State News

NWCDN is a network of law firms dedicated to protecting employers in workers’ compensation claims.


NWCDN Members regularly post articles and summary judgements in workers’ compensations law in your state.  


Select a state from the dropdown menu below to scroll through the state specific archives for updates and opinions on various workers’ compensation laws in your state.


Contact information for NWCDN members is also located on the state specific links in the event you have additional questions or your company is seeking a workers’ compensation lawyer in your state.


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When an employee is injured on the employer’s premises, including a parking lot owned and controlled by the employer, it is fundamental that such a claim is work related.  If this injury is caused by the actions of another employee, it is also fundamental that the two employees cannot sue each other or their employer in negligence.  Given these well-established rules, the published Appellate Division decision in Lapsley v. Township of Sparta, A-0958-19T3, (App. Div. January 29, 2021) is a real head scratcher.

Diane Lapsley worked as a librarian for the Township of Sparta.  The library sits within a municipal complex including three common-use parking lots, a baseball field, and the offices of the Sparta Township Board of Education. Petitioner could park in any of the lots.  On February 3, 2014 the library closed early on account of weather conditions, and petitioner’s husband came to pick Ms. Lapsley up.  Petitioner stepped off the library curb and walked about 18 feet into the lot when a township Public Works employee drove a snowplow into Mr. and Mrs. Lapsley.  Petitioner suffered serious injuries and required multiple surgeries. 

Ms. Lapsley brought a civil suit alleging negligence against the Township of Sparta and its Department of Public Works.  The Township moved to dismiss the suit because the exclusive remedy for an injured worker arising out of work is in the Division of Workers’ Compensation.  The case eventually moved to the Division of Workers’ Compensation for a determination of compensability. The Judge of Compensation found that the injury was compensable. The reasons were sound:  the Township owned, maintained and controlled the parking lot where the accident occurred.  

Petitioner appealed and argued that her injury was not compensable because it did not arise from her employment and because she was not engaged in any task for her employer’s benefit when the injury occurred.  The Appellate Division reviewed the relevant law in N.J.S.A. 34:15-36, which states that “employment … shall be deemed to commence when an employee arrives at the employer’s place of employment to report for work and shall terminate when the employee leaves the employer’s place of employment, excluding areas not under the control of the employer ….”  This is the provision that the Judge of Compensation properly relied on.

Nonetheless, the Appellate Division reversed the decision of the Judge of Compensation and found that Ms. Lapsley was not within the scope of her employment when she was injured.   Even though the Court acknowledged that the Township owned the parking lot next to the library where petitioner was injured, the Court based its decision on certain considerations seemingly never cited before by any other court.  The Court said, “It was stipulated that petitioner was off-the-clock at the time of the accident and exited the library premises.”  But the Supreme Court decision in Ramos v. M & F Fashions specifically noted that New Jersey has no clock in or clock out rule.  Employees often linger at work long past the end of their day and arrive at work long before they may clock in, but nonetheless they are covered for purposes of workers’ compensation once they reach the work premises unless they deviate from employment.

The Court next relied on another principle not found within the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act. “Library employees were not given any instructions about where in the subject lot to park or indeed whether to park in that particular lot, on the street, or anywhere else in town where parking may be available.  Nor were library staff instructed on the manner of ingress or egress.”  To this practitioner’s knowledge, there are no published cases that have ever restricted the premises rule to a need to instruct employees about parking in public lots.  This petitioner was on the adjacent parking lot to the building where she worked when she was injured. The Court seems to be saying that since the Township did not require petitioner to park in that particular lot, and she could have parked elsewhere, her injury was not compensable.  This seems illogical.

The last point which the Court made was that the lot was shared with other municipal employees and members of the public alike. The Court postulated, “Thus, the stipulated facts established that petitioner’s employer exercised no control of its employee’s use of the subject lot, that control being a critical element of the premises rule’s application.”  This comment misses the emphasis in the statute on the words, “excluding areas not under control of the employer.”  It is not the employee’s use of the lot that matters but the employer’s control of the lot that the employee is injured on.

This is a reported decision and therefore it must be studied by practitioners and evaluated.  What this decision meant is that a badly injured worker was able to get around the exclusive remedy provision in order to sue her employer and make a much greater financial recovery.  From the employer standpoint, and public employers in particular, this case would expose employers to extremely costly civil litigation.  The exclusive remedy should have been applied here, and the Judge of Compensation was clearly correct.

From the employee standpoint, the case raises a number of alarming questions.  Does it mean that New Jersey employees lose workers’ compensation coverage when they “clock out?”  The Supreme Court has already stated that clocking in or out is not a precondition for employment coverage.  Does it mean that injured workers lose coverage when they are injured on a public lot simply because the public lot is shared by fellow employees and the public?  All municipal parking lots are shared by employees and the public.  Why would that matter?  Does it mean that a public employer is not liable for injuries in its own parking lot if it has not instructed employees on the manner of ingress or egress?   

In short, for both employers and injured workers, the Lapsley case is singularly problematic. Its rationale does not square with any prior decisions.

 

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John H. Geaney, Esq., is a Shareholder and Co-Chair in Capehart Scatchard's Workers’ Compensation Group.  Mr. Geaney concentrates his practice in the representation of employers, self-insured companies, third-party administrators, and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation, the Americans with Disabilities Act and Family and Medical Leave Act. Should you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Mr. Geaney at 856.914.2063 or by e‑mail at jgeaney@capehart.com. 

KENTUCKY UPDATE – NEW LEGISLATION

Kentucky Legislation (House Bill 48) Reimbursement for Pharmaceutical Services, effective 6/28/21

 Creates a new section of Subtitle 12 of KRS Chapter 304 to establish certain insurance practices relating to the reimbursement of pharmacists;

 Amends KRS 304.14-135 to establish a clean claim form for the reimbursement of certain pharmacist services or procedures;

 Amends KRS 304.17A-844 and 304.17B-011 to conform;

 Amends KRS 18A.225 to require the state employee health plan to comply with pharmacist reimbursement requirements; and

 Amends KRS 342.020 (Workers’ Compensation Statute) to require workers' compensation employers, insurers, and payment obligors to comply with pharmacist reimbursement requirements.

     o Section (14) was added to KRS 342.020. Medical treatment.

          (14)(a) As used in this subsection, "practice of pharmacy" has the same meaning as in KRS 315.010.     

             (b) In addition to all other compensation that may be reimbursed to a pharmacist under this chapter, the employer, insurer, or payment obligor shall be liable for the reimbursement of a pharmacist for a service or procedure at a rate not less than that provided to other nonphysician practitioners if the service or procedure:

                         1. Is within the scope of the practice of pharmacy;

                         2. Would otherwise be compensable under this chapter if the service or procedure were provided by a:

                                a. Physician;

                                 b. Advanced practice registered nurse; or

                                 c. Physician assistant; and

                         3. Is performed by the pharmacist in strict compliance with laws and administrative regulations related to the pharmacist's license.

    o KRS 315 is titled Pharmacists and Pharmacies. KRS 315.010 defines “practice of pharmacy” as follows:

              "Practice of pharmacy" means interpretation, evaluation, and implementation of medical orders and prescription drug orders; responsibility for dispensing prescription drug orders, including radioactive substances; participation in drug and drug-related device selection; administration of medications or biologics in the course of dispensing or maintaining a prescription drug order; the administration of adult immunizations pursuant to prescriberapproved protocols; the administration of immunizations to individuals nine (9) to seventeen (17) years of age pursuant to prescriber-approved protocols with the consent of a parent or guardian; the administration of immunizations to a child as defined in KRS 214.032, pursuant to protocols as authorized by KRS 315.500; drug evaluation, utilization, or regimen review; maintenance of patient pharmacy records; and provision of patient counseling and those professional acts, professional decisions, or professional services necessary to maintain and manage all areas of a patient's pharmacy-related care, including pharmacy-related primary care as defined in this section;

o Therefore, HB 48 amends KRS 342.020 to require employer/insurers to reimburse pharmacists for services provided if they fall within the scope of the “practice of pharmacy” definition above and would otherwise be compensable if provided by a physician, advanced practice registered nurse, or physician assistant. Also the service must be performed in strict compliance with the laws and administrative regulations related to the pharmacist’s license.

Should you have any questions or wish to discuss any of these matters personally, please contact us at your convenience.

H. Douglas Jones, Esq. djones@jsbattorneys.com

Margo J. Menefee, Esq. mmenefee@jsbattorneys.com 

What if two lawyers leave their separate offices to meet at a coffee shop to discuss a case?  Is the commute to the coffee shop compensable for either or both of them?  The answer was no in the context of the facts in Pilone v. County of Middlesex, A-1676-19, (App. Div. March 15, 2021).

Lynn Pilone, an assistant prosecutor for Middlesex County, arrived at her Bayard Street office in New Brunswick between 8:30 and 9:00 a.m. on March 21, 2017.  Later in the day she knew she would be meeting with a victim-witness.  Before that meeting she wanted to discuss the case with a colleague, Helen Zanatakos, a fellow assistant prosecutor with years of experience, who worked nearby in a different office. The two decided to meet at 11:00 a.m. at a donut/coffee shop one block away from Pilone’s office.

At the appointed 11:00 a.m. time Pilone left her office and walked to 25 Kirkpatrick Street to meet Zanatakos in front her office, and then the two of them started walking to the donut/coffee shop one block away. On the way, Pilone fell on the sidewalk in front of a parking lot near Kirkpatrick Street and was taken by ambulance to a hospital.

Pilone filed a workers’ compensation claim which the County of Middlesex denied on the ground that the injury did not arise from petitioner’s employment.  Trial ensued with Pilone testifying that she was not on a lunch break when she fell.  She simply wanted to discuss the case with Zanatakos face-to-face.  It was a common practice for her to discuss cases outside the office as the inside offices were often too busy. Her intent was to buy coffee in the shop and then discuss the file, which she thought she carried with her at the time of her fall.

For her part Zanatakos testified that she also planned to discuss the case with Pilone because she was aware the victim-witness was dissatisfied with how her case had proceeded.  She intended to provide guidance to Pilone.  Sometimes the two of them would discuss personal matters, but this time the discussion was definitely about this particular file.

The Judge of Compensation granted the County’s motion to dismiss the case because petitioner’s fall occurred off work premises. The fall occurred on public property.  On appeal petitioner argued that her fall was subject to the “special mission” exception.  The Court relied on the Supreme Court decision in Hersh v. County of Morris, 217 N.J. 236 (2014).  That case focused on the “situs of the accident” and “the degree of employer’s control.”  The Court pointed out that the County had no control of the public walkway, nor of the coffee shop. 

The Appellate Division noted that petitioner had not been directed to work offsite by her employer. “Although N.J.S.A. 34:15-36 extends compensability to duties assigned or directed by the employer, petitioner did not demonstrate that meeting at the donut shop was assigned or directed by the Prosecutor’s Office.”  The Court distinguished another well-known case involving a drive to a coffee shop, namely Cooper v. Barnickel Enters, 411 N.J. Super. 343 (App. Div. 2010).  In that case the Court noted that petitioner was directed to work away from the primary place of employment while being injured en route to purchase coffee.  The Court said that here petitioner could have decided to meet in the office or outside the office, but there was no employer direction to meet at the donut/coffee shop.

The decision makes sense in not extending the special mission exception to a situation where employees decide for themselves (without employer direction) to meet off work premises.

 

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John H. Geaney, Esq., is a Shareholder and Co-Chair in Capehart Scatchard's Workers’ Compensation Group.  Mr. Geaney concentrates his practice in the representation of employers, self-insured companies, third-party administrators, and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation, the Americans with Disabilities Act and Family and Medical Leave Act. Should you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Mr. Geaney at 856.914.2063 or by e‑mail at jgeaney@capehart.com. 

Lack of Clarity Surrounding Classification of Workers in the “Gig Economy” Drove the West Virginia Legislature to Redefine What Constitutes an Independent Contractor


On March 22, 2021, Senate Bill 272 was passed and Governor Jim Justice signed into law the West Virginia Employment Law Worker Classification Act. The bill will prevent worker misclassification and defines the differences between employees and independent contractors. As expressed in the bill: “Clarity in a worker’s classification allows businesses to comply with applicable laws, provides workers with certainty as to their benefits and obligations, and minimizes unnecessary mistakes, litigation, risk and legal exposure laws concerning workers’ compensation.”


Concerned with the lack of clarity in the legal standards used to differentiate employees from independent contractors, especially in the context of the “so-called ‘gig’, ‘entrepreneurial’, [and] ‘sharing’ economy,” the West Virginia Legislature drafted W. Va. Code §21-5I-1 et seq. to provide an objective method of making that distinction.  Additionally, the Legislature wanted to bring cohesion to the definition of independent contractor, as it can be defined differently depending on the law at issue.  In bringing cohesion to the law, the Legislature partially succeeded.  W. Va. Code §21-5I-4 will only apply “for the purpose of classifying workers” under the workers’ compensation laws in Chapter 23, unemployment compensation in Chapter 21A, the Human Rights Act in §5-11-1 et seq., and wage payment and collection in §21-5-1 et seq., it will not apply in any other area of law.


In order to qualify as an independent contractor, a worker must sign a written contract with the principal that makes it clear that the principal’s intent it to employ them as an independent contractor.  The contract must also contain five different acknowledgments for the worker to sign which help make it clear that the intent at the beginning of the relationship was to form a principal-independent contractor relationship.  For example, the worker must acknowledge that he or she is providing services as an independent contractor and that he or she will be responsible for all federal and state taxes.  The terms of the contract must “substantially comply” with all of the statutory requirements, although the statute does not define what constitutes substantial compliance.  Until there is case law on the issue, it will be impossible to determine if a contract containing 80% of the contractual requirements will be considered to be in substantial compliance. 


In addition to the contract requirements, the worker must also meet certain criteria.  The independent contractor must either file, or be contractually obligated to file, an income tax return for the fees earned from the work in question or the independent contractor must provide their services through some type of business entity, even a sole proprietorship as long as it is registered with a “doing business as.”  Further, the independent contractor must “actually and directly control[] the manner and means by which the work is to be accomplished,” which does not require that the contractor control “the final result of the work.”  This control does not extend to control necessary to ensure compliance with federal or state laws and regulations.  It also does not extend to contractually required measures regarding general safety concerns.


Finally, in addition to the requirements above, persons may either satisfy at least three of the enumerated requirements in W. Va. Code §21-5I-4(a)(4) to be classified as an independent contractor or be considered a direct seller under the Internal Revenue Code §3508(b)(2).  The requirements of W. Va. Code §21-5I-4(a)(4), are similar to the test used in other areas of the law to determine whether a worker is an independent contractor.  For example, an independent contractor is someone who controls the amount of time they spend providing services, controls where services are being performed, and is free to hire or solicit help.  Any combination of three requirements will be enough to satisfy the requirements of W. Va. Code §21-5I-4(a)(4) and no requirement holds more weight than the others do.


In conclusion, in order to be classified as an independent contractor the contract between the contractor and the principal must satisfy the writing requirements of W. Va. Code §21-5I-4(a)(1).  From there the contractor must either be required to file income taxes for the fees earned or do business through some business entity and must control how the work is to be performed.  Finally, the contractor must either meet three of the requirements of subsection W. Va. Code §21-5I-4(a)(4) or be considered a direct seller under IRC §3508(b)(2).  If the contractor does not meet these requirements, the classification test set forth in Internal Revenue Service Revenue Ruling 87-41 will determine whether the person is an independent contractor.    



By: 

Dill Battle

304-340-3823

dbattle@spilmanlaw.com


Kellen M. Shearin

304.340.3892

kshearin@spilmanlaw.com


Spilman Thomas & Battle, PLLC

300 Kanawha Blvd, E.

Charleston, WV 25301


Written by: Tracey Jones


In the course of handling a workers’ compensation case, an adjuster will have to communicate with the employee’s treating physician to collect valuable medical information relevant to the diagnosis and ability to return to work. As noted in N.C.G.S § 97-25.6(c)(2), Written Communications with Healthcare Providers:

Defendants may communicate with the Plaintiff’s authorized health care provider in writing, without the express authorization of Plaintiff, to obtain certain relevant medical information not available in Plaintiff’s medical records, provided Defendants provide Plaintiff with contemporaneous written notice.

Without express authorization by the employee, but with contemporaneous written notice – Defendants may request the following additional information not available in the employee’s medical records:

  • The diagnosis of Plaintiff’s condition;
  • The appropriate course of treatment;
  • The anticipated time that Plaintiff will be out of work;
  • The relationship, if any, of Plaintiff’s condition to the employment;
  • Work restrictions from the condition, including whether Plaintiff may return to work with the employer as provided in attached job description (New provision enacted 7/1/12 provides clarity that Defendants may forward job description to physician);
  • The kind of work for which Plaintiff may be eligible; and
  • Any permanent impairment as a result of the condition.

Defendants must provide Plaintiff a copy of the healthcare provider’s response within ten business days of receipt.

When communicating with healthcare providers, NC adjusters and Defendants can use the following examples as a guide:

  • Communications on Diagnosis: In situations where you are trying to differentiate between a shoulder injury or back injury; or if you are trying to determine if Plaintiff has an enumerated occupational disease; or if the doctor is just not being clear about the diagnosis in his note – you can ask the question bluntly in correspondence.
  • Communications about Return to Work: Useful when you require information for when Plaintiff may be able to return to some form of light duty work.  You no longer have to serve the form MSQ on which too much information may be placed.
  • Communications regarding causation: You may now reference facts listed in Plaintiff’s records that might indicate lack of causal relationship and then inquire about opinion.
  • Communications regarding appropriate care:
    • Why are you recommending X treatment?

It is critical to keep in mind that all correspondence with the treating physician must be shared with the employee. All correspondence must occur with an authorized healthcare provider.

If you have questions on corresponding with medical providers or other workers’ compensation questions, reach out to Teague Campbell’s skilled team of workers’ compensation attorneys.

Written By: Elizabeth Ligon

The day is finally here and your case is settled. But is it really over? Let’s go over some key issues in regards to mutual consent in settlement agreements and make sure.

First things first, a settlement agreement is a contract, to be interpreted and tested by established rules relating to contracts. A valid contract exists only where there has been a “meeting of the minds” as to all the essential terms of the agreement.   Material terms generally means anything essential to the bargain, such as amount of settlement.  The fact that a few secondary issues remain to be resolved will not defeat enforcement.   If a court finds the material terms of a contract are overly vague or not definitive enough to provide a basis for mutual consent, it will not enforce the agreement.

Often times a court will find no mutual consent where a settlement agreement includes a provision that a release will be drafted later.  Disagreements as to the terms of the release have caused many settlement agreements to fail.  Similarly, where parties provide in the settlement agreement that the release to be delivered later is to be “mutually agreeable to both parties”, courts have refused enforcement of the entire agreement because there was no meeting of the minds on that material term.

Keeping that in mind, North Carolina courts will not recognize lack of mutual consent when a party claims that it had not signed the agreement, and that the signature of his attorney was not authorized. North Carolina courts presume that an attorney acts under the authority and in favor of the client, even in settlement circumstances. One who challenges the actions of his attorney has the burden of rebutting the presumption and proving lack of authority.

Ensuring that mutual consent occurs and that all settlement terms are well documented is critical, but that is only part of the settlement agreement process.

Claimant, Mary Justice, was seeking acknowledgment of an alleged cumulative detrimental effects injuries to her back and lower extremities as the result of lifting activities as a school bus aide.
The Board denied Justice’s claim, noting she was not credible as there were numerous inconsistencies throughout the case. Claimant denied having any prior back problems during a defense medical examination with Dr. Rushton and told her own doctor that she had back surgery in 1989 and then no other back problems. The Board noted these statements were “far from the truth” as she had extensive spinal problems since 1989 with several injuries and numerous rounds of treatment over the years, including additional lumbar surgical recommendations, which Claimant also denied during her testimony at the Board. Claimant denied having diabetes, which was contradicted by her own records. She failed to report two other jobs in connection with filing her Petition, despite being specifically asked for this information. She made conflicting statements about when her allegedly work-related back problems started. Her job duties were much less physically demanding than she alleged. She filed numerous prior workers’ compensation claims, but denied them when speaking with the adjuster, and claimed to not be able to remember them during the current Hearing, despite the current Hearing being conducted in front of the same Hearing Officer as a prior Board Hearing. She made statements in the earlier Hearing that were inconsistent with statements made at the current Hearing. Given all of the above inconsistencies, the Board noted that they did not believe that claimant was injured as a result of her job duties as a school bus aide.
Should you have any questions concerning this Decision, please contactJohn Ellis or any other attorney in our Workers’ Compensation Department.
Mary Justice v. State, IAB Hrg. No. 1494830 (Feb. 5, 2021)

Written By John Tomei 

When the actions of an insured give rise to the need for a carrier to cancel a workers’ compensation policy, it is vitally important for the carrier to be aware of how to effectively cancel the policy under North Carolina law. The North Carolina Supreme Court has long established the principle that failure to comply with statutory requirements for cancelling an insurance policy renders the cancellation ineffective. Pearson v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 325 N.C. 246, 382 S.E.2d 745 (1989). Compliance with statutory requirements may seem straightforward but there are a few common pitfalls that prevent effective cancellation and create liability.

Cancellations of workers’ compensation insurance policies in North Carolina are governed by N.C.G.S. § 58-36-105, “Certain Workers’ Compensation Insurance Policy Cancellations Prohibited” (hereinafter the “Statute”). It is critical for an insurance carrier to be aware of the governing statute and the correct processes to effectively cancel a workers’ compensation insurance policy in North Carolina.

Provisions of the Statute

The Statute states:

(a)  No policy of workers’ compensation insurance or employers’ liability insurance written in connection with a policy of workers’ compensation insurance shall be cancelled by the insurer before the expiration of the term or anniversary date stated in the policy and without the prior written consent of the insured, except for any one of the following reasons:

 (1) Nonpayment of premium in accordance with the policy terms;

(2) An act or omission by the insured or his representative that constitutes material misrepresentation or nondisclosure of a material fact in obtaining the policy, continuing the policy, or presenting a claim under the policy;

(3) Increased hazard or material change in the risk assumed that could not have been reasonably contemplated by the parties at the time of assumption of the risk;

(4) Substantial breach of contractual duties, conditions, or warranties that materially affects the insurability of the risk;

(5) A fraudulent act against the company by the insured or his representative that materially affects the insurability of the risk;

(6) Willful failure by the insured or his representative to institute reasonable loss control measures that materially affect the insurability of the risk after written notice by the insurer;

(7) Loss of facultative reinsurance, or loss of or substantial changes in applicable reinsurance as provided in G.S. 58-41-30;

(8) Conviction of the insured of a crime arising out of acts that materially affect the insurability of the risk;

(9) A determination by the Commissioner that the continuation of the policy would place the insurer in violation of the laws of this State; or

(10) The named insured fails to meet the requirements contained in the corporate charter, articles of incorporation, or bylaws of the insurer, when the insurer is a company organized for the sole purpose of providing members of an organization with insurance coverage in this State.

(b)  Any cancellation permitted by subsection (a) of this section is not effective unless written notice of cancellation has been given to the insured not less than 15 days before the proposed effective date of cancellation. The notice may be given by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the insured and any other person designated in the policy to receive notice of cancellation at their addresses shown in the policy or, if not indicated in the policy, at their last known addresses. The notice shall state the precise reason for cancellation. Whenever notice of intention to cancel is given by registered or certified mail, no cancellation by the insurer shall be effective unless and until such method is employed and completed. Notice of intent to cancel given by registered or certified mail shall be conclusively presumed completed three days after the notice is sent if, on the same day that the notice is sent by registered or certified mail, the insurer also provides notice by first-class mail and by electronic means if available as defined in G.S. 58-2-255(a) to the insured and any other person designated in the policy to receive notice. Any such supplemental notice given by electronic means shall be effective for the limited purpose of establishing this conclusive presumption. Notice of cancellation, termination, or nonrenewal may also be given by any method permitted for service of process pursuant to Rule 4 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Failure to send this notice, as provided in this section, to any other person designated in the policy to receive notice of cancellation invalidates the cancellation only as to that other person’s interest.

(c) This section does not apply to any policy that has been in effect for fewer than 60 days and is not a renewal of a policy. That policy may be cancelled for any reason by giving at least 30 days prior written notice of and reasons for cancellation to the insured by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.

(d) Cancellation for nonpayment of premium is not effective if the amount due is paid before the effective date set forth in the notice of cancellation.

(e) Copies of the notice required by this section shall also be sent to the agent or broker of record though failure to send copies of the notice to those persons shall not invalidate the cancellation. Mailing copies of the notice by regular first-class mail to the agent or broker of record satisfies the requirements of this subsection.

Complying with Sections (a) and (b) to Reduce Risk of Improper Cancellation of Workers’ Compensation Insurance Policies

The central requirements of the Statute are that the insured be notified in writing of the precise reason for the cancellation of the policy and that the insured be given the required notice of such cancellation.

Some of the more common reasons for canceling a workers’ compensation policy include: failure to pay premiums, failure to submit to audits pursuant to the policy provisions, or other failures by the insured to otherwise cooperate with the carrier in providing coverage.

    • Nonpayment of a premium is covered under section (1).
    • Misrepresenting the nature of the insured’s business, and the risks connected with it, would come under section (2).
    • If the insured changes the nature of its business, thereby increasing the risk of an employee’s injury, such behavior would come under section (3).
    • Failing to submit to an audit would likely be deemed a substantial breach of contractual duties or conditions under the policy, which would be covered under section (4). Any form of fraud would be covered by section (5).
    • Behavior that would be covered by sections (6) and (7) are less common.
    • Clearly, if an insured commits a crime that impacts the insurability of the risk, that would be covered under section (8).
    • If the Department of Insurance determines that continuation of the policy would cause the carrier to violate the laws of the state of North Carolina, this would implicate section (9).
    • Finally, if the insured somehow violates its corporate charter, articles of incorporation or its bylaws, this conduct could give rise to cancellation of a policy where the carrier is a self-insurance pool or other similar organization, under section (10).

As mentioned above, when canceling a policy, it is critical for the carrier to state the precise reason, in writing, in its notice for the cancellation of the policy. Ideally, a citation to the particular section of the Statute, or at least tracking its language, would be best, since it would help to build a stronger case for effective cancellation in the event of litigation.

The Statute clearly sets out the manner by which the insured must be given notice of the cancellation of the policy. Specifically, the notice is not effective unless it is in writing and it is “given” to the insured, not less than 15 days before the proposed effective date of cancellation. Again, the written notice must be consistent with one or more of the 10 bases of cancellation as allowed under the Statute. Note that the Statute has no explicit requirement that the insured actually “receive” the notice of cancellation. Rather, the Statute clearly sets out the means by which the giving of the notice is rendered effective and how it can be proven as such. More specifically, the Statute provides that cancellation of a policy is effective once the mailing requirement is “employed and completed.” So, if the carrier can show its use and completion of the registered or certified mail and its return receipt process, such use is a showing of effective cancellation of a policy.

Importantly for a carrier, the Statute provides for a conclusive presumption of completion of the registered or certified mailing of notice of a cancellation of a policy, three days after the notice is sent. Specifically, on the same day that the notice is sent by registered or certified mail, if the insurer also provides notice by first-class mail and by electronic means if available (as defined in G.S. 58-2-255(a), which concerns and allows for electronic insurance communications and records) to the insured, this conclusive presumption applies. So, to enjoy this conclusive presumption, the best practice is for a carrier to (1) use the required registered or certified mail return receipt process and, (2) use the first class mail and electronic means of communications as allowed in the Statute for electronic insurance communications and records.

Complying with Section (c) Notice Requirements for Effective Cancellation

It is important to be aware that section (c) of the Statute has significantly different notice requirement for cancellation of those workers’ compensation insurance policies that have been in effect for less than 60 days and are not a renewal of a policy. More specifically, those policies may be canceled for any reason, and not just those set out in section (a)’s subsections (1) through (10), simply by giving the insured at least 30 days prior written notice of the reason for the cancellation.

In a homeowners insurance policy case which involved N.C.G.S. § 58-41-15, in Ha v. Nationwide Insurance Co., the Court held that an insured’s actual receipt of notice of the cancellation is necessary in these section (c) policy cancellations. In that statute, under its section (c), a carrier is required to “furnish” an insured with the notice of cancellation, rather than “giving” such notice to an insured in the workers’ compensation statute.

Keeping this in mind, it is not clear whether Ha would apply to a N.C.G.S. § 58-36-105 (c) cancellation of a workers’ compensation policy. In this writer’s opinion, the holding in Ha would very likely be found applicable to workers’ compensation policies. This is because of the very similar structure, language and provisions of each of the two statutes.

With all of this in mind, section (c) provides for the same registered or certified mail, return receipt requested process for giving an insured notice of a policy’s cancellation, as does section (b). However, it must be noted that section (c) does not provide for the conclusive presumption of completion of the registered and certified mailing of notice of a cancellation of a policy, as provided in section (b). So, in section (c), a carrier can only use and complete registered or certified mail and its return receipt process, to prove that an insured actually received the notice of cancellation of the policy to effectively cancel it under section (c)’s circumstances.

Additional Items to Consider When Canceling a Policy, Sections (d) and (e)

If a policy is canceled for nonpayment of premium, section (d) of the Statute provides that such cancellation is not effective if the amount due is paid before the effective date set forth in the notice of cancellation.

Finally, in section (e) of the Statute, it is required that copies of the notice required by the Statute be sent to the agent or broker of record. However, there is no sanction of invalidating the cancellation if copies of those notices are not sent to such persons. Nonetheless, it is the best practice to copy such persons, as that may serve to aid in proving that the notice of cancellation was also given to the insured.

Final Thoughts for Insurance Carriers Keep In Mind

The foremost considerations in effectively canceling a North Carolina workers’ compensation policy are 1.) N.C.G.S. § 58-36-105’s requirements that the precise reason be stated in writing, and 2.) that the notice be given consistent with both the 15-day timing, as well as the mailing requirements.

Have questions? Reach out to Teague Campbell’s John Tomei who can aid insurance carriers in the effective cancellation of policies when the actions of their insureds dictate the need for such cancellations.

We all know certain events are going to happen every year:  Alabama is going to play for the national football championship, your property taxes will certainly rise, Tom Brady will be in the Super Bowl, and most likely of all – someone is going to challenge the way Section 40 liens are calculated in New Jersey.  This year the lien challenge has already occurred in Panckeri v. Allentown Police Department, No. A-2015-19 (App. Div. March 2, 2021).

Police Officer Daniel Panckeri was injured on April 15, 2012 rendering assistance at the scene of a motor vehicle accident. While attempting to stop one of the cars that was rolling into oncoming traffic, Panckeri suffered injuries to his left foot that resulted in an award of thirty three and one third percent permanent disability.  He reopened the case two years later and received an increase to forty percent of the foot. 

Panckeri also settled a third party suit for $99,000 and respondent asserted its full lien for the gross amount of its workers’ compensation payments: $16,547.13 for temporary disability benefits, $16,287.05 in medical benefits, $16,560.01 in permanency benefits for the first settlement, and $4,323.09 for the reopener settlement.  That meant that the Township was entitled to be reimbursed two thirds of all these payments minus $750 in costs because the third party settlement amount was higher than the total amount of workers’ compensation payments.

The issue in this case centered on the fees petitioner paid his attorney and whether they should be included in the lien.  In the original workers’ compensation case the Judge of Compensation assessed against petitioner $1,524 for Panckeri’s share of counsel fees and costs and another $844 for Panckeri’s share of counsel fees and costs on the reopener claim.  Panckeri argued that the workers’ compensation lien should not apply to his payments of counsel fees and costs on the two cases because he never received those funds.  He argued they should be deducted before respondent calculates its lien.

The Judge of Compensation, Christopher B. Leitner, ruled in favor of the Allentown Police Department and held that there should be no reduction of $2,368 for the two combined awards of counsel fees and costs assessed against petitioner because the New Jersey statute does not sanction any such exception.  The judge ruled that the statute is designed to avoid double recoveries, and the only cost allowance allowed by the statute is $750.  Judge Leitner further observed that the Act is “silent’ with regard to costs incurred in the workers’ compensation matter by the petitioner.  Finally, Judge Leitner observed that the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 34:15-40 in 2007 to raise the cost allowance from $250 to $750 and specifically “examined exemptible fees and costs,” choosing “only to increase the deductible amount,” and “not to include any new interpretation.”

On appeal Panckeri argued that the attorneys’ fees and costs he paid in the workers’ compensation case were not made for his “benefit or enjoyment” and therefore were not “compensation payments.”   The Appellate Division did not agree. “We affirm substantially for the reasons articulated by Judge of Compensation Christopher B. Leitner, in his thoughtful and thorough written decision.”

The Appellate Division observed that the case relied on by Panckeri, namely Kuhnel v. CNA Insurance Cos., 322 N.J. Super. 568 (App. Div. 1999) is not really on point.  That case held that a Section 40 lien does not include rehabilitation nursing services in most cases and does not include the respondent’s portion of petitioner’s attorney’ fees nor expert fees for defense IMEs.  The Court concluded that Kuhnel did not address at all whether petitioner can deduct his portion of fees and costs paid in the workers’ compensation case.  Lastly, the Court said that the Legislature could have amended Section 40 in 2007 to make such an adjustment, but it chose not to do so.

 

 

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John H. Geaney, Esq., is a Shareholder and Co-Chair in Capehart Scatchard's Workers’ Compensation Group.  Mr. Geaney concentrates his practice in the representation of employers, self-insured companies, third-party administrators, and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation, the Americans with Disabilities Act and Family and Medical Leave Act. Should you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Mr. Geaney at 856.914.2063 or by e‑mail at jgeaney@capehart.com. 

Legal Update by Attorneys Alison Stewart, Nick Cooling, and Law Clerk Jordan Gehlhaar

The Iowa Court of Appeals recently addressed workers’ compensation benefits, causation, and penalties inRegional Care Hospital Partners Inc. v. Marrs. Claimant Marrs injured her back and neck while working as a nurse and was diagnosed with thoracic and high-lumbar sprains. Four months following the accident she was released to return to light duty work. The employer did not offer light duty work and stopped payment of medical expenses and temporary benefits. The Claimant continued to have pain, which was attributed to a degenerative disc condition of the cervical spine. A cervical fusion procedure was recommended.

Three doctors provided opinions on the work relatedness of Claimant Marrs’s condition. Doctor Abernathey concluded she reached MMI ( Maximum Medical Improvement) six months following the accident and the surgery was not work related. Doctor Kaspar, who had treated Claimant through her private insurance, determined the work incident either caused the injury or materially aggravated her pre-exiting degenerative condition. Doctor Harbach, who completed an IME (Independent Medical Examination), opined Claimant had not reached MMI and would have a permanent impairment as a result of the work injury.

Following a hearing, a deputy commissioner awarded healing period benefits and ordered the employer to reimburse medical expenses and pay a penalty of $50,000. On appeal, the commissioner affirmed healing period benefits but reduced the penalty to $39,000. The district court affirmed. Regional challenged causation, the weekly benefit rate, and the assessment of penalty benefits.

The Court of Appeals held that causation was properly attributed to the work injury. The commissioner properly concluded that Dr. Abernathy’s opinion was unpersuasive because it provided “no explanation whatsoever.” Further, the commissioner properly excluded a two-week outlier payment period from the benefit calculation in which the Claimant worked 54.75 hours as opposed to the usual 62.5. Under Iowa Code § 85.36(6) this was the “closest previous week with earnings that fairly represent[ed] the employee’s customary earnings.”

Penalty benefits were also affirmed on appeal. Under Iowa Code § 86.134(a), the commissioner may award benefits up to 50 percent of the amount denied, delayed, or terminated without reason, probable cause, or excuse. Regional care ceased payment when claimant was released for light duty work, relying on Dr. Abernathey’s opinion and claiming she did not return to work for unrelated reasons. However, the opinion was rendered months after benefits ceased and there was no evidence Regional communicated its denial to Marrs. The court found $39,000 to be an appropriate penalty, given roughly $80,000 in benefits were unpaid at the time of the hearing.

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Peddicord Wharton Legal Updates are intended to provide information on current developments in legislation impacting our clients. Readers should not rely solely upon this information as legal advice. Peddicord Wharton attorneys would be pleased to answer any questions you may have about this update. ©2021 Peddicord Wharton. All Rights Reserved.