NWCDN Members regularly post articles and summary judgements in workers’ compensations law in your state.
Select a state from the dropdown menu below to scroll through the state specific archives for updates and opinions on various workers’ compensation laws in your state.
Contact information for NWCDN members is also located on the state specific links in the event you have additional questions or your company is seeking a workers’ compensation lawyer in your state.
Teague Campbell’s Medicare Settlement Solutions recently obtained a favorable MSA approval from CMS in a case where the plaintiff sustained a compensable back injury in 2002. He was provided authorized medical care until his release in 2009, when his authorized treating orthopaedist indicated that he would not need any additional treatment. In 2012, an outside MSA vendor was hired to prepare a MSA proposal. The proposal recommended a MSA in excess of $288,000, based largely on medications prescribed for unrelated conditions. Teague Campbell’s Medicare Settlement Solutions analyzed the file materials and relevant issues, and worked with the parties to formulate a strategy for more accurately projecting the lifetime Medicare-covered expenses specifically related to the at-work injury. Medicare Settlement Solutions prepared a new MSA proposal and handled submission of this proposal to CMS. CMS approved the new MSA amount with total funding of less than $9,000, which resulted in significant savings and ultimately allowed the parties to proceed with full and final settlement of the claim.
Florence Godin has retired as a Specialist I after 23years in state service.
DEPARTMENT DECISIONS
Wood v. Fairpoint Communications Opinion No. 7-15WC (Apr. 10 2015)
Attorney fees awarded following informal conference when initial denial based upon “‘lack of investigative evidence to determine causal relationship to employment.’” Treating physician altered initial treatment note to show causal connection to work but Defendant did not rescind denial.
Kurant v Sugarbush Soaring Association, Inc. (Kurant III), Opinion No. 8-15WC (April 13, 2015). Attorney fees awarded without formal hearing when Carrier refused to pay ongoing medical treatment based upon an IME report stating that such ongoing treatment is not reasonable or necessary, but no Form 27 filed in support of the IME and no other medical records filed in support thereon. “Defendant’s failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 18.2100 amounted to misconduct or neglect under Rule 10.1330. It thus became necessary for Claimant to retain an attorney, whose efforts resulted in an interim order requiring Defendant to continue benefit payments. Notably, because the benefits at issue involve ongoing medical coverage rather than a cash award, under the circumstances of this case Claimant has no other workers’ compensation-related fund from which topay his attorney for her work. If he is to be made whole, an award of attorney fees is necessary.”
Julie Mercier of Williamstown, VT, has joined the staff at the Department as a Workers’ Compensation Specialist II. Ms Mercier has an Associates of Science as a Paralegal and a Bachelor of Science in Legal Studies, both from Woodbury College. She also has worked for the law firm of Zalinger Cameron & Lambek, PC, as a paralegal providing support for workers’ compensation and personal injury cases. Most recently, Ms. Mercier served as a Docket Clerk for the Criminal and Family Court of Washington County, Vermont.
We also regretfully say goodbye to Lisa Brassard WC Specialist II who will be leaving the Department to join the Vermont League of Cities and Towns
VERMONT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Smiley v State of Vermont, 2014 Vt 42 (Mar. 6, 2015)
In 3-1 split decision, Court upholds Commissioner’s determination that statute of limitations barred claim and statute was not tolled by regulation requiring employers to determine impairment at time of medical end result. Carrier’s agreement to pay for an impairment rating after the statute of limitations had expired did not constitute a waiver as “claimant cannot unequivocally demonstrate an implicit wiaver under the circumstances of this case.” Court determines that new regulation requiring carriers to determine impairment at time of medical end result was procedural not substantive and thus could be applied retroactively. “In essence, the commissioner’s decision has expanded equitable estoppel or equitable tolling by reading a critical element out of each so that the employer’s inaction alone allows the limitation period to be suspended forever. This use of equitable doctrine eliminates the statutory limitation period in favor of one created by the commissioner. This is beyond the commissioner’s power.” Case invovles unique aspect of small impairment award with large interest award almost twice as large as impairment. “[I]nterest at the statutory rate is a form of penalty imposed on the employer, and if the claimant is not in immediate need for the money, the financial incentive is to delay a claim as long as possible to realize the high rate of interest. We conclude that this is prejdice as a matter of law.” Justice Robinson concurred and dissented from the majority’s opinion. She “emphasize[d] the clear state of our current law ...[that] the notion that a workers’ compensation case is open-ended, and that a claimant may not be statutorily barred from pursuing a claim for benefits years after an injury, and even years after the claim for benefits has arisen, is not particularly shocking or unusual. This is one of the most striking features distinguishing workers’ compensation from its tort-law cousin.” “[T]he Legislature’s elimination ofany distinct statute of limitations for permanent partial disability claims renders the majority’s appraisal of the former Rule 18(a) obsolete as it relates to injuries that arose on or after May 26, 2004.”
Marshall v. Vermont State Hospital, 2015 VT 47 (Mar. 6, 2015)
Reversing and remanding Superior Court decision and finding in favor of Defendant/Appellant. Subsequent disputes as to the propriety of an initial impairment rating is not a basis for determining that a Form 22 can be modified for mutual mistake. “While we conclude here that Dr Cyr’s allegedly mistaken medical opinion is an insufficient basis for concluding that there has been a material mistake of fact, we decline to hold that an impairment rating cannever be the basis for reforming a Form 22 agreement under the material-mistake-of-fact doctrine.”
VERMONT DEPARTMENT OF LABOR DECISIONS
Bohannon v Town of Stowe, Opinion No. 1-15WC (Jan. 5, 2015)(HO Woodruff)
Claim not barred by Statute of Limitations as equitable estoppel defense by claimant prevails. Hearing officer finds that: “ If [Claimant’s] claim was denied, he would have been seasonably notified and afforded an appropriate opportunity to appeal. Had he not done so within the applicable limitations period, his current claim would likely be time-barred.” Pursuant to the Odd Lot Doctrine, Claimant found to be PTD despite having no formal vocational rehabilitation assessment. “The language of the rule is suggestive, not mandatory, however, and the particular circumstances of this case justify a rare exception.See, e.g., Prescott v. Suburban Propane, Opinion No. 42-09WC (November 2, 2009). Although it is Claimant’s burden of proof, Defendant has not proffered any evidence, either from a functional capacity evaluator or from a vocational rehabilitation professional, from which I might conclude that he in fact has any meaningful vocational options.”
Thomas v. Engelberth Construction, Opinion No. 2-15WC (Feb. 6, 2015)
“I do not necessarily equate the requisite finding for issuing and interim order under 21 V.S.A.§662(b)- that the employer’s denial lacks ‘reasonable support’ based upon the record as a whole,see 21 V.S.A. §601(24) - with the finding required for an award of attorney fees under Rule 10.1320- that at the tine it denied the claim the employer had no ‘reasonable basis’ for doing so.Ploof v. Franklin County Sherriff’s Department, Opinion No. 13-14WC (August 8, 2014), citingYustin [v. State of Vermont, Department of Public Safety., Opinion No. 38-11WC (November 18, 2011).]”
Chase v State of Vermont, Opinion No. 3-15WC (Jan. 28, 2015)(HO Phillips)
Claimant’s treating physician’s opinions found more credible than Defendant’s IME opinion. Vermont Supreme Court’s “heightened burden of proof” in which aggravated symptoms “without a worsening of the underlying disability, does not meet the causation requirement”, (Stanard v. Stannard Co, Inc., 2003 VT 52) found inapplicable in the instant case. “Where the claimant is already suffering from a symptomatic, degenerative condition, it is often impossible to discern whether worsened symptoms during work activities are merely a manifestation of the underlying disease or alternatively, whether the work activities themselves have caused or aggravated it. No such ambiguity exists here, however.” Claimant’s claim for reimbursement for naturpoathic supplements denied pursuant to statutes 21 V.S.A. §640(a) as “the employer’s obligation does not extend to over-the-counter medication, no matter how effective of necessary they might be.”
Fifield v Heatech Inc., Opinion No. 4-15WC (Feb. 25 2015)(HO Woodruff)
Based upon treating medical providers opinions Sacroliac joint injection is reasonable and necessary medical treatment as opposed to IME doctor’s opinions. “As in so many areas of medical decision-making, the analysis required to make an accurate diagnosis is most oftn a question of quality, not quantity.”
Richards v C&S Wholesale Grocers, Opinion No. 5-15WC (HO Woodruff)(Feb. 27, 2105)
In rejecting IME doctor’s opinion as to causation, Hearing Officer relies, in part, upon Vermont Supreme Court decision inStannard v. Stannard, 203 VT 52 to determine that the “work injury caused his preexisting L5-S1 pathology to become symptomatic to the point where his associated disability came upon him sooner than otherwise would have occurred.”
Herring v Department of Liquor Control, Opinion No. 6-15WC (HO Phillips) (Mar. 24, 2015).
Claimant had accepted back injury with an alleged 0% permanent impairment and files a claim for compensability determination of shoulder condition. However, Claimant withdrew the claim and six months later files a new claim for 10% permanency benefits based upon the accepted back condition. At the informal level, an interiem order issued against Defendant which pays the full 10% impairment rating. Then Claimant seeks an award of attorney fees. Analyzing the request for an award of attorney fees pursuant to the 2008 amendments to the statute and the 2010 amendments to the WC Rules governing an award of attorney fees at the informal conference level, Commissioner awards most of the attorney fees and all of the costs Claimant had sought in this matter. “[T]he amendments have effectively eliminated employer or insurance carrier delay, unreasonable denial or misconduct as a necessary prerequisite to an award of fees at the informal level. Instead, in appropriate circumstances an award can now be based solely on a finding that but for the attorney’s efforts, the claimant would not have prevailed.... [W]hile the Commissioner retains the authority to award fees when a claim is resolved informally, she is by no means compelled to do so in every case. Exercising that discretion should further the goals of (a) maintaining appropriate standards of employer and adjuster conduct; (b) discouraging excessive and unnecessary attorney involvement; and © encouraging the parties to make effective use of the informal dispute resolution process. With these goals in mind, for example, an award of attorney fees might not be appropriate in a case that would have been amenable to informal resolution but for the attorney’s unnecessarily adversarial posturing. Similarly, where the claimant’s attorney prolongs a dispute by failing to obtain and share critical information promptly and voluntarily, fees will likely be denied. There might be other instances as well where the attorney’s conduct so undermines the informal process as to negate his or her entitlement to an award of fees. And last, there might be claims that are successfully resolved largely as a consequence of the workers’ compensation specialist’s efforts rather than the attorney’s, in which case a fee award might not be justified.”
Rayford H. Taylor
Of Counsel
Gilson Athans P.C.
980 Hammond Drive, Suite 800
Atlanta, Georgia 30328
770-512-0300 - Ext. 529
770-512-0070 - Fax
rtaylor@gilsonathans.com
www.gilsonathans.com
The Appellate Court found that the evidence supported the State Board
of Worker’s Compensation’s denial of benefits to the claimant
ABF Freight System, Inc. v. Presley
(Georgia Court of Appeals)
Employee not entitled to additional benefits because he could not establish he had sustained a “fictional new accident,” but rather had merely had a “change in condition.”
Summary
Employee had to prove right knee problems were a result of a fictional new injury, rather than a change in condition arising out of normal life. He failed to prove a new injury, so not entitled to benefits.
Discussion
Mr. Presley worked for ABF Freight System, Inc. as a truck driver and dock worker. He sustained a compensable injury to his right knee, had surgery, and received temporary total disability (“TTD”) benefits during his absence from work. He later returned to work without restrictions or limitations and continued to perform his normal job duties. However, his right knee pain worsened and he was diagnosed with arthritis in the knee and was advised that he would eventually need a right knee replacement.
Mr. Presley also sustained a compensable job-related injury to his left knee, had surgery and again ultimately returned to work without restrictions or limitations and resumed his normal duties. His right knee pain continued to worsen following his left knee surgery. He had apparently suffered a tear of the medial meniscus to his left knee but continued his normal job duties even as his right knee pain worsened.
After an additional year of continuing to work in his regular job duties following his left meniscal tear, the doctor informed Mr. Presley that a total right knee replacement was necessary. Mr. Presley had the surgery and was placed on a “no work” status and sought payment of TTD benefits, arguing that he had sustained a fictional new injury. ABF argued that it was a change in condition for the worse, and the right knee condition and it was not compensable.
Whether an employee suffers a fictional new injury or change in condition is a question of fact for determination by the administrative law judge (“ALJ”). In this case, the ALJ denied benefits, finding that Mr. Presley did not suffer fictional new injury and that the two-year statute of limitation barred his claim since he had last received TTD benefits for his right knee more than years prior. On appeal, the State Board adopted that decision.
The parties agreed that there was no singular specific incident creating an immediate need for Presley’s total right knee replacement. Instead, the dispute was whether Presley’s total temporary disability arising from his right knee replacement should be characterized as a fictional new accident or a change in condition for the worse.
A fictional new injury, or aggravation of a pre-existing condition, occurs when a “claimant is injured on the job but continues to perform the duties of his employment until such time that he is forced to cease work because of the gradual worsening of his condition which was at least partly attributable to his physical activity in continuing work subsequent to his injury.” Central State Hospital v. James, 147 Ga. App. 308, 309, 248 S.E.2d 678 (Ga. App. 1978).
A change in physical condition, on the other hand, occurs when a claimant sustains an injury and is awarded compensation during his period of disability. Subsequent thereto, the employee returns to employment performing his normal duties or ordinary work. Then as a result of the wear and tear, ordinary life and the activity connected with performing his normal duties and not because of any specific job-related incident, his condition gradually worsens to the point where he can no longer continue to perform his ordinary work.
Ordinarily, the distinguishing feature that determines whether that disability is either “a change of condition” or a “fictional new accident” is the intervention of new circumstances. Whether an employee suffers a fictional new accident or a change in condition is a question of fact to be determined by the ALJ. In this case, the Appellate Court found that under the “any evidence rule” the findings of the State Board and the ALJ had to be affirmed.
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
The article was written by Rayford H. Taylor, Esq., Of Counsel to Gilson Athans P.C., a law firm dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation and all other liability and commercial matters. Mr. Taylor is admitted to practice law in Florida and Georgia and is AV rated by Martindale-Hubbell, which is the highest rating an attorney can receive. Taylor and Gilson Athans are members of The National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network (NWCDN). The NWCDN is a national and Canadian network of reputable law firms organized to provide employers and insurers access to the highest quality representation in workers’ compensation and related employer liability fields.
Rayford H. Taylor
Of Counsel
Gilson Athans P.C.
980 Hammond Drive, Suite 800
Atlanta, Georgia 30328
770-512-0300 - Ext. 529
770-512-0070 - Fax
rtaylor@gilsonathans.com
www.gilsonathans.com
Employee Entitled to receive Temporary Total Disability Benefits
Burns v. State of Georgia, Department of Administrative Services
(Georgia Court of Appeals)
Employee entitled to receive temporary total disability (“TTD”) benefits following termination because Employer was found to have terminated her because of her work-related injury.
Summary
LaVerne Burns was a receptionist for the State of Georgia, Department of Administrative Services. She was injured when the chair she was sitting in collapsed. She received worker’s compensation benefits in connection with the injury, but continued to work in her position until her employment was terminated. She then sought TTD benefits. An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) awarded Ms. Burns TTD benefits, finding the reasons the employer gave for terminating her employment were pretextual and she was terminated due to her work injury. The State Board’s Appellate Division upheld the award of TTD benefits.
Discussion
Following her employer’s termination, the claimant sought TTD benefits. The employer challenged the request on the grounds that her employment was terminated for reasons unrelated to her injury and because she had not sought another job. After the trial, the ALJ awarded Burns TTD benefits and specifically found she was a credible witness and “the reasons given by the employer to justify her termination were pretextual and that she was terminated due to her work injury.” Because the real reason for the termination was the work-related injury and claim, the ALJ determined Burns had carried her burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, entitlement to TTD benefits.
As a general rule to obtain benefits, a claimant is required to show either that they have searched for another position or that they had been working in a restricted capacity when their employment was terminated. The Supreme Court of Georgia inPadgett v. Waffle House, 269 Ga. 105, 498 S.E.2d 499 (Ga. 1998), clarified that showing a diligent but unsuccessful effort to secure employment following termination was a way of establishing the necessary element of causation. However, in this case, by proving the work-related injury was the proximate cause of the termination, the claimant established the causal link between injury and her worsened economic condition. Therefore, she did not have to establish she had searched for another position. Finding the reasons for the termination were a pretext to avoid continued payment of benefits satisfied the proximate cause requirement.
The Court said the issue was not whether Burns sought new employment or whether she was working under restrictions when the employer terminated her, but whether she demonstrated the necessary causal link between her work-related injury and her worsened economic condition. The fact that the employer gave pretextual reasons for terminating her employment, which was due in part to Burns’ work-related injury, established the causal link. The case was remanded back to address whether or not there was sufficient evidence to establish the finding of her termination based upon a pretext.
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
The article was written by Rayford H. Taylor, Esq., Of Counsel to Gilson Athans P.C., a law firm dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation and all other liability and commercial matters. Mr. Taylor is admitted to practice law in Florida and Georgia and is AV rated by Martindale-Hubbell, which is the highest rating an attorney can receive. Taylor and Gilson Athans are members of The National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network (NWCDN). The NWCDN is a national and Canadian network of reputable law firms organized to provide employers and insurers access to the highest quality representation in workers’ compensation and related employer liability fields.
NEWS
RITSEMA & LYON WEBINAR – MEDICARE SET ASIDES
Ritsema & Lyon is hosting a webinar on Medicare set asides. The webinar is scheduled for Thursday July 23, 2015 from 9:00 a.m. - 10:30 a.m. MDT. Delores Dafoe will be discussing the ins & outs of preparing and handling MSAs. Check out the Events section of our website, www.Ritsema-Lyon.com, for more information and to register. Please contact Jennie Smith atJennie.Smith@Ritsema-Lyon.com or 303.297.7275 with any questions.
22nd ANNUAL SEMINAR
Ritsema & Lyon’s 22nd Annual Workers’ Compensation Seminar will be held on Friday, August 28, 2015, at the Doubletree by Hilton Hotel in Denver. Full itinerary and invitation coming soon. Contact Jennie Smith atJennie.Smith@Ritsema-Lyon.com or 303.297.7275 with any questions.
NEBRASKA UPDATE
NEW LEGISLATION PASSED
LB480, discussed in our May 2015 newsletter was passed. The changes are as follows:
Benefits can be denied when an employee knowingly and willfully made false statements regarding his or her physical or medical condition by acknowledging that he or she is able to perform the essential functions of a job based on the employer’s job descriptionwhen such misrepresentation caused further injury.
Employers are not responsible for any finance charges or late penalty payments as a result of medical services rendered by a provider.
The interest rate applicable to late payments is now 6 percentage points above the bond investment yield, as published by the U.S. Secretary of Treasury, which is currently 2.137 percent.
Workers’ compensation trust investment rules were changed to expand investment options.
NEBRASKA OPINIONS
The case of Canas-Luong v. Americold Realty Trust, 22 Neb. App. 999 (2015), confirmed that an employee is not at MMI until all conditions are at MMI and no permanency is due for one condition until all conditions are at MMI. The trial court found claimant was not at MMI for her psychological injury and awarded ongoing TTD, but also awarded PPD for an upper extremity impairment. The Court of Appeals reversed the award of the member impairment, noting that not only was the employee not at MMI for all conditions, that impairment may be factored into her overall loss of earning capacity once she did reach MMI for all conditions pursuant toBishop v. Specialty Fabricating Co., 277 Neb. 171, 760 N.W.2d 352 (2009), andMadlock v. Square D Co., 269 Neb. 675, 695 N.W.2d 412 (2005).
TALES FROM THE TRENCHES
The Omaha office successfully defended an attempt by a plaintiff to strike a counterclaim filed by the employer. Filing counterclaims is a useful procedural tool to ensure a hearing on the merits is had if either party believes one is necessary, and is very valuable. A different trial judge recently struck a counterclaim, which created some question on whether the practice could continue. The favorable ruling supports its use and stems the concern that the Court as a whole may shift to disallow it.
For more information regarding counterclaims contact Jennifer Caswell in our Omaha, NE office.
Jennifer.Caswell@Ritsema-Lyon.com or 402.505.4630
On June 26, 2015, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals released its decision in Pat Tate as Administrator of the Estate of Michael Traffanstedt v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and Dover Corporation. In 2006, Traffanstedt entered into an agreement to settle his workers’ compensation claim against his employer, Dover Corporation. That settlement left future medical benefits open. In 2011, Traffanstedt and Dover entered into a second settlement agreement regarding his future medical benefits, but the trial court rejected the settlement. In 2013, Traffanstedt and Dover again entered into an agreement for the settlement of his future medical benefits, and scheduled a hearing before the trial court for approval. Dover’s insurance carrier, Liberty Mutual, issued a check in the amount of $70,000 for the settlement, contingent upon court approval. However, Traffanstedt died before the settlement hearing, and Liberty Mutual refused to honor the check. Tate, the Administrator of Traffanstedt’s estate, sued Liberty Mutual and Dover, alleging breach of contract. Liberty Mutual and Dover took the position that they were not bound by the settlement agreement because it had not yet been court-approved prior to Traffanstedt’s death. They also asserted that the exclusivity provisions of The Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act barred Tate’s claims for breach of contract. The Trial Court entered Summary Judgment in favor of Liberty Mutual and Dover, and Tate appealed.
In its analysis, the Court of Appeals noted that workers’ compensation settlements, including the one at issue, are handled differently under the law than other settlements, such as those involving tort claims. The Court also stated that workers’ compensation settlements were different even than settlements involving a minor, in that a settlement contract between a minor and insurer is voidable at the election of the minor, whereas workers’ compensation settlements for less than the amount of compensation provided for in the Act are contingent upon Court approval. Therefore, the Court held that workers’ compensation settlements are not valid for any purpose until approved by the Court.
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
This article was written by Charley M. Drummond, Esq. of Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC. Fish Nelson & Holden is a law firm located in Birmingham, Alabama dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers, and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation cases and related liability matters. Drummond and his firm are members of The National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network (NWCDN). The NWCDN is a national and Canadian network of reputable law firms organized to provide employers and insurers access to the highest quality representation in workers’ compensation and related employer liability fields. If you have questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the author at cdrummond@fishnelson.com or (205) 332-3414.
Intermittent leave can be extremely difficult for employers. One important point for employers to realize is that an employee on intermittent leave who comes to work in between flare-ups may be held to all customary performance standards. The case ofParks v. UPS Supply Chain Solutions, Inc. 2014 U.S. DIST LEXIS 13538 (E.D. Kentucky 2014) illustrates this concept.
Gene Parks worked for UPS since 1999 as a material handler. He drove a forklift, moved boxes, picked products and controlled inventory. He began taking leave for medical reasons in 2003, and he conceded that UPS never interfered with his leave during his early years with the company.
In 2009, Parks was transferred to a new account. Parks began experiencing severe neck pain and applied for up to 12 weeks of intermittent leave. The company granted this request. In May 2010 the company issued a verbal warning to Parks for failure to meet standard productivity goals in either replenishment or picking. The company noted that Parks had a record of poor quality in receiving, but Parks attributed his errors to a medical condition that affected his ability to concentrate. The HR Director advised Parks that his current FMLA paperwork only authorized intermittent leave and indicated that he could perform all essential job functions between flare-ups. She also spoke to him about additional training opportunities which Parks declined. Parks countered that he himself had asked his doctor not to label him as disabled because he feared losing his job. The HR Director suggested that Parks should update his FMLA paperwork; otherwise he would be held accountable for production expectations.
A few days later Parks received a first written warning for poor quality in picking. By late 2010 the write ups became more frequent. Parks was written up numerous times for errors. He would put cartons away but record an incorrect location in the computer system or fail to enter their location in the computer system, or put boxes away upside down. Parks told his supervisors that his medical condition was impacting his performance. His supervisors advised him again that FMLA only covers missed time, not performance at work. They recommended again that if he could not do his job for medical reasons, he should update his FMLA paperwork.
Parks next was issued warnings for conduct and behavior violations. Around this period of time, Parks began a course of physical therapy and cortisone injections, but this treatment was also ineffective. His doctor told him that he would need surgery some time in the future. He submitted an new FMLA certification in January 2011 stating that he would need continuous leave for neck surgery in the near future. No specific date was given until a medical appointment in May when Parks’s doctor advised that the surgery date would be June 16, 2011. Parks claimed he told his supervisors about the scheduled surgery at the beginning of his shift the following week. The company denied being told any specific surgery date. Rather, they knew only that surgery would take place in the future.
On the same date that Parks says he told the company about his need for surgery on June 16, 2011, his supervisor discovered that Parks had logged an incorrect location in the computer system for a container. Under the company’s progressive discipline system, Parks was already on a final written warning status for performance and conduct. The company met with Parks at the end of his shift and terminated his employment. They offered him COBRA information but Parks threw away the COBRA packet because he felt COBRA was too expensive. Parks then sued under the FMLA for interference and retaliation.
The court noted the timing issue in this case between Parks’ alleged discussion about his upcoming surgery and his termination. It said that the close timing between Parks’s request for leave and his termination established a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation, shifting the burden to UPS to explain a non-discriminatory reason for its actions. UPS produced detailed information regarding the poor performance of Parks in the months leading up to his discharge. The Court was impressed with the company’s detailed documentation:
Defendant has produced thorough documentation of Plaintiff’s performance issues at UPS. Plaintiff received multiple written warnings for his sub-par performance, all of which indicated that he could face termination if his work did not improve. Despite this admonition, Plaintiff declined additional training opportunities. Although Plaintiff’s errors became more frequent as his neck condition worsened, Lovelace, Valdez and Welch repeatedly told him that, while his FMLA paperwork authorized time off to cope with his condition, it did not excuse poor performance. As long as Plaintiff chose to work, he would have to meet the standards expected of all employees. If Plaintiff felt that he could not do so, then he needed to update his paperwork again. Defendant has not only demonstrated that Plaintiff had consistent performance issues, it has shown that Plaintiff failed to heed warnings or take advantage of opportunities for improvement, knowing full well that termination could result from continued errors. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff, thus shifting the burden back to Plaintiff.
The court granted summary judgment to UPS and dismissed Parks’s law suit. One important concept which this case demonstrates is that the FMLA provides only for leave. It does not insulate an employee or an exempt an employee from meeting performance standards while at work. The employer has a right to assume that if an employee on intermittent leave comes to work, he or she will be able to meet work requirements. In this case, UPS did an extraordinary job in documenting each and every performance issue, and this excellent documentation was the chief reason that the company prevailed.
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John H. Geaney, Esq., is an Executive Committee Member and a Shareholder in Capehart Scatchard's Workers’ Compensation Group. Mr. Geaney concentrates his practice in the representation of employers, self-insured companies, third-party administrators, and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation, the Americans with Disabilities Act and Family and Medical Leave Act. Should you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Mr. Geaney at 856.914.2063 or by e‑mail at jgeaney@capehart.com.
On June 26, 2015, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals released its opinion in Todd Entrekin, Etowah County Sheriff v. Jerry Frederic Lasseter. At the trial court level, the employee petitioned the court for an order compelling the employer to provide medical treatment for his lower back. Treatment for the lower back had been provided by the employer prior to the settlement. When the parties settled, however, the settlement agreement specified that future medical was to remain available for T-11 and T-8 levels of his back. Despite this language, the trial court granted the petition and issued an order compelling the treatment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial judge because the language in the settlement agreement specifically limited the employee’s right to future medical benefits to the two specified levels of his spine.
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About the Author
This blog submission was prepared by Mike Fish, an attorney with Fish, Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers, and third party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this submission or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Fish by e-mailing him atmfish@fishnelson.com or by calling him directly at 205-332-1448.
On June 19, 2014, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals released its second opinion inGoodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bush (). The first time around the Court of Appeals addressed several issues. On appeal the first time the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court since it had not issued findings of fact and conclusions of law to support it’s finding that the employee’s knee injury affected the use and efficiency of other parts of his body. On appeal the second time, the only issue was whether or not the trial court’s ruling that the employee’s knee injury should be removed from the schedule, allowing for a permanent and total disability finding, was supported by substantial evidence.
At trial testimony from the authorized treating physician was presented that established the employee would ultimately need a knee replacement and would have continued discomfort. The doctor also testified that the knee injury resulted in the following restrictions: 1) no lifting, pushing or pulling over 20 pounds; 2) no bending at the waist, crouching, kneeling, stooping, or squatting; 3) no climbing stairs, ladders, or poles: and 4) avoid navigating unprotected heights since the right knee had reduced balance and stability. The doctor at no point testified that the right knee affected any other body parts. The doctor also did not testify that the restrictions issued arose from problems the employee was having with other body parts. The medicals records presented at trial also indicated that the employee complained solely of right knee pain and dysfunction during each medical visit. The physical therapy records noted hip flexion and extension of 4/5 and 4+/5 but did not state this was an abnormality nor did it state it was due to the right knee injury. The employee testified that he injured his back in 1978 and would still occasionally experience flare-ups and have to take nonprescription pain medication. He testified that the preexisting condition also caused him to limp prior to the on the job injury. In fact, evidence revealed that the employee told his vocational expert that his occasional lower back pain was not related to the right knee. The employee did testify that he now takes Lortab for pain but only for his knee pain. At no time did the employee testify that the right knee injury affected other parts of his body and, in fact, testified to the contrary. Finally, the evidence was undisputed that the employee could not return to his former occupation due to the permanent light duty restrictions placed on him by his doctor.
Based, on the above testimony the trial court found the employee had a preexisting back condition but now, as a result of the knee injury, he could no longer perform his duties. They also found that the doctor stated the knee injury affected his body as a whole. As such, the trial court found medial testimony sufficiently connected dysfunction to other body parts as a result of the knee injury. The trial court stated that the doctor had no reason to issues restrictions related to the other body parts because the restrictions issued for the knee would encompass the restrictions to the other body parts. Finally, the court supported its decision based on its observation of the employee limping and using furniture to steady himself as he walked around the courtroom.
The Alabama Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court and found there was not sufficient evidence to remove the knee injury from the schedule. The Court of Appeals stated that the decision comes down to a question of medical causation: Is there substantial evidence that the effects of the injury to the scheduled member extends to other body parts and that those effects cause or contribute to pain, limitations, or other symptoms in those body parts.Boise Cascade Corp. v. Jackson. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that medical testimony was not required to prove medical causation on the issue of the injury affecting or extending to non-scheduled body parts. The Court of Appeals also pointed out that medical causation could be established on this issue based lay testimony and/or observations of the trial court. However, in this case the Court of Appeals found that the medical testimony established that the knee injury did not extend into other body parts and the fact that the doctor gave a rating to the body as a whole did not mean the schedule could be avoided.Ex parte Drummond Co. (Alabama Supreme Court specifically stated an impairment rating to the body as a whole does not remove an injury from the schedule). The Court of Appeals noted that the doctor testified that the restrictions issued were for the right knee only.
Since the medical testimony did not support removing the injury from the schedule the Court of Appeals next examined the lay testimony. The Court of Appeals pointed out that the trial court can find medical causation without direct expert medical testimony, so long the other evidence, lay and circumstantial, is sufficient to support that finding. The Court of Appeals stated that this is to be determined on a case-by-case basis. The Court of Appeals ruled that, in this case, the lay testimony actually established that the knee injury did not affect other parts of the employee’s body and that the knee injury had not worsened the preexisting back injury. The employee himself testified that the knee injury did not affect other body parts or worsen his back condition.
The Court of Appeals next addressed the trial court’s observations, which it used to support its decision. The Court of Appeals pointed out that case law does allow a trial court to consider its own observations when determining extent of disability, to include how the employee ambulates during trial. However, the Court of Appeals stated that nothing in the case law allows the trial court to make a finding of medical causation solely on its own observations without any other supporting evidence, much less when the finding is disputed by other evidence as it was in this case. The Court of Appeals stated "a trial court may not rest a finding on speculation or conjecture, even if arising from its observations, that contradicts the positive evidence in the record."
Finally, the employee argued the Court of Appeals should reconsider its holding that vocational evidence cannot be used to circumvent the schedule. The Court of Appeals stated that this court has applied in past case the rule, which was issued by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Drummond Co., that a trial court cannot consider vocational disability as a factor in determining the exclusivity of the schedule. Therefore, the trial court’s ruling that the employee is permanently and totally disabled cannot be supported by the employee’s inability to return to his former job as a result of the scheduled knee injury.
My Two Cents
The Court of Appeals again established that this is not a chicken or egg situation, since you must first establish that an injury is removed from the schedule before evidence of vocational loss can be considered. As a result, simply not being able to return to work is not an exception to the list of scheduled injuries.
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
The article was written by Joshua G. Holden, Esq. a Member of Fish, Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation and related liability matters. Mr. Holden is AV rated by Martindale-Hubbell, which is the highest rating an attorney can receive. Holden and his firm are members of The National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network (NWCDN). The NWCDN is a national and Canadian network of reputable law firms organized to provide employers and insurers access to the highest quality representation in workers’ compensation and related employer liability fields.