State News

The case of Budhun v. Reading Hospital and Medical Center, 765 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 2014) shows how complex return-to-work issues can be under FMLA.  The plaintiff in that case, Vanessa Budhun, worked as a credential assistant for Reading Hospital.  About sixty five percent of her job required typing.  Budhun took about four weeks of FMLA leave between March 31, 2010 and May 7, 2010.  An employee from a different department filled in for her during that time. 

            On July 30, 2010, Budhun broke the fifth metacarpal of her hand and came to work with a metal splint on her hand.  An HR manager emailed her stating, “Your supervisor has made us aware that you have an injury that prevents you from working full duty.”  Budhun was given FMLA forms and she left work to see a doctor.  She told her doctor that she could type with the five fingers on her left hand and just her thumb and index finger on her right hand, so Dr. Battista provided a note dated August 10, 2010 stating that Budhun could return to work “no restrictions in splint.”

            Budhun returned to work on August 16, 2010.  She advised HR that her doctor would complete the FMLA form she gave him within 10 to 15 days. She advised in an email that she could “type slowly and write a little bit, but not as fast as I used to . . . I could work but not fast.”   The HR manager wrote back replying that because her return to work note provided no restrictions, Budhun should be able to work at full speed.  She added that if she could not work full speed, she needed to contact her physician and ask for a note keeping her out of work.  The HR representative advised Budhun that she needed to be able to perform at the same capacity she had before her hand injury. 

            Budhun left work again and made contact with her physician, who then supplied a note keeping her out of work until August 16, 2010.  He checked off “yes” on the box referring to her being unable to perform all of her job functions.  He did not clarify which job functions she was unable to perform.  However, the final page of the medical certification was inconsistent in that it stated Budhun needed to be out of work until September 8, 2010.  Budhun underwent occupational therapy. On September 8, 2010, she faxed another note in which Dr. Battista stated she would be out of work until her next appointment in November.

            The hospital extended her FMLA leave until September 23, 2010, when her 12 weeks would run.  It approved non-FMLA leave until November 9, 2010. In mid-September the hospital offered  Budhun’s job to another employee. 

            On September 29, 2010, Budhun emailed the Hospital a note saying she could return to work on October 4, 2010. She was then told that she had been replaced by another employee.  Because of a prior written discipline charge, Budhun was unable to transfer to another position.  She was given the option to apply to the hospital essentially as an outsider for a position but Budhun did not pursue this route, and when her non-FMLA leave ran out in November, she was terminated.

            Budhun sued under the FMLA and argued that she had been able to return to work full duty on August 16, 2010 but the hospital prevented her from working.  The court sided with Budhun:

At the time she entered her place of work on August 16, all of the information that shehad from her treating physician, and all of the information that she had provided to Reading,indicated that she intended to return to work as of that day, and could do so with ‘no restrictions.’

The court said that Budhun’s fitness for duty certification stated she could return to work with no restrictions.  The court noted that Reading did not provide Budhun a list of essential functions for her to present to Dr. Battista, essentially laying the blame on the hospital for the lack of clarity in this area.  The court suggested that the hospital could have contacted Dr. Battista to clarify any issues but failed to do so.  However, it could not delay the return to work of an employee with a full duty return-to-work note. The court criticized the HR manager for overruling the doctor on the return-to-work issue. 

            This case is an important one for employers in the State of New Jersey which is part of the Third Circuit.  The downfall of the hospital here was the failure to provide the essential job functions to the physician, so the physician perhaps did not fully understand the job duties.  The court focused on a strict reading of the FMLA, which provides job reinstatement rights when the employee’s physician indicates that the employee can return to work. 

This case underscores an inherent dilemma in the FMLA for employers. Employees must be able to perform their job duties on return to work.  A return to work with restrictions is not a full-duty return-to-work note.  The question is who decides whether the employee has restrictions?  The FMLA does not allow employers to assess ability to perform essential functions; instead it places this obligation on the physician, who often may not fully understand the essential functions, particularly if the physician has no job description.  Further, physicians have limited time to address such issues with all the other competing demands on medical practices today.  In this case, the employee herself admitted she could only type slowly.  The response of the court on this point was very interesting: “Budhun admitted that it was not likely that she could type as quickly with seven fingers as she formerly could with ten.  But this alone does not mean that she could not perform this essential function.” 

Ex parte Dalton Logistics

Petition for Writ of Mandamus

On November 7, 2014, The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals granted Dalton Logistics Petition for Writ of Mandamus. The Choctaw County Circuit Court had denied Dalton Logistics summary judgment motion, which asserted the Alabama court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the injury that occurred in North Dakota. The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals ordered that the matter be remanded to the trial court and that the trial court enter an order dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The employee was a resident of Alabama and was informed of job openings with Dalton Logistics in North Dakota. The employee was sent "paperwork" via facsimile, which he completed and sent back to Dalton Logistics in North Dakota. Dalton Logistics arranged transport for the employee to North Dakota. Upon arrival, Dalton Logistics housed the employee in a "man camp" located in North Dakota. From the "man camp" Dalton Logistics would transport the employee to various work sites in North Dakota. Dalton Logistics did withhold Alabama income taxes from the employee’s check. The employee would work in North Dakota for 20 days and then Dalton Logistics would provide transportation back to Alabama where the employee would stay for 10 days, performing no work for Dalton Logistics.

The employee was injured on a job site in North Dakota. Dalton Logistics did not file the initial report of injury with North Dakota’s workers’ compensation investigative and adjudicatory entity within 7 days. The employee subsequently filed for workers’ compensation benefits under Alabama law.

In ruling in favor of Dalton Logistics, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals stated that Ala. Code 1975, §25-5-35(d)(1)-(4) addresses claims due to injury which occurred outside of Alabama. Generally, if injured outside of Alabama, and the employee would have been entitled to benefits had he been injured in Alabama, Alabama benefits are owed provide that several alternate conditions are met.

The first condition to consider is: was the employee’s employment principally localized in Alabama. In order to be principally localized in Alabama, or another state, the employer must have a place of business in the specific state, and the employee regularly works out of that place of business, or if the employee is domiciled and spends substantial part of the employee’s working time in service of the employer in that specific state.Associated Gen. Contractors Workers Comp Self Ins. Fund v. Williams, 982 So. 2d 557, 560 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007). In this case, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals ruled that the employee was transported to North Dakota, housed in North Dakota during working periods and traveled to North Dakota locations to perform work for Dalton Logistics. While the employee was provided transport to Alabama he did not perform work for Dalton Logistics while in Alabama. In addition, the fact that Alabama income taxes were withheld did not establish the employment was principally localized in Alabama, as no work was performed in Alabama. Therefore, the employment in this case was principally localized in North Dakota.

The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals next analyzed was the employee working under a contract for hired entered into in Alabama, and, if so, 1) was the employment principally localized in any state, 2) was the employment principally localized in a stated but the employer was not subject to that state’s workers’ compensation laws and 3) was the employment outside the United States. There was no disputed that the employee was working under a contract for hire entered into in Alabama and the Court had already found the employer was principally localized in North Dakota. Therefore, they looked to see if Dalton Logistics was subject to the workers’ compensation laws in North Dakota. The employee cited N.D Cent Code §65-08-01 to support his contention that coverage was not afforded under North Dakota law. However, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals stated that the North Dakota statute merely addressed that injuries sustained outside the state may nonetheless be compensable, which does not apply to injuries that occurred in North Dakota as the case before them. The employee next asserted that by failing to file paperwork in North Dakota within 7 days, Dalton Logistics implicitly recognized that North Dakota benefits where not available. The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals disagreed with this assertion based on the fact that the North Dakota Workers’ Compensation Act has built in sanctions for this situation. N.D. Cent. Code §65-05-01.4. In ruling that the employee had not proven Dalton Logistics was not subject to North Dakota worker’s compensation laws, they cited Barry v. Baker Elec. Coop., Inc., 354 N.W. 2d 666 (1984) (North Dakota law, not Minnesota, applied to claim stemming from injury due to conduct in North Dakota by a Minnesota-domiciled employee of a Minnesota employer). The Court stated "the Barry court expressly noted that ‘North Dakota has a long-standing and strong public policy interest in making workers’ compensation the exclusive remedy against an employer in the case of an injured employee.’" As a result, the Alabama Court o Civil Appeals found that the fact the contract for hire was entered into in Alabama alone did not support the trial court’s decision that it had jurisdiction over the case under the Alabama Worker’s Compensation Act.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

The article was written by Joshua G. Holden, Esq. a Member of Fish, Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation and related liability matters. Mr. Holden is AV rated by Martindale-Hubbell, which is the highest rating an attorney can receive. Holden and his firm are members of The National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network (NWCDN). The NWCDN is a national and Canadian network of reputable law firms organized to provide employers and insurers access to the highest quality representation in workers’ compensation and related employer liability fields.

If you have questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the author atjholden@fishnelson.com or 205-332-1428.

On July 14, 2014, the EEOC issued Enforcement Guidance on the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA).  That law was passed in 1978 to make clear that discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

            The basic premise of the law is that women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions must be treated the same as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.

            Several of the examples provided by the EEOC of possible discrimination concern light duty.  In Example 9 of the Guidance, the Commission provides an example of pregnancy-related animus motivating an employer’s decision to deny a pregnant employee light duty. 

An employee requests light duty because of her pregnancy.  The employee’s supervisor is aware that the employee is pregnant and knows that there are light duty positions available that the pregnant employee could perform.  Nevertheless, the supervisor denies the request, telling the employee that having a pregnant worker in the workplace is just too much of a liability for the company.  It is not necessary in this instance that the pregnant worker produce evidence of a non-pregnant worker similar in his or her ability or inability to work who was given a light duty position. 

The Commission goes on to state that even if there are no statements showing an animus, a pregnant worker can establish a violation of the PDA by showing that she was denied light duty or reasonable accommodations.  In Example 10 the Commission states:

An employer has a policy or practice of providing light duty, subject to availability, for any employee who cannot perform one or more job duties for up to 90 days due to injury, illness, or a condition that would be a disability under the ADA.  An employee requests a light duty assignment for a 20-pound lifting restriction related to her pregnancy.  The employer denies the light duty request, claiming that pregnancy itself does not constitute an injury, illness, or disability, and that the employee has not provided any evidence that the restriction is the result of pregnancy-related impairment that constitutes a disability under the ADA.  The employer has violated the PDA because the employer’s policy treats pregnant employees differently from other employees similar in their ability or inability to work.

However, the Commission goes on to say that if the employer has certain restrictions, such as limits on the number of light duty positions or the duration of light duty assignments, the employer can apply those restrictions across the board, including to pregnant workers. 

The Commission also provides Example 12, demonstrating failure of an employer to apply restrictions equally. 

An employer makes six light duty positions available to workers unable to perform one or more job duties due to an on the job injury, pregnancy, or an injury, illness, or condition that would constitute a disability under the ADA.  A pregnant worker applies for a light duty assignment as a result of work restrictions imposed by her pregnancy.  The employer denies the request, claiming that all six positions are currently filled.  The employee produces evidence that, in the past, the employer has provided light duty assignments to workers injured on the job even when all six assignments were filled.  The employee has provided evidence that the policy’s restrictions were not applied equally to the pregnant worker’s request for a light duty position. 

The Guidance is helpful to employers in understanding and avoiding potential acts of discrimination in relation to pregnant employees.  Employers who have a paternalistic approach to pregnant employees may easily stumble into violations of the PDA.  The focus should be on the ability of the pregnant employee to perform the essential job functions, not on speculative assessments of what a pregnant employee may or may not be able to do.  Stereotypes and assumptions that employers have about pregnant employees generally lead to ill-advised decisions.  For further information on the Enforcement Guidance on Pregnancy Discrimination, please contact the undersigned.

The Division is about to take aim at insurance carrier peer reviewers.

The agency is in the process of creating a Peer Review Plan-Based Audit, which it says will define

the scope, methodology, and selection criteria of its review process. A draft of the Plan Based Audit

is posted it on the Division website. It says that its purpose is to:

• Promote the delivery of quality healthcare in a cost-effective manner;

• Ensure peer reviewers adhere to requirements when issuing peer review reports for extent

of injury and/or medical necessity issues;

• Ensure peer reviewers review and maintain records when performing peer review; and

• Ensure that peer reviewers hold the appropriate credentials when performing peer review.

Once the Plan-Based Audit is finalized, the Division will begin collecting and reviewing select peer

reviews that address extent of injury and medical necessity issues. It appears that the Division will

be focusing on (among other things) whether peer reviewers (1) rely on evidence-based medicine,

(2) use Division treatment guidelines, and (3) comply with Division Rule 180.28 which governs peer

review requirements, reporting, and sanctions.

The Division seeks comment from stakeholders on the current draft. Suggestions for improvement

can be emailed to OMA@tdi.texas.gov by 5 p.m. Central Time on November 4.

The Division has published the results of disciplinary action taken last month and, as usual, they

look a little – uh – lopsided.

In September the agency disciplined twice as many carriers (8) as providers (4). Furthermore, the

Division took a lot more hide from the carriers’ backside. The largest monetary penalty it assessed

against a provider was $7,500. In contrast, the Division assessed a penalty of $40,000 against one

carrier and a penalty of $47,000 against another.

This is in keeping with the trend. The Division’s statistics show that since January 1, 2014, it has

assessed penalties totaling $1,658,245 for insurance carriers and only $65,600 for health care

providers.

The Dallas Court of Appeals has denied rehearing of a decision that we first mentioned in our

August newsletter. The decision explains that the “continuous coverage rule” is not exactly what the

name implies. The court held that a Texas-based worker was not covered when killed while on a

business trip to New York City.

Ronald Davis worked in Texas but had a business meeting in New York scheduled for a Monday.

He flew to New York on the previous Saturday and checked into a hotel. The next day, Sunday, he

was crossing a street near Central Park at 10:30 a.m. when he was hit by a bicyclist and killed. He

was 10 blocks away from his hotel. No one knows where he had been or where he was going.

Mr. Davis’ family argued that he was covered under the continuous coverage rule. Under that rule,

an employee whose work entails travel away from the employer’s premises is in the course of his

employment when the injury has its origin in a risk created by the necessity of sleeping or eating

away from home, except when a distinct departure on a personal errand is shown.

The Division of Workers’ Compensation found the injury to be non-compensable, so the Davis

family had the burden of proof on judicial review. Although there was no evidence that Mr. Davis

was on a personal errand at the time of the accident, the court found the injury to be noncompensable.

It reasoned that the Davis family had the burden of showing that Mr. Davis wasnot

on a personal errand or mission at the time of the accident and, because they could make no such

showing, they could not meet their burden of proof.

Davis v. Texas Mutual Insurance Company, ___ S. W.3d ___, 2014 WL 3705130 (Tex. App. –

Dallas 2104).

We in Texas are at ground zero in the Ebola scare. The first person to test positive for the disease

in the United States treated at Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital, and two of his nurses contracted

the virus and were quarantined. These events have raised questions regarding the interplay between

Ebola and workers’ compensation insurance coverage. Specifically, under what circumstances is a

worker covered under a workers’ compensation insurance policy if the worker tests positive for the

Ebola virus or is quarantined for monitoring?

This question has no bright-line answer. On the one hand, a compensable injury includes an

occupational disease. On the other hand, the term occupational disease does not include an ordinary

disease of life to which the general public is exposed outside of employment.

Generally speaking, to prove a compensable occupational disease, a worker must show that the

disease is indigenous to the work or present in an increased degree in that work as compared with

employment generally. Using that standard, the two quarantined hospital nurses probably can meet

their burden of proof to show that their conditions are compensable. The same is true for others on

the front line, such as laboratory workers and emergency responders.

But what about those who are not on the front lines but still face possible exposure, such as airline

flight attendants? Or workers who travel on airlines for business? Would they be covered?

The blogosphere is red hot with discussions of questions like these as insurance carriers, employers,

and state regulators scramble to find answers.

So, remember this: To get a DD to address MMI or IR after a BRC or CCH the BRO or HO will

send a PODODDE, not a DWC-32. Capisce?

It’s called the Presiding Officer’s Directive to Order a Designated Doctor Exam, and it’s the

newest thing at Division field offices. You’ll start seeing it come across your desk, because the

Division now uses it when Benefit Review Officers and Hearing Officers (now collectively

called “Presiding Officers”) order designated doctor exams.

In the past, a Presiding Officer ordered a designated doctor exam like the rest of us – by filling

out a Form DWC-32 (Request for Designated Doctor Exam). Not any more. Effective 10/01/14,

Presiding Officers are to use the new form.

Accordingly to a memo from Kerry Sullivan, the Division’s Deputy Commissioner of Hearings,

“the purpose of this change is to clarify when an examination is ordered by a Presiding Officer

and to identify clearly what the Presiding Officer is ordering the DD to address.” (Why that

requires a new, special form we’re not sure.)

Unless you have been cryogenically frozen in carbonite for the past 3 months, you have probably heard about the recent opinion released by Miami-Dade Circuit Judge Jorge Cueto which declared the Florida Exclusivity Doctrine unconstitutional.  His 22 page opinion (Padgett v. State of Florida No. 11-13661 CA 25) attacked the erosion of the Florida workers’ compensation system as a whole and asserted that the value of the benefits available to claimants did not justify thequid pro quo tort liability protections afforded employers.  The purpose of this article is to provide a general outline of what lead to Judge Cueto’s opinion and to consider its effect on a national scale.

Accident and Injury

The employee, Elsa Padgett, was an account clerk who tripped over some boxes that were left on the floor by a co-worker.  She reportedly fell on her hip and sustained significant injury to her shoulder.  After undergoing replacement surgery for her shoulder, she claimed that the resulting pain forced her to retire. 

Procedural Background

Padgett opted to file a negligence lawsuit against her employer.  In its Answer, the employer asserted the Exclusivity Doctrine (§440.11, Fla. Stat. 2003) as an affirmative defense.  Padgett then amended her Complaint to add a Count for Declaratory Relief asking the Court to declare the Florida Exclusivity Doctrine in violation of the U.S. and the Florida Constitutions.  Once Florida Worker’ Advocates (FWA) and Workers Injury Law & Advocacy Group (WILG) joined the party as interveners, the employer strategically withdrew its Exclusivity Doctrine defense and the negligence action was severed from the Declaratory Relief portion of the lawsuit.  The Florida Attorney General opted not to intervene in order to defend the constitutionality or validity of the Exclusivity Doctrine.  However, she did file a responsive pleading pointing out various procedural and substantive defects in the case.  FWA and WILG next sought a summary judgment but Judge Cueto denied the motion on the grounds that there was no longer a present justiciable controversy.  Padgett then intervened in the Declaratory Relief action which presented a controversy upon which Judge Cueto could rule (Florida empowers a judge to decide an issue if that issue is capable of repetition in the future and might evade review).

Erosion of Benefits

In his written opinion, Judge Cueto noted that the system of workers’ compensation is supposed to be the result of a compromise wherein employees receive immediate access to indemnity and medical benefits through a no-fault insurance system and employers are insulated, with limited exceptions, from tort liability.  He then pointed out that the benefits afforded employees had been greatly reduced as the result of the 2003 amendments that eliminated permanent partial disability benefits, put a 5 year cap on permanent and total disability benefits, capped said benefits at age 75, and apportioned medical care by requiring contribution in the form of co-pays by the employee after reaching maximum medical improvement.   Judge Cueto concluded that the Florida workers’ compensation system no longer provided adequate indemnity and medical benefits for injured workers and that preventing them from pursuing a tort remedy was a violation of due process.

Ruling

Judge Cueto ruled that the Florida Exclusivity Doctrine was unconstitutional on August 13, 2014.  One week later, he denied a motion for rehearing filed by the Attorney General’s office.

Appeal

The Attorney General appealed Judge Cueto’s ruling to the Third District Court of Appeal on August 26, 2014.  The case is now calledFlorida v. Florida Workers’ Advocates.  Should the District Court of Appeal decide to rule, its decision could become the law for the Third District, and possibly followed by the other Florida districts.  The Third District Court declined to certify the case directly to the Supreme Court and the District Court of Appeal also denied that request.  The Attorney General’s initial Brief is due on or before December 4, 2014.

According to Casey Gilson attorney Rayford Taylor, who practices in Georgia and Florida, there is a legitimate chance that Judge Cueto’s ruling will be treated merely as an advisory opinion rather than a declaratory judgment.    None of the Interveners established that they had been injured or prejudiced by the Exclusivity Doctrine, or by the provisions they cited as a basis for a challenge to the statute.  The issue may need to be addressed again the next time an employee sues an employer in tort and the employer asserts the Exclusivity Doctrine as a defense.

Other Constitutional Attacks in Florida

The Padgett case is not the first time this particular claimant’s attorney has taken the offensive against the Florida Workers’ Compensation Act on constitutional grounds.  According to attorney Rob Grace, who practices with the Bleakley Bavol firm in Florida, this same attorney has filed a number of these suits around the state during the last five years. Padgett just happened to be one where a judge accepted his argument.  The attorney filed a similar suit in Broward County which was dismissed approximately five years ago.  At the same time, the attorney had another comparable suit (Stahl v. Tenet Health Systems, Inc.) in Dade County which he lost at the Third District Court of Appeals level. 

The Florida Supreme Court is currently considering a couple of other cases involving constitutional attacks on the state’s workers’ compensation system.  In the case ofWestphal v. City of St. Petersburg, The Court has before it an appeal from a firefighter who was injured and left with no income after his temporary indemnity benefits expired.  His authorized doctors took him out of work and he was not eligible for additional benefits until the doctors placed him at maximum medical improvement.  The firefighter is challenging the constitutionality of the statutory limit on the payment of temporary total disability benefits.

In the case of Castellanos v. Next Door Company, the Florida Supreme Court is considering an appeal challenging the constitutionality of the statute that provides for the calculation of attorneys’ fees in workers’ compensation matters, based solely on a statutory percentage of benefits achieved by the attorney.

Other States

Although it has not yet risen to the level of a national trend, several other states have seen constitutional attacks on certain aspects of their respective workers’ compensation systems. 

In California, the constitutionality of the workers’ compensation lien system was recently raised in the case ofAngelotti Chiropractic v. Baker. 

Approximately 20 years ago, the entire Texas Workers’ Compensation Act withstood a constitutional challenge and, more recently, the Texas Office of Injured Employees Counsel released a few reports last year that pointed out the inequities of the alternative dispute resolution program. 

In Tennessee, there have been some unsuccessful constitutional attacks on other parts of the workers’ compensation statute (i.e. multipliers and the Medical Impairment Registry program) but not the Exclusivity Doctrine. 

Approximately 6 years ago In Alabama, an employee filed a motion seeking to have the $220 cap for permanent partial benefits deemed unconstitutional.  The judge denied the motion but stated in his Order that the cap set 23 years prior basically guarantees poverty for claimants and their families.  The judge further stated that "the trial courts see these workers leave our courtrooms week after week, without the ability to support themselves or their families."  The judge deemed the cap unfair but not unconstitutional and called upon the Alabama Legislature to make the change.  Several legislative attempts at increasing the cap have been made since that time but all have been unsuccessful. 

Moral of the Story

According to Rob Grace, “my prediction is that, in the end, nothing will come ofPadgett.  Maybe I will be proven wrong but I find it difficult to believe that our supreme court is going to basically throw out the entire workers’ compensation statute.”  Rayford Taylor agrees with Grace.  According to Taylor, “I do not see how mere allegations that certain provisions are different from what they once were invalidates the tort immunity of an employer whose only offense was complying with the statute.”  Even if Grace and Taylor are correct, there remain lessons that can be learned from the Padgett opinion and other such cases.  The more you reduce benefits to employees, the more susceptible to constitutional attacks your workers’ compensation system becomes.  In his now already infamous opinion, Judge Cueto referred to a First District Court of Appeal comment on the “minimum” requirements necessary for a workers’ compensation system to pass constitutional muster.  InBradley v. Hurricane Restaurant (an 18 year old case that interestingly involved both attorneys Taylor and Grace), the Court stated that workers’ compensation law continues to be a “reasonable alternative to tort litigation” when it “provides injured workers with full medical care and benefits for disability (loss of wage earning capacity) and permanent impairment regardless of fault, without the delay and uncertainty of tort litigation.”  In Judge Cueto’s opinion, the Florida system does not meet this minimum.  Does yours?

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About the Author

This article was written by Michael I. Fish, Esq. of Fish Nelson & Holden LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation matters. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of The National Workers’ Compensation Network (NWCDN). If you have any questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the author atmfish@fishnelson.com or any firm member at 205-332-1448.