State News : New Jersey

In a surprising decision from the New Jersey Supreme Court, an award to Cheryl Hersh, an employee of Morris County, was reversed on April 1, 2014.

Ms. Hersh was employed by the County since September 2002 as a Senior Clerk in the Board of Elections.  In 2004 the County assigned her free parking at a private garage on Cattano Avenue located about two blocks from the Administration Building where she worked.  The garage contained several hundred parking spaces of which the County rented about 65 for its employees.  Hersh was unable to park next to the county building in the county parking lot because she lacked sufficient seniority.  Instead, she was permitted to park at the Cattano Garage but she was not given an assigned space.

On January 29, 2010, Hersh parked her car in the Cattano Garage, exited on Cattano Avenue, and began walking one-half block to Washington Street.  As she crossed Washington Street, she was struck by a motor vehicle that ran a red light. Hersh brought a workers’ compensation claim and prevailed in the Division of Workers’ Compensation.  The Appellate Division affirmed her award.  The County appealed.

The County argued that this case was different from the decision in Livingstone v. Abraham & Strauss, Inc., 111N.J. 89 (1989).  In that case, the employer required its employees to park in a distant location of a mall parking lot so that the customers of the store would have access to the lot closest to the store. The petitioner was injured when she was struck by a vehicle walking to the store, and the Supreme Court found that injury compensable.   Here the County argued that there was no real benefit to the employer in having employees park in the Cattano Garage. 

The Supreme Court agreed with the County in finding that two factors distinguished theLivingstone case that were missing from Ms. Hersh’s case:

Of chief concern in Livingstone, supra, was the employer-derived benefit that was created by dictating that employees park at the far end of the lot. Ibid.  The employer’s business benefit, along with the added hazard employees were forced to endure by the employer while they walked through the parking lot, made the injury compensable.Ibid. 

The Court found that the Cattano Garage was not part of the premises of the County, and significantly, the County did not control the garage.  It was neither owned nor maintained by the County.  “The County derived no direct business interest from paying for employees to park in the Cattano Garage.  Most importantly, the accident occurred on a public street not under the control of the County.  In walking a few blocks from the Cattano Garage to her workplace, Hersh did not assume any special or additional hazard.”

            The case is significant because on the surface, the facts appeared to be on all fours withLivingstone as noted by the Judge of Compensation and the Appellate Division.  The Supreme Court seemed to suggest that there must be a special benefit to the employer or additional hazard for an accident of this nature to be found compensable.  The tenor of the case is that parking privileges were a perquisite, much like having a company-paid car, but these facts do not make the injury compensable.

            This case may be found at Hersh v. County of Morris, A-59-12, (April 1, 2014).  

The ADA Amendments Act has substantially broadened coverage under the law.  An example comes inGogos v. AMS Mechanical Systems, Inc., 737 F.3d 1170 (7^th Cir. 2013).  Mr. Gogos worked as a pipe welder and had been taking medication to reduce his elevated blood pressure for the past eight years.  He commenced employment with the defendant in December 2012 as a welder.  One month later his blood pressure spiked to a very high level, causing some intermittent vision loss. 

            After reporting to work on January 30, 2013, Gogos noticed that his right eye was red.  He sought and received permission to obtain immediate medical treatment for his blood pressure and ocular conditions.  As he left the work site to go for treatment, he saw his general foreman and said he was headed to the hospital for health reasons.  The foreman immediately fired him.

            Gogos sued under the ADA, but his case was dismissed by the district court because the court felt that his medical conditions were transitory.  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the ADA Amendments Act and observed: “Under the 2008 amendments, a person with an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, or a record of one, is disabled, even if the impairment is ‘transitory and minor’ (defined as lasting six months or less).   The court noted that the “transitory and minor” language only applies if the law suit is premised on being regarded as having an impairment. That was not the basis of Mr. Gogos’s law suit.  The court also noted that impairments that are episodic or in remission constitute a disability if they substantially limit a major life activity when active.

Based on these provisions, Gogos’s episode of a blood-pressure spike and vision loss are covered disabilities.  He attributes both problems to his longstanding blood-pressure condition, and the ADA’s implementing regulation lists hypertension as an example of an ‘impairment that may be episodic.’  Under the 2008 amendments, ‘the fact that the periods during which an episodic impairment is active and substantially limits a major life activity may be brief or occur infrequently is no longer relevant to determining whether the impairment substantially limits a major life activity.’

            The court said that what was relevant was whether Gogos’s higher-than-usual blood pressure and vision loss substantially impaired a major life activity when they occurred. The court accepted Gogos’s argument that he had impairment of two major life activities: circulatory function and eyesight.  The court also said that the chronic blood-pressure condition could also qualify as a disability because mitigating measures, such as medication that controls the condition, cannot be considered when assessing disability.  The condition must be considered without the benefit of medication in determining whether the condition is substantially limiting.  For these reasons the court vacated the dismissal of Gogos’s case.

            The lesson here is to appreciate that coverage under the ADA has been greatly expanded.  In the aftermath of the ADA Amendments Act, it will be extremely difficult for an employer to prevail in ADA litigation by arguing that there is no covered disability.

Among the hardest cases for employers to contend with are those where the claimant already has an advanced degenerative or arthritic condition and then has an injury.  That was the situation when Veronica Graham, a 55-year-old Certified Nursing Assistant, fell on a wet floor at work on June 25, 2011.  She landed on her left hip, buttocks, and back and was diagnosed with a contusion of the left hip. 

            Initially Graham returned to work with no pain, but within a few days she began to have hip pain.  She was referred to a physician who recommended three physical therapy sessions.  She was placed on light duty while in physical therapy and then returned to work full duty on her discharge date of  July 18, 2011.

            Graham said that she did not experience pain after the accident but did start having pain following physical therapy for her left hip.  She had to stop working in October due to her pain. 

            In November 2011, Graham met with Dr. Gregory S. Maslow, an orthopedic surgeon, who prescribed Percocet for pain management and took x-rays, which showed moderately severe degenerative arthritis of the left hip.  The x-rays showed petitioner lacked cartilage between her hip bone and hip socket.  Dr. Maslow gave an opinion that the work accident caused a previously asymptomatic condition to become symptomatic and thereby accelerated the time frame for a need for hip replacement surgery.

            The respondent’s expert, Dr. Hausmann, an orthopedic surgeon, opined that petitioner had “very severe arthritis” and said that this condition predated the work accident.  In his opinion, petitioner would have needed total hip replacement surgery regardless of the fall at work.  He said that there was a complete loss of the joint space and large spurs around the hip joint.

            The Judge of Compensation accepted the testimony of Dr. Maslow over Dr. Hausmann and found for the petitioner.  The employer appealed and argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding in favor of petitioner.  For one thing, the employer argued that petitioner had showed a lack of candor when she failed to disclose an earlier automobile accident and therefore could not be found to be credible in her entire testimony.  There is a doctrine in the law derived from the Latin phrase, “falsus in unum, falsus in omnibus.”  It means false in one thing, false in everything. The Judge of Compensation disagreed with this philosophy and found that the petitioner’s lack of candor was inconsequential since the prior car accident did not pertain to any hip problem.

            The Appellate Division affirmed the decision in favor of petitioner.  The court said,“With respect to petitioner’s claim of exacerbation and acceleration of degenerative arthritis, the record amply supports the judge’s finding that petitioner’s accident caused her previously asymptomatic hip to become symptomatic and increasingly painful.” The court cited previous case law to the effect that “Employers take their employees as they find them, ‘with all of the pre-existing disease and infirmity that may exist.’ “Verge v. Cnty. Of Morris, 272 N.J. Super. 118, 125 (App. Div. 1994).

            This case involves a fairly common situation for employers.  The case involved mostly the concept of “acceleration. ”  There was no dispute that petitioner would have needed a hip replacement at some point in time, so the issue in the case was whether the timing of that surgery changed because of the work accident.  The court was of the opinion that if the accident hastened the need for surgery, even if surgery would have been inevitable eventually, then the employer must pay for the surgery.  In handling similar cases, employers need to focus on prior medical discovery because this case turned on the fact that respondent was never able to prove petitioner had prior hip complaints.  The case also shows that proof that a claimant is not candid in testimony will not necessarily doom the petitioner’s case if the judge feels the lack of candor was not material to the claim.

            This case may be found at Graham v. Silver Care Nursing Center, A-2923-12T2 (App. Div. March 7, 2014).

Many clients ask what the difference is between the defense of independent contractor and casual employment.  The truth is that the defenses are very similar, and one important case,Berkeyheiser v. Mollie S. Woolf, 71 N.J. Super. 171, (App. Div. 1961), illustrates this point.

            The case involved a man who worked full time for St. Regis Paper Company as a pipefitter five days a week, seven and one half hours per day.  From time to time, he performed some odd jobs for Mollie S. Woolf, who owned several buildings. He repaired some doorbells in buildings in 1956.  In September 1957, he repaired a damaged ceiling in a building.  He also installed some shields over doorbells to prevent children from unnecessarily pushing on them.  In November 1957, he repaired apartment windows that had been damaged and installed two window sashes in an apartment.  In February 1958 he repaired some outlets and worked all day.

            On July 12, 1958, Mr. Berkeyheiser borrowed a drill from his son and started to install an electric outlet for a refrigerator in the home of Mollie S. Woolf.  The drill struck a live wire and caused injury to his right eye and facial scars.  He filed a workers’ compensation claim. 

            The facts showed that Mr. Berkeyheiser did not hold himself out to the general public as a repair person.  He had only done some repair work for one other person besides respondent.  The respondent would provide the equipment, of if she did not have the equipment, Berkeyheiser would purchase it and bill respondent.  He was paid by the hour and there was no withholding from his pay.

            The Judge of Compensation found petitioner to be an independent contractor, and the County Court affirmed.  Berkeyheiser appealed and argued that the work he performed was essential to the maintenance and operation of respondent’s business, the so-called relative nature of the work test. 

            The Court said, “Overlapping between casual employees and independent contractors is common, and it is not unusual that a petitioner falls into either or both unprotected classes.”  The Appellate Division held that there a number of factors arguing against employment here.  Petitioner had a regular and permanent full-time job at a substantial salary.  He had no expectation of regular and steady employment by the respondent and only worked when the need arose.  He did not perform repairs on a scheduled basis but would choose the times when he would appear to make repairs. 

We conclude that the character of the work was such as to preclude petitioner from the right to compensation under the Workers’ Compensation Act.  We have accepted all his factual contentions as true, but they do not establish the essential existence of an employer-employee relationship.  Whether he was more a casual employee or an independent contractor need not be decided.  There is no merit to petitioner’s claim that would justify an award, either within the letter or spirit of this remedial legislation.

            This case is useful for practitioners in dealing with these two very close cousins:  the independent contractor defense and the casual employee defense.

          Adesina Mercer worked for the Arc of Prince George County from 2004 to 2011.  Her job included applying for and processing initial applications for benefits for Food Stamps and Social Security. 

            In May 2007, The Arc put Mercer on conditional employment status due to poor work performance.  She was returned to regular status the next month. However, while she was on medical leave in 2009, her co-workers discovered that many of the Arc’s food-stamp-eligible clients were no longer receiving benefits.  When Mercer returned to work, this issue was addressed with her and she was instructed to take steps to renew those clients’ benefits.

            In October 2010, Mercer received a performance review which was largely average with only one category being above average.  The next month, The Arc once again discovered that some food-stamp-eligible clients were not receiving benefits.  Mercer was provided with a list of clients and told to pursue reinstatement of benefits.

Mercer countered that these kinds of lapses in benefits were fairly commonplace.  She felt that she should not be reprimanded for these lapses.

            In January 2011, Mercer was involved in a car accident with injuries that kept her out of work for about three weeks.  She requested and obtained FMLA leave.   While Mercer was on leave, other workers performed her job and discovered again that there were many more eligible clients not receiving benefits due to Mercer’s failure to submit renewal or redetermination requests.

            Mercer returned to work on February 22, 2011 and was placed on administrative leave due to poor job performance.  At the end of the five-day administrative leave period, Mercer sought additional FMLA leave until March 14, 2011.

            The investigation of Mercer continued, leading The Arc to conclude Mercer grossly deviated from her job’s requirements and failed to obtain Food Stamp benefits for 99 of 160 eligible clients.  For this reason her employment was terminated during her FMLA leave.  

            Mercer sued and argued that her termination constituted unlawful interference with the exercise of her FMLA rights.  The Arc moved to dismiss the case, and the district court ruled for the Arc.  Mercer appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.  The Court said that “being on FMLA leave does not provide an employee any greater rights than he or she would have had without taking leave, and an employee’s right to reinstatement is not absolute.”

An employer has discretion to discipline or terminate the employment of an at-will employee for poor performance regardless of whether the employer’s reason for terminating the employment was discovered while the employee is taking FMLA leave.

Mercer argued that her employer improperly used her leave request to generate a reason for termination.  The Court said the fact that the leave permitted The Arc to discover the problems with Mercer’s job performance could not logically be a bar to the employer’s ability to fire a deficient employee. 

            The case is helpful because it demonstrates an important rule, namely that an employee on FMLA leave is not entitled to greater rights than the employee would have had without taking leave.  The case can be found atMercer v. The Arc of Prince George County, Inc., 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 14060 (4^th Cir. 2013).

The City of Gibraltar employed 41 employees excluding its “volunteer” firefighters.  When it fired one of the firefighters, Paul Mendel, he sued under the FMLA. The City countered that it was not covered under the FMLA because it had less than 50 employees. There were 25-30 “volunteer firefighters” whom the City contended were not truly employees and should not be counted toward the 50 employee threshold.

            The issue in the case came down to the definition of “employee” for purposes of the FMLA.  The firefighters did not receive health, sick, or vacation benefits; nor did they receive social security benefits.  They did training on their own time.  On the other hand, when the volunteer firefighters responded to any emergency call or maintained equipment, there were paid $15 per hour. 

1.      The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals studied the Fair Labor Standards Act to obtain the definition of “employee” since the FMLA and FLSA use the same standard.  The Court observed that the United States Supreme Court previously adopted an “economic reality” test to determine whether someone was an employee for purposes of the FLSA. While the district court found that the City had no control over the firefighters, the Court of Appeals said that lack of control was not sufficient to account for the result in this case.  “Each time a firefighter responds to a call, he knows he will receive compensation at a particular hourly rate -- which happens to be substantially similar to the hourly rates paid to full-time employed firefighters in some of the neighboring areas.”

            The Court noted that the FLSA excludes those who receive only a nominal fee from the definition of employee, but the Court did not consider a payment of $15 per hour to be a nominal fee. Therefore the Court held in favor of employment status for the so-called City of Gibraltar volunteer firefighters.  It found that the FMLA applied to the City and to Mr. Mendel’s law suit:

Despite the fact that the Gibraltar firefighters are referred to as ‘volunteers,’ the inescapable fact nevertheless remains that they ‘work in contemplation of compensation.’  Thus, the Gibraltar firefighters are ‘employees’ and not ‘volunteers’ within the meaning of the FLSA.

There was an interesting dissent in this case in which it was argued that the City does not require a firefighter to respond to any fires and did not supervise such firefighters on the scene.  Someone could go for years without responding to a single fire.  The dissent pointed out that the volunteers really were not paid $15 per hour considering the fact that they had to complete 152 hours of training, pass an exam and then complete an additional 73 hours of training each year -- all without pay.

This case can be found at Mendel v. City of Gibraltar, 727 F.3d 565 (6^th Cir. 2013).

          Remi Beausejour had problems with his lower back dating back to 2006 when he injured his back at work.  He had pain in his back down his right leg.  An MRI showed degenerative disc disease and a disc herniation at L3-4 and L4-5 levels.  He also experienced radiculopathy at the time and was discharged from treatment four months post injury.

            Beausejour suffered a second low back injury in January 2008 and another one on September 17, 2009.  Both injuries required treatment to the lower back.  After the September 2009 incident, he was unable to sit due to the extreme pain. 

            An MRI was performed on September 28, 2009, showing a small right paracentral annular tear and disc herniation at L1-2, with bulging discs at L2-3 and L3-4, and a disc herniation at L4-5 with lumbar radiculopathy.  He required epidural injections at this time and was out of work for three weeks. The last injection occurred in November 2009.

            The accident which was the subject of this case occurred on December 2, 2009 when Beausejour fell 18 feet from a ladder and fractured his left ankle. Beausejour had an EMG in 2010 which revelaed acute L5-S1 radiculopathy.  He contended that this fall at work aggravated his preexisting lower back condition.  A new MRI was ordered on January 17, 2011.  That MRI showed much the same findings as the 2009 MRI. 

            At trial two orthopedic experts testified.  Dr. Lance Markbreiter compared the 2009 MRI with the 2011 MRI and said that there was no significant change and no traumatic findings.  He felt that the degenerative changes on the MRI were what one would have expected given the two-year gap in dates of the studies. Dr. Markbreiter felt that there would have been much more pathology on the 2011 MRI if the fall from the ladder had actually produced a back injury.  He felt that petitioner’s lower back complaints would have been the same regardless of the fall.

            Dr. Cary Skolnick testified for petitioner.  He said that the fall in 2009 aggravated and exacerbated petitioner’s preexisting lumbar degenerative disc disease. 

            The Honorable Watson Berich, Judge of Compensation, held that Dr. Markbreiter’s testimony was more persuasive, in part because he had been petitioner’s treating doctor after the 2009 fall.  In contrast, Dr. Skolnick had only seen petitioner on one occasion for an IME.  Judge Berich found that there was no demonstrable objective medical evidence of any aggravation of the petitioner’s preexisting condition and therefore dismissed the claim petition.

            Petitioner appealed to the Appellate Division, which noted that a petitioner in an aggravation case must provide proof of both legal and medical causation.  “Medical causation means the injury is a physical or emotional consequence of work exposure” and “that the disability was actually caused by the work-related event.”  (citations omitted).  The court added that generally an opinion of a treating doctor is entitled to greater weight than that of an evaluating doctor on causation.  For these reasons the Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of petitioner’s claim petition for partial permanent disability. 

            This case provides guidance on the term “aggravation.”  The Judge of Compensation clearly appreciated that this term means more than just “more pain.”  Since the MRI findings were exactly the same after the fall as before the fall, it was very difficult for petitioner to prove aggravation.  The case also illustrates the advantage given generally to treating doctors over IME doctors. 

This case can be found at Beausejour v. Chamberlin Plumbing & Heating, Inc., A-1459-12T4, (App. Div. January 29, 2014).

             The premises rule in New Jersey states that employees are covered when they are on property owned or controlled by the employer.  How far can this be stretched?  When a car accident occurs on a public street with only part of the car touching the employer’s premises, is an injury still covered under the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act?

            This precise issue was posed in Burdette v. Harrah’s Atlantic City, A-4797-12T1 (App. Div. January 17, 2014).  A casino dealer, Carla Burdette finished her shift and proceeded to her Ford Explorer in the Harrah’s parking yard.  She then drove her vehicle along an internal Harrah’s driveway, passed through a Harrah’s security gate, and made a lawful left turn on MGM Mirage Boulevard, a three lane public highway. 

            At the very same time, another vehicle was proceeding northwest and collided with Burdette’s vehicle. The impact occurred on MGM Mirage Boulevard, but a portion of the rear of Burdette’s car was positioned over the Harrah’s driveway apron. 

            Burdette filed a claim petition seeking workers’ compensation benefits.  Harrah’s rejected the claim and asserted that the impact of the accident occurred on a public street, not on Harrah’s property.  The Judge of Compensation noted that about one foot of Burdette’s car was still in the area of the parking lot controlled by Harrah’s and therefore found the case to be compensable.  Harrah’s appealed.

            The Appellate Division reviewed the premises rule and observed that the key questions were where the accident occurred and did the employer control the location of the accident.  The court said that the workers’ compensation act must be liberally construed in favor of coverage for the protection of employees. 

The circumstances of the present case plainly reveal that Burdette never fully left her employer’s premises.  Although her vehicle was in the midst of navigating a left turn onto a public thoroughfare, the exact spot where Burdette suffered injuries was neither remote from, nor unconnected to, her work premises.  We reject Harrah’s ultra-rigid approach that focuses only on the colliding vehicles’ point of impact and the front seat location of Burdette in her Explorer. Instead, applying the common sense and the policies inherent in the Act, we subscribe to the judge of compensation’s viewpoint that the injuries suffered here were a result of Burdette’s firm attachment to her place of employment, albeit while on her way home.

            This case illustrates that any established rule can seem capricious at the margins.  When it comes to the premises rule, courts will interpret the rule liberally in favor of coverage given the social policy behind our workers’ compensation laws.

Bryan Shirley worked for Wman-Gordon Forgings, L.P. (“W-G”) as an operator of the largest extrusion press in the world.  Company policy required that any employee who should develop a problem with drugs or alcohol may confidentially inform the HR manager in order to pursue treatment.  Failure to comply with treatment could subject the employee to discharge.

Shirley suffered a near overdose in November 2009.  He requested a medical leave to be treated for his addiction.  He entered a program in Houston, Texas, involving two steps:  first, cleansing the body of drugs, and second, undergoing treatment to curb the need for the drug. 

Shirley completed the detox portion of the program on December 5, 2009.  Against the recommendation of his treating doctor, Shirley sought to be discharged before completing the second portion of the program.  He saw his physician who gave him a return-to-work note on December 9, 2009.  The HR representative informed Shirley that his early departure from the program was grounds for termination under the company’s drug-free workplace policy.  The company allowed Shirley to reenter the program to complete the second phase. 

After the second admission to the program, Shirley tested positive for hydrocodone on readmission.  He admitted to taking Vicodin following his initial discharge.  After only one day of detox, he checked himself out again.  A few days later the company fired Shirley for twice failing to complete the program.  Shirley sued under the ADA and argued that as he should be protected from job termination because he was participating in a rehabilitation program.

The district court ruled against Shirley, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.  The court noted that current users of illegal drugs are not protected by the ADA.  It said that someone who had used illegal drugs in the weeks or even months preceding the adverse employment action may be considered a current user of illegal drugs. 

Shirley argued that he was participating in a supervised rehab program and was no longer engaging in illegal drug use when he was fired.  The court said that the mere fact that he was in a program did not mean he was automatically protected under the ADA.  The court said that a significant period of recovery is needed for an employee to be protected under the ADA. 

As the district court noted, Shirley’s refusal to complete an inpatient treatment program, his insistence that he remain on an opiate pain reliever, and his continued use of Vicodin following detox ‘supported a reasonable belief that continued drug use was still an on-going problem at the time W-G terminated his employment.’

This case may be found at Shirley v. Precision Castparts Corp., Wyman-Gordon Forgings,L.P., 726 F.3d 675 (5^th Cir. August 12, 2013).

What if the conduct of an employee during the course of employment is found to so reckless as to be potentially criminal? Does that permit an injured co-employee to sue his or her fellow employee in civil court for intentional harm?  That was the issue addressed in Morales v. Christopher S. Schneider, A-0862-12T4 (App. Div. December 16, 2013).

Luciano Morales was injured on December 31, 2009 in the course of his employment.  He was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Christopher Schneider, who was driving a construction truck southbound on Rivervale Road in River Vale, N.J.  It was snowing at the time, and both men were on their way to the company’s place of business to meet other contractors in order to perform snowplowing services for clients.

While driving the truck, Schneider crossed the double yellow line and entered the northbound lane on Rivervale Road, which was a two lane road.  He drove for more than a full block in the northbound lane.  A truck travelling lawfully in the southbound lane began to make a left turn onto a local side street. Schneider veered left to avoid that vehicle, lost control of his truck, left the roadway and hit a utility pole and tree.  Morales was seriously injured in the accident and received workers’ compensation benefits.

Schneider was given motor vehicle summonses for reckless driving, failing to keep right, improper passing, and he was also charged by the Bergen County Prosecutor with fourth-degree assault by auto for “causing serious bodily injury to . . . Morales by recklessly driving.”  Schneider was admitted into the pre-trial intervention program and pled guilty to the motor vehicle summons for reckless driving.

Morales brought a civil suit against Schneider, who contended that the suit should be barred by the exclusive remedy provision in the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act. Morales countered that a co-employee should not be protected where the conduct is “outrageous and egregious.”

The trial judge dismissed Morales’s law suit, and the Appellate Division affirmed.  It relied on an important decision by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 2012 entitledVan Dunk v. Reckson Associates Realty Corp., 210 N.J. 449 (2012).  The court said, “Most recently, inVan Dunk, the Court held that the Act’s exclusivity bar applied where the workplace accident produced an OSHA violation for a ‘willful’ violation of OSHA safety rules.”

Thus, in addition to violations of safety regulations or failure to follow good safety practice, an intentional wrong must be accompanied by something more, typically deception, affirmative acts that defeat safety devices, or a willful failure to remedy past violations.

The court concluded, “While it might be said that Schneider ignored various safety precautions and statutory provisions, and in doing so created a greater risk of injury to plaintiff -- conduct that clearly cannot be condoned -- we are convinced it does not amount to an intentional wrong that allows plaintiff to avoid the workers’ compensation bar.

            The case shows that the high standard in New Jersey for screening intentional harm law suits applies to both suits against employers and co-employees, even where the co-employee acts in a fashion that could subject him to criminal negligence charges.