NWCDN Members regularly post articles and summary judgements in workers’ compensations law in your state.
Select a state from the dropdown menu below to scroll through the state specific archives for updates and opinions on various workers’ compensation laws in your state.
Contact information for NWCDN members is also located on the state specific links in the event you have additional questions or your company is seeking a workers’ compensation lawyer in your state.
The DWC’s new
Austin-based Administrative Law Judge, Hsin-Wei Luang, started on June 26.
Judge Luang received a degree in engineering from the University of
Illinois, then her law degree from St. Mary’s School of Law in 1997. She
combined her legal acumen and engineering background for a career in
technology, business, and intellectual property.
Among her prior employment, Judge Luang served as senior counsel for Honda and
vice-president of IP at Lone Star Circle of Care. She owns a business
& technical writing service, and since May 2021 she has used her expertise
in technological and legal writing to produce a blog helping entrepreneurs
start and run small businesses. We congratulate her on accepting the
position with the DWC and certainly look forward to reading her decisions.
Copyright 2023, Stone Loughlin & Swanson, LLP
Further changes to the
Administrative Code were announced on June 21, 2023. Section 55.15(6),
pertaining to requirements for Compromise Settlement Agreements in old law
claims, contains the following instructions, held over from the Old Law days:
“all compromise settlement agreements submitted to the board must be submitted
in four parts--the original must be white, the second copy pink, the third copy
yellow, and fourth copy white. The forms must either be on NCR [no carbon
required] paper or be submitted with carbon left intact.”
For all future “old law” CSAs (of which there are likely to be few), system
participants have finally—finally—been
relieved of these onerous multichromatic paper specifications, which have been
cut from the rule, allowing for submission of settlement agreements “in the
form and manner prescribed by the DWC.” All further paper-related queries
can be directed here: https://youtu.be/6OlEEfvwXnA
Copyright 2023, Stone Loughlin & Swanson, LLP
As previously
mentioned, House Bill 2702 would have revised portions of the Labor Code by
tagging insurance carriers with an additional expense: a fee for a missed
medical examination. The bill failed to pass the Senate in May 2023, but
its most dubious component has found new life in the DWC’s proposed Rule
134.240(b).
Under the newly drafted rule, an injured worker who fails to attend an
examination by a designated doctor would endure the eternal ignominy of
subjecting his or her workers’ compensation carrier to an additional $100.00
fee. That’ll show ‘em!
You read that correctly—the insurance carrier would be subjected to what
amounts to a fine for an AWOL claimant’s missed DD exam. (And in case you
were wondering, no, the rule does not permit an insurance carrier to take a credit
for that fee from later benefits.)
This change to DD exam billing is intended, one assumes, to offset the lost
time from patients and the general inconvenience experienced by doctors whose
examinees are M.I.A. However, imposing an additional fee on the insurance
carrier for the injured worker’s truancy may invite challenges over the
perceived fairness of the measure, especially in instances where the missed
exam was requested by the Claimant or Claimant’s attorney; the proposed rule
does not take into consideration the party that sought the exam.
Copyright 2023, Stone Loughlin & Swanson, LLP
As we reported last month, the DWC-32 form for requesting a designated doctor exam has been revised, most noticeably in its capacity to alert the examining doctor of the conditions for which he or she should be examining the injured worker. Parties must begin using the new version of the form very soon, on June 5, 2023.
Copyright 2023, Stone Loughlin & Swanson, LLP
In Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v.
Francois, decided May 23, 2023, the Dallas Court of Appeals spells
out how to allocate a third-party settlement between the workers’ compensation
carrier, injured employee, and injured employee’s attorney. These
calculations are a source of continuing confusion for some despite the plain
language of the statute and the case law applying it.
The Dallas Court of Appeals’ decision also dispels the notion that the law
requires the parties to split a settlement three ways: one-third to the
carrier, one-third to the claimant, and one-third to the claimant’s attorney.
This idea refuses to die despite the fact that there is no support for it
in the law. As a result, some carriers still give up much more than they
should.
Janery Francois sustained a work injury for which Hartford paid her $356,669.73
in workers’ compensation benefits. Francois sued the third-party property owner
of the building where she was injured and recovered $150,000. Hartford argued
that under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act’s subrogation statute, it was
entitled to $95,206.03 of Francois’s $150,000 recovery.
However, Judge Martin Hoffman, a former personal injury attorney, agreed with
the interpretation of the statute offered by Francois’s attorney and found that
Hartford was only entitled to $57,088.04 and that Francois and her attorney
were entitled to $92,911.96. Of this amount, $4,793.97 was for expenses
and the remaining $88,117.99 was for attorney’s fees for Francois’s attorney.
Judge Hoffman also awarded Francois’s attorney an additional $10,000 in fees
under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act (UDJA) which allows the trial court
to award fees that are equitable and just.
The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed Judge Hoffman’s decision and rendered
judgment that Hartford was entitled to $95,206.03 of the third-party
settlement. The court of appeals also found that Judge Hoffman abused his
discretion by awarding Francois’s attorney an additional $10,000 in attorney’s
fees under the UDJA because the award violates the Workers’ Compensation Act
and is not equitable or just.
Francois’s attorney argued at trial that the award is equitable and just
because Hartford refused to agree to a three-way split of the settlement which
would have provided $50,000 to Hartford, $50,000 to Francois, and $50,000 to
Francois’s attorney. This approach would have resulted in Hartford
recovering $45,206.03 less than it was entitled. The Dallas Court of
Appeals rejected this argument:
According to Francois’s counsel, the carrier, employee, and employee’s counsel “always” agree to split a settlement three ways, and he has entered into those agreements “dozens of times.” But Francois cites no authority to support an argument that Hartford was under any obligation to reduce its lien and accept a three-way split.
The Dallas Court of Appeals held that Hartford has a statutory right to recover
its entire lien amount and it should not be penalized for asserting its rights.
The court found that Judge Hoffman abused his discretion by awarding additional
attorney’s fees to Francois’s attorney when “Hartford was well within its right
to seek the full amount of reimbursement permitted under Chapter 417.”
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Francois, No.
05-21-00981-CV (Tex. App—Dallas, May 23, 2023).
Copyright 2023, Stone Loughlin & Swanson, LLP
House Bill 2468 also amends Section 408.161(a)(7) which pertains to
serious burn injuries. Previously, an injured worker would be entitled to
LIBs if he/she sustained third degree burns to the majority of either both
hands, or one hand and the face. Now, third degree burns to both hands,
to one hand and one foot, or to the face and either one hand or one foot can
establish LIBs entitlement.
House Bill 2468 further expands LIBs entitlement to certain first responders in
the newly promulgated Section 408.1615. Peace officers, EMTs, and
firefighters (or those acting as EMTs or firefighters on a volunteer basis) who
are rendered “permanently unemployable” following a “serious bodily injury”
beyond those specifically enumerated in Section 408.161 may be entitled to
LIBs.
Qualifying claimants would be compelled to recertify their total unemployment
to Carriers annually. Carriers may audit the worker’s employment
status periodically, but not more than once in any five-year window, unless the
Carrier can show that the injured first responder’s assertion of non-employment
is false. Under such circumstances, the Carrier would be compelled to
request a designated doctor to evaluate the claimant’s employability.
LIBs may be suspended if the annual certification is not accomplished, or
if the first responder is employed in any capacity. Suspension of LIBs is
also codified under the new Section 408.0041(k-1).
Copyright 2023, Stone Loughlin & Swanson, LLP
The Texas Workers’ Compensation Act sets forth specifically prescribed
categories for grievously injured employees who qualify for Lifetime Income
Benefits (LIBs), most of which are straightforward: those who suffer permanent
loss of use in both eyes, both feet, or both hands, or a combination of one
hand and one foot; spinal injuries resulting in paralysis of both arms, both
legs, or one leg and one arm; and significant third-degree burn victims.
However, one classification has fostered equal parts ambiguity and scorn among
system participants for decades: head trauma injuries resulting in “incurable
insanity or imbecility.” The phrasing of this portion of the statute,
found in Texas Labor Code Section 408.161(a)(6), is not only inherently vague (as
neither “insanity” nor “imbecility” is defined anywhere in the Act), but also
antiquated, relying on medical terminology established during the reign of
Queen Victoria.
At long last, the Legislature is poised to rid us of the much-maligned clause.
House Bill 2468 replaces the unfortunate “incurable insanity or
imbecility” with “permanent major neurocognitive disorder.” But while the
revision may be exponentially more tactful, is it any clearer?
“Permanent major neurocognitive disorder” is not yet defined in the statute,
other than to say it necessitates “occasional supervision in the routine daily
tasks of self-care” and renders an employee “permanently unemployable.” What
constitutes “occasional supervision” or permanent unemployability remains to be
seen. If left unaddressed in the corresponding rules the DWC has been
charged with drafting, it is foreseeable that these phrases could generate as
much uncertainty as those they replace.
If signed by Governor Abbott, House Bill 2468 goes into effect September 1,
2023.
Copyright 2023, Stone Loughlin & Swanson, LLP
It never hurts to remember triumph over misfortune as a reminder that a work
injury - even a serious one - is rarely reason to despair. Maybe you never
thought about work injuries like that before, but if not, do you remember this
movie? Hard as it may be to believe, it has been thirty years since the release
of Dazed and Confused.
That’s almost twice the span of time between its premiere in 1993 and the
film’s setting: Texas, May 28, 1976. Since it’s late May in the Lone Star
state, it seems like the perfect time to revisit Richard Linklater’s
coming-of-age classic, shot in and around the director’s adopted home of
Austin. (Disclaimer:
Events depicted therein are for viewing enjoyment only, not for emulating.)
The ensemble comedy has gained a fanatical following far exceeding its paltry
box office grosses upon initial release, and some of today’s most recognizable
faces got their big breaks from the movie, including Academy Award winners Ben
Affleck, Renee Zellweger, and University of Texas alum Matthew McConaughey.
It turned the Texas capital into a viable alternative to Hollywood for
independent-minded filmmakers: Linklater co-founded the Austin Film Society.
It also spawned arguably the biggest movie catchphrase in recent memory,
albeit decades after the fact.
Melissa Maerz’s excellent book Alright,
Alright, Alright: An Oral History of Richard Linklater’s Dazed and Confused
(HarperCollins, 2020), is packed with insight and anecdotes about the making of
the film. Among those: the revelation that the movie’s two de facto
protagonists, freshman Mitch Kramer and senior Randall “Pink” Floyd, were
avatars for the writer/director at those ages, with his older, wiser self mentoring
his baby-faced doppelganger throughout the film. “Pink is me,” Linklater
admits to Maerz. “And so is Mitch.” (Eagle-eyed viewers will notice that
the characters are even dressed identically in gray t-shirts, blue pants, and
long brown hair when they first cross paths.)
When seeking the performers who would not only carry the film but embody its
creator, Linklater did not have to look far for his Mitch; Austin native Wiley
Wiggins happened to be outside a local coffee shop when the casting director,
looking for non-professional actors, offered him a chance to audition.
Finding the right person to play Pink, though, depended on an initially
horrific twist of fate in the form of a Texas work injury.
Jason London, who eventually won the role, never intended to become an actor
either. In Alright, Alright,
Alright, he recalls being fifteen and working construction for his
father in DeSoto, Texas, until his left foot got caught in the lift mechanism
on a forklift, amputating two toes. As he tells Maerz: “My whole life at
that point was all about sports, and the only way I was gonna get to go to
college was through scholarships in sports or the military. All of [a]
sudden, that path was gone. I thought it was the worst thing that could’ve
ever happened to me. But then I decided to take drama. I guess it was
destiny. I had to think about life beyond sports, just like Pink.”
London’s unfortunate Texas work injury inadvertently set him on an alternate
career trajectory, fortuitously intersecting with Richard Linklater in Austin
five years later and providing one of the most beloved Texas-based movies its
co-lead. The anecdote is one of triumph over misfortune and a reminder
that a work injury—even a serious one—is rarely reason to despair. As we
reminded you at the beginning, if you never thought of triumph over
misfortune before…
Copyright 2023, Stone Loughlin & Swanson, LLP
The Division, faced with a rapidly dwindling list of available designated
doctors (current numbers show 60 MDs, 9 DOs and 169 DCs for a total of 238 designated
doctors), has again changed things up in efforts to make more doctors available
to field the number of requests they receive each year.
The new rules change the qualification criteria to require less for certain
kinds of examinations and add to the list of board-certified doctors qualified
to evaluate traumatic brain injuries with the justification that those doctors
are to send out for testing anyway and they can then incorporate that testing
into their reports. These qualification changes are effective 6/5/23.
This is not the first rule change impacting the designated doctor suite of
rules, and it likely won’t be the last, but here are the high points:
• For DD
examinations involving traumatic brain injuries, the Division added doctors who
are or have been board certified in orthopaedic surgery, occupational medicine,
dermatology, plastic surgery, surgery, anesthesiology with a subspeciality in
pain medicine, emergency medicine, thoracic and cardiac surgery and family
medicine.
• For DD examinations involving injuries with multiple fractures, a
single spinal fracture or rib fractures where there is no vascular injury,
chiropractors are now qualified, in addition to MDs and DOs.
• DD examinations involving spinal cord injuries including spinal
fractures with documented neurological injury or vascular injury, more than one
spinal fracture or cauda equina syndrome are assigned to board certified
doctors in neurosurgery, neurology, PM&R or orthopedic surgery.*
• DD examinations involving multiple fractures accompanied by vascular
injury are assigned to board certified doctors in emergency medicine,
orthopedic surgery, plastic surgery, PM&R or occupational medicine.*
• Multiple certifications will no longer be ordered unless the Division
orders them as the result of a Presiding Officer Directive.
*These examinations are handled by the same specialties, but carve out the more complex fracture injuries for board certification while allowing chiropractors to evaluate multiple fractures, single spine fractures and rib fractures that don’t involve vascular injury.
• Doctors
who passed DWC certification on or after 5/13/13 don’t have to test again for
certifications that expire on or after 4/30/23.**
• Doctors still have to take required training and reapply every 2
years.
• The certification and re-certification rules have been streamlined.
• None of the
rule changes address billing and reimbursement for designated doctor
examinations. (Specifically, there is no mention of increasing
the reimbursement rate for designated doctor examinations. In 2022, the
Division posted and took comment on Rules 133 and 134 and the relevant sections
relating to billing and reimbursement for designated doctor examinations. The
second informal posting of those rules provided increased reimbursement for
examinations and even provided a $150.00 missed appointment fee. The
comment deadline for those rules was 12/16/22. There is no word yet on
the status of this rule project).
**The rule allows the
Division to require a doctor to take the test again on a case-by-case basis as
part of a performance review.
Copyright 2023, Stone Loughlin & Swanson, LLP
The El Paso Court of Appeals recently reversed a district court’s summary
judgment decision involving a coming and going case. Duane Cook was employed by
an oilfield fishing and rental tools company in far West Texas. The company
issued him a truck, which included tools, that he was to take to and from their
yard and other job sites as part of his job. He was allowed to drive the
truck to and from home and the employer’s shop, but could not use it for
personal errands. He was the sole mechanic employee and was responsible
for checking all of the company equipment before the crews took it to the
worksites from the shop.
The night before the accident in question, his supervisor told Cook to drive to
the employer’s yard the next morning to inspect some equipment that was to
leave the yard early in the morning to arrive on site at a designated delivery
time. Early that next morning, Cook began driving from his home to the
yard and was involved in a MVA only one or two blocks from his house.
The Division held Cook sustained a compensable injury and had disability.
The Appeals Panel reversed and rendered a decision against Cook and found
he was not acting in the course and scope of his employment. Cook filed
suit in district court and Texas Mutual filed a motion for summary judgment,
which the trial court granted. The El Paso Court of Appeals analyzed
Texas workers’ compensation course and scope law and the coming-and-going rule
with its exceptions and ultimately held that there was a genuine fact issue as
to whether Cook’s trip originated in the course and scope of his employment or
was in the furtherance of the affairs of his employer’s business and remanded
the case to the trial court. Cook v. Texas Mutual Insurance Company,
2023 WL 2919332, ___ S.W. 3d ___ (Tex. App. – El Paso, April 12, 2023).
In most Texas workers’ compensation cases, the question of venue is pretty straightforward. In the case of Dallas Cowboys offensive lineman, Alcus Reshod Fortenberry, however, it was less so. Texas Labor Code §410.252(b) requires suits to be brought in the county where the employee “resided at the time of the injury.” In this case, Mr. Fortenberry was injured while attending training camp in California on 8/2/15. He signed a 3-year contract in May of that year to play for the Cowboys. He stayed in a hotel in Dallas County while attending team practices that summer beginning in May. He sprained his knee in June and had to sit out practice for 2 weeks, but continued to attend and participate in other activities during that time. Later that month, he traveled to Louisiana to rehab his knee, but stayed in touch with the team regarding his progress and returned to Dallas for a conditioning test with his teammates in July before training camp began. On 8/2/15, he injured his knee and was added to the injured reserve list with an estimated recovery time of 9 to 12 months. His contract was ultimately terminated in May of 2016. He filed for workers’ compensation benefits and the Carrier denied them. The parties stipulated to venue in the Dallas Field Office at the DWC level. Unhappy with his impairment rating, Fortenberry filed suit in district court in Dallas, and the Carrier sought transfer to Travis County. Fortenberry alleged his residence at the time of the injury was the Marriott Residence Inn in Dallas. The trial court denied the Carrier’s motion and the trial went forward in Dallas. The jury returned a verdict for Fortenberry and the Carrier appealed. The Court of Appeals held Texas Labor Code § 410.252(b) did not apply and rejected his other venue arguments and reversed the trial court’s judgment. The Texas Supreme Court held the venue provision of Labor Code § 410.252(b) was mandatory and Fortenberry more than presented enough evidence that he “resided” in Dallas County at the time of his injury. The Court further held that the fact that he was staying in a hotel for a prolonged period of time did not preclude him from qualifying as a “resident” and found it probative that the parties stipulated to venue at the Division level. Fortenberry v. Great Divide Insurance Company, 2023 WL 2719475 (Tex., March 3, 2023).
Copyright 2023, Stone Loughlin & Swanson, LLP