Written by: Lindsay A. Underwood and Tracey L. Jones

As opioid use continues to plague the community, as part of the workers’ compensation system and otherwise, North Carolina is one of many states working to take steps to reduce availability and use of prescription pain killers. Per the North Carolina Opioid Action Plan (2017-2021), prepared by the Prescription Drug Abuse Advisory Committee (PDAAC), unintentional opioid-related deaths totaled 1,194 in 2016. Drug overdoses have become the leading cause of death among Americans under the age of 50. Further, it is estimated that more than two million people are dependent on opioids. In light of this epidemic, North Carolina Governor Roy Cooper has released an action plan to reduce the number of opioids being prescribed, increase community awareness and prevention, and expand other treatment and recovery systems.

As part of this policy overhaul, Governor Cooper recently signed into law a bill that regulates pain medication prescriptions. The bill, titled the STOP, or Strengthen Opioid Misuse Prevention, Act, limits physicians from prescribing more than a five-day supply of opioids during an initial visit. Though this provision does not apply to people receiving treatment for chronic pain, or a life-threatening condition like cancer, it does significantly limit immediate access to pain medications in the emergency department, where many individuals, including workers’ compensation claimants, seek initial treatment.

In an effort to reduce opioid-related deaths, the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) recently recommended that Endo International, P.L.C., withdraw its long-lasting opioid painkiller, Opana ER, from the market. This request is the first time an agency has called for the removal of an opioid painkiller for public health reasons, and could mark a turning point in how the FDA views painkillers. It should be noted that an FDA panel of advisors made this recommendation after determining the risks of Opana simply did not outweigh its benefits.

It is clear that policymakers across the board are recognizing opioid use as an epidemic. Notably, the North Carolina Industrial Commission recently appointed an Opioid Task Force to study and recommend solutions for the problems arising from the intersection of the opioid epidemic and related issues in workers’ compensation claims. In the workers’ compensation setting, medication use and costs are often a barrier to facilitating a return to work, and to claim closure. Further, the cost of opioids makes it extremely difficult to obtain a reasonable Medicare Set-Aside, where Medicare issues are at play. Ideally, these new limitations on medications will help reduce claim costs and facilitate rehabilitation and return to work.

Workers’ compensation claims often lead to complex disability discrimination law suits, and the recent New Jersey Supreme Court case of Grande v. Saint Clare’s Health System (A-67-15) (July 12, 2017) provides a good example of this.   The case concerned the termination of a registered nurse by the hospital following a series of work-related injuries involving the nurse.

Maryanne Grande was employed by St. Clare’s from 2000 to July 2010.  Her job tending to stroke victims involved maintaining charts, administering medications, providing general care, assisting patients with daily living activities such as washing, bathing, dressing, walking, repositioning patients in bed, and guarding them against falls.

In August 2008, St. Clare’s performed a job system analysis for various nursing positions, resulting in a description of the frequency that nurses performed certain tasks.  In the year prior to the job analysis, Grande injured her left shoulder while repositioning a patient in bed.  This led to surgery with a three month recovery period at home before returning on a light-duty basis, followed by full duty status in a month.

In May 2008, Grande was repositioning a patient in bed and felt pain in her right shoulder this time.  An MRI showed no serious abnormality.   But in November 2008, Grande reinjured her left shoulder again while lifting the legs of a 300-pound patient.  She underwent a second surgery and returned to full duty approximately six months after the accident.

In February 2010, Grande was caring for an overweight patient.  The patient began to fall, and Grande grabbed the patient’s shoulders from behind, injuring her neck.  She had surgery on her neck and was out of work four months.  On her first day back to work, she left after four hours due to pain.  Two weeks later she returned to full-time, light-duty work.

In early July 2010, Grande’s physician, Dr. Joel Spielman, cleared her to return to full-duty work, but the hospital required her to attend an FCE.  The FCE professionals understood that her job required her to push, pull and lift from waist to chest frequently (34-66% of the time).  She was able to perform these functions occasionally (1-33% of the time).  The report documented “mild residual functional issues” but concluded that “it is improbable that this will significantly affect job performance ability.” Given the recent neck surgery, the FCE report suggested that Grande be permitted changes in activities during periods of prolonged or repetitive neck movements.  Finally, the report suggested that Grande “seek appropriate assistance with heavier physical activities such as patient transfers, guarding ambulatory patients or handling loads” greater than 50 pounds.  She was cleared for medium category work (occasional lift and work up to 50 pounds).  The FCE report also deferred to Grande’s treating physician, Dr. Spielman.

Dr. Spielman took contradictory positions in the case.  As noted above, his first note approved full-duty return to work before any FCE was done.  On July 21, 2010, following the FCE, Dr. Spielman approved Grande to return to work with restrictions as outlined in the FCE.  He advised that Grande needed permanent restrictions of lifting up to 50 pounds occasionally and should transfer patients with assistance only.

The hospital proceeded to terminate Grande’s employment because the hospital concluded that she could not perform the essential functions safely.  Grande then saw Dr. Spielman again, and this time Dr. Spielman pivoted back to his original note, stating that Grande had no restrictions any longer.  St. Clare’s had already terminated Grande and refused to rehire her.  The Court ignored Dr. Spielman’s last note because it was issued after Grande had been fired.

Grande sued alleging discrimination based on disability under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.  The trial court granted St. Clare’s motion for summary judgement.   A divided Appellate Division panel reversed.  The New Jersey Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the Appellate Division.  The Court examined the two main reasons that the hospital terminated Grande.  First, the hospital argued that Grande had chronic and excessive absenteeism.  In the prior three years, Grande had been out of work for about a year.  But the Supreme Court noted that there were issues of fact whether Grande’s absences were sufficiently “chronic and excessive.”

The second reason advanced by St. Clare’s was that the FCE supported its position that Grande could not safely perform the essential job functions.  The Court rejected this as well, stating that there was no consistent understanding of the essential job functions.  The 2008 St. Clare’s Job Analysis showed that RNs must lift fifty pounds from waist to chest frequently (34% to 66% of the day).  It also reflected that there was no activity that is performed at a frequency greater than 66% of the time.

The Court examined the FCE results carefully. It became apparent to the Court that there was an inconsistency between the 2008 Job Analysis and the testing standards of the FCE.  The 2008 Job Analysis required lifting 50 pounds from waist to chest frequently. The FCE understood that a nurse must lift 20 pounds constantly, 67% to 100% of the time.   There was no requirement for constant lifting in the Job Analysis.  Additionally, the FCE understood that there was an occasional requirement of lifting of up to 100 pounds, which did not appear in the Job Analysis at all.  In essence, the FCE assumed almost constant lifting, and sometimes at much higher weights, than the 2008 Job Analysis.  The FCE referred to a job analysis received from the hospital, but it did not appear to be the 2008 Job Analysis.  For her part, Grande said both the 2008 Job Analysis and the FCE criteria were wrong:  she contended that the actual physical aspects of her job were less onerous and that she could do the job.

The Supreme Court also noted that the FCE cautioned that the results “may be compatible with mild residual functional issues,” but “it is improbable that this will significantly affect job performance ability.”  This language did not support the termination of Grande at all.  The FCE deferred to Dr. Spielman, who wrote his second report incorporating the conclusions of the FCE.  In essence, Dr. Spielman embraced the FCE recommendations.

Finally, the Court noted that the hospital was concerned about Grande’s potential to injure patients.  She had never actually injured any patient when she was injured on the job previously, and the FCE report only recommended that Grande be assisted in lifting more than 50 pounds, notwithstanding that she was able to lift over 100 pounds during testing.  St. Clare’s produced no expert indicating that there was a material risk of harm to herself or patients if she returned to work.

The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of summary judgment for the hospital and remanded the case for trial.  The case is of great importance because the use of FCEs is widespread in New Jersey in helping employers determine whether to return employees to work following work injuries or non-work medical conditions.  The issue in this case arises quite often, namely a disagreement over the essential job functions.  In this case the hospital did have a good job analysis, but somehow that requirements in the 2008 Job Analysis did not coincide with the requirements of the FCE.  Further, the hospital seemed to have reached too far in concluding from the FCE that the employee could not do her job.

What should employers and FCE companies do when an employee disagrees with the essential functions?  One idea is to have a document that clearly records the essential functions which has been signed off by the employer and the employee.  Getting all parties on the same page would eliminate the main objection in countless situations over what is and what is not an essential job function.  FCEs are extremely helpful because they provide scientific data on what an employee can physically do, but if the test does not replicate the job duties, then the test if invalid.  More time should be put into confirming the essential functions and then confirming with the employee that he or she agrees with those functions.  Creating a sound list of essential functions is critical, and there are companies who can visit work sites and document the essential functions.

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John H. Geaney, Esq., is an Executive Committee Member and a Shareholder in Capehart Scatchard's Workers’ Compensation Group.  Mr. Geaney concentrates his practice in the representation of employers, self-insured companies, third-party administrators, and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation, the Americans with Disabilities Act and Family and Medical Leave Act. Should you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Mr. Geaney at 856.914.2063 or by e‑mail at jgeaney@capehart.com. 

On July 21, 2017, The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals released its opinion in Laura Wyatt v. Baptist Health System, Inc.  In Wyatt, the employee was a patient-care tech that experienced a sharp pain in her back when she was lifting and twisting.  The pain was followed by a burning sensation and pain down into her legs and toes.  She was diagnosed with transverse myelitis and continues to experience weakness in her legs, trouble with walking and balance, and has issues with her bladder and bowels.

The employee filed a workers’ compensation lawsuit in Jefferson County and it subsequently transferred to Shelby County upon motion of the employer.

At trial, the testimony of three doctors was received into evidence.  Dr. Meador, who examined the employee, was of the opinion that the employee likely impinged an artery in her lower back during the act of lifting and twisting which resulted in a spinal cord stroke which, in turn, lead to her condition.  Drs. Kirschberg and Counce conducted record reviews and offered testimony that rebutted the opinions of Dr. Meador.  Dr. Kirschberg testified that a twisting motion would not cause the employee’s condition.  Dr. Counce, who testified live in court, opined that the employee’s condition was not caused by trauma of by work activities.  She further testified that the employee did not suffer from an impingement.  Rather, it was her opinion that the condition and symptoms were more likely related to a severe vitamin B-12 deficiency.

Based on the evidence at trial, the trial judge was of the opinion that the testimony of Drs. Kirschberg and Counce was more well-reasoned, medically sound, and persuasive.  As such, judgment was rendered in favor of the employer.  The employee timely appealed the decision.

Among the reasons for appeal, the employee noted that the trial court erred in failing to resolve reasonable doubts in the evidence in favor of the employee.  The Court of Civil Appeals noted that the requirement of liberally construing the construction of the Workers’ Compensation Act to effectuate its beneficent purposes had nothing to do with the assignment of weight to the evidence.  Rather, judges in workers’ compensation matters should consider the evidence and assign weight as they would in any other civil matter.  Since the trial judge obviously assigned much more weight to the testimony of Drs. Kirschberg and Counce, it was clear that substantial evidence supported the judge’s ruling in favor of the employer.  As such, the judgment was affirmed.

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About the Author

This blog submission was prepared by Mike Fish, an attorney with Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers, and third party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this submission or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Fish by e-mailing him at mfish@fishnelson.com or by calling him directly at 205-332-1448.

On July 21, 2017, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals released its opinion in Felisha Bailey v. Jacksonville Health and Rehabilitation Center.  In Bailey, the employee was a certified nursing assistant who sued her employer and the third party administrator (TPA) handling her workers’ compensation claim.  Count One of her complaint was against her employer for workers’ compensation benefits related to her claim of contracting scabies and the related psychological issues.  Count Two was against the TPA for outrageous conduct.  Count Two was subsequently dismissed upon motion of the TPA.

Rather than proceed to trial on the workers’ compensation issues, the employer elected to first file a motion for summary judgment.  In support of the motion, the employer offered evidence which demonstrated that the employee never contracted scabies.  Rather, the employee more likely suffered from delusional parasitosis whish is a disorder that causes a person to believe that they are infested by parasites.  The evidence in support of this theory was compelling and the judge granted the motion for summary judgment.  The employee timely filed her appeal.

On appeal, the employee pointed out that the trial judge improperly weighed the evidence in granting the employer’s motion for summary judgment.  Since there was some evidence that could arguably support the employee’s theory, the Court of Civil Appeals agreed with the employee that granting summary judgment was improper.  As such, the judgment was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

My Two Cents:

Unless there is evidence introduced at trial that is not referenced in the Court’s opinion, the time and expense associated with appealing the trial court’s decision is probably all for naught.

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About the Author

This blog submission was prepared by Mike Fish, an attorney with Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers, and third party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this submission or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Fish by e-mailing him at mfish@fishnelson.com or by calling him directly at 205-332-1448.

Michael Savio was injured on a job site on June 1, 2006.  He stated that he worked for Matthew Giambri for four weeks on two job sites, pouring concrete on one site, and doing plumbing work on the other site.  Giambri paid him $150 per day to pour concrete; otherwise, he paid him $100 to $125 per day.

On the day of the accident, Giambri picked up Savio from his home and drove him to a job site.  His job that day was to tear off siding on a home.  Savio testified that Giambri pointed out what he had to do and then left.  He said he had his own tools but there was no evidence that he used them on the job site.  He brought no materials with him as everything he needed was there.

After Savio removed the siding, he descended from a ladder which broke, causing Savio to fall two-and-a-half stories and injure his spine.  He treated for four years for the injury and was never able to resume construction work.  Petitioner filed a petition asserting that he was employed by Giambri, and his employer asserted that he was an independent contractor or a casual employee and therefore not protected by workers’ compensation laws.

The Judge of Compensation and the Appellate Division found that petitioner was an employee.  The opinion of the Appellate Division is interesting because the court reviewed 12 factors outlined in the case of Estate of Kotsovska, ex rel. Kotsovska v. Liebman, 221 N.J. 568 (2015).

§  The first factor is the employer’s right to control the means and manner of work performance. The court found that there was evidence that Giambri provided instruction in what to do and how to remove the siding, as well as materials to do the job. The court felt it insignificant that Giambri left the work site while the siding was removed. The court also said that the “control” factor carries less weight than other factors;

§  The court felt that the second and third factors had minimal significance in this case. They involve supervision necessary over the job and skills to perform the job.  The court agreed with the Judge of Compensation that Savio had the skills and required little direction;

§  The fourth factor pertains to who furnishes equipment, and this was clearly in Savio’s favor;

§  The fifth factor involves the length of time a worker performs duties for the alleged employer. In this case the court felt that four weeks was sufficient.

§  The sixth factor relates to the method used to pay the alleged employee. Here Savio was paid by cash or personal check, and Gambri gave him a W-2 form at the end of the year.  This also favored employment;

§  The seventh factor focuses on the manner in which the work relationship terminated. In this case the petitioner could not return to work because of his injury.

§  The eighth, tenth, and eleventh factors pertain to benefits: annual leave, retirement benefits, and payment of Social Security taxes.  There was no evidence in this case regarding these factors.

§  The ninth factor focuses on whether the alleged employee’s work is an integral part of the employer’s business. “Here, the judge found Giambri was a contractor who employed laborers to perform services on his behalf and, thus, the work Savio performed was an integral part of Giambri’s business.”

§  Lastly, the twelfth factor examines the intentions of the parties. The Appellate Division believed that there was a relationship consistent with an employer and employee, even if there was no documentation expressing intention.

The Appellate Division felt that the vast majority of these factors favored employment status and affirmed the decision of the Judge of Compensation.  The case is very helpful in resolving disputes of this nature by providing a framework to analyze similar situations.   It can be found at Savio v. Giambri, A-0701-15T1 (App. Div. July 12, 2017).

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John H. Geaney, Esq., is an Executive Committee Member and a Shareholder in Capehart Scatchard's Workers’ Compensation Group.  Mr. Geaney concentrates his practice in the representation of employers, self-insured companies, third-party administrators, and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation, the Americans with Disabilities Act and Family and Medical Leave Act. Should you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Mr. Geaney at 856.914.2063 or by e‑mail at jgeaney@capehart.com.

The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed a decision by the WCCA, and held that the WCCA erred when it found that an expert opinion lacked adequate foundation.

In this case, Debra Mattick (“Employee”) sustained a non-work-related injury to her right ankle in 2000. She underwent two surgeries, and eventually was able to engage in recreational activities including sand volleyball and biking. She was diagnosed with post-traumatic arthritis, and had periodic pain. She returned to work as a cake decorator at Hy-Vee in 2001, working 40-45 hours per week. In 2004, the Employee tripped over a pallet while working at Hy-Vee and twisted her right ankle. She filed a workers’ compensation claim seeking reimbursement for an ankle-fusion surgery. At the Hearing, the compensation judge denied the Employee’s claim for surgery and found that the injury was temporary and had fully resolved. The judge relied on the expert opinion of Dr. Fey and concluded that neither the Employee’s medical records nor the opinions of her treating physicians supported her claim.

The case was appealed to the WCCA, which reversed the compensation judge’s decision and concluded that Dr. Fey’s report lacked adequate factual foundation. The WCCA found that Dr. Fey’s report was suspect, including his discussion of the Employee’s arthritis condition and ankle sprain, and well as his failure to note a 10-year gap in the Employee’s symptoms. Due to this, they found the report to be lacking in adequate foundation.

The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the WCCA’s decision and reinstated the findings of the compensation judge. The Supreme Court noted that an expert opinion lacks foundation when (1) the opinion does not include the facts and/or data upon which the expert relied in forming the opinion, (2) it does not explain the basis for the opinion, or (3) the facts assumed by the expert in rendering an opinion are not supported by the evidence. Hudson v. Trillium Staffing, 2017 WL 2458132 (Minn. June 7, 2017). The Supreme Court, however, analyzed Dr. Fey’s report based on these factors and found that the report clearly recounted and analyzed the specifics of the Employee’s injuries before opining on the potential aggravation of her arthritis in her ankle, and it was adequately supported by factual foundation. A few statements in the report taken out of context is not enough to discredit the entire report. In conclusion, the Supreme Court found that the WCCA erred, and that the compensation judge properly relied on Dr. Fey’s report.

As the takeaway, the Minnesota Supreme Court reiterated the WCCA’s appellate standard of review under Hengemuhle for the past three decades: the WCCA exceeds its scope of review when it rejects a Compensation Judge’s findings that are supported by substantial evidence and substitutes its own findings.

The case Mattick v. Hy-Vee Foods Stores, A16-1802 and can be found here: http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/Appellate/Supreme%20Court/Standard%20Opinions/OPA161802-071217.pdf

The issue of independent contractor versus employer has been litigated in South Dakota. There is a presumption that the worker was an employee and it is the employer’s burden to establish the worker is an independent contractor. The Department of Labor and the South Dakota Supreme Court have provided a set of factors to consider when determining whether a worker is an independent contractor or an employee.

The following factors have been used by the Department of Labor as considerations when determining whether a worker is an independent contractor or employee:

1. The extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the work;

1. One must look at whether the employer has the ability to hire, fire, and lay off the worker. It is also important how much control the master has over the workers’ functions.

2. Whether the one employee is engaged in a distinct occupation or business.

1. Here it is important to see whether the worker operated a separate business or under a separate trade name. It is also important whether the worker worked solely for this master, on a full time basis.

3. The kind of occupation with reference to, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision.

4. The skill required for that particular occupation.

5. Whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work;

1. Here, “when the employer furnishes valuable equipment, the relationship is almost invariably that of employment.” SeeLarson on Worker’s Compensation §44.43(a).

6. The length of time for which the person is employed.

7. The method of payment, whether by the job or by the hour.

8. Whether the work is part of the regular business of the employer.

9. Whether the parties believe they are creating the relationship of master and servant.

The South Dakota Supreme Court has essentially adopted these factors although it has grouped certain factors into a two-part test. InEgemo v. Flores, 470 NW2d 817 (SD 1991) the employer argued the servant was an independent contractor. The court noted there was an important distinction as an independent contractor is not covered by workers’ compensation. The court stated there is a two factor test: (1) whether the individual has been and will continue to be free from control or direction over the performance of the services, both under contract or service and fact, and (2) whether the individual is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business.

In evaluating the “right of control test” the important considerations include direct evidence of the right of control, the method of payment, furnishing major items of equipment, and the right to terminate the employment relationship at will and without liability. In Egemo, the court noted the employer did not exercise control or supervision over the method or manner in which the servant completed his task. Furthermore, the master did not direct the hours of work, breaks, or even the days off. The court also noted the servant did not withhold any amounts for income tax, social security, or unemployment insurance. The employer also filed a Form 1099 as a non-employee compensation form. The court noted the servant was required to supply all of his own tools, and his own maintenance and transportation to the work sites. Furthermore, the employment relationship could not be terminated without liability.

The significant considerations in the test of “independently established trade” are that:

The requirement that the employee’s occupation be independently established and that he be customarily engaged and it calls for an enterprise created and existing separate and apart from the relationship with the particular employer; an enterprise that will survive the determination of that relationship. The individual must have a proprietary interest in the enterprise to the extent that he can operate without hindrance from any other individual.

However, it is not skill alone which determines whether an individual is established in a trade or business, but whether that individual by reason of such skill engages himself in an economic enterprise such that he bears the risk of his own unemployment. Whether or not he is unemployed is solely a function of market forces and a demand for skills, not the response of his master to similar economic realities.

The South Dakota legislature has also addressed this issue and stated the difference between an employer and an independent contractor in SDCL 61-1-11. That statute states “service performed by an individual for wages is employment subject to this title unless and until it is shown to the satisfaction of the Department of Labor that: (1) the individual has and will continue to be free from control or direction over the performance of the service, both under his contract of service and in fact; and (2) the individual is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business. The South Dakota legislature defined employee in SDCL 62-1-3 for the purposes of worker’s compensation. The definition is roughly the same as that set forth above.

Roy Hendrickson worked for thirty years at UPS.  His first 19 years were as a package car driver making over 100 stops per day to deliver or pick up packages.  He injured his back in 1992 but did not file a workers’ compensation claim.   In 2002 he injured his back lifting a heavy package, losing two months of work time.  He was diagnosed with sprains, degenerative disc disease and stenosis.  He received an award of 15% permanent partial disability.   He reopened that claim in 2004, settling for 17.5% credit 15% for the prior award.

In 2006 Hendrickson began working as a feeder driver for UPS, driving tractor-trailers to New York City, the Meadowlands, Secaucus, Cranbury and locations in New England.  He drove trucks without air ride suspensions, testifying that he felt shocks and vibrations over pot-hole ridden roads.  He said this activity caused additional pain in his low back, requiring acupuncture treatment.

In 2008 Hendrickson also began working as a shifter driver, which required backing the truck into a trailer and “hitting the pin” to connect the two.   He testified that every time he made the connection, around 75 times per day, there was an impact such that he felt as though he were being punched in the back.

In 2012 Hendrickson was at a mall and collapsed due to pain and numbness radiating down his legs from his low back.  His chiropractor sent him for an MRI in August 2013, which showed herniated discs at L3-4 and L4-5 along with severe stenosis.  His chiropractor refused to treat him after the MRI study, so Hendrickson saw a surgeon who recommended bilateral nerve blocks.  When that failed to relieve his pain, Hendrickson opted for surgery in March 2014 to decompress the disc at L4-5.  The surgery provided three months’ relief, but a repeat MRI showed persistent disc herniation at L4-5 with impingement on the L5 nerve root.  Hendrickson said he continued to work in pain but avoided any non-work activities that might increase his pain.

Hendrickson filed a Claim Petition and a Motion for Medical and Temporary Disability Benefits, asserting that UPS should pay for his back surgery and lost wages based on occupational injuries over the years.  UPS opposed the motion and argued that the claim was time barred because the back problems stemmed from the 2002 trauma.  That claim had not been reopened but once, concluding many years ago.

Petitioner produced testimony from Dr. Michael Cohen, who contended that petitioner’s back problems were not the result of trauma suffered in 2002 but rather repetitive occupational stress over the years.   Dr. Nirav Shah on behalf of UPS testified that petitioner suffered an injury to his back on April 16, 2014 from lifting packages.  However, the record did not support Dr. Shah’s assertion that there was a work accident on April 16, 2014.   Dr. Shah testified that petitioner’s back revealed multiple herniations that were the result of chronic degenerative changes in the spine.  He said these changes progressed naturally, not from repetitive occupational exposures.

The Judge of Compensation found Dr. Cohen to be more persuasive than Dr. Shah.  The judge credited petitioner’s testimony that the 2006 transfer to feeder and shifter work worsened his spine condition.  The judge noted that petitioner frequently bounced around in his truck when driving over potholes or bumps in the road.   The judge further noted that the action of hitting the pin in connecting vehicles created a sensation of petitioner being hit in the low back.  He found Dr. Cohen credible in explaining how driving a tractor trailer objectively worsened petitioner’s low back.   The Judge found Dr. Shah less than credible because in part Dr. Shah mistakenly believed there was a 2014 traumatic accident.  The judge found that there was aggravation and acceleration of petitioner’s spine from 2006 to 2013 caused by work.

UPS appealed and argued again that petitioner’s claim petition was barred by the statute of limitations because everything went back to 2002 accident.  The legal argument was interesting, pitting two major case precedents against each other.  UPS argued that this was like the case of Peterson v. Hermann Forwarding Co., 267 N.J. Super. 493 (App. Div. 1993), certif. denied, 135 N.J. 304 (1994).  In that case a trauma occurred to a truck driver, whose back got progressively worse after the next five brief trucking jobs he worked, eventually leading to total disability.  The Appellate Division placed responsibility in that case on the first employer with the traumatic event, stating that there was no objective proof of worsening over the next five employments.  All of the occupational claims were dismissed.

Petitioner relied on the case of Singletary v. WAWA, 406 N.J. Super. 558 (App. Div. 2009).   The rule in that case was that “Very short periods of employment . . . may allow no reasonable inference of material contribution to disability. In contrast, long periods of physically taxing employment, such as the five years Singletary worked at WAWA after her December 2001 accident, may reasonably support a finding of material contribution of disability.”  The Appellate Division disagreed with UPS and concluded that petitioner’s occupational exposure was largely responsible for causing petitioner’s medical issues.  Counsel for Hendrickson, Mr. Richard Schibell, Esq., contended that petitioner’s back pain progressively worsened over the years due to ongoing stressors at work, and that there was no statute of limitations issue since petitioner was still being exposed to occupational injuries when he filed the claim petition.

The case can be found at Hendrickson v. UPS, A-3627-15T2 (App. Div. July 11, 2017).  The case shows how an occupational orthopedic disease claim must be proved in order to prevail in workers’ compensation.  There must be detailed testimony by the employee or co-employees of credible physical stressors, and then credible medical testimony linking those physical stressors to the medical condition afflicting the claimant.

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John H. Geaney, Esq., is an Executive Committee Member and a Shareholder in Capehart Scatchard's Workers’ Compensation Group.  Mr. Geaney concentrates his practice in the representation of employers, self-insured companies, third-party administrators, and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation, the Americans with Disabilities Act and Family and Medical Leave Act. Should you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Mr. Geaney at 856.914.2063 or by e‑mail at jgeaney@capehart.com.