PTD. The employer was responsible for PPD at the level of the body and right shoulder as well as future medical treatment.

On appeal, the Commission found the opinions of Dr. Musich and Mr. Weimholt more persuasive and noted that she missed a significant amount of work due to her injuries after being released from care and the employer terminated her employment rather than hiring her for a light-duty position as a receptionist. The Commission modified the ALJs decision and Award to include PTD benefits to be paid by the employer.

Fund Responsible for PTD Benefits After Primary Low Back Injury Combined With Pre-Existing Low Back Condition

Davis vs. Ozarks Coca-Cola/Dr. Pepper Bottling Company and Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of Second Injury Fund, Injury No. 07-050555

The claimant worked for the employer for 27 years delivering vending machines, which required a lot of heavy lifting, pushing, and pulling. He sustained an injury to his low back on June 6, 2007 when a 600-pound vending machine tipped backward onto him. He treated conservatively with multiple doctors both through the employer and on his own. He was diagnosed with lumbar pain with radiculopathy and aggravation of pre-existing lumbar DDD. Dr. Woodward, the authorized treating physician, placed him at MMI on May 26, 2009 with permanent restrictions. He did not undergo surgery. The employer subsequently fired the claimant because they could not accommodate his permanent restrictions, and he did not work thereafter.

With respect to the claimant’s pre-existing conditions, he had a prior back injury in June 2001, for which he underwent physical therapy. He also had a low back injury in June 2006 and testified he had ongoing low back pain but was able to continue working. The claimant also had a prior right shoulder injury and experienced ongoing shoulder pain and popping prior to his primary injury, and he had a prior left shoulder injury as a result of a motor vehicle accident.

The claimant’s experts, Dr. Bennoch and Dr. Mullins, opined he was PTD as a result of a combination of his primary injury and pre-existing degeneration in his lumbar spine. The claimant’s vocational expert, Mr. Swearingin, noted his 11th grade education and age and opined he was not a candidate for vocational rehabilitation. He also noted the claimant’s extensive history working manual labor positions and opined he was unemployable as a result of pre-existing degeneration and the primary work injury.

The employer’s medical and vocational experts opined the claimant was not PTD.

At a Hearing, the ALJ found the claimant was PTD as a result of the combination of his pre-existing injuries, low back degeneration, and the primary injury. The ALJ found Dr. Bennoch’s opinion most persuasive with respect to permanency and assessed 20% PPD of the body referable to the primary injury. The Fund was liable for PTD benefits, and the employer was ordered to provide future medical care referable to the primary injury.  On appeal, the Commission affirmed the ALJ’s decision and Award.


2017 Changes to the Workers’ Compensation Statute

Please note this Bill has been signed by Gov. Greitens and goes into effect on August 28, 2017

Below is a description of the additions/changes to the Statute:

MMI

MMI is the point at which the claimant’s medical condition has stabilized and can no longer reasonably improve with additional medical care.

TTD/PTD

TTD/PTD benefits shall be paid throughout the rehabilitative process until the claimant reaches MMI unless benefits are terminated by the claimant’s return to work or as otherwise specified in the statute.

If a claimant voluntarily separates from employment with an employer and the employer had work available for the claimant that was within his or her medical restrictions imposed by the treating physician, neither TTD nor TPD benefits shall be payable

Drug Testing

If a claimant tests positive for a nonprescribed controlled drug or the metabolites of such drug there is a rebuttable presumption which may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence, that the tested drug was in the claimant’s system at the time of the accident or injury and that the injury was sustained in conjunction with the use of the drug if:

·         the initial testing was administered within 24 hours of the accident or injury;

·         notice was given to the claimant of the test results within 14 calendar days of the insurer receiving actual notice of the positive test results;

·         the claimant was given an opportunity to perform a second test upon the original sample;AND

·         the positive test was confirmed by mass spectrometry using generally accepted medical

or forensic testing procedures

Settlements/Rating Reports

With respect to compromised settlements, after a claimant has reached MMI and the employer/insurer has received a rating from the authorized treating physician, a claimant shall have a period of 12 months from such date to obtain a rating from a physician of his or her own choosing.

Absent a finding of extenuating circumstances by an ALJ or the Commission, if after 12 months the claimant has not obtained a rating from a second physician, any compromise settlement entered into under this section shall be based upon the initial rating.

A finding of extenuating circumstances by an ALJ or the Commission shall require more than failure of the claimant to timely obtain a rating from a second physician.

The provisions of this subsection may be waived by the employer with or without stating a cause.

PTD

With respect to injuries resulting in the death of a claimant, the statute has been changed with respect to dependents. The statute previously stated that the employer shall pay to the “total” dependents of the claimant a death benefit. However, “total” has been removed from the statute.

The definition of dependent now also includes a stepchild claimable by the deceased on his or her federal tax return at the time of the injury.

Termination

No employer or agent shall discharge or discriminate against a claimant for exercising any of his or her rights under this chapter when the exercising of such rights is the motivating factor in the discharge or discrimination.

For the purposes of this section “motivating factor” shall mean that the claimant’s exercise of his or her rights under this chapter actually played a role in the discharge or discrimination and had a determinative influence on the discharge or discrimination.

Hardship Hearings

With respect to a claimant’s request for a Hardship Hearing the statute previously allowed the Division 60 days to set a case for Hearing but the statute has now been changed to allow only 30 days.

Coverage for Shareholders of an S Corporation

Beginning on January 1, 2018 a shareholder of an S corporation with at least 40% or greater interest in it may individually elect to reject coverage by providing written notice of such rejection to the corporation and its insurer.